diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/.gitignore b/depend/secp256k1/.gitignore index 59d1e9f..d081f73 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/.gitignore +++ b/depend/secp256k1/.gitignore @@ -1,15 +1,16 @@ bench_inv bench_ecdh bench_ecmult +bench_schnorrsig bench_sign bench_verify -bench_schnorr_verify bench_recover bench_internal bench_multiset tests exhaustive_tests gen_context +valgrind_ctime_test *.exe *.so *.a @@ -31,6 +32,8 @@ libtool *.lo *.o *~ +*.log +*.trs src/libsecp256k1-config.h src/libsecp256k1-config.h.in src/ecmult_static_context.h diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/.travis.yml b/depend/secp256k1/.travis.yml index 7f219fd..91f1d41 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/.travis.yml +++ b/depend/secp256k1/.travis.yml @@ -1,93 +1,109 @@ language: c -os: linux +os: + - linux + - osx + +dist: bionic +# Valgrind currently supports upto macOS 10.13, the latest xcode of that version is 10.1 +osx_image: xcode10.1 addons: apt: - packages: libgmp-dev + packages: + - libgmp-dev + - valgrind + - libtool-bin compiler: - clang - gcc env: global: - - FIELD=auto BIGNUM=auto SCALAR=auto ENDOMORPHISM=no STATICPRECOMPUTATION=yes ECMULTGENPRECISION=auto ASM=no BUILD=check EXTRAFLAGS= HOST= ECDH=no RECOVERY=no OLDSCHNORR=no MULTISET=no EXPERIMENTAL=no + - WIDEMUL=auto BIGNUM=auto STATICPRECOMPUTATION=yes ECMULTGENPRECISION=auto ASM=no BUILD=check WITH_VALGRIND=yes RUN_VALGRIND=no EXTRAFLAGS= HOST= ECDH=no RECOVERY=no SCHNORRSIG=no EXPERIMENTAL=no CTIMETEST=yes BENCH=yes ITERS=2 matrix: - - SCALAR=32bit RECOVERY=yes - - SCALAR=32bit FIELD=32bit ECDH=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes OLDSCHNORR=yes MULTISET=yes - - SCALAR=64bit - - FIELD=64bit RECOVERY=yes - - FIELD=64bit ENDOMORPHISM=yes - - FIELD=64bit ENDOMORPHISM=yes ECDH=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes OLDSCHNORR=yes MULTISET=yes - - FIELD=64bit ASM=x86_64 - - FIELD=64bit ENDOMORPHISM=yes ASM=x86_64 - - FIELD=32bit ENDOMORPHISM=yes + - WIDEMUL=int64 RECOVERY=yes + - WIDEMUL=int64 ECDH=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes SCHNORRSIG=yes + - WIDEMUL=int128 + - WIDEMUL=int128 RECOVERY=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes SCHNORRSIG=yes + - WIDEMUL=int128 ECDH=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes SCHNORRSIG=yes + - WIDEMUL=int128 ASM=x86_64 - BIGNUM=no - - BIGNUM=no ENDOMORPHISM=yes RECOVERY=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes OLDSCHNORR=yes MULTISET=yes + - BIGNUM=no RECOVERY=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes SCHNORRSIG=yes - BIGNUM=no STATICPRECOMPUTATION=no - - BUILD=distcheck - - EXTRAFLAGS=CPPFLAGS=-DDETERMINISTIC - - EXTRAFLAGS=CFLAGS=-O0 + - BUILD=distcheck WITH_VALGRIND=no CTIMETEST=no BENCH=no + - CPPFLAGS=-DDETERMINISTIC + - CFLAGS=-O0 CTIMETEST=no + - CFLAGS="-fsanitize=undefined -fno-omit-frame-pointer" LDFLAGS="-fsanitize=undefined -fno-omit-frame-pointer" UBSAN_OPTIONS="print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1" BIGNUM=no ASM=x86_64 ECDH=yes RECOVERY=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes SCHNORRSIG=yes CTIMETEST=no - ECMULTGENPRECISION=2 - ECMULTGENPRECISION=8 + - RUN_VALGRIND=yes BIGNUM=no ASM=x86_64 ECDH=yes RECOVERY=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes SCHNORRSIG=yes EXTRAFLAGS="--disable-openssl-tests" BUILD= matrix: fast_finish: true include: - compiler: clang - env: HOST=i686-linux-gnu ENDOMORPHISM=yes + os: linux + env: HOST=i686-linux-gnu addons: apt: packages: - gcc-multilib - libgmp-dev:i386 + - valgrind + - libtool-bin + - libc6-dbg:i386 - compiler: clang env: HOST=i686-linux-gnu + os: linux addons: apt: packages: - gcc-multilib + - valgrind + - libtool-bin + - libc6-dbg:i386 - compiler: gcc - env: HOST=i686-linux-gnu ENDOMORPHISM=yes + env: HOST=i686-linux-gnu + os: linux addons: apt: packages: - gcc-multilib + - valgrind + - libtool-bin + - libc6-dbg:i386 - compiler: gcc + os: linux env: HOST=i686-linux-gnu addons: apt: packages: - gcc-multilib - libgmp-dev:i386 - - compiler: gcc - env: - - BIGNUM=no ENDOMORPHISM=yes ASM=x86_64 EXPERIMENTAL=yes ECDH=yes RECOVERY=yes OLDSCHNORR=yes MULTISET=yes - - VALGRIND=yes EXTRAFLAGS="--disable-openssl-tests CPPFLAGS=-DVALGRIND" BUILD= - addons: - apt: - packages: - valgrind + - libtool-bin + - libc6-dbg:i386 + # S390x build (big endian system) - compiler: gcc - env: # The same as above but without endomorphism. - - BIGNUM=no ENDOMORPHISM=no ASM=x86_64 EXPERIMENTAL=yes ECDH=yes RECOVERY=yes OLDSCHNORR=yes MULTISET=yes - - VALGRIND=yes EXTRAFLAGS="--disable-openssl-tests CPPFLAGS=-DVALGRIND" BUILD= - addons: - apt: - packages: - - valgrind + env: HOST=s390x-unknown-linux-gnu ECDH=yes RECOVERY=yes EXPERIMENTAL=yes SCHNORRSIG=yes CTIMETEST= + arch: s390x + +# We use this to install macOS dependencies instead of the built in `homebrew` plugin, +# because in xcode earlier than 11 they have a bug requiring updating the system which overall takes ~8 minutes. +# https://travis-ci.community/t/macos-build-fails-because-of-homebrew-bundle-unknown-command/7296 +before_install: + - if [ "${TRAVIS_OS_NAME}" = "osx" ]; then HOMEBREW_NO_AUTO_UPDATE=1 brew install gmp valgrind gcc@9; fi before_script: ./autogen.sh +# travis auto terminates jobs that go for 10 minutes without printing to stdout, but travis_wait doesn't work well with forking programs like valgrind (https://docs.travis-ci.com/user/common-build-problems/#build-times-out-because-no-output-was-received https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/pull/750#issuecomment-623476860) script: - - if [ -n "$HOST" ]; then export USE_HOST="--host=$HOST"; fi - - if [ "x$HOST" = "xi686-linux-gnu" ]; then export CC="$CC -m32"; fi - - ./configure --enable-experimental=$EXPERIMENTAL --enable-endomorphism=$ENDOMORPHISM --with-field=$FIELD --with-bignum=$BIGNUM --with-asm=$ASM --with-scalar=$SCALAR --enable-ecmult-static-precomputation=$STATICPRECOMPUTATION --with-ecmult-gen-precision=$ECMULTGENPRECISION --enable-module-ecdh=$ECDH --enable-module-oldschnorr=$OLDSCHNORR --enable-module-multiset=$MULTISET --enable-module-recovery=$RECOVERY $EXTRAFLAGS $USE_HOST - - if [ -n "$BUILD" ]; then make -j2 $BUILD; fi - - # travis_wait extends the 10 minutes without output allowed (https://docs.travis-ci.com/user/common-build-problems/#build-times-out-because-no-output-was-received) - - # the `--error-exitcode` is required to make the test fail if valgrind found errors, otherwise it'll return 0 (http://valgrind.org/docs/manual/manual-core.html) - - if [ -n "$VALGRIND" ]; then - make -j2 && - travis_wait 30 valgrind --error-exitcode=42 ./tests 16 && - travis_wait 30 valgrind --error-exitcode=42 ./exhaustive_tests; - fi + - function keep_alive() { while true; do echo -en "\a"; sleep 60; done } + - keep_alive & + - ./contrib/travis.sh + - kill %keep_alive after_script: - cat ./tests.log - cat ./exhaustive_tests.log + - cat ./valgrind_ctime_test.log + - cat ./bench.log + - $CC --version + - valgrind --version diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/Makefile.am b/depend/secp256k1/Makefile.am index dd3e125..4c7b66b 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/Makefile.am +++ b/depend/secp256k1/Makefile.am @@ -34,9 +34,11 @@ noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52.h noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52_impl.h noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52_int128_impl.h noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52_asm_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/assumptions.h noinst_HEADERS += src/util.h noinst_HEADERS += src/scratch.h noinst_HEADERS += src/scratch_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/selftest.h noinst_HEADERS += src/testrand.h noinst_HEADERS += src/testrand_impl.h noinst_HEADERS += src/hash.h @@ -69,11 +71,17 @@ libsecp256k1_la_SOURCES = src/secp256k1.c libsecp256k1_la_CPPFLAGS = -DSECP256K1_BUILD -I$(top_srcdir)/include -I$(top_srcdir)/src $(SECP_INCLUDES) libsecp256k1_la_LIBADD = $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) +if VALGRIND_ENABLED +libsecp256k1_la_CPPFLAGS += -DVALGRIND +endif + noinst_PROGRAMS = if USE_BENCHMARK noinst_PROGRAMS += bench_verify bench_sign bench_internal bench_ecmult bench_verify_SOURCES = src/bench_verify.c bench_verify_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(SECP_TEST_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) +# SECP_TEST_INCLUDES are only used here for CRYPTO_CPPFLAGS +bench_verify_CPPFLAGS = -DSECP256K1_BUILD $(SECP_TEST_INCLUDES) bench_sign_SOURCES = src/bench_sign.c bench_sign_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(SECP_TEST_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) bench_internal_SOURCES = src/bench_internal.c @@ -89,6 +97,12 @@ if USE_TESTS noinst_PROGRAMS += tests tests_SOURCES = src/tests.c tests_CPPFLAGS = -DSECP256K1_BUILD -I$(top_srcdir)/src -I$(top_srcdir)/include $(SECP_INCLUDES) $(SECP_TEST_INCLUDES) +if VALGRIND_ENABLED +tests_CPPFLAGS += -DVALGRIND +noinst_PROGRAMS += valgrind_ctime_test +valgrind_ctime_test_SOURCES = src/valgrind_ctime_test.c +valgrind_ctime_test_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) +endif if !ENABLE_COVERAGE tests_CPPFLAGS += -DVERIFY endif @@ -141,10 +155,14 @@ if ENABLE_MODULE_MULTISET include src/modules/multiset/Makefile.am.include endif -if ENABLE_MODULE_OLDSCHNORR -include src/modules/oldschnorr/Makefile.am.include -endif - if ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY include src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include endif + +if ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS +include src/modules/extrakeys/Makefile.am.include +endif + +if ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG +include src/modules/schnorrsig/Makefile.am.include +endif diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/README.md b/depend/secp256k1/README.md index 434178b..e070937 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/README.md +++ b/depend/secp256k1/README.md @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Features: * Very efficient implementation. * Suitable for embedded systems. * Optional module for public key recovery. -* Optional module for ECDH key exchange (experimental). +* Optional module for ECDH key exchange. Experimental features have not received enough scrutiny to satisfy the standard of quality of this library but are made available for testing and review by the community. The APIs of these features should not be considered stable. @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Implementation details * Use wNAF notation for point multiplicands. * Use a much larger window for multiples of G, using precomputed multiples. * Use Shamir's trick to do the multiplication with the public key and the generator simultaneously. - * Optionally (off by default) use secp256k1's efficiently-computable endomorphism to split the P multiplicand into 2 half-sized ones. + * Use secp256k1's efficiently-computable endomorphism to split the P multiplicand into 2 half-sized ones. * Point multiplication for signing * Use a precomputed table of multiples of powers of 16 multiplied with the generator, so general multiplication becomes a series of additions. * Intended to be completely free of timing sidechannels for secret-key operations (on reasonable hardware/toolchains) diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/TODO b/depend/secp256k1/TODO deleted file mode 100644 index a300e1c..0000000 --- a/depend/secp256k1/TODO +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -* Unit tests for fieldelem/groupelem, including ones intended to - trigger fieldelem's boundary cases. -* Complete constant-time operations for signing/keygen diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 b/depend/secp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 index 3b3975c..ece3d65 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 +++ b/depend/secp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 @@ -1,8 +1,3 @@ -dnl libsecp25k1 helper checks -AC_DEFUN([SECP_INT128_CHECK],[ -has_int128=$ac_cv_type___int128 -]) - dnl escape "$0x" below using the m4 quadrigaph @S|@, and escape it again with a \ for the shell. AC_DEFUN([SECP_64BIT_ASM_CHECK],[ AC_MSG_CHECKING(for x86_64 assembly availability) @@ -38,19 +33,45 @@ AC_DEFUN([SECP_OPENSSL_CHECK],[ fi if test x"$has_libcrypto" = x"yes" && test x"$has_openssl_ec" = x; then AC_MSG_CHECKING(for EC functions in libcrypto) + CPPFLAGS_TEMP="$CPPFLAGS" + CPPFLAGS="$CRYPTO_CPPFLAGS $CPPFLAGS" AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include #include #include #include ]],[[ - EC_KEY *eckey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1); - ECDSA_sign(0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, eckey); + # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L + void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) {(void)sig->r; (void)sig->s;} + # endif + + unsigned int zero = 0; + const unsigned char *zero_ptr = (unsigned char*)&zero; + EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1)); + EC_KEY *eckey = EC_KEY_new(); + EC_GROUP *group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1); + EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group); + ECDSA_sign(0, NULL, 0, NULL, &zero, eckey); ECDSA_verify(0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, eckey); + o2i_ECPublicKey(&eckey, &zero_ptr, 0); + d2i_ECPrivateKey(&eckey, &zero_ptr, 0); + EC_KEY_check_key(eckey); EC_KEY_free(eckey); + EC_GROUP_free(group); ECDSA_SIG *sig_openssl; sig_openssl = ECDSA_SIG_new(); + d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&sig_openssl, &zero_ptr, 0); + i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig_openssl, NULL); + ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig_openssl, NULL, NULL); ECDSA_SIG_free(sig_openssl); + const BIGNUM *bignum = BN_value_one(); + BN_is_negative(bignum); + BN_num_bits(bignum); + if (sizeof(zero) >= BN_num_bytes(bignum)) { + BN_bn2bin(bignum, (unsigned char*)&zero); + } ]])],[has_openssl_ec=yes],[has_openssl_ec=no]) AC_MSG_RESULT([$has_openssl_ec]) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS_TEMP" fi ]) diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/configure.ac b/depend/secp256k1/configure.ac index 7a10c8a..fe4bf04 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/configure.ac +++ b/depend/secp256k1/configure.ac @@ -7,6 +7,11 @@ AH_TOP([#ifndef LIBSECP256K1_CONFIG_H]) AH_TOP([#define LIBSECP256K1_CONFIG_H]) AH_BOTTOM([#endif /*LIBSECP256K1_CONFIG_H*/]) AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([foreign subdir-objects]) + +# Set -g if CFLAGS are not already set, which matches the default autoconf +# behavior (see PROG_CC in the Autoconf manual) with the exception that we don't +# set -O2 here because we set it in any case (see further down). +: ${CFLAGS="-g"} LT_INIT dnl make the compilation flags quiet unless V=1 is used @@ -19,10 +24,6 @@ AC_PATH_TOOL(RANLIB, ranlib) AC_PATH_TOOL(STRIP, strip) AX_PROG_CC_FOR_BUILD -if test "x$CFLAGS" = "x"; then - CFLAGS="-g" -fi - AM_PROG_CC_C_O AC_PROG_CC_C89 @@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ case $host_os in if test x$openssl_prefix != x; then PKG_CONFIG_PATH="$openssl_prefix/lib/pkgconfig:$PKG_CONFIG_PATH" export PKG_CONFIG_PATH + CRYPTO_CPPFLAGS="-I$openssl_prefix/include" fi if test x$gmp_prefix != x; then GMP_CPPFLAGS="-I$gmp_prefix/include" @@ -63,11 +65,11 @@ case $host_os in ;; esac -CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -W" +CFLAGS="-W $CFLAGS" -warn_CFLAGS="-std=c89 -pedantic -Wall -Wextra -Wcast-align -Wnested-externs -Wshadow -Wstrict-prototypes -Wno-unused-function -Wno-long-long -Wno-overlength-strings" +warn_CFLAGS="-std=c89 -pedantic -Wall -Wextra -Wcast-align -Wnested-externs -Wshadow -Wstrict-prototypes -Wundef -Wno-unused-function -Wno-long-long -Wno-overlength-strings" saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" -CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $warn_CFLAGS" +CFLAGS="$warn_CFLAGS $CFLAGS" AC_MSG_CHECKING([if ${CC} supports ${warn_CFLAGS}]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[char foo;]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], @@ -76,7 +78,7 @@ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[char foo;]])], ]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" -CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fvisibility=hidden" +CFLAGS="-fvisibility=hidden $CFLAGS" AC_MSG_CHECKING([if ${CC} supports -fvisibility=hidden]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[char foo;]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], @@ -114,18 +116,13 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(exhaustive_tests, [use_exhaustive_tests=$enableval], [use_exhaustive_tests=yes]) -AC_ARG_ENABLE(endomorphism, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-endomorphism],[enable endomorphism [default=no]]), - [use_endomorphism=$enableval], - [use_endomorphism=no]) - AC_ARG_ENABLE(ecmult_static_precomputation, AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-ecmult-static-precomputation],[enable precomputed ecmult table for signing [default=auto]]), [use_ecmult_static_precomputation=$enableval], [use_ecmult_static_precomputation=auto]) AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_ecdh, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-ecdh],[enable ECDH shared secret computation (experimental)]), + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-ecdh],[enable ECDH shared secret computation]), [enable_module_ecdh=$enableval], [enable_module_ecdh=no]) @@ -134,38 +131,40 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_multiset, [enable_module_multiset=$enableval], [enable_module_multiset=no]) -AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_oldschnorr, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-oldschnorr],[enable oldschnorr module (experimental)]), - [enable_module_oldschnorr=$enableval], - [enable_module_oldschnorr=no]) - AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_recovery, AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-recovery],[enable ECDSA pubkey recovery module [default=no]]), [enable_module_recovery=$enableval], [enable_module_recovery=no]) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_extrakeys, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-extrakeys],[enable extrakeys module (experimental)]), + [enable_module_extrakeys=$enableval], + [enable_module_extrakeys=no]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_schnorrsig, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-schnorrsig],[enable schnorrsig module (experimental)]), + [enable_module_schnorrsig=$enableval], + [enable_module_schnorrsig=no]) + AC_ARG_ENABLE(external_default_callbacks, AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-external-default-callbacks],[enable external default callback functions [default=no]]), [use_external_default_callbacks=$enableval], [use_external_default_callbacks=no]) -AC_ARG_WITH([field], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-field=64bit|32bit|auto], -[finite field implementation to use [default=auto]])],[req_field=$withval], [req_field=auto]) +dnl Test-only override of the (autodetected by the C code) "widemul" setting. +dnl Legal values are int64 (for [u]int64_t), int128 (for [unsigned] __int128), and auto (the default). +AC_ARG_WITH([test-override-wide-multiply], [] ,[set_widemul=$withval], [set_widemul=auto]) AC_ARG_WITH([bignum], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-bignum=gmp|no|auto], [bignum implementation to use [default=auto]])],[req_bignum=$withval], [req_bignum=auto]) -AC_ARG_WITH([scalar], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-scalar=64bit|32bit|auto], -[scalar implementation to use [default=auto]])],[req_scalar=$withval], [req_scalar=auto]) - AC_ARG_WITH([asm], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-asm=x86_64|arm|no|auto], [assembly optimizations to use (experimental: arm) [default=auto]])],[req_asm=$withval], [req_asm=auto]) AC_ARG_WITH([ecmult-window], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-ecmult-window=SIZE|auto], [window size for ecmult precomputation for verification, specified as integer in range [2..24].] [Larger values result in possibly better performance at the cost of an exponentially larger precomputed table.] -[The table will store 2^(SIZE-2) * 64 bytes of data but can be larger in memory due to platform-specific padding and alignment.] -[If the endomorphism optimization is enabled, two tables of this size are used instead of only one.] +[The table will store 2^(SIZE-1) * 64 bytes of data but can be larger in memory due to platform-specific padding and alignment.] ["auto" is a reasonable setting for desktop machines (currently 15). [default=auto]] )], [req_ecmult_window=$withval], [req_ecmult_window=auto]) @@ -178,14 +177,29 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([ecmult-gen-precision], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-ecmult-gen-precision )], [req_ecmult_gen_precision=$withval], [req_ecmult_gen_precision=auto]) -AC_CHECK_TYPES([__int128]) +AC_ARG_WITH([valgrind], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-valgrind=yes|no|auto], +[Build with extra checks for running inside Valgrind [default=auto]] +)], +[req_valgrind=$withval], [req_valgrind=auto]) + +if test x"$req_valgrind" = x"no"; then + enable_valgrind=no +else + AC_CHECK_HEADER([valgrind/memcheck.h], [enable_valgrind=yes], [ + if test x"$req_valgrind" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Valgrind support explicitly requested but valgrind/memcheck.h header not available]) + fi + enable_valgrind=no + ], []) +fi +AM_CONDITIONAL([VALGRIND_ENABLED],[test "$enable_valgrind" = "yes"]) if test x"$enable_coverage" = x"yes"; then AC_DEFINE(COVERAGE, 1, [Define this symbol to compile out all VERIFY code]) - CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -O0 --coverage" - LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS --coverage" + CFLAGS="-O0 --coverage $CFLAGS" + LDFLAGS="--coverage $LDFLAGS" else - CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -O3" + CFLAGS="-O2 $CFLAGS" fi if test x"$use_ecmult_static_precomputation" != x"no"; then @@ -203,7 +217,7 @@ if test x"$use_ecmult_static_precomputation" != x"no"; then warn_CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD="-Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-function" saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" - CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $warn_CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD" + CFLAGS="$warn_CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD $CFLAGS" AC_MSG_CHECKING([if native ${CC_FOR_BUILD} supports ${warn_CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD}]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[char foo;]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], @@ -215,7 +229,7 @@ if test x"$use_ecmult_static_precomputation" != x"no"; then AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([], [])], [working_native_cc=yes], - [working_native_cc=no],[dnl]) + [working_native_cc=no],[:]) CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD="$CFLAGS" @@ -270,63 +284,6 @@ else esac fi -if test x"$req_field" = x"auto"; then - if test x"set_asm" = x"x86_64"; then - set_field=64bit - fi - if test x"$set_field" = x; then - SECP_INT128_CHECK - if test x"$has_int128" = x"yes"; then - set_field=64bit - fi - fi - if test x"$set_field" = x; then - set_field=32bit - fi -else - set_field=$req_field - case $set_field in - 64bit) - if test x"$set_asm" != x"x86_64"; then - SECP_INT128_CHECK - if test x"$has_int128" != x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([64bit field explicitly requested but neither __int128 support or x86_64 assembly available]) - fi - fi - ;; - 32bit) - ;; - *) - AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid field implementation selection]) - ;; - esac -fi - -if test x"$req_scalar" = x"auto"; then - SECP_INT128_CHECK - if test x"$has_int128" = x"yes"; then - set_scalar=64bit - fi - if test x"$set_scalar" = x; then - set_scalar=32bit - fi -else - set_scalar=$req_scalar - case $set_scalar in - 64bit) - SECP_INT128_CHECK - if test x"$has_int128" != x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([64bit scalar explicitly requested but __int128 support not available]) - fi - ;; - 32bit) - ;; - *) - AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid scalar implementation selected]) - ;; - esac -fi - if test x"$req_bignum" = x"auto"; then SECP_GMP_CHECK if test x"$has_gmp" = x"yes"; then @@ -370,16 +327,18 @@ no) ;; esac -# select field implementation -case $set_field in -64bit) - AC_DEFINE(USE_FIELD_5X52, 1, [Define this symbol to use the FIELD_5X52 implementation]) +# select wide multiplication implementation +case $set_widemul in +int128) + AC_DEFINE(USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT128, 1, [Define this symbol to force the use of the (unsigned) __int128 based wide multiplication implementation]) ;; -32bit) - AC_DEFINE(USE_FIELD_10X26, 1, [Define this symbol to use the FIELD_10X26 implementation]) +int64) + AC_DEFINE(USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT64, 1, [Define this symbol to force the use of the (u)int64_t based wide multiplication implementation]) + ;; +auto) ;; *) - AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid field implementation]) + AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid wide multiplication implementation]) ;; esac @@ -401,19 +360,6 @@ no) ;; esac -#select scalar implementation -case $set_scalar in -64bit) - AC_DEFINE(USE_SCALAR_4X64, 1, [Define this symbol to use the 4x64 scalar implementation]) - ;; -32bit) - AC_DEFINE(USE_SCALAR_8X32, 1, [Define this symbol to use the 8x32 scalar implementation]) - ;; -*) - AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid scalar implementation]) - ;; -esac - #set ecmult window size if test x"$req_ecmult_window" = x"auto"; then set_ecmult_window=15 @@ -454,10 +400,10 @@ esac if test x"$use_tests" = x"yes"; then SECP_OPENSSL_CHECK - if test x"$has_openssl_ec" = x"yes"; then - if test x"$enable_openssl_tests" != x"no"; then + if test x"$enable_openssl_tests" != x"no" && test x"$has_openssl_ec" = x"yes"; then + enable_openssl_tests=yes AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS, 1, [Define this symbol if OpenSSL EC functions are available]) - SECP_TEST_INCLUDES="$SSL_CFLAGS $CRYPTO_CFLAGS" + SECP_TEST_INCLUDES="$SSL_CFLAGS $CRYPTO_CFLAGS $CRYPTO_CPPFLAGS" SECP_TEST_LIBS="$CRYPTO_LIBS" case $host in @@ -465,16 +411,17 @@ if test x"$use_tests" = x"yes"; then SECP_TEST_LIBS="$SECP_TEST_LIBS -lgdi32" ;; esac - fi else if test x"$enable_openssl_tests" = x"yes"; then AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL tests requested but OpenSSL with EC support is not available]) fi + enable_openssl_tests=no fi else if test x"$enable_openssl_tests" = x"yes"; then AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL tests requested but tests are not enabled]) fi + enable_openssl_tests=no fi if test x"$set_bignum" = x"gmp"; then @@ -482,10 +429,6 @@ if test x"$set_bignum" = x"gmp"; then SECP_INCLUDES="$SECP_INCLUDES $GMP_CPPFLAGS" fi -if test x"$use_endomorphism" = x"yes"; then - AC_DEFINE(USE_ENDOMORPHISM, 1, [Define this symbol to use endomorphism optimization]) -fi - if test x"$set_precomp" = x"yes"; then AC_DEFINE(USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION, 1, [Define this symbol to use a statically generated ecmult table]) fi @@ -498,15 +441,20 @@ if test x"$enable_module_multiset" = x"yes"; then AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_MULTISET, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the multiset module]) fi -if test x"$enable_module_oldschnorr" = x"yes"; then - AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_OLDSCHNORR, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the oldschnorr module]) -fi - if test x"$enable_module_recovery" = x"yes"; then AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the ECDSA pubkey recovery module]) fi -AC_C_BIGENDIAN() +if test x"$enable_module_schnorrsig" = x"yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the schnorrsig module]) + enable_module_extrakeys=yes +fi + +# Test if extrakeys is set after the schnorrsig module to allow the schnorrsig +# module to set enable_module_extrakeys=yes +if test x"$enable_module_extrakeys" = x"yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the extrakeys module]) +fi if test x"$use_external_asm" = x"yes"; then AC_DEFINE(USE_EXTERNAL_ASM, 1, [Define this symbol if an external (non-inline) assembly implementation is used]) @@ -522,18 +470,19 @@ if test x"$enable_experimental" = x"yes"; then AC_MSG_NOTICE([Experimental features do not have stable APIs or properties, and may not be safe for production use.]) AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building ECDH module: $enable_module_ecdh]) AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building multiset module: $enable_module_multiset]) - AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building oldschnorr module: $enable_module_oldschnorr]) + AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building extrakeys module: $enable_module_extrakeys]) + AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building schnorrsig module: $enable_module_schnorrsig]) AC_MSG_NOTICE([******]) else - if test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([ECDH module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) + if test x"$enable_module_extrakeys" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([extrakeys module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) + fi + if test x"$enable_module_schnorrsig" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([schnorrsig module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) fi if test x"$enable_module_multiset" = x"yes"; then AC_MSG_ERROR([Multiset module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) fi - if test x"$enable_module_oldschnorr" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([oldschnorr module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) - fi if test x"$set_asm" = x"arm"; then AC_MSG_ERROR([ARM assembly optimization is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) fi @@ -552,8 +501,9 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_BENCHMARK], [test x"$use_benchmark" = x"yes"]) AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION], [test x"$set_precomp" = x"yes"]) AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH], [test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"]) AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_MULTISET], [test x"$enable_module_multiset" = x"yes"]) -AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_OLDSCHNORR], [test x"$enable_module_oldschnorr" = x"yes"]) AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY], [test x"$enable_module_recovery" = x"yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS], [test x"$enable_module_extrakeys" = x"yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG], [test x"$enable_module_schnorrsig" = x"yes"]) AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_EXTERNAL_ASM], [test x"$use_external_asm" = x"yes"]) AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_ASM_ARM], [test x"$set_asm" = x"arm"]) @@ -566,23 +516,28 @@ AC_OUTPUT echo echo "Build Options:" -echo " with endomorphism = $use_endomorphism" echo " with ecmult precomp = $set_precomp" echo " with external callbacks = $use_external_default_callbacks" echo " with benchmarks = $use_benchmark" +echo " with tests = $use_tests" +echo " with openssl tests = $enable_openssl_tests" echo " with coverage = $enable_coverage" echo " module ecdh = $enable_module_ecdh" echo " module multiset = $enable_module_multiset" -echo " module oldschnorr = $enable_module_oldschnorr" echo " module recovery = $enable_module_recovery" +echo " module extrakeys = $enable_module_extrakeys" +echo " module schnorrsig = $enable_module_schnorrsig" echo echo " asm = $set_asm" echo " bignum = $set_bignum" -echo " field = $set_field" -echo " scalar = $set_scalar" echo " ecmult window size = $set_ecmult_window" echo " ecmult gen prec. bits = $set_ecmult_gen_precision" +dnl Hide test-only options unless they're used. +if test x"$set_widemul" != xauto; then +echo " wide multiplication = $set_widemul" +fi echo +echo " valgrind = $enable_valgrind" echo " CC = $CC" echo " CFLAGS = $CFLAGS" echo " CPPFLAGS = $CPPFLAGS" diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.c b/depend/secp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.c index e177a05..f71db4b 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.c +++ b/depend/secp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.c @@ -112,7 +112,6 @@ int ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_ return 0; } spos = pos; - pos += slen; /* Ignore leading zeroes in R */ while (rlen > 0 && input[rpos] == 0) { diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/contrib/travis.sh b/depend/secp256k1/contrib/travis.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..24cc931 --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/contrib/travis.sh @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +set -e +set -x + +if [ "$HOST" = "i686-linux-gnu" ] +then + export CC="$CC -m32" +fi +if [ "$TRAVIS_OS_NAME" = "osx" ] && [ "$TRAVIS_COMPILER" = "gcc" ] +then + export CC="gcc-9" +fi + +./configure \ + --enable-experimental="$EXPERIMENTAL" \ + --with-test-override-wide-multiply="$WIDEMUL" --with-bignum="$BIGNUM" --with-asm="$ASM" \ + --enable-ecmult-static-precomputation="$STATICPRECOMPUTATION" --with-ecmult-gen-precision="$ECMULTGENPRECISION" \ + --enable-module-ecdh="$ECDH" --enable-module-recovery="$RECOVERY" \ + --enable-module-schnorrsig="$SCHNORRSIG" \ + --with-valgrind="$WITH_VALGRIND" \ + --host="$HOST" $EXTRAFLAGS + +if [ -n "$BUILD" ] +then + make -j2 "$BUILD" +fi +if [ "$RUN_VALGRIND" = "yes" ] +then + make -j2 + # the `--error-exitcode` is required to make the test fail if valgrind found errors, otherwise it'll return 0 (http://valgrind.org/docs/manual/manual-core.html) + valgrind --error-exitcode=42 ./tests 16 + valgrind --error-exitcode=42 ./exhaustive_tests +fi +if [ "$BENCH" = "yes" ] +then + if [ "$RUN_VALGRIND" = "yes" ] + then + # Using the local `libtool` because on macOS the system's libtool has nothing to do with GNU libtool + EXEC='./libtool --mode=execute valgrind --error-exitcode=42' + else + EXEC= + fi + # This limits the iterations in the benchmarks below to ITER(set in .travis.yml) iterations. + export SECP256K1_BENCH_ITERS="$ITERS" + { + $EXEC ./bench_ecmult + $EXEC ./bench_internal + $EXEC ./bench_sign + $EXEC ./bench_verify + } >> bench.log 2>&1 + if [ "$RECOVERY" = "yes" ] + then + $EXEC ./bench_recover >> bench.log 2>&1 + fi + if [ "$ECDH" = "yes" ] + then + $EXEC ./bench_ecdh >> bench.log 2>&1 + fi + if [ "$SCHNORRSIG" = "yes" ] + then + $EXEC ./bench_schnorrsig >> bench.log 2>&1 + fi +fi +if [ "$CTIMETEST" = "yes" ] +then + ./libtool --mode=execute valgrind --error-exitcode=42 ./valgrind_ctime_test > valgrind_ctime_test.log 2>&1 +fi diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1.h b/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1.h index 36020e5..2178c8e 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1.h @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ extern "C" { * 2. Array lengths always immediately the follow the argument whose length * they describe, even if this violates rule 1. * 3. Within the OUT/OUTIN/IN groups, pointers to data that is typically generated - * later go first. This means: signatures, public nonces, private nonces, + * later go first. This means: signatures, public nonces, secret nonces, * messages, public keys, secret keys, tweaks. * 4. Arguments that are not data pointers go last, from more complex to less * complex: function pointers, algorithm names, messages, void pointers, @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ typedef int (*secp256k1_nonce_function)( # else # define SECP256K1_API # endif -# elif defined(__GNUC__) && defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) +# elif defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ >= 4) && defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) # define SECP256K1_API __attribute__ ((visibility ("default"))) # else # define SECP256K1_API @@ -162,12 +162,14 @@ typedef int (*secp256k1_nonce_function)( /** The higher bits contain the actual data. Do not use directly. */ #define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY (1 << 8) #define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN (1 << 9) +#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY (1 << 10) #define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION (1 << 8) /** Flags to pass to secp256k1_context_create, secp256k1_context_preallocated_size, and * secp256k1_context_preallocated_create. */ #define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY) #define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN) +#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY) #define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT) /** Flag to pass to secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize. */ @@ -529,7 +531,7 @@ SECP256K1_API extern const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_def /** Create an ECDSA signature. * * Returns: 1: signature created - * 0: the nonce generation function failed, or the private key was invalid. + * 0: the nonce generation function failed, or the secret key was invalid. * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL) * Out: sig: pointer to an array where the signature will be placed (cannot be NULL) * In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash being signed (cannot be NULL) @@ -550,6 +552,11 @@ SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign( ) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); /** Verify an ECDSA secret key. + * + * A secret key is valid if it is not 0 and less than the secp256k1 curve order + * when interpreted as an integer (most significant byte first). The + * probability of choosing a 32-byte string uniformly at random which is an + * invalid secret key is negligible. * * Returns: 1: secret key is valid * 0: secret key is invalid @@ -567,7 +574,7 @@ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify( * 0: secret was invalid, try again * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL) * Out: pubkey: pointer to the created public key (cannot be NULL) - * In: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key (cannot be NULL) + * In: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL) */ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create( const secp256k1_context* ctx, @@ -575,12 +582,24 @@ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create( const unsigned char *seckey ) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); -/** Negates a private key in place. +/** Negates a secret key in place. * - * Returns: 1 always - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object - * In/Out: seckey: pointer to the 32-byte private key to be negated (cannot be NULL) + * Returns: 0 if the given secret key is invalid according to + * secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify. 1 otherwise + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object + * In/Out: seckey: pointer to the 32-byte secret key to be negated. If the + * secret key is invalid according to + * secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function returns 0 and + * seckey will be set to some unspecified value. (cannot be + * NULL) */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *seckey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); + +/** Same as secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate, but DEPRECATED. Will be removed in + * future versions. */ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_negate( const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey @@ -597,15 +616,29 @@ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate( secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey ) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); -/** Tweak a private key by adding tweak to it. - * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for - * uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or if the resulting private key - * would be invalid (only when the tweak is the complement of the - * private key). 1 otherwise. - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL). - * In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key. - * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. - */ +/** Tweak a secret key by adding tweak to it. + * + * Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the resulting secret key would be + * invalid (only when the tweak is the negation of the secret key). 1 + * otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL). + * In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key. If the secret key is + * invalid according to secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this + * function returns 0. seckey will be set to some unspecified + * value if this function returns 0. (cannot be NULL) + * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. If the tweak is invalid according to + * secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function returns 0. For + * uniformly random 32-byte arrays the chance of being invalid + * is negligible (around 1 in 2^128) (cannot be NULL). + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *seckey, + const unsigned char *tweak +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Same as secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add, but DEPRECATED. Will be removed in + * future versions. */ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add( const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey, @@ -613,14 +646,18 @@ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add( ) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); /** Tweak a public key by adding tweak times the generator to it. - * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for - * uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or if the resulting public key - * would be invalid (only when the tweak is the complement of the - * corresponding private key). 1 otherwise. - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for validation + * + * Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the resulting public key would be + * invalid (only when the tweak is the negation of the corresponding + * secret key). 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for validation * (cannot be NULL). - * In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key object. - * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. + * In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key object. pubkey will be set to an + * invalid value if this function returns 0 (cannot be NULL). + * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. If the tweak is invalid according to + * secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function returns 0. For + * uniformly random 32-byte arrays the chance of being invalid + * is negligible (around 1 in 2^128) (cannot be NULL). */ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add( const secp256k1_context* ctx, @@ -628,13 +665,27 @@ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add( const unsigned char *tweak ) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); -/** Tweak a private key by multiplying it by a tweak. - * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for - * uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or equal to zero. 1 otherwise. - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL). - * In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key. - * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. +/** Tweak a secret key by multiplying it by a tweak. + * + * Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid. 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL). + * In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key. If the secret key is + * invalid according to secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this + * function returns 0. seckey will be set to some unspecified + * value if this function returns 0. (cannot be NULL) + * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. If the tweak is invalid according to + * secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function returns 0. For + * uniformly random 32-byte arrays the chance of being invalid + * is negligible (around 1 in 2^128) (cannot be NULL). */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *seckey, + const unsigned char *tweak +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Same as secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul, but DEPRECATED. Will be removed in + * future versions. */ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul( const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey, @@ -642,12 +693,16 @@ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul( ) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); /** Tweak a public key by multiplying it by a tweak value. - * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for - * uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or equal to zero. 1 otherwise. - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for validation - * (cannot be NULL). - * In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key object. - * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. + * + * Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid. 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for validation + * (cannot be NULL). + * In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key object. pubkey will be set to an + * invalid value if this function returns 0 (cannot be NULL). + * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. If the tweak is invalid according to + * secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function returns 0. For + * uniformly random 32-byte arrays the chance of being invalid + * is negligible (around 1 in 2^128) (cannot be NULL). */ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul( const secp256k1_context* ctx, @@ -686,6 +741,7 @@ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_context_randomize( ) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); /** Add a number of public keys together. + * * Returns: 1: the sum of the public keys is valid. * 0: the sum of the public keys is not valid. * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_ecdh.h b/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_ecdh.h index a02ef71..4058e9c 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_ecdh.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_ecdh.h @@ -7,18 +7,21 @@ extern "C" { #endif -/** A pointer to a function that applies hash function to a point +/** A pointer to a function that hashes an EC point to obtain an ECDH secret * - * Returns: 1 if a point was successfully hashed. 0 will cause ecdh to fail - * Out: output: pointer to an array to be filled by the function - * In: x: pointer to a 32-byte x coordinate - * y: pointer to a 32-byte y coordinate - * data: Arbitrary data pointer that is passed through + * Returns: 1 if the point was successfully hashed. + * 0 will cause secp256k1_ecdh to fail and return 0. + * Other return values are not allowed, and the behaviour of + * secp256k1_ecdh is undefined for other return values. + * Out: output: pointer to an array to be filled by the function + * In: x32: pointer to a 32-byte x coordinate + * y32: pointer to a 32-byte y coordinate + * data: arbitrary data pointer that is passed through */ typedef int (*secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function)( unsigned char *output, - const unsigned char *x, - const unsigned char *y, + const unsigned char *x32, + const unsigned char *y32, void *data ); @@ -26,27 +29,28 @@ typedef int (*secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function)( * Populates the output parameter with 32 bytes. */ SECP256K1_API extern const secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function_sha256; -/** A default ecdh hash function (currently equal to secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function_sha256). +/** A default ECDH hash function (currently equal to secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function_sha256). * Populates the output parameter with 32 bytes. */ SECP256K1_API extern const secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function_default; /** Compute an EC Diffie-Hellman secret in constant time + * * Returns: 1: exponentiation was successful - * 0: scalar was invalid (zero or overflow) + * 0: scalar was invalid (zero or overflow) or hashfp returned 0 * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) * Out: output: pointer to an array to be filled by hashfp * In: pubkey: a pointer to a secp256k1_pubkey containing an * initialized public key - * privkey: a 32-byte scalar with which to multiply the point + * seckey: a 32-byte scalar with which to multiply the point * hashfp: pointer to a hash function. If NULL, secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function_sha256 is used * (in which case, 32 bytes will be written to output) - * data: Arbitrary data pointer that is passed through to hashfp + * data: arbitrary data pointer that is passed through to hashfp */ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ecdh( const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output, const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, - const unsigned char *privkey, + const unsigned char *seckey, secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function hashfp, void *data ) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h b/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0c5dff2 --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +#ifndef SECP256K1_EXTRAKEYS_H +#define SECP256K1_EXTRAKEYS_H + +#include "secp256k1.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed and valid "x-only" public key. + * An x-only pubkey encodes a point whose Y coordinate is even. It is + * serialized using only its X coordinate (32 bytes). See BIP-340 for more + * information about x-only pubkeys. + * + * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not + * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is + * however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved. + * If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage, transmission, or + * comparison, use secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize and + * secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char data[64]; +} secp256k1_xonly_pubkey; + +/** Opaque data structure that holds a keypair consisting of a secret and a + * public key. + * + * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not + * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is + * however guaranteed to be 96 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char data[96]; +} secp256k1_keypair; + +/** Parse a 32-byte sequence into a xonly_pubkey object. + * + * Returns: 1 if the public key was fully valid. + * 0 if the public key could not be parsed or is invalid. + * + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object (cannot be NULL). + * Out: pubkey: pointer to a pubkey object. If 1 is returned, it is set to a + * parsed version of input. If not, it's set to an invalid value. + * (cannot be NULL). + * In: input32: pointer to a serialized xonly_pubkey (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey* pubkey, + const unsigned char *input32 +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Serialize an xonly_pubkey object into a 32-byte sequence. + * + * Returns: 1 always. + * + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object (cannot be NULL). + * Out: output32: a pointer to a 32-byte array to place the serialized key in + * (cannot be NULL). + * In: pubkey: a pointer to a secp256k1_xonly_pubkey containing an + * initialized public key (cannot be NULL). + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *output32, + const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey* pubkey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Converts a secp256k1_pubkey into a secp256k1_xonly_pubkey. + * + * Returns: 1 if the public key was successfully converted + * 0 otherwise + * + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * Out: xonly_pubkey: pointer to an x-only public key object for placing the + * converted public key (cannot be NULL) + * pk_parity: pointer to an integer that will be set to 1 if the point + * encoded by xonly_pubkey is the negation of the pubkey and + * set to 0 otherwise. (can be NULL) + * In: pubkey: pointer to a public key that is converted (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *xonly_pubkey, + int *pk_parity, + const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Tweak an x-only public key by adding the generator multiplied with tweak32 + * to it. + * + * Note that the resulting point can not in general be represented by an x-only + * pubkey because it may have an odd Y coordinate. Instead, the output_pubkey + * is a normal secp256k1_pubkey. + * + * Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the resulting public key would be + * invalid (only when the tweak is the negation of the corresponding + * secret key). 1 otherwise. + * + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for verification + * (cannot be NULL) + * Out: output_pubkey: pointer to a public key to store the result. Will be set + * to an invalid value if this function returns 0 (cannot + * be NULL) + * In: internal_pubkey: pointer to an x-only pubkey to apply the tweak to. + * (cannot be NULL). + * tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. If the tweak is invalid + * according to secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function + * returns 0. For uniformly random 32-byte arrays the + * chance of being invalid is negligible (around 1 in + * 2^128) (cannot be NULL). + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey *output_pubkey, + const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *internal_pubkey, + const unsigned char *tweak32 +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Checks that a tweaked pubkey is the result of calling + * secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add with internal_pubkey and tweak32. + * + * The tweaked pubkey is represented by its 32-byte x-only serialization and + * its pk_parity, which can both be obtained by converting the result of + * tweak_add to a secp256k1_xonly_pubkey. + * + * Note that this alone does _not_ verify that the tweaked pubkey is a + * commitment. If the tweak is not chosen in a specific way, the tweaked pubkey + * can easily be the result of a different internal_pubkey and tweak. + * + * Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the tweaked pubkey is not the + * result of tweaking the internal_pubkey with tweak32. 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for verification + * (cannot be NULL) + * In: tweaked_pubkey32: pointer to a serialized xonly_pubkey (cannot be NULL) + * tweaked_pk_parity: the parity of the tweaked pubkey (whose serialization + * is passed in as tweaked_pubkey32). This must match the + * pk_parity value that is returned when calling + * secp256k1_xonly_pubkey with the tweaked pubkey, or + * this function will fail. + * internal_pubkey: pointer to an x-only public key object to apply the + * tweak to (cannot be NULL) + * tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const unsigned char *tweaked_pubkey32, + int tweaked_pk_parity, + const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *internal_pubkey, + const unsigned char *tweak32 +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5); + +/** Compute the keypair for a secret key. + * + * Returns: 1: secret was valid, keypair is ready to use + * 0: secret was invalid, try again with a different secret + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL) + * Out: keypair: pointer to the created keypair (cannot be NULL) + * In: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_keypair_create( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_keypair *keypair, + const unsigned char *seckey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Get the public key from a keypair. + * + * Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid. 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * Out: pubkey: pointer to a pubkey object. If 1 is returned, it is set to + * the keypair public key. If not, it's set to an invalid value. + * (cannot be NULL) + * In: keypair: pointer to a keypair (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_keypair_pub( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, + const secp256k1_keypair *keypair +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Get the x-only public key from a keypair. + * + * This is the same as calling secp256k1_keypair_pub and then + * secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey. + * + * Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid. 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * Out: pubkey: pointer to an xonly_pubkey object. If 1 is returned, it is set + * to the keypair public key after converting it to an + * xonly_pubkey. If not, it's set to an invalid value (cannot be + * NULL). + * pk_parity: pointer to an integer that will be set to the pk_parity + * argument of secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey (can be NULL). + * In: keypair: pointer to a keypair (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey, + int *pk_parity, + const secp256k1_keypair *keypair +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Tweak a keypair by adding tweak32 to the secret key and updating the public + * key accordingly. + * + * Calling this function and then secp256k1_keypair_pub results in the same + * public key as calling secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub and then + * secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add. + * + * Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the resulting keypair would be + * invalid (only when the tweak is the negation of the keypair's + * secret key). 1 otherwise. + * + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for verification + * (cannot be NULL) + * In/Out: keypair: pointer to a keypair to apply the tweak to. Will be set to + * an invalid value if this function returns 0 (cannot be + * NULL). + * In: tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. If the tweak is invalid according + * to secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function returns 0. For + * uniformly random 32-byte arrays the chance of being invalid + * is negligible (around 1 in 2^128) (cannot be NULL). + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_keypair *keypair, + const unsigned char *tweak32 +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* SECP256K1_EXTRAKEYS_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_oldschnorr.h b/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_oldschnorr.h deleted file mode 100644 index 0e930b7..0000000 --- a/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_oldschnorr.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,57 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef _SECP256K1_OLDSCHNORR_ -#define _SECP256K1_OLDSCHNORR_ - -#include "secp256k1.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * Verify a signature created by secp256k1_schnorr_sign. - * Returns: 1: correct signature - * 0: incorrect signature - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object, initialized for verification. - * In: sig64: the 64-byte signature being verified (cannot be NULL) - * msg32: the 32-byte message hash being verified (cannot be NULL) - * pubkey: the public key to verify with (cannot be NULL) - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_schnorr_verify( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - const unsigned char *sig64, - const unsigned char *msg32, - const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); - -/** - * Create a signature using a custom EC-Schnorr-SHA256 construction. It - * produces non-malleable 64-byte signatures which support batch validation, - * and multiparty signing. - * Returns: 1: signature created - * 0: the nonce generation function failed, or the private key was - * invalid. - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing - * (cannot be NULL) - * Out: sig64: pointer to a 64-byte array where the signature will be - * placed (cannot be NULL) - * In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash being signed (cannot be NULL) - * seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL) - * noncefp:pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL, - * secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used - * ndata: pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation - * function (can be NULL) - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_schnorr_sign( - const secp256k1_context *ctx, - unsigned char *sig64, - const unsigned char *msg32, - const unsigned char *seckey, - secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, - const void *ndata -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_recovery.h b/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_recovery.h index cf6c5ed..f8ccaec 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_recovery.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_recovery.h @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact( /** Create a recoverable ECDSA signature. * * Returns: 1: signature created - * 0: the nonce generation function failed, or the private key was invalid. + * 0: the nonce generation function failed, or the secret key was invalid. * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL) * Out: sig: pointer to an array where the signature will be placed (cannot be NULL) * In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash being signed (cannot be NULL) diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h b/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0150cd3 --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +#ifndef SECP256K1_SCHNORRSIG_H +#define SECP256K1_SCHNORRSIG_H + +#include "secp256k1.h" +#include "secp256k1_extrakeys.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** This module implements a variant of Schnorr signatures compliant with + * Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 340 "Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1" + * (https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340.mediawiki). + */ + +/** A pointer to a function to deterministically generate a nonce. + * + * Same as secp256k1_nonce function with the exception of accepting an + * additional pubkey argument and not requiring an attempt argument. The pubkey + * argument can protect signature schemes with key-prefixed challenge hash + * inputs against reusing the nonce when signing with the wrong precomputed + * pubkey. + * + * Returns: 1 if a nonce was successfully generated. 0 will cause signing to + * return an error. + * Out: nonce32: pointer to a 32-byte array to be filled by the function. + * In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash being verified (will not be NULL) + * key32: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (will not be NULL) + * xonly_pk32: the 32-byte serialized xonly pubkey corresponding to key32 + * (will not be NULL) + * algo16: pointer to a 16-byte array describing the signature + * algorithm (will not be NULL). + * data: Arbitrary data pointer that is passed through. + * + * Except for test cases, this function should compute some cryptographic hash of + * the message, the key, the pubkey, the algorithm description, and data. + */ +typedef int (*secp256k1_nonce_function_hardened)( + unsigned char *nonce32, + const unsigned char *msg32, + const unsigned char *key32, + const unsigned char *xonly_pk32, + const unsigned char *algo16, + void *data +); + +/** An implementation of the nonce generation function as defined in Bitcoin + * Improvement Proposal 340 "Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1" + * (https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340.mediawiki). + * + * If a data pointer is passed, it is assumed to be a pointer to 32 bytes of + * auxiliary random data as defined in BIP-340. If the data pointer is NULL, + * schnorrsig_sign does not produce BIP-340 compliant signatures. The algo16 + * argument must be non-NULL, otherwise the function will fail and return 0. + * The hash will be tagged with algo16 after removing all terminating null + * bytes. Therefore, to create BIP-340 compliant signatures, algo16 must be set + * to "BIP0340/nonce\0\0\0" + */ +SECP256K1_API extern const secp256k1_nonce_function_hardened secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340; + +/** Create a Schnorr signature. + * + * Does _not_ strictly follow BIP-340 because it does not verify the resulting + * signature. Instead, you can manually use secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify and + * abort if it fails. + * + * Otherwise BIP-340 compliant if the noncefp argument is NULL or + * secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340 and the ndata argument is 32-byte auxiliary + * randomness. + * + * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL) + * Out: sig64: pointer to a 64-byte array to store the serialized signature (cannot be NULL) + * In: msg32: the 32-byte message being signed (cannot be NULL) + * keypair: pointer to an initialized keypair (cannot be NULL) + * noncefp: pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL, secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340 is used + * ndata: pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation + * function (can be NULL). If it is non-NULL and + * secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340 is used, then ndata must be a + * pointer to 32-byte auxiliary randomness as per BIP-340. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *sig64, + const unsigned char *msg32, + const secp256k1_keypair *keypair, + secp256k1_nonce_function_hardened noncefp, + void *ndata +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Verify a Schnorr signature. + * + * Returns: 1: correct signature + * 0: incorrect signature + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object, initialized for verification. + * In: sig64: pointer to the 64-byte signature to verify (cannot be NULL) + * msg32: the 32-byte message being verified (cannot be NULL) + * pubkey: pointer to an x-only public key to verify with (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const unsigned char *sig64, + const unsigned char *msg32, + const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* SECP256K1_SCHNORRSIG_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/sage/gen_exhaustive_groups.sage b/depend/secp256k1/sage/gen_exhaustive_groups.sage new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3c3c984 --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/sage/gen_exhaustive_groups.sage @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +# Define field size and field +P = 2^256 - 2^32 - 977 +F = GF(P) +BETA = F(0x7ae96a2b657c07106e64479eac3434e99cf0497512f58995c1396c28719501ee) + +assert(BETA != F(1) and BETA^3 == F(1)) + +orders_done = set() +results = {} +first = True +for b in range(1, P): + # There are only 6 curves (up to isomorphism) of the form y^2=x^3+B. Stop once we have tried all. + if len(orders_done) == 6: + break + + E = EllipticCurve(F, [0, b]) + print("Analyzing curve y^2 = x^3 + %i" % b) + n = E.order() + # Skip curves with an order we've already tried + if n in orders_done: + print("- Isomorphic to earlier curve") + continue + orders_done.add(n) + # Skip curves isomorphic to the real secp256k1 + if n.is_pseudoprime(): + print(" - Isomorphic to secp256k1") + continue + + print("- Finding subgroups") + + # Find what prime subgroups exist + for f, _ in n.factor(): + print("- Analyzing subgroup of order %i" % f) + # Skip subgroups of order >1000 + if f < 4 or f > 1000: + print(" - Bad size") + continue + + # Iterate over X coordinates until we find one that is on the curve, has order f, + # and for which curve isomorphism exists that maps it to X coordinate 1. + for x in range(1, P): + # Skip X coordinates not on the curve, and construct the full point otherwise. + if not E.is_x_coord(x): + continue + G = E.lift_x(F(x)) + + print(" - Analyzing (multiples of) point with X=%i" % x) + + # Skip points whose order is not a multiple of f. Project the point to have + # order f otherwise. + if (G.order() % f): + print(" - Bad order") + continue + G = G * (G.order() // f) + + # Find lambda for endomorphism. Skip if none can be found. + lam = None + for l in Integers(f)(1).nth_root(3, all=True): + if int(l)*G == E(BETA*G[0], G[1]): + lam = int(l) + break + if lam is None: + print(" - No endomorphism for this subgroup") + break + + # Now look for an isomorphism of the curve that gives this point an X + # coordinate equal to 1. + # If (x,y) is on y^2 = x^3 + b, then (a^2*x, a^3*y) is on y^2 = x^3 + a^6*b. + # So look for m=a^2=1/x. + m = F(1)/G[0] + if not m.is_square(): + print(" - No curve isomorphism maps it to a point with X=1") + continue + a = m.sqrt() + rb = a^6*b + RE = EllipticCurve(F, [0, rb]) + + # Use as generator twice the image of G under the above isormorphism. + # This means that generator*(1/2 mod f) will have X coordinate 1. + RG = RE(1, a^3*G[1]) * 2 + # And even Y coordinate. + if int(RG[1]) % 2: + RG = -RG + assert(RG.order() == f) + assert(lam*RG == RE(BETA*RG[0], RG[1])) + + # We have found curve RE:y^2=x^3+rb with generator RG of order f. Remember it + results[f] = {"b": rb, "G": RG, "lambda": lam} + print(" - Found solution") + break + + print("") + +print("") +print("") +print("/* To be put in src/group_impl.h: */") +first = True +for f in sorted(results.keys()): + b = results[f]["b"] + G = results[f]["G"] + print("# %s EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == %i" % ("if" if first else "elif", f)) + first = False + print("static const secp256k1_ge secp256k1_ge_const_g = SECP256K1_GE_CONST(") + print(" 0x%08x, 0x%08x, 0x%08x, 0x%08x," % tuple((int(G[0]) >> (32 * (7 - i))) & 0xffffffff for i in range(4))) + print(" 0x%08x, 0x%08x, 0x%08x, 0x%08x," % tuple((int(G[0]) >> (32 * (7 - i))) & 0xffffffff for i in range(4, 8))) + print(" 0x%08x, 0x%08x, 0x%08x, 0x%08x," % tuple((int(G[1]) >> (32 * (7 - i))) & 0xffffffff for i in range(4))) + print(" 0x%08x, 0x%08x, 0x%08x, 0x%08x" % tuple((int(G[1]) >> (32 * (7 - i))) & 0xffffffff for i in range(4, 8))) + print(");") + print("static const secp256k1_fe secp256k1_fe_const_b = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(") + print(" 0x%08x, 0x%08x, 0x%08x, 0x%08x," % tuple((int(b) >> (32 * (7 - i))) & 0xffffffff for i in range(4))) + print(" 0x%08x, 0x%08x, 0x%08x, 0x%08x" % tuple((int(b) >> (32 * (7 - i))) & 0xffffffff for i in range(4, 8))) + print(");") +print("# else") +print("# error No known generator for the specified exhaustive test group order.") +print("# endif") + +print("") +print("") +print("/* To be put in src/scalar_impl.h: */") +first = True +for f in sorted(results.keys()): + lam = results[f]["lambda"] + print("# %s EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == %i" % ("if" if first else "elif", f)) + first = False + print("# define EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA %i" % lam) +print("# else") +print("# error No known lambda for the specified exhaustive test group order.") +print("# endif") +print("") diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/sage/group_prover.sage b/depend/secp256k1/sage/group_prover.sage index 8521f07..53ffee2 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/sage/group_prover.sage +++ b/depend/secp256k1/sage/group_prover.sage @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ class fastfrac: return self.top in I and self.bot not in I def reduce(self,assumeZero): - zero = self.R.ideal(map(numerator, assumeZero)) + zero = self.R.ideal(list(map(numerator, assumeZero))) return fastfrac(self.R, zero.reduce(self.top)) / fastfrac(self.R, zero.reduce(self.bot)) def __add__(self,other): @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ class fastfrac: """Multiply something else with a fraction.""" return self.__mul__(other) - def __div__(self,other): + def __truediv__(self,other): """Divide two fractions.""" if parent(other) == ZZ: return fastfrac(self.R,self.top,self.bot * other) @@ -108,6 +108,11 @@ class fastfrac: return fastfrac(self.R,self.top * other.bot,self.bot * other.top) return NotImplemented + # Compatibility wrapper for Sage versions based on Python 2 + def __div__(self,other): + """Divide two fractions.""" + return self.__truediv__(other) + def __pow__(self,other): """Compute a power of a fraction.""" if parent(other) == ZZ: @@ -175,7 +180,7 @@ class constraints: def conflicts(R, con): """Check whether any of the passed non-zero assumptions is implied by the zero assumptions""" - zero = R.ideal(map(numerator, con.zero)) + zero = R.ideal(list(map(numerator, con.zero))) if 1 in zero: return True # First a cheap check whether any of the individual nonzero terms conflict on @@ -195,7 +200,7 @@ def conflicts(R, con): def get_nonzero_set(R, assume): """Calculate a simple set of nonzero expressions""" - zero = R.ideal(map(numerator, assume.zero)) + zero = R.ideal(list(map(numerator, assume.zero))) nonzero = set() for nz in map(numerator, assume.nonzero): for (f,n) in nz.factor(): @@ -208,7 +213,7 @@ def get_nonzero_set(R, assume): def prove_nonzero(R, exprs, assume): """Check whether an expression is provably nonzero, given assumptions""" - zero = R.ideal(map(numerator, assume.zero)) + zero = R.ideal(list(map(numerator, assume.zero))) nonzero = get_nonzero_set(R, assume) expl = set() ok = True @@ -250,7 +255,7 @@ def prove_zero(R, exprs, assume): r, e = prove_nonzero(R, dict(map(lambda x: (fastfrac(R, x.bot, 1), exprs[x]), exprs)), assume) if not r: return (False, map(lambda x: "Possibly zero denominator: %s" % x, e)) - zero = R.ideal(map(numerator, assume.zero)) + zero = R.ideal(list(map(numerator, assume.zero))) nonzero = prod(x for x in assume.nonzero) expl = [] for expr in exprs: @@ -265,8 +270,8 @@ def describe_extra(R, assume, assumeExtra): """Describe what assumptions are added, given existing assumptions""" zerox = assume.zero.copy() zerox.update(assumeExtra.zero) - zero = R.ideal(map(numerator, assume.zero)) - zeroextra = R.ideal(map(numerator, zerox)) + zero = R.ideal(list(map(numerator, assume.zero))) + zeroextra = R.ideal(list(map(numerator, zerox))) nonzero = get_nonzero_set(R, assume) ret = set() # Iterate over the extra zero expressions diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/sage/weierstrass_prover.sage b/depend/secp256k1/sage/weierstrass_prover.sage index 03ef2ec..b770c6d 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/sage/weierstrass_prover.sage +++ b/depend/secp256k1/sage/weierstrass_prover.sage @@ -175,24 +175,24 @@ laws_jacobian_weierstrass = { def check_exhaustive_jacobian_weierstrass(name, A, B, branches, formula, p): """Verify an implementation of addition of Jacobian points on a Weierstrass curve, by executing and validating the result for every possible addition in a prime field""" F = Integers(p) - print "Formula %s on Z%i:" % (name, p) + print("Formula %s on Z%i:" % (name, p)) points = [] - for x in xrange(0, p): - for y in xrange(0, p): + for x in range(0, p): + for y in range(0, p): point = affinepoint(F(x), F(y)) r, e = concrete_verify(on_weierstrass_curve(A, B, point)) if r: points.append(point) - for za in xrange(1, p): - for zb in xrange(1, p): + for za in range(1, p): + for zb in range(1, p): for pa in points: for pb in points: - for ia in xrange(2): - for ib in xrange(2): + for ia in range(2): + for ib in range(2): pA = jacobianpoint(pa.x * F(za)^2, pa.y * F(za)^3, F(za), ia) pB = jacobianpoint(pb.x * F(zb)^2, pb.y * F(zb)^3, F(zb), ib) - for branch in xrange(0, branches): + for branch in range(0, branches): assumeAssert, assumeBranch, pC = formula(branch, pA, pB) pC.X = F(pC.X) pC.Y = F(pC.Y) @@ -206,13 +206,13 @@ def check_exhaustive_jacobian_weierstrass(name, A, B, branches, formula, p): r, e = concrete_verify(assumeLaw) if r: if match: - print " multiple branches for (%s,%s,%s,%s) + (%s,%s,%s,%s)" % (pA.X, pA.Y, pA.Z, pA.Infinity, pB.X, pB.Y, pB.Z, pB.Infinity) + print(" multiple branches for (%s,%s,%s,%s) + (%s,%s,%s,%s)" % (pA.X, pA.Y, pA.Z, pA.Infinity, pB.X, pB.Y, pB.Z, pB.Infinity)) else: match = True r, e = concrete_verify(require) if not r: - print " failure in branch %i for (%s,%s,%s,%s) + (%s,%s,%s,%s) = (%s,%s,%s,%s): %s" % (branch, pA.X, pA.Y, pA.Z, pA.Infinity, pB.X, pB.Y, pB.Z, pB.Infinity, pC.X, pC.Y, pC.Z, pC.Infinity, e) - print + print(" failure in branch %i for (%s,%s,%s,%s) + (%s,%s,%s,%s) = (%s,%s,%s,%s): %s" % (branch, pA.X, pA.Y, pA.Z, pA.Infinity, pB.X, pB.Y, pB.Z, pB.Infinity, pC.X, pC.Y, pC.Z, pC.Infinity, e)) + print() def check_symbolic_function(R, assumeAssert, assumeBranch, f, A, B, pa, pb, pA, pB, pC): @@ -242,9 +242,9 @@ def check_symbolic_jacobian_weierstrass(name, A, B, branches, formula): for key in laws_jacobian_weierstrass: res[key] = [] - print ("Formula " + name + ":") + print("Formula " + name + ":") count = 0 - for branch in xrange(branches): + for branch in range(branches): assumeFormula, assumeBranch, pC = formula(branch, pA, pB) pC.X = lift(pC.X) pC.Y = lift(pC.Y) @@ -255,10 +255,10 @@ def check_symbolic_jacobian_weierstrass(name, A, B, branches, formula): res[key].append((check_symbolic_function(R, assumeFormula, assumeBranch, laws_jacobian_weierstrass[key], A, B, pa, pb, pA, pB, pC), branch)) for key in res: - print " %s:" % key + print(" %s:" % key) val = res[key] for x in val: if x[0] is not None: - print " branch %i: %s" % (x[1], x[0]) + print(" branch %i: %s" % (x[1], x[0])) - print + print() diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/assumptions.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/assumptions.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..77204de --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/assumptions.h @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2020 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_ASSUMPTIONS_H +#define SECP256K1_ASSUMPTIONS_H + +#include + +#include "util.h" + +/* This library, like most software, relies on a number of compiler implementation defined (but not undefined) + behaviours. Although the behaviours we require are essentially universal we test them specifically here to + reduce the odds of experiencing an unwelcome surprise. +*/ + +struct secp256k1_assumption_checker { + /* This uses a trick to implement a static assertion in C89: a type with an array of negative size is not + allowed. */ + int dummy_array[( + /* Bytes are 8 bits. */ + (CHAR_BIT == 8) && + + /* No integer promotion for uint32_t. This ensures that we can multiply uintXX_t values where XX >= 32 + without signed overflow, which would be undefined behaviour. */ + (UINT_MAX <= UINT32_MAX) && + + /* Conversions from unsigned to signed outside of the bounds of the signed type are + implementation-defined. Verify that they function as reinterpreting the lower + bits of the input in two's complement notation. Do this for conversions: + - from uint(N)_t to int(N)_t with negative result + - from uint(2N)_t to int(N)_t with negative result + - from int(2N)_t to int(N)_t with negative result + - from int(2N)_t to int(N)_t with positive result */ + + /* To int8_t. */ + ((int8_t)(uint8_t)0xAB == (int8_t)-(int8_t)0x55) && + ((int8_t)(uint16_t)0xABCD == (int8_t)-(int8_t)0x33) && + ((int8_t)(int16_t)(uint16_t)0xCDEF == (int8_t)(uint8_t)0xEF) && + ((int8_t)(int16_t)(uint16_t)0x9234 == (int8_t)(uint8_t)0x34) && + + /* To int16_t. */ + ((int16_t)(uint16_t)0xBCDE == (int16_t)-(int16_t)0x4322) && + ((int16_t)(uint32_t)0xA1B2C3D4 == (int16_t)-(int16_t)0x3C2C) && + ((int16_t)(int32_t)(uint32_t)0xC1D2E3F4 == (int16_t)(uint16_t)0xE3F4) && + ((int16_t)(int32_t)(uint32_t)0x92345678 == (int16_t)(uint16_t)0x5678) && + + /* To int32_t. */ + ((int32_t)(uint32_t)0xB2C3D4E5 == (int32_t)-(int32_t)0x4D3C2B1B) && + ((int32_t)(uint64_t)0xA123B456C789D012ULL == (int32_t)-(int32_t)0x38762FEE) && + ((int32_t)(int64_t)(uint64_t)0xC1D2E3F4A5B6C7D8ULL == (int32_t)(uint32_t)0xA5B6C7D8) && + ((int32_t)(int64_t)(uint64_t)0xABCDEF0123456789ULL == (int32_t)(uint32_t)0x23456789) && + + /* To int64_t. */ + ((int64_t)(uint64_t)0xB123C456D789E012ULL == (int64_t)-(int64_t)0x4EDC3BA928761FEEULL) && +#if defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128) + ((int64_t)(((uint128_t)0xA1234567B8901234ULL << 64) + 0xC5678901D2345678ULL) == (int64_t)-(int64_t)0x3A9876FE2DCBA988ULL) && + (((int64_t)(int128_t)(((uint128_t)0xB1C2D3E4F5A6B7C8ULL << 64) + 0xD9E0F1A2B3C4D5E6ULL)) == (int64_t)(uint64_t)0xD9E0F1A2B3C4D5E6ULL) && + (((int64_t)(int128_t)(((uint128_t)0xABCDEF0123456789ULL << 64) + 0x0123456789ABCDEFULL)) == (int64_t)(uint64_t)0x0123456789ABCDEFULL) && + + /* To int128_t. */ + ((int128_t)(((uint128_t)0xB1234567C8901234ULL << 64) + 0xD5678901E2345678ULL) == (int128_t)(-(int128_t)0x8E1648B3F50E80DCULL * 0x8E1648B3F50E80DDULL + 0x5EA688D5482F9464ULL)) && +#endif + + /* Right shift on negative signed values is implementation defined. Verify that it + acts as a right shift in two's complement with sign extension (i.e duplicating + the top bit into newly added bits). */ + ((((int8_t)0xE8) >> 2) == (int8_t)(uint8_t)0xFA) && + ((((int16_t)0xE9AC) >> 4) == (int16_t)(uint16_t)0xFE9A) && + ((((int32_t)0x937C918A) >> 9) == (int32_t)(uint32_t)0xFFC9BE48) && + ((((int64_t)0xA8B72231DF9CF4B9ULL) >> 19) == (int64_t)(uint64_t)0xFFFFF516E4463BF3ULL) && +#if defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128) + ((((int128_t)(((uint128_t)0xCD833A65684A0DBCULL << 64) + 0xB349312F71EA7637ULL)) >> 39) == (int128_t)(((uint128_t)0xFFFFFFFFFF9B0674ULL << 64) + 0xCAD0941B79669262ULL)) && +#endif + 1) * 2 - 1]; +}; + +#endif /* SECP256K1_ASSUMPTIONS_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/basic-config.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/basic-config.h index e9be39d..b0d82e8 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/basic-config.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/basic-config.h @@ -11,26 +11,22 @@ #undef USE_ASM_X86_64 #undef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION -#undef USE_ENDOMORPHISM #undef USE_EXTERNAL_ASM #undef USE_EXTERNAL_DEFAULT_CALLBACKS -#undef USE_FIELD_10X26 -#undef USE_FIELD_5X52 #undef USE_FIELD_INV_BUILTIN #undef USE_FIELD_INV_NUM #undef USE_NUM_GMP #undef USE_NUM_NONE -#undef USE_SCALAR_4X64 -#undef USE_SCALAR_8X32 #undef USE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN #undef USE_SCALAR_INV_NUM +#undef USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT64 +#undef USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT128 #undef ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE #define USE_NUM_NONE 1 #define USE_FIELD_INV_BUILTIN 1 #define USE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN 1 -#define USE_FIELD_10X26 1 -#define USE_SCALAR_8X32 1 +#define USE_WIDEMUL_64 1 #define ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE 15 #endif /* USE_BASIC_CONFIG */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/bench.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/bench.h index b8a1c2b..9bfed90 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/bench.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/bench.h @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ void print_number(const int64_t x) { printf("%s", &buffer[ptr]); } -void run_benchmark(char *name, void (*benchmark)(void*), void (*setup)(void*), void (*teardown)(void*), void* data, int count, int iter) { +void run_benchmark(char *name, void (*benchmark)(void*, int), void (*setup)(void*), void (*teardown)(void*, int), void* data, int count, int iter) { int i; int64_t min = INT64_MAX; int64_t sum = 0; @@ -84,10 +84,10 @@ void run_benchmark(char *name, void (*benchmark)(void*), void (*setup)(void*), v setup(data); } begin = gettime_i64(); - benchmark(data); + benchmark(data, iter); total = gettime_i64() - begin; if (teardown != NULL) { - teardown(data); + teardown(data, iter); } if (total < min) { min = total; @@ -121,4 +121,13 @@ int have_flag(int argc, char** argv, char *flag) { return 0; } +int get_iters(int default_iters) { + char* env = getenv("SECP256K1_BENCH_ITERS"); + if (env) { + return strtol(env, NULL, 0); + } else { + return default_iters; + } +} + #endif /* SECP256K1_BENCH_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_ecdh.c b/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_ecdh.c index c1dd5a6..f099d33 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_ecdh.c +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_ecdh.c @@ -28,20 +28,18 @@ static void bench_ecdh_setup(void* arg) { 0xa2, 0xba, 0xd1, 0x84, 0xf8, 0x83, 0xc6, 0x9f }; - /* create a context with no capabilities */ - data->ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT); for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { data->scalar[i] = i + 1; } CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(data->ctx, &data->point, point, sizeof(point)) == 1); } -static void bench_ecdh(void* arg) { +static void bench_ecdh(void* arg, int iters) { int i; unsigned char res[32]; bench_ecdh_data *data = (bench_ecdh_data*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(data->ctx, res, &data->point, data->scalar, NULL, NULL) == 1); } } @@ -49,6 +47,13 @@ static void bench_ecdh(void* arg) { int main(void) { bench_ecdh_data data; - run_benchmark("ecdh", bench_ecdh, bench_ecdh_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + int iters = get_iters(20000); + + /* create a context with no capabilities */ + data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT); + + run_benchmark("ecdh", bench_ecdh, bench_ecdh_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); return 0; } diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_ecmult.c b/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_ecmult.c index 7b5d185..facd07e 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_ecmult.c +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_ecmult.c @@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ #include "secp256k1.c" #define POINTS 32768 -#define ITERS 10000 typedef struct { /* Setup once in advance */ @@ -55,13 +54,13 @@ static int bench_callback(secp256k1_scalar* sc, secp256k1_ge* ge, size_t idx, vo return 1; } -static void bench_ecmult(void* arg) { +static void bench_ecmult(void* arg, int iters) { bench_data* data = (bench_data*)arg; - size_t count = data->count; int includes_g = data->includes_g; - size_t iters = 1 + ITERS / count; - size_t iter; + int iter; + int count = data->count; + iters = iters / data->count; for (iter = 0; iter < iters; ++iter) { data->ecmult_multi(&data->ctx->error_callback, &data->ctx->ecmult_ctx, data->scratch, &data->output[iter], data->includes_g ? &data->scalars[data->offset1] : NULL, bench_callback, arg, count - includes_g); @@ -76,10 +75,10 @@ static void bench_ecmult_setup(void* arg) { data->offset2 = (data->count * 0x7f6f537b + 0x6a1a8f49) % POINTS; } -static void bench_ecmult_teardown(void* arg) { +static void bench_ecmult_teardown(void* arg, int iters) { bench_data* data = (bench_data*)arg; - size_t iters = 1 + ITERS / data->count; - size_t iter; + int iter; + iters = iters / data->count; /* Verify the results in teardown, to avoid doing comparisons while benchmarking. */ for (iter = 0; iter < iters; ++iter) { secp256k1_gej tmp; @@ -104,10 +103,10 @@ static void generate_scalar(uint32_t num, secp256k1_scalar* scalar) { CHECK(!overflow); } -static void run_test(bench_data* data, size_t count, int includes_g) { +static void run_test(bench_data* data, size_t count, int includes_g, int num_iters) { char str[32]; static const secp256k1_scalar zero = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); - size_t iters = 1 + ITERS / count; + size_t iters = 1 + num_iters / count; size_t iter; data->count = count; @@ -130,7 +129,7 @@ static void run_test(bench_data* data, size_t count, int includes_g) { /* Run the benchmark. */ sprintf(str, includes_g ? "ecmult_%ig" : "ecmult_%i", (int)count); - run_benchmark(str, bench_ecmult, bench_ecmult_setup, bench_ecmult_teardown, data, 10, count * (1 + ITERS / count)); + run_benchmark(str, bench_ecmult, bench_ecmult_setup, bench_ecmult_teardown, data, 10, count * iters); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { @@ -139,6 +138,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { secp256k1_gej* pubkeys_gej; size_t scratch_size; + int iters = get_iters(10000); + data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); scratch_size = secp256k1_strauss_scratch_size(POINTS) + STRAUSS_SCRATCH_OBJECTS*16; data.scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(data.ctx, scratch_size); @@ -167,8 +168,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { data.scalars = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) * POINTS); data.seckeys = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) * POINTS); data.pubkeys = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_ge) * POINTS); - data.expected_output = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_gej) * (ITERS + 1)); - data.output = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_gej) * (ITERS + 1)); + data.expected_output = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_gej) * (iters + 1)); + data.output = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_gej) * (iters + 1)); /* Generate a set of scalars, and private/public keypairs. */ pubkeys_gej = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_gej) * POINTS); @@ -185,14 +186,20 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { free(pubkeys_gej); for (i = 1; i <= 8; ++i) { - run_test(&data, i, 1); + run_test(&data, i, 1, iters); } - for (p = 0; p <= 11; ++p) { - for (i = 9; i <= 16; ++i) { - run_test(&data, i << p, 1); + /* This is disabled with low count of iterations because the loop runs 77 times even with iters=1 + * and the higher it goes the longer the computation takes(more points) + * So we don't run this benchmark with low iterations to prevent slow down */ + if (iters > 2) { + for (p = 0; p <= 11; ++p) { + for (i = 9; i <= 16; ++i) { + run_test(&data, i << p, 1, iters); + } } } + if (data.scratch != NULL) { secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(data.ctx, data.scratch); } diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_internal.c b/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_internal.c index 9159c0a..5f2b7a9 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_internal.c +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_internal.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "assumptions.h" #include "util.h" #include "hash_impl.h" #include "num_impl.h" @@ -19,10 +20,10 @@ #include "secp256k1.c" typedef struct { - secp256k1_scalar scalar_x, scalar_y; - secp256k1_fe fe_x, fe_y; - secp256k1_ge ge_x, ge_y; - secp256k1_gej gej_x, gej_y; + secp256k1_scalar scalar[2]; + secp256k1_fe fe[4]; + secp256k1_ge ge[2]; + secp256k1_gej gej[2]; unsigned char data[64]; int wnaf[256]; } bench_inv; @@ -30,350 +31,401 @@ typedef struct { void bench_setup(void* arg) { bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - static const unsigned char init_x[32] = { - 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x07, 0x0b, 0x0d, 0x11, 0x13, - 0x17, 0x1d, 0x1f, 0x25, 0x29, 0x2b, 0x2f, 0x35, - 0x3b, 0x3d, 0x43, 0x47, 0x49, 0x4f, 0x53, 0x59, - 0x61, 0x65, 0x67, 0x6b, 0x6d, 0x71, 0x7f, 0x83 + static const unsigned char init[4][32] = { + /* Initializer for scalar[0], fe[0], first half of data, the X coordinate of ge[0], + and the (implied affine) X coordinate of gej[0]. */ + { + 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x07, 0x0b, 0x0d, 0x11, 0x13, + 0x17, 0x1d, 0x1f, 0x25, 0x29, 0x2b, 0x2f, 0x35, + 0x3b, 0x3d, 0x43, 0x47, 0x49, 0x4f, 0x53, 0x59, + 0x61, 0x65, 0x67, 0x6b, 0x6d, 0x71, 0x7f, 0x83 + }, + /* Initializer for scalar[1], fe[1], first half of data, the X coordinate of ge[1], + and the (implied affine) X coordinate of gej[1]. */ + { + 0x82, 0x83, 0x85, 0x87, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0x81, 0x83, + 0x97, 0xad, 0xaf, 0xb5, 0xb9, 0xbb, 0xbf, 0xc5, + 0xdb, 0xdd, 0xe3, 0xe7, 0xe9, 0xef, 0xf3, 0xf9, + 0x11, 0x15, 0x17, 0x1b, 0x1d, 0xb1, 0xbf, 0xd3 + }, + /* Initializer for fe[2] and the Z coordinate of gej[0]. */ + { + 0x3d, 0x2d, 0xef, 0xf4, 0x25, 0x98, 0x4f, 0x5d, + 0xe2, 0xca, 0x5f, 0x41, 0x3f, 0x3f, 0xce, 0x44, + 0xaa, 0x2c, 0x53, 0x8a, 0xc6, 0x59, 0x1f, 0x38, + 0x38, 0x23, 0xe4, 0x11, 0x27, 0xc6, 0xa0, 0xe7 + }, + /* Initializer for fe[3] and the Z coordinate of gej[1]. */ + { + 0xbd, 0x21, 0xa5, 0xe1, 0x13, 0x50, 0x73, 0x2e, + 0x52, 0x98, 0xc8, 0x9e, 0xab, 0x00, 0xa2, 0x68, + 0x43, 0xf5, 0xd7, 0x49, 0x80, 0x72, 0xa7, 0xf3, + 0xd7, 0x60, 0xe6, 0xab, 0x90, 0x92, 0xdf, 0xc5 + } }; - static const unsigned char init_y[32] = { - 0x82, 0x83, 0x85, 0x87, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0x81, 0x83, - 0x97, 0xad, 0xaf, 0xb5, 0xb9, 0xbb, 0xbf, 0xc5, - 0xdb, 0xdd, 0xe3, 0xe7, 0xe9, 0xef, 0xf3, 0xf9, - 0x11, 0x15, 0x17, 0x1b, 0x1d, 0xb1, 0xbf, 0xd3 - }; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&data->scalar_x, init_x, NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&data->scalar_y, init_y, NULL); - secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&data->fe_x, init_x); - secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&data->fe_y, init_y); - CHECK(secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&data->ge_x, &data->fe_x, 0)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&data->ge_y, &data->fe_y, 1)); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&data->gej_x, &data->ge_x); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&data->gej_y, &data->ge_y); - memcpy(data->data, init_x, 32); - memcpy(data->data + 32, init_y, 32); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&data->scalar[0], init[0], NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&data->scalar[1], init[1], NULL); + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&data->fe[0], init[0]); + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&data->fe[1], init[1]); + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&data->fe[2], init[2]); + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&data->fe[3], init[3]); + CHECK(secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&data->ge[0], &data->fe[0], 0)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&data->ge[1], &data->fe[1], 1)); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&data->gej[0], &data->ge[0]); + secp256k1_gej_rescale(&data->gej[0], &data->fe[2]); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&data->gej[1], &data->ge[1]); + secp256k1_gej_rescale(&data->gej[1], &data->fe[3]); + memcpy(data->data, init[0], 32); + memcpy(data->data + 32, init[1], 32); } -void bench_scalar_add(void* arg) { +void bench_scalar_add(void* arg, int iters) { int i, j = 0; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 2000000; i++) { - j += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + j += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[1]); } - CHECK(j <= 2000000); + CHECK(j <= iters); } -void bench_scalar_negate(void* arg) { +void bench_scalar_negate(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 2000000; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0]); } } -void bench_scalar_sqr(void* arg) { +void bench_scalar_sqr(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0]); } } -void bench_scalar_mul(void* arg) { +void bench_scalar_mul(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[1]); } } -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -void bench_scalar_split(void* arg) { +void bench_scalar_split(void* arg, int iters) { int i, j = 0; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y, &data->scalar_x); - j += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[1], &data->scalar[0]); + j += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[1]); } - CHECK(j <= 20000); + CHECK(j <= iters); } -#endif -void bench_scalar_inverse(void* arg) { +void bench_scalar_inverse(void* arg, int iters) { int i, j = 0; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 2000; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x); - j += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0]); + j += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[1]); } - CHECK(j <= 2000); + CHECK(j <= iters); } -void bench_scalar_inverse_var(void* arg) { +void bench_scalar_inverse_var(void* arg, int iters) { int i, j = 0; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 2000; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x); - j += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0]); + j += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[1]); } - CHECK(j <= 2000); + CHECK(j <= iters); } -void bench_field_normalize(void* arg) { +void bench_field_normalize(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 2000000; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&data->fe_x); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&data->fe[0]); } } -void bench_field_normalize_weak(void* arg) { +void bench_field_normalize_weak(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 2000000; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&data->fe_x); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&data->fe[0]); } } -void bench_field_mul(void* arg) { +void bench_field_mul(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_mul(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x, &data->fe_y); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_fe_mul(&data->fe[0], &data->fe[0], &data->fe[1]); } } -void bench_field_sqr(void* arg) { +void bench_field_sqr(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&data->fe[0], &data->fe[0]); } } -void bench_field_inverse(void* arg) { +void bench_field_inverse(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_inv(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x); - secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_y); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_fe_inv(&data->fe[0], &data->fe[0]); + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe[0], &data->fe[1]); } } -void bench_field_inverse_var(void* arg) { +void bench_field_inverse_var(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x); - secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_y); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&data->fe[0], &data->fe[0]); + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe[0], &data->fe[1]); } } -void bench_field_sqrt(void* arg) { +void bench_field_sqrt(void* arg, int iters) { int i, j = 0; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; secp256k1_fe t; - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - t = data->fe_x; - j += secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&data->fe_x, &t); - secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_y); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + t = data->fe[0]; + j += secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&data->fe[0], &t); + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe[0], &data->fe[1]); } - CHECK(j <= 20000); + CHECK(j <= iters); } -void bench_group_double_var(void* arg) { +void bench_group_double_var(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&data->gej_x, &data->gej_x, NULL); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&data->gej[0], &data->gej[0], NULL); } } -void bench_group_add_var(void* arg) { +void bench_group_add_var(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&data->gej_x, &data->gej_x, &data->gej_y, NULL); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&data->gej[0], &data->gej[0], &data->gej[1], NULL); } } -void bench_group_add_affine(void* arg) { +void bench_group_add_affine(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&data->gej_x, &data->gej_x, &data->ge_y); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&data->gej[0], &data->gej[0], &data->ge[1]); } } -void bench_group_add_affine_var(void* arg) { +void bench_group_add_affine_var(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&data->gej_x, &data->gej_x, &data->ge_y, NULL); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&data->gej[0], &data->gej[0], &data->ge[1], NULL); } } -void bench_group_jacobi_var(void* arg) { +void bench_group_jacobi_var(void* arg, int iters) { int i, j = 0; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - j += secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&data->gej_x); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + j += secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&data->gej[0]); + /* Vary the Y and Z coordinates of the input (the X coordinate doesn't matter to + secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var). Note that the resulting coordinates will + generally not correspond to a point on the curve, but this is not a problem + for the code being benchmarked here. Adding and normalizing have less + overhead than EC operations (which could guarantee the point remains on the + curve). */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->gej[0].y, &data->fe[1]); + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->gej[0].z, &data->fe[2]); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&data->gej[0].y); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&data->gej[0].z); } - CHECK(j == 20000); + CHECK(j <= iters); } -void bench_ecmult_wnaf(void* arg) { +void bench_group_to_affine_var(void* arg, int iters) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < iters; ++i) { + secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&data->ge[1], &data->gej[0]); + /* Use the output affine X/Y coordinates to vary the input X/Y/Z coordinates. + Similar to bench_group_jacobi_var, this approach does not result in + coordinates of points on the curve. */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->gej[0].x, &data->ge[1].y); + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->gej[0].y, &data->fe[2]); + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->gej[0].z, &data->ge[1].x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&data->gej[0].x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&data->gej[0].y); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&data->gej[0].z); + } +} + +void bench_ecmult_wnaf(void* arg, int iters) { int i, bits = 0, overflow = 0; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - bits += secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(data->wnaf, 256, &data->scalar_x, WINDOW_A); - overflow += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + bits += secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(data->wnaf, 256, &data->scalar[0], WINDOW_A); + overflow += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[1]); } CHECK(overflow >= 0); - CHECK(bits <= 256*20000); + CHECK(bits <= 256*iters); } -void bench_wnaf_const(void* arg) { +void bench_wnaf_const(void* arg, int iters) { int i, bits = 0, overflow = 0; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - bits += secp256k1_wnaf_const(data->wnaf, &data->scalar_x, WINDOW_A, 256); - overflow += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + bits += secp256k1_wnaf_const(data->wnaf, &data->scalar[0], WINDOW_A, 256); + overflow += secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[0], &data->scalar[1]); } CHECK(overflow >= 0); - CHECK(bits <= 256*20000); + CHECK(bits <= 256*iters); } -void bench_sha256(void* arg) { +void bench_sha256(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; secp256k1_sha256 sha; - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha); secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, data->data, 32); secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, data->data); } } -void bench_hmac_sha256(void* arg) { +void bench_hmac_sha256(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; secp256k1_hmac_sha256 hmac; - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, data->data, 32); secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, data->data, 32); secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, data->data); } } -void bench_rfc6979_hmac_sha256(void* arg) { +void bench_rfc6979_hmac_sha256(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 rng; - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, data->data, 64); secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, data->data, 32); } } -void bench_context_verify(void* arg) { +void bench_context_verify(void* arg, int iters) { int i; (void)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { secp256k1_context_destroy(secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY)); } } -void bench_context_sign(void* arg) { +void bench_context_sign(void* arg, int iters) { int i; (void)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 200; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { secp256k1_context_destroy(secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN)); } } #ifndef USE_NUM_NONE -void bench_num_jacobi(void* arg) { +void bench_num_jacobi(void* arg, int iters) { int i, j = 0; bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - secp256k1_num nx, norder; + secp256k1_num nx, na, norder; - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&nx, &data->scalar_x); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&nx, &data->scalar[0]); secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(&norder); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&norder, &data->scalar_y); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&na, &data->scalar[1]); - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { j += secp256k1_num_jacobi(&nx, &norder); + secp256k1_num_add(&nx, &nx, &na); } - CHECK(j <= 200000); + CHECK(j <= iters); } #endif int main(int argc, char **argv) { bench_inv data; - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("scalar_add", bench_scalar_add, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "negate")) run_benchmark("scalar_negate", bench_scalar_negate, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sqr")) run_benchmark("scalar_sqr", bench_scalar_sqr, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "mul")) run_benchmark("scalar_mul", bench_scalar_mul, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "split")) run_benchmark("scalar_split", bench_scalar_split, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); -#endif + int iters = get_iters(20000); + + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("scalar_add", bench_scalar_add, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters*100); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "negate")) run_benchmark("scalar_negate", bench_scalar_negate, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters*100); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sqr")) run_benchmark("scalar_sqr", bench_scalar_sqr, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters*10); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "mul")) run_benchmark("scalar_mul", bench_scalar_mul, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters*10); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "split")) run_benchmark("scalar_split", bench_scalar_split, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "inverse")) run_benchmark("scalar_inverse", bench_scalar_inverse, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000); if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "inverse")) run_benchmark("scalar_inverse_var", bench_scalar_inverse_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "normalize")) run_benchmark("field_normalize", bench_field_normalize, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "normalize")) run_benchmark("field_normalize_weak", bench_field_normalize_weak, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sqr")) run_benchmark("field_sqr", bench_field_sqr, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "mul")) run_benchmark("field_mul", bench_field_mul, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "inverse")) run_benchmark("field_inverse", bench_field_inverse, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "inverse")) run_benchmark("field_inverse_var", bench_field_inverse_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sqrt")) run_benchmark("field_sqrt", bench_field_sqrt, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "normalize")) run_benchmark("field_normalize", bench_field_normalize, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters*100); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "normalize")) run_benchmark("field_normalize_weak", bench_field_normalize_weak, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters*100); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sqr")) run_benchmark("field_sqr", bench_field_sqr, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters*10); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "mul")) run_benchmark("field_mul", bench_field_mul, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters*10); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "inverse")) run_benchmark("field_inverse", bench_field_inverse, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "inverse")) run_benchmark("field_inverse_var", bench_field_inverse_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sqrt")) run_benchmark("field_sqrt", bench_field_sqrt, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "double")) run_benchmark("group_double_var", bench_group_double_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("group_add_var", bench_group_add_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("group_add_affine", bench_group_add_affine, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("group_add_affine_var", bench_group_add_affine_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "jacobi")) run_benchmark("group_jacobi_var", bench_group_jacobi_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "double")) run_benchmark("group_double_var", bench_group_double_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters*10); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("group_add_var", bench_group_add_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters*10); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("group_add_affine", bench_group_add_affine, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters*10); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("group_add_affine_var", bench_group_add_affine_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters*10); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "jacobi")) run_benchmark("group_jacobi_var", bench_group_jacobi_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "to_affine")) run_benchmark("group_to_affine_var", bench_group_to_affine_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "ecmult") || have_flag(argc, argv, "wnaf")) run_benchmark("wnaf_const", bench_wnaf_const, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "ecmult") || have_flag(argc, argv, "wnaf")) run_benchmark("ecmult_wnaf", bench_ecmult_wnaf, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "ecmult") || have_flag(argc, argv, "wnaf")) run_benchmark("wnaf_const", bench_wnaf_const, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "ecmult") || have_flag(argc, argv, "wnaf")) run_benchmark("ecmult_wnaf", bench_ecmult_wnaf, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "hash") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sha256")) run_benchmark("hash_sha256", bench_sha256, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "hash") || have_flag(argc, argv, "hmac")) run_benchmark("hash_hmac_sha256", bench_hmac_sha256, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "hash") || have_flag(argc, argv, "rng6979")) run_benchmark("hash_rfc6979_hmac_sha256", bench_rfc6979_hmac_sha256, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "hash") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sha256")) run_benchmark("hash_sha256", bench_sha256, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "hash") || have_flag(argc, argv, "hmac")) run_benchmark("hash_hmac_sha256", bench_hmac_sha256, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "hash") || have_flag(argc, argv, "rng6979")) run_benchmark("hash_rfc6979_hmac_sha256", bench_rfc6979_hmac_sha256, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "context") || have_flag(argc, argv, "verify")) run_benchmark("context_verify", bench_context_verify, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "context") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sign")) run_benchmark("context_sign", bench_context_sign, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "context") || have_flag(argc, argv, "verify")) run_benchmark("context_verify", bench_context_verify, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 1 + iters/1000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "context") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sign")) run_benchmark("context_sign", bench_context_sign, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 1 + iters/100); #ifndef USE_NUM_NONE - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "num") || have_flag(argc, argv, "jacobi")) run_benchmark("num_jacobi", bench_num_jacobi, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "num") || have_flag(argc, argv, "jacobi")) run_benchmark("num_jacobi", bench_num_jacobi, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters*10); #endif return 0; } diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_recover.c b/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_recover.c index b806eed..e952ed1 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_recover.c +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_recover.c @@ -15,13 +15,13 @@ typedef struct { unsigned char sig[64]; } bench_recover_data; -void bench_recover(void* arg) { +void bench_recover(void* arg, int iters) { int i; bench_recover_data *data = (bench_recover_data*)arg; secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; unsigned char pubkeyc[33]; - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { int j; size_t pubkeylen = 33; secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature sig; @@ -51,9 +51,11 @@ void bench_recover_setup(void* arg) { int main(void) { bench_recover_data data; + int iters = get_iters(20000); + data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - run_benchmark("ecdsa_recover", bench_recover, bench_recover_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + run_benchmark("ecdsa_recover", bench_recover, bench_recover_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); return 0; diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_schnorrsig.c b/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_schnorrsig.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..315f5af --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_schnorrsig.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2018-2020 Andrew Poelstra, Jonas Nick * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + + +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "bench.h" + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_context *ctx; + int n; + + const secp256k1_keypair **keypairs; + const unsigned char **pk; + const unsigned char **sigs; + const unsigned char **msgs; +} bench_schnorrsig_data; + +void bench_schnorrsig_sign(void* arg, int iters) { + bench_schnorrsig_data *data = (bench_schnorrsig_data *)arg; + int i; + unsigned char msg[32] = "benchmarkexamplemessagetemplate"; + unsigned char sig[64]; + + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + msg[0] = i; + msg[1] = i >> 8; + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(data->ctx, sig, msg, data->keypairs[i], NULL, NULL)); + } +} + +void bench_schnorrsig_verify(void* arg, int iters) { + bench_schnorrsig_data *data = (bench_schnorrsig_data *)arg; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk; + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(data->ctx, &pk, data->pk[i]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(data->ctx, data->sigs[i], data->msgs[i], &pk)); + } +} + +int main(void) { + int i; + bench_schnorrsig_data data; + int iters = get_iters(10000); + + data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); + data.keypairs = (const secp256k1_keypair **)malloc(iters * sizeof(secp256k1_keypair *)); + data.pk = (const unsigned char **)malloc(iters * sizeof(unsigned char *)); + data.msgs = (const unsigned char **)malloc(iters * sizeof(unsigned char *)); + data.sigs = (const unsigned char **)malloc(iters * sizeof(unsigned char *)); + + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + unsigned char sk[32]; + unsigned char *msg = (unsigned char *)malloc(32); + unsigned char *sig = (unsigned char *)malloc(64); + secp256k1_keypair *keypair = (secp256k1_keypair *)malloc(sizeof(*keypair)); + unsigned char *pk_char = (unsigned char *)malloc(32); + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk; + msg[0] = sk[0] = i; + msg[1] = sk[1] = i >> 8; + msg[2] = sk[2] = i >> 16; + msg[3] = sk[3] = i >> 24; + memset(&msg[4], 'm', 28); + memset(&sk[4], 's', 28); + + data.keypairs[i] = keypair; + data.pk[i] = pk_char; + data.msgs[i] = msg; + data.sigs[i] = sig; + + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(data.ctx, keypair, sk)); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(data.ctx, sig, msg, keypair, NULL, NULL)); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(data.ctx, &pk, NULL, keypair)); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(data.ctx, pk_char, &pk) == 1); + } + + run_benchmark("schnorrsig_sign", bench_schnorrsig_sign, NULL, NULL, (void *) &data, 10, iters); + run_benchmark("schnorrsig_verify", bench_schnorrsig_verify, NULL, NULL, (void *) &data, 10, iters); + + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { + free((void *)data.keypairs[i]); + free((void *)data.pk[i]); + free((void *)data.msgs[i]); + free((void *)data.sigs[i]); + } + free(data.keypairs); + free(data.pk); + free(data.msgs); + free(data.sigs); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); + return 0; +} diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_sign.c b/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_sign.c index 544b439..0fd6c00 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_sign.c +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_sign.c @@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ typedef struct { secp256k1_context* ctx; unsigned char msg[32]; unsigned char key[32]; -} bench_sign; +} bench_sign_data; static void bench_sign_setup(void* arg) { int i; - bench_sign *data = (bench_sign*)arg; + bench_sign_data *data = (bench_sign_data*)arg; for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { data->msg[i] = i + 1; @@ -26,12 +26,12 @@ static void bench_sign_setup(void* arg) { } } -static void bench_sign_run(void* arg) { +static void bench_sign_run(void* arg, int iters) { int i; - bench_sign *data = (bench_sign*)arg; + bench_sign_data *data = (bench_sign_data*)arg; unsigned char sig[74]; - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { size_t siglen = 74; int j; secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature; @@ -45,11 +45,13 @@ static void bench_sign_run(void* arg) { } int main(void) { - bench_sign data; + bench_sign_data data; + + int iters = get_iters(20000); data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); - run_benchmark("ecdsa_sign", bench_sign_run, bench_sign_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + run_benchmark("ecdsa_sign", bench_sign_run, bench_sign_setup, NULL, &data, 10, iters); secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); return 0; diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_verify.c b/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_verify.c index 418defa..c9efa5f 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_verify.c +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/bench_verify.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include #endif + typedef struct { secp256k1_context *ctx; unsigned char msg[32]; @@ -28,13 +29,13 @@ typedef struct { #ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS EC_GROUP* ec_group; #endif -} benchmark_verify_t; +} bench_verify_data; -static void benchmark_verify(void* arg) { +static void bench_verify(void* arg, int iters) { int i; - benchmark_verify_t* data = (benchmark_verify_t*)arg; + bench_verify_data* data = (bench_verify_data*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; data->sig[data->siglen - 1] ^= (i & 0xFF); @@ -50,11 +51,11 @@ static void benchmark_verify(void* arg) { } #ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS -static void benchmark_verify_openssl(void* arg) { +static void bench_verify_openssl(void* arg, int iters) { int i; - benchmark_verify_t* data = (benchmark_verify_t*)arg; + bench_verify_data* data = (bench_verify_data*)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < iters; i++) { data->sig[data->siglen - 1] ^= (i & 0xFF); data->sig[data->siglen - 2] ^= ((i >> 8) & 0xFF); data->sig[data->siglen - 3] ^= ((i >> 16) & 0xFF); @@ -83,7 +84,9 @@ int main(void) { int i; secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; - benchmark_verify_t data; + bench_verify_data data; + + int iters = get_iters(20000); data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); @@ -100,10 +103,10 @@ int main(void) { data.pubkeylen = 33; CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(data.ctx, data.pubkey, &data.pubkeylen, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); - run_benchmark("ecdsa_verify", benchmark_verify, NULL, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + run_benchmark("ecdsa_verify", bench_verify, NULL, NULL, &data, 10, iters); #ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS data.ec_group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1); - run_benchmark("ecdsa_verify_openssl", benchmark_verify_openssl, NULL, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + run_benchmark("ecdsa_verify_openssl", bench_verify_openssl, NULL, NULL, &data, 10, iters); EC_GROUP_free(data.ec_group); #endif diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/ecdsa_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/ecdsa_impl.h index eb099c8..5f54b59 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/ecdsa_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/ecdsa_impl.h @@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, sec secp256k1_ge r; secp256k1_scalar n; int overflow = 0; + int high; secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ctx, &rp, nonce); secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&r, &rp); @@ -287,15 +288,11 @@ static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, sec secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r.y); secp256k1_fe_get_b32(b, &r.x); secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(sigr, b, &overflow); - /* These two conditions should be checked before calling */ - VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigr)); - VERIFY_CHECK(overflow == 0); - if (recid) { /* The overflow condition is cryptographically unreachable as hitting it requires finding the discrete log * of some P where P.x >= order, and only 1 in about 2^127 points meet this criteria. */ - *recid = (overflow ? 2 : 0) | (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r.y) ? 1 : 0); + *recid = (overflow << 1) | secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r.y); } secp256k1_scalar_mul(&n, sigr, seckey); secp256k1_scalar_add(&n, &n, message); @@ -304,16 +301,15 @@ static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, sec secp256k1_scalar_clear(&n); secp256k1_gej_clear(&rp); secp256k1_ge_clear(&r); - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigs)) { - return 0; - } - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_high(sigs)) { - secp256k1_scalar_negate(sigs, sigs); - if (recid) { - *recid ^= 1; - } + high = secp256k1_scalar_is_high(sigs); + secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(sigs, high); + if (recid) { + *recid ^= high; } - return 1; + /* P.x = order is on the curve, so technically sig->r could end up being zero, which would be an invalid signature. + * This is cryptographically unreachable as hitting it requires finding the discrete log of P.x = N. + */ + return !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigr) & !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigs); } #endif /* SECP256K1_ECDSA_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/eckey_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/eckey_impl.h index 7c5b789..e2e72d9 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/eckey_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/eckey_impl.h @@ -54,10 +54,7 @@ static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(secp256k1_ge *elem, unsigned char *p static int secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_add(secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak) { secp256k1_scalar_add(key, key, tweak); - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(key)) { - return 0; - } - return 1; + return !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(key); } static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_ge *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak) { @@ -75,12 +72,11 @@ static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, } static int secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_mul(secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak) { - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(tweak)) { - return 0; - } + int ret; + ret = !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(tweak); secp256k1_scalar_mul(key, key, tweak); - return 1; + return ret; } static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_mul(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_ge *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak) { diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/ecmult.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/ecmult.h index c9b1982..09e8146 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/ecmult.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/ecmult.h @@ -15,9 +15,7 @@ typedef struct { /* For accelerating the computation of a*P + b*G: */ secp256k1_ge_storage (*pre_g)[]; /* odd multiples of the generator */ -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM secp256k1_ge_storage (*pre_g_128)[]; /* odd multiples of 2^128*generator */ -#endif } secp256k1_ecmult_context; static const size_t SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONTEXT_PREALLOCATED_SIZE; diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h index d0d9631..bb95111 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ /* This is like `ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE` but is constant time */ #define ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(r,pre,n,w) do { \ - int m; \ + int m = 0; \ /* Extract the sign-bit for a constant time absolute-value. */ \ int mask = (n) >> (sizeof(n) * CHAR_BIT - 1); \ int abs_n = ((n) + mask) ^ mask; \ @@ -25,7 +25,11 @@ VERIFY_CHECK((n) <= ((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \ VERIFY_SETUP(secp256k1_fe_clear(&(r)->x)); \ VERIFY_SETUP(secp256k1_fe_clear(&(r)->y)); \ - for (m = 0; m < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(w); m++) { \ + /* Unconditionally set r->x = (pre)[m].x. r->y = (pre)[m].y. because it's either the correct one \ + * or will get replaced in the later iterations, this is needed to make sure `r` is initialized. */ \ + (r)->x = (pre)[m].x; \ + (r)->y = (pre)[m].y; \ + for (m = 1; m < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(w); m++) { \ /* This loop is used to avoid secret data in array indices. See * the comment in ecmult_gen_impl.h for rationale. */ \ secp256k1_fe_cmov(&(r)->x, &(pre)[m].x, m == idx_n); \ @@ -46,7 +50,7 @@ * * Adapted from `The Width-w NAF Method Provides Small Memory and Fast Elliptic Scalar * Multiplications Secure against Side Channel Attacks`, Okeya and Tagaki. M. Joye (Ed.) - * CT-RSA 2003, LNCS 2612, pp. 328-443, 2003. Springer-Verlagy Berlin Heidelberg 2003 + * CT-RSA 2003, LNCS 2612, pp. 328-443, 2003. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003 * * Numbers reference steps of `Algorithm SPA-resistant Width-w NAF with Odd Scalar` on pp. 335 */ @@ -101,16 +105,22 @@ static int secp256k1_wnaf_const(int *wnaf, const secp256k1_scalar *scalar, int w /* 4 */ u_last = secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&s, w); do { - int sign; int even; /* 4.1 4.4 */ u = secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&s, w); /* 4.2 */ even = ((u & 1) == 0); - sign = 2 * (u_last > 0) - 1; - u += sign * even; - u_last -= sign * even * (1 << w); + /* In contrast to the original algorithm, u_last is always > 0 and + * therefore we do not need to check its sign. In particular, it's easy + * to see that u_last is never < 0 because u is never < 0. Moreover, + * u_last is never = 0 because u is never even after a loop + * iteration. The same holds analogously for the initial value of + * u_last (in the first loop iteration). */ + VERIFY_CHECK(u_last > 0); + VERIFY_CHECK((u_last & 1) == 1); + u += even; + u_last -= even * (1 << w); /* 4.3, adapted for global sign change */ wnaf[word++] = u_last * global_sign; @@ -130,19 +140,16 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_const(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a, cons secp256k1_fe Z; int skew_1; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM secp256k1_ge pre_a_lam[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; int wnaf_lam[1 + WNAF_SIZE(WINDOW_A - 1)]; int skew_lam; secp256k1_scalar q_1, q_lam; -#endif int wnaf_1[1 + WNAF_SIZE(WINDOW_A - 1)]; int i; /* build wnaf representation for q. */ int rsize = size; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM if (size > 128) { rsize = 128; /* split q into q_1 and q_lam (where q = q_1 + q_lam*lambda, and q_1 and q_lam are ~128 bit) */ @@ -150,12 +157,9 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_const(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a, cons skew_1 = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_1, &q_1, WINDOW_A - 1, 128); skew_lam = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_lam, &q_lam, WINDOW_A - 1, 128); } else -#endif { skew_1 = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_1, scalar, WINDOW_A - 1, size); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM skew_lam = 0; -#endif } /* Calculate odd multiples of a. @@ -169,14 +173,12 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_const(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a, cons for (i = 0; i < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A); i++) { secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&pre_a[i].y); } -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM if (size > 128) { for (i = 0; i < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A); i++) { secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&pre_a_lam[i], &pre_a[i]); } } -#endif /* first loop iteration (separated out so we can directly set r, rather * than having it start at infinity, get doubled several times, then have @@ -185,34 +187,30 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_const(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a, cons VERIFY_CHECK(i != 0); ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a, i, WINDOW_A); secp256k1_gej_set_ge(r, &tmpa); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM if (size > 128) { i = wnaf_lam[WNAF_SIZE_BITS(rsize, WINDOW_A - 1)]; VERIFY_CHECK(i != 0); ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a_lam, i, WINDOW_A); secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &tmpa); } -#endif /* remaining loop iterations */ for (i = WNAF_SIZE_BITS(rsize, WINDOW_A - 1) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { int n; int j; for (j = 0; j < WINDOW_A - 1; ++j) { - secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(r, r); + secp256k1_gej_double(r, r); } n = wnaf_1[i]; ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a, n, WINDOW_A); VERIFY_CHECK(n != 0); secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &tmpa); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM if (size > 128) { n = wnaf_lam[i]; ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a_lam, n, WINDOW_A); VERIFY_CHECK(n != 0); secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &tmpa); } -#endif } secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &r->z, &Z); @@ -221,43 +219,35 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_const(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a, cons /* Correct for wNAF skew */ secp256k1_ge correction = *a; secp256k1_ge_storage correction_1_stor; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM secp256k1_ge_storage correction_lam_stor; -#endif secp256k1_ge_storage a2_stor; secp256k1_gej tmpj; secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&tmpj, &correction); secp256k1_gej_double_var(&tmpj, &tmpj, NULL); secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&correction, &tmpj); secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&correction_1_stor, a); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM if (size > 128) { secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&correction_lam_stor, a); } -#endif secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&a2_stor, &correction); /* For odd numbers this is 2a (so replace it), for even ones a (so no-op) */ secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&correction_1_stor, &a2_stor, skew_1 == 2); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM if (size > 128) { secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&correction_lam_stor, &a2_stor, skew_lam == 2); } -#endif /* Apply the correction */ secp256k1_ge_from_storage(&correction, &correction_1_stor); secp256k1_ge_neg(&correction, &correction); secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &correction); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM if (size > 128) { secp256k1_ge_from_storage(&correction, &correction_lam_stor); secp256k1_ge_neg(&correction, &correction); secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&correction, &correction); secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &correction); } -#endif } } diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h index a1b9639..30ac165 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, const secp256k1_fe s; unsigned char nonce32[32]; secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 rng; - int retry; + int overflow; unsigned char keydata[64] = {0}; if (seed32 == NULL) { /* When seed is NULL, reset the initial point and blinding value. */ @@ -183,21 +183,18 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, const } secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, keydata, seed32 ? 64 : 32); memset(keydata, 0, sizeof(keydata)); - /* Retry for out of range results to achieve uniformity. */ - do { - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32); - retry = !secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&s, nonce32); - retry = retry || secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&s); - } while (retry); /* This branch true is cryptographically unreachable. Requires sha256_hmac output > Fp. */ + /* Accept unobservably small non-uniformity. */ + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32); + overflow = !secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&s, nonce32); + overflow |= secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&s); + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&s, &secp256k1_fe_one, overflow); /* Randomize the projection to defend against multiplier sidechannels. */ secp256k1_gej_rescale(&ctx->initial, &s); secp256k1_fe_clear(&s); - do { - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&b, nonce32, &retry); - /* A blinding value of 0 works, but would undermine the projection hardening. */ - retry = retry || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&b); - } while (retry); /* This branch true is cryptographically unreachable. Requires sha256_hmac output > order. */ + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&b, nonce32, NULL); + /* A blinding value of 0 works, but would undermine the projection hardening. */ + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(&b, &secp256k1_scalar_one, secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&b)); secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); memset(nonce32, 0, 32); secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ctx, &gb, &b); diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/ecmult_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/ecmult_impl.h index f03fa94..caa87e3 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/ecmult_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/ecmult_impl.h @@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ * (1 << (WINDOW_G - 2)) * sizeof(secp256k1_ge_storage) bytes, * where sizeof(secp256k1_ge_storage) is typically 64 bytes but can * be larger due to platform-specific padding and alignment. - * If the endomorphism optimization is enabled (USE_ENDOMORMPHSIM) - * two tables of this size are used instead of only one. + * Two tables of this size are used (due to the endomorphism + * optimization). */ # define WINDOW_G ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE #endif @@ -59,11 +59,7 @@ # error Set ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE to an integer in range [2..24]. #endif -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - #define WNAF_BITS 128 -#else - #define WNAF_BITS 256 -#endif +#define WNAF_BITS 128 #define WNAF_SIZE_BITS(bits, w) (((bits) + (w) - 1) / (w)) #define WNAF_SIZE(w) WNAF_SIZE_BITS(WNAF_BITS, w) @@ -77,17 +73,9 @@ #define PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW 12 /* Minimum number of points for which pippenger_wnaf is faster than strauss wnaf */ -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - #define ECMULT_PIPPENGER_THRESHOLD 88 -#else - #define ECMULT_PIPPENGER_THRESHOLD 160 -#endif +#define ECMULT_PIPPENGER_THRESHOLD 88 -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - #define ECMULT_MAX_POINTS_PER_BATCH 5000000 -#else - #define ECMULT_MAX_POINTS_PER_BATCH 10000000 -#endif +#define ECMULT_MAX_POINTS_PER_BATCH 5000000 /** Fill a table 'prej' with precomputed odd multiples of a. Prej will contain * the values [1*a,3*a,...,(2*n-1)*a], so it space for n values. zr[0] will @@ -313,16 +301,12 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_storage_var(const int n, secp25 static const size_t SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONTEXT_PREALLOCATED_SIZE = ROUND_TO_ALIGN(sizeof((*((secp256k1_ecmult_context*) NULL)->pre_g)[0]) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_G)) -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + ROUND_TO_ALIGN(sizeof((*((secp256k1_ecmult_context*) NULL)->pre_g_128)[0]) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_G)) -#endif ; static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_init(secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx) { ctx->pre_g = NULL; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM ctx->pre_g_128 = NULL; -#endif } static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_build(secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, void **prealloc) { @@ -347,7 +331,6 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_build(secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, void * /* precompute the tables with odd multiples */ secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_storage_var(ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_G), *ctx->pre_g, &gj); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM { secp256k1_gej g_128j; int i; @@ -364,7 +347,6 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_build(secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, void * } secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_storage_var(ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_G), *ctx->pre_g_128, &g_128j); } -#endif } static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_finalize_memcpy(secp256k1_ecmult_context *dst, const secp256k1_ecmult_context *src) { @@ -372,11 +354,9 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_finalize_memcpy(secp256k1_ecmult_context *d /* We cast to void* first to suppress a -Wcast-align warning. */ dst->pre_g = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[])(void*)((unsigned char*)dst + ((unsigned char*)(src->pre_g) - (unsigned char*)src)); } -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM if (src->pre_g_128 != NULL) { dst->pre_g_128 = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[])(void*)((unsigned char*)dst + ((unsigned char*)(src->pre_g_128) - (unsigned char*)src)); } -#endif } static int secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx) { @@ -447,16 +427,11 @@ static int secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(int *wnaf, int len, const secp256k1_scalar *a, } struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state { -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM secp256k1_scalar na_1, na_lam; - int wnaf_na_1[130]; - int wnaf_na_lam[130]; + int wnaf_na_1[129]; + int wnaf_na_lam[129]; int bits_na_1; int bits_na_lam; -#else - int wnaf_na[256]; - int bits_na; -#endif size_t input_pos; }; @@ -464,58 +439,43 @@ struct secp256k1_strauss_state { secp256k1_gej* prej; secp256k1_fe* zr; secp256k1_ge* pre_a; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM secp256k1_ge* pre_a_lam; -#endif struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state* ps; }; -static void secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_wnaf(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const struct secp256k1_strauss_state *state, secp256k1_gej *r, int num, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_scalar *na, const secp256k1_scalar *ng) { +static void secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_wnaf(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const struct secp256k1_strauss_state *state, secp256k1_gej *r, size_t num, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_scalar *na, const secp256k1_scalar *ng) { secp256k1_ge tmpa; secp256k1_fe Z; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM /* Splitted G factors. */ secp256k1_scalar ng_1, ng_128; int wnaf_ng_1[129]; int bits_ng_1 = 0; int wnaf_ng_128[129]; int bits_ng_128 = 0; -#else - int wnaf_ng[256]; - int bits_ng = 0; -#endif int i; int bits = 0; - int np; - int no = 0; + size_t np; + size_t no = 0; for (np = 0; np < num; ++np) { if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&na[np]) || secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&a[np])) { continue; } state->ps[no].input_pos = np; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM /* split na into na_1 and na_lam (where na = na_1 + na_lam*lambda, and na_1 and na_lam are ~128 bit) */ secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&state->ps[no].na_1, &state->ps[no].na_lam, &na[np]); /* build wnaf representation for na_1 and na_lam. */ - state->ps[no].bits_na_1 = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(state->ps[no].wnaf_na_1, 130, &state->ps[no].na_1, WINDOW_A); - state->ps[no].bits_na_lam = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(state->ps[no].wnaf_na_lam, 130, &state->ps[no].na_lam, WINDOW_A); - VERIFY_CHECK(state->ps[no].bits_na_1 <= 130); - VERIFY_CHECK(state->ps[no].bits_na_lam <= 130); + state->ps[no].bits_na_1 = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(state->ps[no].wnaf_na_1, 129, &state->ps[no].na_1, WINDOW_A); + state->ps[no].bits_na_lam = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(state->ps[no].wnaf_na_lam, 129, &state->ps[no].na_lam, WINDOW_A); + VERIFY_CHECK(state->ps[no].bits_na_1 <= 129); + VERIFY_CHECK(state->ps[no].bits_na_lam <= 129); if (state->ps[no].bits_na_1 > bits) { bits = state->ps[no].bits_na_1; } if (state->ps[no].bits_na_lam > bits) { bits = state->ps[no].bits_na_lam; } -#else - /* build wnaf representation for na. */ - state->ps[no].bits_na = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(state->ps[no].wnaf_na, 256, &na[np], WINDOW_A); - if (state->ps[no].bits_na > bits) { - bits = state->ps[no].bits_na; - } -#endif ++no; } @@ -547,7 +507,6 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_wnaf(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, c secp256k1_fe_set_int(&Z, 1); } -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM for (np = 0; np < no; ++np) { for (i = 0; i < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A); i++) { secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&state->pre_a_lam[np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) + i], &state->pre_a[np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) + i]); @@ -568,21 +527,12 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_wnaf(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, c bits = bits_ng_128; } } -#else - if (ng) { - bits_ng = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(wnaf_ng, 256, ng, WINDOW_G); - if (bits_ng > bits) { - bits = bits_ng; - } - } -#endif secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r); for (i = bits - 1; i >= 0; i--) { int n; secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, r, NULL); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM for (np = 0; np < no; ++np) { if (i < state->ps[np].bits_na_1 && (n = state->ps[np].wnaf_na_1[i])) { ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, state->pre_a + np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), n, WINDOW_A); @@ -601,18 +551,6 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_wnaf(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, c ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE_STORAGE(&tmpa, *ctx->pre_g_128, n, WINDOW_G); secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(r, r, &tmpa, &Z); } -#else - for (np = 0; np < no; ++np) { - if (i < state->ps[np].bits_na && (n = state->ps[np].wnaf_na[i])) { - ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, state->pre_a + np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), n, WINDOW_A); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(r, r, &tmpa, NULL); - } - } - if (i < bits_ng && (n = wnaf_ng[i])) { - ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE_STORAGE(&tmpa, *ctx->pre_g, n, WINDOW_G); - secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(r, r, &tmpa, &Z); - } -#endif } if (!r->infinity) { @@ -625,27 +563,19 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_gej secp256k1_fe zr[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; secp256k1_ge pre_a[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state ps[1]; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM secp256k1_ge pre_a_lam[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; -#endif struct secp256k1_strauss_state state; state.prej = prej; state.zr = zr; state.pre_a = pre_a; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM state.pre_a_lam = pre_a_lam; -#endif state.ps = ps; secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_wnaf(ctx, &state, r, 1, a, na, ng); } static size_t secp256k1_strauss_scratch_size(size_t n_points) { -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM static const size_t point_size = (2 * sizeof(secp256k1_ge) + sizeof(secp256k1_gej) + sizeof(secp256k1_fe)) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) + sizeof(struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state) + sizeof(secp256k1_gej) + sizeof(secp256k1_scalar); -#else - static const size_t point_size = (sizeof(secp256k1_ge) + sizeof(secp256k1_gej) + sizeof(secp256k1_fe)) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) + sizeof(struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state) + sizeof(secp256k1_gej) + sizeof(secp256k1_scalar); -#endif return n_points*point_size; } @@ -665,15 +595,11 @@ static int secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_batch(const secp256k1_callback* error_callba scalars = (secp256k1_scalar*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(error_callback, scratch, n_points * sizeof(secp256k1_scalar)); state.prej = (secp256k1_gej*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(error_callback, scratch, n_points * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) * sizeof(secp256k1_gej)); state.zr = (secp256k1_fe*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(error_callback, scratch, n_points * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) * sizeof(secp256k1_fe)); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - state.pre_a = (secp256k1_ge*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(error_callback, scratch, n_points * 2 * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); - state.pre_a_lam = state.pre_a + n_points * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A); -#else state.pre_a = (secp256k1_ge*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(error_callback, scratch, n_points * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); -#endif + state.pre_a_lam = (secp256k1_ge*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(error_callback, scratch, n_points * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); state.ps = (struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(error_callback, scratch, n_points * sizeof(struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state)); - if (points == NULL || scalars == NULL || state.prej == NULL || state.zr == NULL || state.pre_a == NULL) { + if (points == NULL || scalars == NULL || state.prej == NULL || state.zr == NULL || state.pre_a == NULL || state.pre_a_lam == NULL || state.ps == NULL) { secp256k1_scratch_apply_checkpoint(error_callback, scratch, scratch_checkpoint); return 0; } @@ -868,7 +794,6 @@ static int secp256k1_ecmult_pippenger_wnaf(secp256k1_gej *buckets, int bucket_wi * set of buckets) for a given number of points. */ static int secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window(size_t n) { -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM if (n <= 1) { return 1; } else if (n <= 4) { @@ -892,33 +817,6 @@ static int secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window(size_t n) { } else { return PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW; } -#else - if (n <= 1) { - return 1; - } else if (n <= 11) { - return 2; - } else if (n <= 45) { - return 3; - } else if (n <= 100) { - return 4; - } else if (n <= 275) { - return 5; - } else if (n <= 625) { - return 6; - } else if (n <= 1850) { - return 7; - } else if (n <= 3400) { - return 8; - } else if (n <= 9630) { - return 9; - } else if (n <= 17900) { - return 10; - } else if (n <= 32800) { - return 11; - } else { - return PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW; - } -#endif } /** @@ -926,7 +824,6 @@ static int secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window(size_t n) { */ static size_t secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(int bucket_window) { switch(bucket_window) { -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM case 1: return 1; case 2: return 4; case 3: return 20; @@ -939,26 +836,11 @@ static size_t secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(int bucket_window) { case 10: return 7880; case 11: return 16050; case PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW: return SIZE_MAX; -#else - case 1: return 1; - case 2: return 11; - case 3: return 45; - case 4: return 100; - case 5: return 275; - case 6: return 625; - case 7: return 1850; - case 8: return 3400; - case 9: return 9630; - case 10: return 17900; - case 11: return 32800; - case PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW: return SIZE_MAX; -#endif } return 0; } -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_ecmult_endo_split(secp256k1_scalar *s1, secp256k1_scalar *s2, secp256k1_ge *p1, secp256k1_ge *p2) { secp256k1_scalar tmp = *s1; secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(s1, s2, &tmp); @@ -973,32 +855,23 @@ SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_ecmult_endo_split(secp256k1_scalar *s1, s secp256k1_ge_neg(p2, p2); } } -#endif /** * Returns the scratch size required for a given number of points (excluding * base point G) without considering alignment. */ static size_t secp256k1_pippenger_scratch_size(size_t n_points, int bucket_window) { -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM size_t entries = 2*n_points + 2; -#else - size_t entries = n_points + 1; -#endif size_t entry_size = sizeof(secp256k1_ge) + sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) + sizeof(struct secp256k1_pippenger_point_state) + (WNAF_SIZE(bucket_window+1)+1)*sizeof(int); return (sizeof(secp256k1_gej) << bucket_window) + sizeof(struct secp256k1_pippenger_state) + entries * entry_size; } static int secp256k1_ecmult_pippenger_batch(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *inp_g_sc, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback cb, void *cbdata, size_t n_points, size_t cb_offset) { const size_t scratch_checkpoint = secp256k1_scratch_checkpoint(error_callback, scratch); - /* Use 2(n+1) with the endomorphism, n+1 without, when calculating batch + /* Use 2(n+1) with the endomorphism, when calculating batch * sizes. The reason for +1 is that we add the G scalar to the list of * other scalars. */ -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM size_t entries = 2*n_points + 2; -#else - size_t entries = n_points + 1; -#endif secp256k1_ge *points; secp256k1_scalar *scalars; secp256k1_gej *buckets; @@ -1035,10 +908,8 @@ static int secp256k1_ecmult_pippenger_batch(const secp256k1_callback* error_call scalars[0] = *inp_g_sc; points[0] = secp256k1_ge_const_g; idx++; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM secp256k1_ecmult_endo_split(&scalars[0], &scalars[1], &points[0], &points[1]); idx++; -#endif } while (point_idx < n_points) { @@ -1047,10 +918,8 @@ static int secp256k1_ecmult_pippenger_batch(const secp256k1_callback* error_call return 0; } idx++; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM secp256k1_ecmult_endo_split(&scalars[idx - 1], &scalars[idx], &points[idx - 1], &points[idx]); idx++; -#endif point_idx++; } @@ -1093,9 +962,7 @@ static size_t secp256k1_pippenger_max_points(const secp256k1_callback* error_cal size_t space_overhead; size_t entry_size = sizeof(secp256k1_ge) + sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) + sizeof(struct secp256k1_pippenger_point_state) + (WNAF_SIZE(bucket_window+1)+1)*sizeof(int); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM entry_size = 2*entry_size; -#endif space_overhead = (sizeof(secp256k1_gej) << bucket_window) + entry_size + sizeof(struct secp256k1_pippenger_state); if (space_overhead > max_alloc) { break; diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/field.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/field.h index 8283e4b..aca1fb7 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/field.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/field.h @@ -22,16 +22,16 @@ #include "libsecp256k1-config.h" #endif -#if defined(USE_FIELD_10X26) -#include "field_10x26.h" -#elif defined(USE_FIELD_5X52) +#include "util.h" + +#if defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128) #include "field_5x52.h" +#elif defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT64) +#include "field_10x26.h" #else -#error "Please select field implementation" +#error "Please select wide multiplication implementation" #endif -#include "util.h" - /** Normalize a field element. This brings the field element to a canonical representation, reduces * its magnitude to 1, and reduces it modulo field size `p`. */ @@ -125,10 +125,10 @@ static void secp256k1_fe_to_storage(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe /** Convert a field element back from the storage type. */ static void secp256k1_fe_from_storage(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a); -/** If flag is true, set *r equal to *a; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. */ +/** If flag is true, set *r equal to *a; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. Both *r and *a must be initialized.*/ static void secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a, int flag); -/** If flag is true, set *r equal to *a; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. */ +/** If flag is true, set *r equal to *a; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. Both *r and *a must be initialized.*/ static void secp256k1_fe_cmov(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int flag); #endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/field_10x26_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/field_10x26_impl.h index 4ae4fdc..651500e 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/field_10x26_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/field_10x26_impl.h @@ -320,6 +320,7 @@ static int secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { } static int secp256k1_fe_set_b32(secp256k1_fe *r, const unsigned char *a) { + int ret; r->n[0] = (uint32_t)a[31] | ((uint32_t)a[30] << 8) | ((uint32_t)a[29] << 16) | ((uint32_t)(a[28] & 0x3) << 24); r->n[1] = (uint32_t)((a[28] >> 2) & 0x3f) | ((uint32_t)a[27] << 6) | ((uint32_t)a[26] << 14) | ((uint32_t)(a[25] & 0xf) << 22); r->n[2] = (uint32_t)((a[25] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((uint32_t)a[24] << 4) | ((uint32_t)a[23] << 12) | ((uint32_t)(a[22] & 0x3f) << 20); @@ -331,15 +332,17 @@ static int secp256k1_fe_set_b32(secp256k1_fe *r, const unsigned char *a) { r->n[8] = (uint32_t)a[5] | ((uint32_t)a[4] << 8) | ((uint32_t)a[3] << 16) | ((uint32_t)(a[2] & 0x3) << 24); r->n[9] = (uint32_t)((a[2] >> 2) & 0x3f) | ((uint32_t)a[1] << 6) | ((uint32_t)a[0] << 14); - if (r->n[9] == 0x3FFFFFUL && (r->n[8] & r->n[7] & r->n[6] & r->n[5] & r->n[4] & r->n[3] & r->n[2]) == 0x3FFFFFFUL && (r->n[1] + 0x40UL + ((r->n[0] + 0x3D1UL) >> 26)) > 0x3FFFFFFUL) { - return 0; - } + ret = !((r->n[9] == 0x3FFFFFUL) & ((r->n[8] & r->n[7] & r->n[6] & r->n[5] & r->n[4] & r->n[3] & r->n[2]) == 0x3FFFFFFUL) & ((r->n[1] + 0x40UL + ((r->n[0] + 0x3D1UL) >> 26)) > 0x3FFFFFFUL)); #ifdef VERIFY r->magnitude = 1; - r->normalized = 1; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); + if (ret) { + r->normalized = 1; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); + } else { + r->normalized = 0; + } #endif - return 1; + return ret; } /** Convert a field element to a 32-byte big endian value. Requires the input to be normalized */ @@ -1094,6 +1097,7 @@ static void secp256k1_fe_sqr(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_cmov(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int flag) { uint32_t mask0, mask1; + VG_CHECK_VERIFY(r->n, sizeof(r->n)); mask0 = flag + ~((uint32_t)0); mask1 = ~mask0; r->n[0] = (r->n[0] & mask0) | (a->n[0] & mask1); @@ -1107,15 +1111,16 @@ static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_cmov(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_ r->n[8] = (r->n[8] & mask0) | (a->n[8] & mask1); r->n[9] = (r->n[9] & mask0) | (a->n[9] & mask1); #ifdef VERIFY - if (a->magnitude > r->magnitude) { + if (flag) { r->magnitude = a->magnitude; + r->normalized = a->normalized; } - r->normalized &= a->normalized; #endif } static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a, int flag) { uint32_t mask0, mask1; + VG_CHECK_VERIFY(r->n, sizeof(r->n)); mask0 = flag + ~((uint32_t)0); mask1 = ~mask0; r->n[0] = (r->n[0] & mask0) | (a->n[0] & mask1); diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/field_5x52.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/field_5x52.h index fc5bfe3..6a06848 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/field_5x52.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/field_5x52.h @@ -46,4 +46,10 @@ typedef struct { (d6) | (((uint64_t)(d7)) << 32) \ }} +#define SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST_GET(d) \ + (uint32_t)(d.n[3] >> 32), (uint32_t)d.n[3], \ + (uint32_t)(d.n[2] >> 32), (uint32_t)d.n[2], \ + (uint32_t)(d.n[1] >> 32), (uint32_t)d.n[1], \ + (uint32_t)(d.n[0] >> 32), (uint32_t)d.n[0] + #endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/field_5x52_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/field_5x52_impl.h index f426332..71a38f9 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/field_5x52_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/field_5x52_impl.h @@ -283,6 +283,7 @@ static int secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { } static int secp256k1_fe_set_b32(secp256k1_fe *r, const unsigned char *a) { + int ret; r->n[0] = (uint64_t)a[31] | ((uint64_t)a[30] << 8) | ((uint64_t)a[29] << 16) @@ -317,15 +318,17 @@ static int secp256k1_fe_set_b32(secp256k1_fe *r, const unsigned char *a) { | ((uint64_t)a[2] << 24) | ((uint64_t)a[1] << 32) | ((uint64_t)a[0] << 40); - if (r->n[4] == 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL && (r->n[3] & r->n[2] & r->n[1]) == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL && r->n[0] >= 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL) { - return 0; - } + ret = !((r->n[4] == 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL) & ((r->n[3] & r->n[2] & r->n[1]) == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) & (r->n[0] >= 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL)); #ifdef VERIFY r->magnitude = 1; - r->normalized = 1; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); + if (ret) { + r->normalized = 1; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); + } else { + r->normalized = 0; + } #endif - return 1; + return ret; } /** Convert a field element to a 32-byte big endian value. Requires the input to be normalized */ @@ -446,6 +449,7 @@ static void secp256k1_fe_sqr(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_cmov(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int flag) { uint64_t mask0, mask1; + VG_CHECK_VERIFY(r->n, sizeof(r->n)); mask0 = flag + ~((uint64_t)0); mask1 = ~mask0; r->n[0] = (r->n[0] & mask0) | (a->n[0] & mask1); @@ -454,15 +458,16 @@ static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_cmov(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_ r->n[3] = (r->n[3] & mask0) | (a->n[3] & mask1); r->n[4] = (r->n[4] & mask0) | (a->n[4] & mask1); #ifdef VERIFY - if (a->magnitude > r->magnitude) { + if (flag) { r->magnitude = a->magnitude; + r->normalized = a->normalized; } - r->normalized &= a->normalized; #endif } static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a, int flag) { uint64_t mask0, mask1; + VG_CHECK_VERIFY(r->n, sizeof(r->n)); mask0 = flag + ~((uint64_t)0); mask1 = ~mask0; r->n[0] = (r->n[0] & mask0) | (a->n[0] & mask1); diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/field_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/field_impl.h index 6070cac..18e4d2f 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/field_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/field_impl.h @@ -14,12 +14,12 @@ #include "util.h" #include "num.h" -#if defined(USE_FIELD_10X26) -#include "field_10x26_impl.h" -#elif defined(USE_FIELD_5X52) +#if defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128) #include "field_5x52_impl.h" +#elif defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT64) +#include "field_10x26_impl.h" #else -#error "Please select field implementation" +#error "Please select wide multiplication implementation" #endif SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_equal(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { @@ -315,4 +315,6 @@ static int secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(const secp256k1_fe *a) { #endif } +static const secp256k1_fe secp256k1_fe_one = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); + #endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/gen_context.c b/depend/secp256k1/src/gen_context.c index 539f574..8b7729a 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/gen_context.c +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/gen_context.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include "basic-config.h" #include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "assumptions.h" #include "util.h" #include "field_impl.h" #include "scalar_impl.h" diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/group.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/group.h index ded4e1d..36e39ec 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/group.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/group.h @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ static int secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(const secp256k1_ge *a); /** Check whether a group element is valid (i.e., on the curve). */ static int secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(const secp256k1_ge *a); +/** Set r equal to the inverse of a (i.e., mirrored around the X axis) */ static void secp256k1_ge_neg(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge *a); /** Set a group element equal to another which is given in jacobian coordinates */ @@ -95,8 +96,8 @@ static int secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(const secp256k1_gej *a); /** Check whether a group element's y coordinate is a quadratic residue. */ static int secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(const secp256k1_gej *a); -/** Set r equal to the double of a, a cannot be infinity. Constant time. */ -static void secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a); +/** Set r equal to the double of a. Constant time. */ +static void secp256k1_gej_double(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a); /** Set r equal to the double of a. If rzr is not-NULL this sets *rzr such that r->z == a->z * *rzr (where infinity means an implicit z = 0). */ static void secp256k1_gej_double_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, secp256k1_fe *rzr); @@ -115,10 +116,8 @@ static void secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, c /** Set r equal to the sum of a and b (with the inverse of b's Z coordinate passed as bzinv). */ static void secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_ge *b, const secp256k1_fe *bzinv); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM /** Set r to be equal to lambda times a, where lambda is chosen in a way such that this is very fast. */ static void secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge *a); -#endif /** Clear a secp256k1_gej to prevent leaking sensitive information. */ static void secp256k1_gej_clear(secp256k1_gej *r); @@ -132,10 +131,21 @@ static void secp256k1_ge_to_storage(secp256k1_ge_storage *r, const secp256k1_ge /** Convert a group element back from the storage type. */ static void secp256k1_ge_from_storage(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge_storage *a); -/** If flag is true, set *r equal to *a; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. */ +/** If flag is true, set *r equal to *a; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. Both *r and *a must be initialized.*/ static void secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(secp256k1_ge_storage *r, const secp256k1_ge_storage *a, int flag); /** Rescale a jacobian point by b which must be non-zero. Constant-time. */ static void secp256k1_gej_rescale(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_fe *b); +/** Determine if a point (which is assumed to be on the curve) is in the correct (sub)group of the curve. + * + * In normal mode, the used group is secp256k1, which has cofactor=1 meaning that every point on the curve is in the + * group, and this function returns always true. + * + * When compiling in exhaustive test mode, a slightly different curve equation is used, leading to a group with a + * (very) small subgroup, and that subgroup is what is used for all cryptographic operations. In that mode, this + * function checks whether a point that is on the curve is in fact also in that subgroup. + */ +static int secp256k1_ge_is_in_correct_subgroup(const secp256k1_ge* ge); + #endif /* SECP256K1_GROUP_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/group_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/group_impl.h index 43b039b..a5fbc91 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/group_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/group_impl.h @@ -11,49 +11,38 @@ #include "field.h" #include "group.h" -/* These points can be generated in sage as follows: +/* These exhaustive group test orders and generators are chosen such that: + * - The field size is equal to that of secp256k1, so field code is the same. + * - The curve equation is of the form y^2=x^3+B for some constant B. + * - The subgroup has a generator 2*P, where P.x=1. + * - The subgroup has size less than 1000 to permit exhaustive testing. + * - The subgroup admits an endomorphism of the form lambda*(x,y) == (beta*x,y). * - * 0. Setup a worksheet with the following parameters. - * b = 4 # whatever CURVE_B will be set to - * F = FiniteField (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC2F) - * C = EllipticCurve ([F (0), F (b)]) - * - * 1. Determine all the small orders available to you. (If there are - * no satisfactory ones, go back and change b.) - * print C.order().factor(limit=1000) - * - * 2. Choose an order as one of the prime factors listed in the above step. - * (You can also multiply some to get a composite order, though the - * tests will crash trying to invert scalars during signing.) We take a - * random point and scale it to drop its order to the desired value. - * There is some probability this won't work; just try again. - * order = 199 - * P = C.random_point() - * P = (int(P.order()) / int(order)) * P - * assert(P.order() == order) - * - * 3. Print the values. You'll need to use a vim macro or something to - * split the hex output into 4-byte chunks. - * print "%x %x" % P.xy() + * These parameters are generated using sage/gen_exhaustive_groups.sage. */ #if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) -# if EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 199 +# if EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 13 static const secp256k1_ge secp256k1_ge_const_g = SECP256K1_GE_CONST( - 0xFA7CC9A7, 0x0737F2DB, 0xA749DD39, 0x2B4FB069, - 0x3B017A7D, 0xA808C2F1, 0xFB12940C, 0x9EA66C18, - 0x78AC123A, 0x5ED8AEF3, 0x8732BC91, 0x1F3A2868, - 0x48DF246C, 0x808DAE72, 0xCFE52572, 0x7F0501ED + 0xc3459c3d, 0x35326167, 0xcd86cce8, 0x07a2417f, + 0x5b8bd567, 0xde8538ee, 0x0d507b0c, 0xd128f5bb, + 0x8e467fec, 0xcd30000a, 0x6cc1184e, 0x25d382c2, + 0xa2f4494e, 0x2fbe9abc, 0x8b64abac, 0xd005fb24 ); - -static const int CURVE_B = 4; -# elif EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 13 +static const secp256k1_fe secp256k1_fe_const_b = SECP256K1_FE_CONST( + 0x3d3486b2, 0x159a9ca5, 0xc75638be, 0xb23a69bc, + 0x946a45ab, 0x24801247, 0xb4ed2b8e, 0x26b6a417 +); +# elif EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 199 static const secp256k1_ge secp256k1_ge_const_g = SECP256K1_GE_CONST( - 0xedc60018, 0xa51a786b, 0x2ea91f4d, 0x4c9416c0, - 0x9de54c3b, 0xa1316554, 0x6cf4345c, 0x7277ef15, - 0x54cb1b6b, 0xdc8c1273, 0x087844ea, 0x43f4603e, - 0x0eaf9a43, 0xf6effe55, 0x939f806d, 0x37adf8ac + 0x226e653f, 0xc8df7744, 0x9bacbf12, 0x7d1dcbf9, + 0x87f05b2a, 0xe7edbd28, 0x1f564575, 0xc48dcf18, + 0xa13872c2, 0xe933bb17, 0x5d9ffd5b, 0xb5b6e10c, + 0x57fe3c00, 0xbaaaa15a, 0xe003ec3e, 0x9c269bae +); +static const secp256k1_fe secp256k1_fe_const_b = SECP256K1_FE_CONST( + 0x2cca28fa, 0xfc614b80, 0x2a3db42b, 0x00ba00b1, + 0xbea8d943, 0xdace9ab2, 0x9536daea, 0x0074defb ); -static const int CURVE_B = 2; # else # error No known generator for the specified exhaustive test group order. # endif @@ -68,7 +57,7 @@ static const secp256k1_ge secp256k1_ge_const_g = SECP256K1_GE_CONST( 0xFD17B448UL, 0xA6855419UL, 0x9C47D08FUL, 0xFB10D4B8UL ); -static const int CURVE_B = 7; +static const secp256k1_fe secp256k1_fe_const_b = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7); #endif static void secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zi) { @@ -219,14 +208,13 @@ static void secp256k1_ge_clear(secp256k1_ge *r) { } static int secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x) { - secp256k1_fe x2, x3, c; + secp256k1_fe x2, x3; r->x = *x; secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x2, x); secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, x, &x2); r->infinity = 0; - secp256k1_fe_set_int(&c, CURVE_B); - secp256k1_fe_add(&c, &x3); - return secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&r->y, &c); + secp256k1_fe_add(&x3, &secp256k1_fe_const_b); + return secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&r->y, &x3); } static int secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x, int odd) { @@ -269,41 +257,20 @@ static int secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(const secp256k1_gej *a) { return a->infinity; } -static int secp256k1_gej_is_valid_var(const secp256k1_gej *a) { - secp256k1_fe y2, x3, z2, z6; - if (a->infinity) { - return 0; - } - /** y^2 = x^3 + 7 - * (Y/Z^3)^2 = (X/Z^2)^3 + 7 - * Y^2 / Z^6 = X^3 / Z^6 + 7 - * Y^2 = X^3 + 7*Z^6 - */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&y2, &a->y); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3, &a->x); secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3, &a->x); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2, &a->z); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z6, &z2); secp256k1_fe_mul(&z6, &z6, &z2); - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&z6, CURVE_B); - secp256k1_fe_add(&x3, &z6); - secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&x3); - return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&y2, &x3); -} - static int secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(const secp256k1_ge *a) { - secp256k1_fe y2, x3, c; + secp256k1_fe y2, x3; if (a->infinity) { return 0; } /* y^2 = x^3 + 7 */ secp256k1_fe_sqr(&y2, &a->y); secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3, &a->x); secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3, &a->x); - secp256k1_fe_set_int(&c, CURVE_B); - secp256k1_fe_add(&x3, &c); + secp256k1_fe_add(&x3, &secp256k1_fe_const_b); secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&x3); return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&y2, &x3); } -static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a) { +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_gej_double(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a) { /* Operations: 3 mul, 4 sqr, 0 normalize, 12 mul_int/add/negate. * * Note that there is an implementation described at @@ -313,8 +280,7 @@ static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(secp256k1_gej *r, cons */ secp256k1_fe t1,t2,t3,t4; - VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(a)); - r->infinity = 0; + r->infinity = a->infinity; secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &a->z, &a->y); secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->z, 2); /* Z' = 2*Y*Z (2) */ @@ -363,7 +329,7 @@ static void secp256k1_gej_double_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, s secp256k1_fe_mul_int(rzr, 2); } - secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(r, a); + secp256k1_gej_double(r, a); } static void secp256k1_gej_add_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_gej *b, secp256k1_fe *rzr) { @@ -400,7 +366,7 @@ static void secp256k1_gej_add_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, cons if (rzr != NULL) { secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 0); } - r->infinity = 1; + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r); } return; } @@ -450,7 +416,7 @@ static void secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, c if (rzr != NULL) { secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 0); } - r->infinity = 1; + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r); } return; } @@ -509,7 +475,7 @@ static void secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&i)) { secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, a, NULL); } else { - r->infinity = 1; + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r); } return; } @@ -680,7 +646,6 @@ static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(secp256k1_ge_storage *r, secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&r->y, &a->y, flag); } -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM static void secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge *a) { static const secp256k1_fe beta = SECP256K1_FE_CONST( 0x7ae96a2bul, 0x657c0710ul, 0x6e64479eul, 0xac3434e9ul, @@ -689,7 +654,6 @@ static void secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge *a) { *r = *a; secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->x, &r->x, &beta); } -#endif static int secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(const secp256k1_gej *a) { secp256k1_fe yz; @@ -705,4 +669,25 @@ static int secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(const secp256k1_gej *a) { return secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&yz); } +static int secp256k1_ge_is_in_correct_subgroup(const secp256k1_ge* ge) { +#ifdef EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER + secp256k1_gej out; + int i; + + /* A very simple EC multiplication ladder that avoids a dependecy on ecmult. */ + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&out); + for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i) { + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&out, &out, NULL); + if ((((uint32_t)EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) >> (31 - i)) & 1) { + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&out, &out, ge, NULL); + } + } + return secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&out); +#else + (void)ge; + /* The real secp256k1 group has cofactor 1, so the subgroup is the entire curve. */ + return 1; +#endif +} + #endif /* SECP256K1_GROUP_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/hash_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/hash_impl.h index 782f972..4097725 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/hash_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/hash_impl.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #define SECP256K1_HASH_IMPL_H #include "hash.h" +#include "util.h" #include #include @@ -27,9 +28,9 @@ (h) = t1 + t2; \ } while(0) -#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN +#if defined(SECP256K1_BIG_ENDIAN) #define BE32(x) (x) -#else +#elif defined(SECP256K1_LITTLE_ENDIAN) #define BE32(p) ((((p) & 0xFF) << 24) | (((p) & 0xFF00) << 8) | (((p) & 0xFF0000) >> 8) | (((p) & 0xFF000000) >> 24)) #endif @@ -163,6 +164,19 @@ static void secp256k1_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_sha256 *hash, unsigned char *out memcpy(out32, (const unsigned char*)out, 32); } +/* Initializes a sha256 struct and writes the 64 byte string + * SHA256(tag)||SHA256(tag) into it. */ +static void secp256k1_sha256_initialize_tagged(secp256k1_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *tag, size_t taglen) { + unsigned char buf[32]; + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(hash); + secp256k1_sha256_write(hash, tag, taglen); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(hash, buf); + + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(hash); + secp256k1_sha256_write(hash, buf, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(hash, buf, 32); +} + static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { size_t n; unsigned char rkey[64]; diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/main_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/main_impl.h index 44cb68e..07a25b8 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/main_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/main_impl.h @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ #include "include/secp256k1_ecdh.h" #include "ecmult_const_impl.h" -static int ecdh_hash_function_sha256(unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *x, const unsigned char *y, void *data) { - unsigned char version = (y[31] & 0x01) | 0x02; +static int ecdh_hash_function_sha256(unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *x32, const unsigned char *y32, void *data) { + unsigned char version = (y32[31] & 0x01) | 0x02; secp256k1_sha256 sha; (void)data; secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha); secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, &version, 1); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, x, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, x32, 32); secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, output); return 1; @@ -32,36 +32,40 @@ int secp256k1_ecdh(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output, const se secp256k1_gej res; secp256k1_ge pt; secp256k1_scalar s; + unsigned char x[32]; + unsigned char y[32]; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); ARG_CHECK(output != NULL); ARG_CHECK(point != NULL); ARG_CHECK(scalar != NULL); + if (hashfp == NULL) { hashfp = secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function_default; } secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &pt, point); secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, scalar, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s)) { - ret = 0; - } else { - unsigned char x[32]; - unsigned char y[32]; - - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res, &pt, &s, 256); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pt, &res); - - /* Compute a hash of the point */ - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pt.x); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pt.y); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(x, &pt.x); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(y, &pt.y); - - ret = hashfp(output, x, y, data); - } + overflow |= secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s); + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(&s, &secp256k1_scalar_one, overflow); + + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res, &pt, &s, 256); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pt, &res); + + /* Compute a hash of the point */ + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pt.x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pt.y); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(x, &pt.x); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(y, &pt.y); + + ret = hashfp(output, x, y, data); + + memset(x, 0, 32); + memset(y, 0, 32); secp256k1_scalar_clear(&s); - return ret; + + return !!ret & !overflow; } #endif /* SECP256K1_MODULE_ECDH_MAIN_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h index fe26e8f..e8d2aea 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ void test_ecdh_generator_basepoint(void) { /* compute "explicitly" */ CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, point_ser, &point_ser_len, &point[1], SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED) == 1); /* compare */ - CHECK(memcmp(output_ecdh, point_ser, 65) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(output_ecdh, point_ser, 65) == 0); /* compute using ECDH function with default hash function */ CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, output_ecdh, &point[0], s_b32, NULL, NULL) == 1); @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ void test_ecdh_generator_basepoint(void) { secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, point_ser, point_ser_len); secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, output_ser); /* compare */ - CHECK(memcmp(output_ecdh, output_ser, 32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(output_ecdh, output_ser, 32) == 0); } } diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/Makefile.am.include b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/Makefile.am.include new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d901ec --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/Makefile.am.include @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/extrakeys/tests_exhaustive_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/extrakeys/main_impl.h diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/main_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/main_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e365f92 --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/main_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2020 Jonas Nick * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS_MAIN_ +#define _SECP256K1_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS_MAIN_ + +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h" + +static SECP256K1_INLINE int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ge *ge, const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey) { + return secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, ge, (const secp256k1_pubkey *) pubkey); +} + +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_save(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey, secp256k1_ge *ge) { + secp256k1_pubkey_save((secp256k1_pubkey *) pubkey, ge); +} + +int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *input32) { + secp256k1_ge pk; + secp256k1_fe x; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); + ARG_CHECK(input32 != NULL); + + if (!secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&x, input32)) { + return 0; + } + if (!secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&pk, &x, 0)) { + return 0; + } + if (!secp256k1_ge_is_in_correct_subgroup(&pk)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_save(pubkey, &pk); + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output32, const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey) { + secp256k1_ge pk; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(output32 != NULL); + memset(output32, 0, 32); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + + if (!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk, pubkey)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(output32, &pk.x); + return 1; +} + +/** Keeps a group element as is if it has an even Y and otherwise negates it. + * y_parity is set to 0 in the former case and to 1 in the latter case. + * Requires that the coordinates of r are normalized. */ +static int secp256k1_extrakeys_ge_even_y(secp256k1_ge *r) { + int y_parity = 0; + VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(r)); + + if (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r->y)) { + secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->y, 1); + y_parity = 1; + } + return y_parity; +} + +int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *xonly_pubkey, int *pk_parity, const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey) { + secp256k1_ge pk; + int tmp; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(xonly_pubkey != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + + if (!secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk, pubkey)) { + return 0; + } + tmp = secp256k1_extrakeys_ge_even_y(&pk); + if (pk_parity != NULL) { + *pk_parity = tmp; + } + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_save(xonly_pubkey, &pk); + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *output_pubkey, const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *internal_pubkey, const unsigned char *tweak32) { + secp256k1_ge pk; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(output_pubkey != NULL); + memset(output_pubkey, 0, sizeof(*output_pubkey)); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(internal_pubkey != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(tweak32 != NULL); + + if (!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk, internal_pubkey) + || !secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add_helper(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &pk, tweak32)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_pubkey_save(output_pubkey, &pk); + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const unsigned char *tweaked_pubkey32, int tweaked_pk_parity, const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *internal_pubkey, const unsigned char *tweak32) { + secp256k1_ge pk; + unsigned char pk_expected32[32]; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(internal_pubkey != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(tweaked_pubkey32 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(tweak32 != NULL); + + if (!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk, internal_pubkey) + || !secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add_helper(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &pk, tweak32)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&pk.x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&pk.y); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(pk_expected32, &pk.x); + + return secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pk_expected32, tweaked_pubkey32, 32) == 0 + && secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&pk.y) == tweaked_pk_parity; +} + +static void secp256k1_keypair_save(secp256k1_keypair *keypair, const secp256k1_scalar *sk, secp256k1_ge *pk) { + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&keypair->data[0], sk); + secp256k1_pubkey_save((secp256k1_pubkey *)&keypair->data[32], pk); +} + + +static int secp256k1_keypair_seckey_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scalar *sk, const secp256k1_keypair *keypair) { + int ret; + + ret = secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(sk, &keypair->data[0]); + /* We can declassify ret here because sk is only zero if a keypair function + * failed (which zeroes the keypair) and its return value is ignored. */ + secp256k1_declassify(ctx, &ret, sizeof(ret)); + ARG_CHECK(ret); + return ret; +} + +/* Load a keypair into pk and sk (if non-NULL). This function declassifies pk + * and ARG_CHECKs that the keypair is not invalid. It always initializes sk and + * pk with dummy values. */ +static int secp256k1_keypair_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scalar *sk, secp256k1_ge *pk, const secp256k1_keypair *keypair) { + int ret; + const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey = (const secp256k1_pubkey *)&keypair->data[32]; + + /* Need to declassify the pubkey because pubkey_load ARG_CHECKs if it's + * invalid. */ + secp256k1_declassify(ctx, pubkey, sizeof(*pubkey)); + ret = secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, pk, pubkey); + if (sk != NULL) { + ret = ret && secp256k1_keypair_seckey_load(ctx, sk, keypair); + } + if (!ret) { + *pk = secp256k1_ge_const_g; + if (sk != NULL) { + *sk = secp256k1_scalar_one; + } + } + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_keypair_create(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_keypair *keypair, const unsigned char *seckey32) { + secp256k1_scalar sk; + secp256k1_ge pk; + int ret = 0; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(keypair != NULL); + memset(keypair, 0, sizeof(*keypair)); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(seckey32 != NULL); + + ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create_helper(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &sk, &pk, seckey32); + secp256k1_keypair_save(keypair, &sk, &pk); + secp256k1_memczero(keypair, sizeof(*keypair), !ret); + + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sk); + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_keypair_pub(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const secp256k1_keypair *keypair) { + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); + ARG_CHECK(keypair != NULL); + + memcpy(pubkey->data, &keypair->data[32], sizeof(*pubkey)); + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey, int *pk_parity, const secp256k1_keypair *keypair) { + secp256k1_ge pk; + int tmp; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); + ARG_CHECK(keypair != NULL); + + if (!secp256k1_keypair_load(ctx, NULL, &pk, keypair)) { + return 0; + } + tmp = secp256k1_extrakeys_ge_even_y(&pk); + if (pk_parity != NULL) { + *pk_parity = tmp; + } + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_save(pubkey, &pk); + + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_keypair *keypair, const unsigned char *tweak32) { + secp256k1_ge pk; + secp256k1_scalar sk; + int y_parity; + int ret; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(keypair != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(tweak32 != NULL); + + ret = secp256k1_keypair_load(ctx, &sk, &pk, keypair); + memset(keypair, 0, sizeof(*keypair)); + + y_parity = secp256k1_extrakeys_ge_even_y(&pk); + if (y_parity == 1) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&sk, &sk); + } + + ret &= secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add_helper(&sk, tweak32); + ret &= secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add_helper(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &pk, tweak32); + + secp256k1_declassify(ctx, &ret, sizeof(ret)); + if (ret) { + secp256k1_keypair_save(keypair, &sk, &pk); + } + + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sk); + return ret; +} + +#endif diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/tests_exhaustive_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/tests_exhaustive_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e29bc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/tests_exhaustive_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2020 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS_TESTS_EXHAUSTIVE_ +#define _SECP256K1_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS_TESTS_EXHAUSTIVE_ + +#include "src/modules/extrakeys/main_impl.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h" + +static void test_exhaustive_extrakeys(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge* group) { + secp256k1_keypair keypair[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - 1]; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - 1]; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly_pubkey[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - 1]; + int parities[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - 1]; + unsigned char xonly_pubkey_bytes[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - 1][32]; + int i; + + for (i = 1; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) { + secp256k1_fe fe; + secp256k1_scalar scalar_i; + unsigned char buf[33]; + int parity; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&scalar_i, i); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(buf, &scalar_i); + + /* Construct pubkey and keypair. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair[i - 1], buf)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey[i - 1], buf)); + + /* Construct serialized xonly_pubkey from keypair. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &xonly_pubkey[i - 1], &parities[i - 1], &keypair[i - 1])); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, xonly_pubkey_bytes[i - 1], &xonly_pubkey[i - 1])); + + /* Parse the xonly_pubkey back and verify it matches the previously serialized value. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &xonly_pubkey[i - 1], xonly_pubkey_bytes[i - 1])); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, buf, &xonly_pubkey[i - 1])); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(xonly_pubkey_bytes[i - 1], buf, 32) == 0); + + /* Construct the xonly_pubkey from the pubkey, and verify it matches the same. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &xonly_pubkey[i - 1], &parity, &pubkey[i - 1])); + CHECK(parity == parities[i - 1]); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, buf, &xonly_pubkey[i - 1])); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(xonly_pubkey_bytes[i - 1], buf, 32) == 0); + + /* Compare the xonly_pubkey bytes against the precomputed group. */ + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&fe, xonly_pubkey_bytes[i - 1]); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&fe, &group[i].x)); + + /* Check the parity against the precomputed group. */ + fe = group[i].y; + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&fe); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&fe) == parities[i - 1]); + + /* Verify that the higher half is identical to the lower half mirrored. */ + if (i > EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER / 2) { + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(xonly_pubkey_bytes[i - 1], xonly_pubkey_bytes[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - i - 1], 32) == 0); + CHECK(parities[i - 1] == 1 - parities[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - i - 1]); + } + } + + /* TODO: keypair/xonly_pubkey tweak tests */ +} + +#endif diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5ee1358 --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,524 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2020 Jonas Nick * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS_TESTS_ +#define _SECP256K1_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS_TESTS_ + +#include "secp256k1_extrakeys.h" + +static secp256k1_context* api_test_context(int flags, int *ecount) { + secp256k1_context *ctx0 = secp256k1_context_create(flags); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(ctx0, counting_illegal_callback_fn, ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx0, counting_illegal_callback_fn, ecount); + return ctx0; +} + +void test_xonly_pubkey(void) { + secp256k1_pubkey pk; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly_pk, xonly_pk_tmp; + secp256k1_ge pk1; + secp256k1_ge pk2; + secp256k1_fe y; + unsigned char sk[32]; + unsigned char xy_sk[32]; + unsigned char buf32[32]; + unsigned char ones32[32]; + unsigned char zeros64[64] = { 0 }; + int pk_parity; + int i; + + int ecount; + secp256k1_context *none = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *sign = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *verify = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY, &ecount); + + secp256k1_testrand256(sk); + memset(ones32, 0xFF, 32); + secp256k1_testrand256(xy_sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(sign, &pk, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1); + + /* Test xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey */ + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(sign, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(verify, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, NULL, &pk_parity, &pk) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, NULL, &pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + memset(&pk, 0, sizeof(pk)); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + + /* Choose a secret key such that the resulting pubkey and xonly_pubkey match. */ + memset(sk, 0, sizeof(sk)); + sk[0] = 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pk, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pk, &xonly_pk, sizeof(pk)) == 0); + CHECK(pk_parity == 0); + + /* Choose a secret key such that pubkey and xonly_pubkey are each others + * negation. */ + sk[0] = 2; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pk, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&xonly_pk, &pk, sizeof(xonly_pk)) != 0); + CHECK(pk_parity == 1); + secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk1, &pk); + secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk2, (secp256k1_pubkey *) &xonly_pk); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal(&pk1.x, &pk2.x) == 1); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&y, &pk2.y, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal(&pk1.y, &y) == 1); + + /* Test xonly_pubkey_serialize and xonly_pubkey_parse */ + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(none, NULL, &xonly_pk) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(none, buf32, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(buf32, zeros64, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + { + /* A pubkey filled with 0s will fail to serialize due to pubkey_load + * special casing. */ + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk_tmp; + memset(&pk_tmp, 0, sizeof(pk_tmp)); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(none, buf32, &pk_tmp) == 0); + } + /* pubkey_load called illegal callback */ + CHECK(ecount == 3); + + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(none, buf32, &xonly_pk) == 1); + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(none, NULL, buf32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(none, &xonly_pk, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + + /* Serialization and parse roundtrip */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, NULL, &pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, buf32, &xonly_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &xonly_pk_tmp, buf32) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&xonly_pk, &xonly_pk_tmp, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0); + + /* Test parsing invalid field elements */ + memset(&xonly_pk, 1, sizeof(xonly_pk)); + /* Overflowing field element */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(none, &xonly_pk, ones32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&xonly_pk, zeros64, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0); + memset(&xonly_pk, 1, sizeof(xonly_pk)); + /* There's no point with x-coordinate 0 on secp256k1 */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(none, &xonly_pk, zeros64) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&xonly_pk, zeros64, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0); + /* If a random 32-byte string can not be parsed with ec_pubkey_parse + * (because interpreted as X coordinate it does not correspond to a point on + * the curve) then xonly_pubkey_parse should fail as well. */ + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + unsigned char rand33[33]; + secp256k1_testrand256(&rand33[1]); + rand33[0] = SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_EVEN; + if (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pk, rand33, 33)) { + memset(&xonly_pk, 1, sizeof(xonly_pk)); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &xonly_pk, &rand33[1]) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&xonly_pk, zeros64, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0); + } else { + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &xonly_pk, &rand33[1]) == 1); + } + } + CHECK(ecount == 2); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(verify); +} + +void test_xonly_pubkey_tweak(void) { + unsigned char zeros64[64] = { 0 }; + unsigned char overflows[32]; + unsigned char sk[32]; + secp256k1_pubkey internal_pk; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey internal_xonly_pk; + secp256k1_pubkey output_pk; + int pk_parity; + unsigned char tweak[32]; + int i; + + int ecount; + secp256k1_context *none = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *sign = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *verify = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY, &ecount); + + memset(overflows, 0xff, sizeof(overflows)); + secp256k1_testrand256(tweak); + secp256k1_testrand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &internal_pk, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &internal_xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &internal_pk) == 1); + + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(none, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(sign, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, NULL, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, NULL, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + /* NULL internal_xonly_pk zeroes the output_pk */ + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + /* NULL tweak zeroes the output_pk */ + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0); + + /* Invalid tweak zeroes the output_pk */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, overflows) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0); + + /* A zero tweak is fine */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, zeros64) == 1); + + /* Fails if the resulting key was infinity */ + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar scalar_tweak; + /* Because sk may be negated before adding, we need to try with tweak = + * sk as well as tweak = -sk. */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&scalar_tweak, sk, NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&scalar_tweak, &scalar_tweak); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(tweak, &scalar_tweak); + CHECK((secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, sk) == 0) + || (secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0)); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0); + } + + /* Invalid pk with a valid tweak */ + memset(&internal_xonly_pk, 0, sizeof(internal_xonly_pk)); + secp256k1_testrand256(tweak); + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(verify); +} + +void test_xonly_pubkey_tweak_check(void) { + unsigned char zeros64[64] = { 0 }; + unsigned char overflows[32]; + unsigned char sk[32]; + secp256k1_pubkey internal_pk; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey internal_xonly_pk; + secp256k1_pubkey output_pk; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey output_xonly_pk; + unsigned char output_pk32[32]; + unsigned char buf32[32]; + int pk_parity; + unsigned char tweak[32]; + + int ecount; + secp256k1_context *none = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *sign = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *verify = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY, &ecount); + + memset(overflows, 0xff, sizeof(overflows)); + secp256k1_testrand256(tweak); + secp256k1_testrand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &internal_pk, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &internal_xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &internal_pk) == 1); + + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(verify, &output_xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &output_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, buf32, &output_xonly_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(none, buf32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(sign, buf32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(verify, buf32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(verify, NULL, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + /* invalid pk_parity value */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(verify, buf32, 2, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(verify, buf32, pk_parity, NULL, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(verify, buf32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + + memset(tweak, 1, sizeof(tweak)); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &internal_xonly_pk, NULL, &internal_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &output_xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &output_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, output_pk32, &output_xonly_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, output_pk32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 1); + + /* Wrong pk_parity */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, output_pk32, !pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + /* Wrong public key */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, buf32, &internal_xonly_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, buf32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0); + + /* Overflowing tweak not allowed */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, output_pk32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, overflows) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, overflows) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(verify); +} + +/* Starts with an initial pubkey and recursively creates N_PUBKEYS - 1 + * additional pubkeys by calling tweak_add. Then verifies every tweak starting + * from the last pubkey. */ +#define N_PUBKEYS 32 +void test_xonly_pubkey_tweak_recursive(void) { + unsigned char sk[32]; + secp256k1_pubkey pk[N_PUBKEYS]; + unsigned char pk_serialized[32]; + unsigned char tweak[N_PUBKEYS - 1][32]; + int i; + + secp256k1_testrand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pk[0], sk) == 1); + /* Add tweaks */ + for (i = 0; i < N_PUBKEYS - 1; i++) { + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly_pk; + memset(tweak[i], i + 1, sizeof(tweak[i])); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &xonly_pk, NULL, &pk[i]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pk[i + 1], &xonly_pk, tweak[i]) == 1); + } + + /* Verify tweaks */ + for (i = N_PUBKEYS - 1; i > 0; i--) { + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly_pk; + int pk_parity; + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk[i]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pk_serialized, &xonly_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &xonly_pk, NULL, &pk[i - 1]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, pk_serialized, pk_parity, &xonly_pk, tweak[i - 1]) == 1); + } +} +#undef N_PUBKEYS + +void test_keypair(void) { + unsigned char sk[32]; + unsigned char zeros96[96] = { 0 }; + unsigned char overflows[32]; + secp256k1_keypair keypair; + secp256k1_pubkey pk, pk_tmp; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly_pk, xonly_pk_tmp; + int pk_parity, pk_parity_tmp; + int ecount; + secp256k1_context *none = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *sign = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *verify = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY, &ecount); + + CHECK(sizeof(zeros96) == sizeof(keypair)); + memset(overflows, 0xFF, sizeof(overflows)); + + /* Test keypair_create */ + ecount = 0; + secp256k1_testrand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(none, &keypair, sk) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zeros96, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(verify, &keypair, sk) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zeros96, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, NULL, sk) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zeros96, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + + /* Invalid secret key */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, zeros96) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zeros96, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, overflows) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zeros96, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)) == 0); + + /* Test keypair_pub */ + ecount = 0; + secp256k1_testrand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(none, &pk, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(none, NULL, &keypair) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(none, &pk, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zeros96, &pk, sizeof(pk)) == 0); + + /* Using an invalid keypair is fine for keypair_pub */ + memset(&keypair, 0, sizeof(keypair)); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(none, &pk, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zeros96, &pk, sizeof(pk)) == 0); + + /* keypair holds the same pubkey as pubkey_create */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(sign, &pk, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(none, &pk_tmp, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pk, &pk_tmp, sizeof(pk)) == 0); + + /** Test keypair_xonly_pub **/ + ecount = 0; + secp256k1_testrand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, NULL, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk, NULL, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zeros96, &xonly_pk, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0); + /* Using an invalid keypair will set the xonly_pk to 0 (first reset + * xonly_pk). */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 1); + memset(&keypair, 0, sizeof(keypair)); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zeros96, &xonly_pk, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + + /** keypair holds the same xonly pubkey as pubkey_create **/ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(sign, &pk, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk_tmp, &pk_parity_tmp, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&xonly_pk, &xonly_pk_tmp, sizeof(pk)) == 0); + CHECK(pk_parity == pk_parity_tmp); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(verify); +} + +void test_keypair_add(void) { + unsigned char sk[32]; + secp256k1_keypair keypair; + unsigned char overflows[32]; + unsigned char zeros96[96] = { 0 }; + unsigned char tweak[32]; + int i; + int ecount = 0; + secp256k1_context *none = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *sign = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN, &ecount); + secp256k1_context *verify = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY, &ecount); + + CHECK(sizeof(zeros96) == sizeof(keypair)); + secp256k1_testrand256(sk); + secp256k1_testrand256(tweak); + memset(overflows, 0xFF, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(none, &keypair, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(sign, &keypair, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, &keypair, tweak) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, NULL, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, &keypair, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + /* This does not set the keypair to zeroes */ + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&keypair, zeros96, sizeof(keypair)) != 0); + + /* Invalid tweak zeroes the keypair */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, overflows) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&keypair, zeros96, sizeof(keypair)) == 0); + + /* A zero tweak is fine */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, zeros96) == 1); + + /* Fails if the resulting keypair was (sk=0, pk=infinity) */ + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar scalar_tweak; + secp256k1_keypair keypair_tmp; + secp256k1_testrand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + memcpy(&keypair_tmp, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)); + /* Because sk may be negated before adding, we need to try with tweak = + * sk as well as tweak = -sk. */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&scalar_tweak, sk, NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&scalar_tweak, &scalar_tweak); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(tweak, &scalar_tweak); + CHECK((secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 0) + || (secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair_tmp, tweak) == 0)); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&keypair, zeros96, sizeof(keypair)) == 0 + || secp256k1_memcmp_var(&keypair_tmp, zeros96, sizeof(keypair_tmp)) == 0); + } + + /* Invalid keypair with a valid tweak */ + memset(&keypair, 0, sizeof(keypair)); + secp256k1_testrand256(tweak); + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, &keypair, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&keypair, zeros96, sizeof(keypair)) == 0); + /* Only seckey part of keypair invalid */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + memset(&keypair, 0, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, &keypair, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + /* Only pubkey part of keypair invalid */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + memset(&keypair.data[32], 0, 64); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, &keypair, tweak) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + + /* Check that the keypair_tweak_add implementation is correct */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey internal_pk; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey output_pk; + secp256k1_pubkey output_pk_xy; + secp256k1_pubkey output_pk_expected; + unsigned char pk32[32]; + int pk_parity; + + secp256k1_testrand256(tweak); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &internal_pk, NULL, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, tweak) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &output_pk, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 1); + + /* Check that it passes xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pk32, &output_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, pk32, pk_parity, &internal_pk, tweak) == 1); + + /* Check that the resulting pubkey matches xonly_pubkey_tweak_add */ + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(ctx, &output_pk_xy, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &output_pk_expected, &internal_pk, tweak) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&output_pk_xy, &output_pk_expected, sizeof(output_pk_xy)) == 0); + + /* Check that the secret key in the keypair is tweaked correctly */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &output_pk_expected, &keypair.data[0]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&output_pk_xy, &output_pk_expected, sizeof(output_pk_xy)) == 0); + } + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(verify); +} + +void run_extrakeys_tests(void) { + /* xonly key test cases */ + test_xonly_pubkey(); + test_xonly_pubkey_tweak(); + test_xonly_pubkey_tweak_check(); + test_xonly_pubkey_tweak_recursive(); + + /* keypair tests */ + test_keypair(); + test_keypair_add(); +} + +#endif diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/oldschnorr/Makefile.am.include b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/oldschnorr/Makefile.am.include deleted file mode 100644 index 8759109..0000000 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/oldschnorr/Makefile.am.include +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ -include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_oldschnorr.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/oldschnorr/main_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/oldschnorr/oldschnorr.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/oldschnorr/oldschnorr_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/oldschnorr/tests_impl.h diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/oldschnorr/main_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/oldschnorr/main_impl.h deleted file mode 100755 index e4a8755..0000000 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/oldschnorr/main_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Pieter Wuille * - * Copyright (c) 2017 Amaury Séchet * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_OLDSCHNORR_MAIN -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_OLDSCHNORR_MAIN - -#include "include/secp256k1_oldschnorr.h" -#include "modules/oldschnorr/oldschnorr_impl.h" - -int secp256k1_schnorr_verify( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - const unsigned char *sig64, - const unsigned char *msg32, - const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey -) { - secp256k1_ge q; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(sig64 != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); - - secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &q, pubkey); - return secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, sig64, &q, msg32); -} - -int secp256k1_schnorr_sign( - const secp256k1_context *ctx, - unsigned char *sig64, - const unsigned char *msg32, - const unsigned char *seckey, - secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, - const void *ndata -) { - secp256k1_scalar sec; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - secp256k1_ge p; - int ret = 0; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(sig64 != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); - - if (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, seckey)) { - return 0; - } - - secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &p, &pubkey); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, NULL); - ret = secp256k1_schnorr_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, sig64, msg32, &sec, &p, noncefp, ndata); - if (!ret) { - memset(sig64, 0, 64); - } - - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); - return ret; -} - -#endif diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/oldschnorr/oldschnorr.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/oldschnorr/oldschnorr.h deleted file mode 100644 index 14e491c..0000000 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/oldschnorr/oldschnorr.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,65 +0,0 @@ -/*********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Pieter Wuille * - * Copyright (c) 2017 Amaury SÉCHET * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. * - ***********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef _SECP256K1_MODULE_OLDSCHNORR_H_ -#define _SECP256K1_MODULE_OLDSCHNORR_H_ - -#include "scalar.h" -#include "group.h" - -static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify( - const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ctx, - const unsigned char *sig64, - secp256k1_ge *pubkey, - const unsigned char *msg32 -); - -static int secp256k1_schnorr_compute_e( - secp256k1_scalar* res, - const unsigned char *r, - secp256k1_ge *pubkey, - const unsigned char *msg32 -); - -static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_sign( - const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx, - unsigned char *sig64, - const unsigned char *msg32, - const secp256k1_scalar *privkey, - secp256k1_ge *pubkey, - secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, - const void *ndata -); - -static int secp256k1_schnorr_compute_k_R( - const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx, - secp256k1_scalar *k, - secp256k1_ge *R, - const unsigned char *msg32, - const secp256k1_scalar *privkey, - secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, - const void *ndata -); - -static int secp256k1_schnorr_compute_sig( - unsigned char *sig64, - const unsigned char *msg32, - secp256k1_scalar *k, - secp256k1_ge *R, - const secp256k1_scalar *privkey, - secp256k1_ge *pubkey -); - -static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_generate_k( - secp256k1_scalar *k, - const unsigned char *msg32, - const secp256k1_scalar *privkey, - secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, - const void *ndata -); - -#endif diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/oldschnorr/oldschnorr_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/oldschnorr/oldschnorr_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 2cfe332..0000000 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/oldschnorr/oldschnorr_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,252 +0,0 @@ -/*********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Pieter Wuille * - * Copyright (c) 2017 Amaury SÉCHET * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. * - ***********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef _SECP256K1_OLDSCHNORR_IMPL_H_ -#define _SECP256K1_OLDSCHNORR_IMPL_H_ - -#include - -#include "oldschnorr.h" -#include "field.h" -#include "group.h" -#include "hash.h" -#include "ecmult.h" -#include "ecmult_gen.h" - -/** - * Custom Schnorr-based signature scheme. - * - * Signing: - * Inputs: - * 32-byte message m, - * 32-byte scalar key x (!=0) - * public key point P, - * 32-byte scalar nonce k (!=0) - * - * Compute point R = k * G. Negate nonce if R.y is not a quadratic residue. - * Compute scalar e = Hash(R.x || compressed(P) || m) mod n. - * Compute scalar s = k + e * x. - * The signature is (R.x, s). - * - * Verification: - * Inputs: - * 32-byte message m, - * public key point P, - * signature: (32-byte r, scalar s) - * - * Signature is invalid if s >= n or r >= p. - * Compute scalar e = Hash(r || compressed(P) || m) mod n. - * Option 1 (faster for single verification): - * Compute point R = s * G - e * P. - * Reject if R is infinity or R.y is not a quadratic residue. - * Signature is valid if the serialization of R.x equals r. - * Option 2 (allows batch validation): - * Decompress x coordinate r into point R, with R.y a quadratic residue. - * Reject if R is not on the curve. - * Signature is valid if R + e * P - s * G == 0. - */ -static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify( - const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ctx, - const unsigned char *sig64, - secp256k1_ge *pubkey, - const unsigned char *msg32 -) { - secp256k1_gej Pj, Rj; - secp256k1_fe Rx; - secp256k1_scalar e, s; - int overflow; - - if (secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(pubkey)) { - return 0; - } - - /* Extract s */ - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, sig64 + 32, &overflow); - if (overflow) { - return 0; - } - - /* Extract R.x */ - if (!secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&Rx, sig64)) { - return 0; - } - - /* Compute e */ - secp256k1_schnorr_compute_e(&e, sig64, pubkey, msg32); - - /* Verify the signature */ - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&e, &e); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&Pj, pubkey); - secp256k1_ecmult(ctx, &Rj, &Pj, &e, &s); - if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&Rj)) { - return 0; - } - - /* Check that R.x is what we expect */ - if (!secp256k1_gej_eq_x_var(&Rx, &Rj)) { - return 0; - } - - /* Check that jacobi(R.y) is 1 */ - if (!secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&Rj)) { - return 0; - } - - /* All good, we have a valid signature. */ - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_schnorr_compute_e( - secp256k1_scalar* e, - const unsigned char *r, - secp256k1_ge *p, - const unsigned char *msg32 -) { - int overflow = 0; - size_t size; - secp256k1_sha256 sha; - unsigned char buf[33]; - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha); - - /* R.x */ - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, r, 32); - - /* compressed P */ - secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(p, buf, &size, 1); - VERIFY_CHECK(size == 33); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, buf, 33); - - /* msg */ - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, msg32, 32); - - /* compute e */ - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, buf); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(e, buf, &overflow); - return !overflow & !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(e); -} - -static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_sign( - const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx, - unsigned char *sig64, - const unsigned char *msg32, - const secp256k1_scalar *privkey, - secp256k1_ge *pubkey, - secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, - const void *ndata -) { - secp256k1_ge R; - secp256k1_scalar k; - int ret; - - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(privkey)) { - return 0; - } - - if (!secp256k1_schnorr_compute_k_R(ctx, &k, &R, msg32, privkey, noncefp, ndata)) { - return 0; - } - - ret = secp256k1_schnorr_compute_sig(sig64, msg32, &k, &R, privkey, pubkey); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&k); - return ret; -} - -static int secp256k1_schnorr_compute_k_R( - const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx, - secp256k1_scalar *k, - secp256k1_ge *R, - const unsigned char *msg32, - const secp256k1_scalar *privkey, - secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, - const void *ndata -) { - secp256k1_gej Rj; - - if (!secp256k1_schnorr_sig_generate_k(k, msg32, privkey, noncefp, ndata)) { - return 0; - } - - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ctx, &Rj, k); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(R, &Rj); - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_schnorr_compute_sig( - unsigned char *sig64, - const unsigned char *msg32, - secp256k1_scalar *k, - secp256k1_ge *R, - const secp256k1_scalar *privkey, - secp256k1_ge *pubkey -) { - secp256k1_scalar e, s; - - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(privkey) || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(k)) { - return 0; - } - - if (secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(pubkey)) { - return 0; - } - - if (!secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&R->y)) { - /** - * R's y coordinate is not a quadratic residue, which is not allowed. - * Negate the nonce to ensure it is. - */ - secp256k1_scalar_negate(k, k); - } - - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&R->x); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(sig64, &R->x); - secp256k1_schnorr_compute_e(&e, sig64, pubkey, msg32); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s, &e, privkey); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&s, &s, k); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(sig64 + 32, &s); - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_generate_k( - secp256k1_scalar *k, - const unsigned char *msg32, - const secp256k1_scalar *privkey, - secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, - const void *ndata -) { - int overflow = 0; - int ret = 0; - unsigned int count = 0; - unsigned char nonce32[32], seckey[32]; - - /* Seed used to make sure we generate different values of k for schnorr */ - const unsigned char secp256k1_schnorr_algo16[17] = "Schnorr+SHA256 "; - - if (noncefp == NULL) { - noncefp = secp256k1_nonce_function_default; - } - - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey, privkey); - while (1) { - ret = noncefp(nonce32, msg32, seckey, secp256k1_schnorr_algo16, (void*)ndata, count++); - if (!ret) { - break; - } - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(k, nonce32, &overflow); - if (!overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(k)) { - break; - } - - secp256k1_scalar_clear(k); - } - - memset(seckey, 0, 32); - memset(nonce32, 0, 32); - return ret; -} - -#endif diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/oldschnorr/tests_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/oldschnorr/tests_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index a194407..0000000 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/oldschnorr/tests_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,523 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Pieter Wuille * - * Copyright (c) 2017 Amaury SÉCHET * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_OLDSCHNORR_TESTS -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_OLDSCHNORR_TESTS - -#include "include/secp256k1_oldschnorr.h" - -void test_schnorr_end_to_end(void) { - unsigned char privkey[32]; - unsigned char message[32]; - unsigned char schnorr_signature[64]; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - - /* Generate a random key and message. */ - { - secp256k1_scalar key; - random_scalar_order_test(&key); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(privkey, &key); - secp256k1_rand256_test(message); - } - - /* Construct and verify corresponding public key. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, privkey) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, privkey) == 1); - - /* Schnorr sign. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_sign(ctx, schnorr_signature, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, schnorr_signature, message, &pubkey) == 1); - /* Destroy signature and verify again. */ - schnorr_signature[secp256k1_rand_bits(6)] += 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255); - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, schnorr_signature, message, &pubkey) == 0); -} - -#define SIG_COUNT 32 - -void test_schnorr_sign_verify(void) { - unsigned char msg32[32]; - unsigned char sig64[SIG_COUNT][64]; - unsigned char ndata[SIG_COUNT][32]; - secp256k1_gej pubkeyj[SIG_COUNT]; - secp256k1_ge pubkey[SIG_COUNT]; - secp256k1_scalar key[SIG_COUNT]; - int i, j; - - secp256k1_rand256_test(msg32); - - for (i = 0; i < SIG_COUNT; i++) { - random_scalar_order_test(&key[i]); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pubkeyj[i], &key[i]); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&pubkey[i], &pubkeyj[i]); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pubkey[i].x); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pubkey[i].y); - - do { - secp256k1_rand256_test(ndata[i]); - if (secp256k1_schnorr_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, sig64[i], msg32, &key[i], &pubkey[i], NULL, &ndata[i])) { - break; - } - } while(1); - - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, sig64[i], &pubkey[i], msg32)); - - /* Apply several random modifications to the sig and check that it - * doesn't verify anymore. */ - for (j = 0; j < count; j++) { - int pos = secp256k1_rand_bits(6); - int mod = 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255); - sig64[i][pos] ^= mod; - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, sig64[i], &pubkey[i], msg32) == 0); - sig64[i][pos] ^= mod; - } - } -} - -#undef SIG_COUNT - -void run_schnorr_compact_test(void) { - { - /* Test vector 1 */ - static const unsigned char pkbuf[33] = { - 0x02, - 0x79, 0xBE, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0xAC, - 0x55, 0xA0, 0x62, 0x95, 0xCE, 0x87, 0x0B, 0x07, - 0x02, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x2D, 0xCE, 0x28, 0xD9, - 0x59, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x5B, 0x16, 0xF8, 0x17, 0x98, - }; - - static const unsigned char msg[32] = { - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - }; - - static const unsigned char sig[64] = { - 0x78, 0x7A, 0x84, 0x8E, 0x71, 0x04, 0x3D, 0x28, - 0x0C, 0x50, 0x47, 0x0E, 0x8E, 0x15, 0x32, 0xB2, - 0xDD, 0x5D, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x91, 0x2A, 0x45, 0xDB, - 0xDD, 0x2B, 0xD1, 0xDF, 0xBF, 0x18, 0x7E, 0xF6, - 0x70, 0x31, 0xA9, 0x88, 0x31, 0x85, 0x9D, 0xC3, - 0x4D, 0xFF, 0xEE, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x68, 0x31, 0x84, - 0x2C, 0xCD, 0x00, 0x79, 0xE1, 0xF9, 0x2A, 0xF1, - 0x77, 0xF7, 0xF2, 0x2C, 0xC1, 0xDC, 0xED, 0x05, - }; - - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkbuf, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &pubkey)); - } - - { - /* Test vector 2 */ - static const unsigned char pkbuf[33] = { - 0x02, - 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, - 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, - 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, - 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59, - }; - - static const unsigned char msg[32] = { - 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, - 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, - 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, - 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89, - }; - - static const unsigned char sig[64] = { - 0x2A, 0x29, 0x8D, 0xAC, 0xAE, 0x57, 0x39, 0x5A, - 0x15, 0xD0, 0x79, 0x5D, 0xDB, 0xFD, 0x1D, 0xCB, - 0x56, 0x4D, 0xA8, 0x2B, 0x0F, 0x26, 0x9B, 0xC7, - 0x0A, 0x74, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x04, 0x29, 0xBA, 0x1D, - 0x1E, 0x51, 0xA2, 0x2C, 0xCE, 0xC3, 0x55, 0x99, - 0xB8, 0xF2, 0x66, 0x91, 0x22, 0x81, 0xF8, 0x36, - 0x5F, 0xFC, 0x2D, 0x03, 0x5A, 0x23, 0x04, 0x34, - 0xA1, 0xA6, 0x4D, 0xC5, 0x9F, 0x70, 0x13, 0xFD, - }; - - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkbuf, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &pubkey)); - } - - { - /* Test vector 3 */ - static const unsigned char pkbuf[33] = { - 0x03, - 0xFA, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x4C, 0x2F, 0xBB, 0x09, 0x15, - 0x27, 0xEB, 0x7C, 0x64, 0xEC, 0xB1, 0x1F, 0x80, - 0x21, 0xCB, 0x45, 0xE8, 0xE7, 0x80, 0x9D, 0x3C, - 0x09, 0x38, 0xE4, 0xB8, 0xC0, 0xE5, 0xF8, 0x4B, - }; - - static const unsigned char msg[32] = { - 0x5E, 0x2D, 0x58, 0xD8, 0xB3, 0xBC, 0xDF, 0x1A, - 0xBA, 0xDE, 0xC7, 0x82, 0x90, 0x54, 0xF9, 0x0D, - 0xDA, 0x98, 0x05, 0xAA, 0xB5, 0x6C, 0x77, 0x33, - 0x30, 0x24, 0xB9, 0xD0, 0xA5, 0x08, 0xB7, 0x5C, - }; - - static const unsigned char sig[64] = { - 0x00, 0xDA, 0x9B, 0x08, 0x17, 0x2A, 0x9B, 0x6F, - 0x04, 0x66, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xFD, 0x81, 0x7F, 0x2D, - 0x7A, 0xB4, 0x37, 0xE0, 0xD2, 0x53, 0xCB, 0x53, - 0x95, 0xA9, 0x63, 0x86, 0x6B, 0x35, 0x74, 0xBE, - 0x00, 0x88, 0x03, 0x71, 0xD0, 0x17, 0x66, 0x93, - 0x5B, 0x92, 0xD2, 0xAB, 0x4C, 0xD5, 0xC8, 0xA2, - 0xA5, 0x83, 0x7E, 0xC5, 0x7F, 0xED, 0x76, 0x60, - 0x77, 0x3A, 0x05, 0xF0, 0xDE, 0x14, 0x23, 0x80, - }; - - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkbuf, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &pubkey)); - } - - { - /* Test vector 4 */ - static const unsigned char pkbuf[33] = { - 0x03, - 0xDE, 0xFD, 0xEA, 0x4C, 0xDB, 0x67, 0x77, 0x50, - 0xA4, 0x20, 0xFE, 0xE8, 0x07, 0xEA, 0xCF, 0x21, - 0xEB, 0x98, 0x98, 0xAE, 0x79, 0xB9, 0x76, 0x87, - 0x66, 0xE4, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x4A, 0x2D, 0x4A, 0x34, - }; - - static const unsigned char msg[32] = { - 0x4D, 0xF3, 0xC3, 0xF6, 0x8F, 0xCC, 0x83, 0xB2, - 0x7E, 0x9D, 0x42, 0xC9, 0x04, 0x31, 0xA7, 0x24, - 0x99, 0xF1, 0x78, 0x75, 0xC8, 0x1A, 0x59, 0x9B, - 0x56, 0x6C, 0x98, 0x89, 0xB9, 0x69, 0x67, 0x03, - }; - - static const unsigned char sig[64] = { - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3B, 0x78, 0xCE, 0x56, 0x3F, - 0x89, 0xA0, 0xED, 0x94, 0x14, 0xF5, 0xAA, 0x28, - 0xAD, 0x0D, 0x96, 0xD6, 0x79, 0x5F, 0x9C, 0x63, - 0x02, 0xA8, 0xDC, 0x32, 0xE6, 0x4E, 0x86, 0xA3, - 0x33, 0xF2, 0x0E, 0xF5, 0x6E, 0xAC, 0x9B, 0xA3, - 0x0B, 0x72, 0x46, 0xD6, 0xD2, 0x5E, 0x22, 0xAD, - 0xB8, 0xC6, 0xBE, 0x1A, 0xEB, 0x08, 0xD4, 0x9D, - }; - - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkbuf, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &pubkey)); - } - - { - /* Test vector 4b */ - static const unsigned char pkbuf[33] = { - 0x03, - 0x1B, 0x84, 0xC5, 0x56, 0x7B, 0x12, 0x64, 0x40, - 0x99, 0x5D, 0x3E, 0xD5, 0xAA, 0xBA, 0x05, 0x65, - 0xD7, 0x1E, 0x18, 0x34, 0x60, 0x48, 0x19, 0xFF, - 0x9C, 0x17, 0xF5, 0xE9, 0xD5, 0xDD, 0x07, 0x8F, - }; - - static const unsigned char msg[32] = { - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - }; - - static const unsigned char sig[64] = { - 0x52, 0x81, 0x85, 0x79, 0xAC, 0xA5, 0x97, 0x67, - 0xE3, 0x29, 0x1D, 0x91, 0xB7, 0x6B, 0x63, 0x7B, - 0xEF, 0x06, 0x20, 0x83, 0x28, 0x49, 0x92, 0xF2, - 0xD9, 0x5F, 0x56, 0x4C, 0xA6, 0xCB, 0x4E, 0x35, - 0x30, 0xB1, 0xDA, 0x84, 0x9C, 0x8E, 0x83, 0x04, - 0xAD, 0xC0, 0xCF, 0xE8, 0x70, 0x66, 0x03, 0x34, - 0xB3, 0xCF, 0xC1, 0x8E, 0x82, 0x5E, 0xF1, 0xDB, - 0x34, 0xCF, 0xAE, 0x3D, 0xFC, 0x5D, 0x81, 0x87, - }; - - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkbuf, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &pubkey)); - } - - { - /* Test vector 6: R.y is not a quadratic residue */ - static const unsigned char pkbuf[33] = { - 0x02, - 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, - 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, - 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, - 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59, - }; - - static const unsigned char msg[32] = { - 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, - 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, - 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, - 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89, - }; - - static const unsigned char sig[64] = { - 0x2A, 0x29, 0x8D, 0xAC, 0xAE, 0x57, 0x39, 0x5A, - 0x15, 0xD0, 0x79, 0x5D, 0xDB, 0xFD, 0x1D, 0xCB, - 0x56, 0x4D, 0xA8, 0x2B, 0x0F, 0x26, 0x9B, 0xC7, - 0x0A, 0x74, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x04, 0x29, 0xBA, 0x1D, - 0xFA, 0x16, 0xAE, 0xE0, 0x66, 0x09, 0x28, 0x0A, - 0x19, 0xB6, 0x7A, 0x24, 0xE1, 0x97, 0x7E, 0x46, - 0x97, 0x71, 0x2B, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x94, 0x39, 0x14, - 0xEC, 0xD5, 0xF7, 0x30, 0x90, 0x1B, 0x4A, 0xB7, - }; - - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkbuf, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &pubkey) == 0); - } - - { - /* Test vector 7: Negated message hash, R.x mismatch */ - static const unsigned char pkbuf[33] = { - 0x03, - 0xFA, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x4C, 0x2F, 0xBB, 0x09, 0x15, - 0x27, 0xEB, 0x7C, 0x64, 0xEC, 0xB1, 0x1F, 0x80, - 0x21, 0xCB, 0x45, 0xE8, 0xE7, 0x80, 0x9D, 0x3C, - 0x09, 0x38, 0xE4, 0xB8, 0xC0, 0xE5, 0xF8, 0x4B, - }; - - static const unsigned char msg[32] = { - 0x5E, 0x2D, 0x58, 0xD8, 0xB3, 0xBC, 0xDF, 0x1A, - 0xBA, 0xDE, 0xC7, 0x82, 0x90, 0x54, 0xF9, 0x0D, - 0xDA, 0x98, 0x05, 0xAA, 0xB5, 0x6C, 0x77, 0x33, - 0x30, 0x24, 0xB9, 0xD0, 0xA5, 0x08, 0xB7, 0x5C, - }; - - static const unsigned char sig[64] = { - 0x00, 0xDA, 0x9B, 0x08, 0x17, 0x2A, 0x9B, 0x6F, - 0x04, 0x66, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xFD, 0x81, 0x7F, 0x2D, - 0x7A, 0xB4, 0x37, 0xE0, 0xD2, 0x53, 0xCB, 0x53, - 0x95, 0xA9, 0x63, 0x86, 0x6B, 0x35, 0x74, 0xBE, - 0xD0, 0x92, 0xF9, 0xD8, 0x60, 0xF1, 0x77, 0x6A, - 0x1F, 0x74, 0x12, 0xAD, 0x8A, 0x1E, 0xB5, 0x0D, - 0xAC, 0xCC, 0x22, 0x2B, 0xC8, 0xC0, 0xE2, 0x6B, - 0x20, 0x56, 0xDF, 0x2F, 0x27, 0x3E, 0xFD, 0xEC, - }; - - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkbuf, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &pubkey) == 0); - } - - { - /* Test vector 8: Negated s, R.x mismatch */ - static const unsigned char pkbuf[33] = { - 0x02, - 0x79, 0xBE, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0xAC, - 0x55, 0xA0, 0x62, 0x95, 0xCE, 0x87, 0x0B, 0x07, - 0x02, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x2D, 0xCE, 0x28, 0xD9, - 0x59, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x5B, 0x16, 0xF8, 0x17, 0x98, - }; - - static const unsigned char msg[32] = { - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - }; - - static const unsigned char sig[64] = { - 0x78, 0x7A, 0x84, 0x8E, 0x71, 0x04, 0x3D, 0x28, - 0x0C, 0x50, 0x47, 0x0E, 0x8E, 0x15, 0x32, 0xB2, - 0xDD, 0x5D, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x91, 0x2A, 0x45, 0xDB, - 0xDD, 0x2B, 0xD1, 0xDF, 0xBF, 0x18, 0x7E, 0xF6, - 0x8F, 0xCE, 0x56, 0x77, 0xCE, 0x7A, 0x62, 0x3C, - 0xB2, 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x57, 0x97, 0xCE, 0x7A, - 0x8D, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x6C, 0xCD, 0x4F, 0x75, 0x4A, - 0x47, 0xDA, 0x6C, 0x60, 0x0E, 0x59, 0x54, 0x3C, - }; - - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkbuf, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &pubkey) == 0); - } - - { - /* Test vector 9: Negated P, R.x mismatch */ - static const unsigned char pkbuf[33] = { - 0x03, - 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, - 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, - 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, - 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59, - }; - - static const unsigned char msg[32] = { - 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, - 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, - 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, - 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89, - }; - - static const unsigned char sig[64] = { - 0x2A, 0x29, 0x8D, 0xAC, 0xAE, 0x57, 0x39, 0x5A, - 0x15, 0xD0, 0x79, 0x5D, 0xDB, 0xFD, 0x1D, 0xCB, - 0x56, 0x4D, 0xA8, 0x2B, 0x0F, 0x26, 0x9B, 0xC7, - 0x0A, 0x74, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x04, 0x29, 0xBA, 0x1D, - 0x1E, 0x51, 0xA2, 0x2C, 0xCE, 0xC3, 0x55, 0x99, - 0xB8, 0xF2, 0x66, 0x91, 0x22, 0x81, 0xF8, 0x36, - 0x5F, 0xFC, 0x2D, 0x03, 0x5A, 0x23, 0x04, 0x34, - 0xA1, 0xA6, 0x4D, 0xC5, 0x9F, 0x70, 0x13, 0xFD, - }; - - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkbuf, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &pubkey) == 0); - } - - { - /* Test vector 10: s * G = e * P, R = 0 */ - static const unsigned char pkbuf[33] = { - 0x02, - 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, - 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, - 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, - 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59, - }; - - static const unsigned char msg[32] = { - 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, - 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, - 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, - 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89, - }; - - static const unsigned char sig[64] = { - 0x2A, 0x29, 0x8D, 0xAC, 0xAE, 0x57, 0x39, 0x5A, - 0x15, 0xD0, 0x79, 0x5D, 0xDB, 0xFD, 0x1D, 0xCB, - 0x56, 0x4D, 0xA8, 0x2B, 0x0F, 0x26, 0x9B, 0xC7, - 0x0A, 0x74, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x04, 0x29, 0xBA, 0x1D, - 0x8C, 0x34, 0x28, 0x86, 0x9A, 0x66, 0x3E, 0xD1, - 0xE9, 0x54, 0x70, 0x5B, 0x02, 0x0C, 0xBB, 0x3E, - 0x7B, 0xB6, 0xAC, 0x31, 0x96, 0x5B, 0x9E, 0xA4, - 0xC7, 0x3E, 0x22, 0x7B, 0x17, 0xC5, 0xAF, 0x5A, - }; - - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkbuf, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &pubkey) == 0); - } - - { - /* Test vector 11: R.x not on the curve, R.x mismatch */ - static const unsigned char pkbuf[33] = { - 0x02, - 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, - 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, - 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, - 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59, - }; - - static const unsigned char msg[32] = { - 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, - 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, - 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, - 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89, - }; - - static const unsigned char sig[64] = { - 0x4A, 0x29, 0x8D, 0xAC, 0xAE, 0x57, 0x39, 0x5A, - 0x15, 0xD0, 0x79, 0x5D, 0xDB, 0xFD, 0x1D, 0xCB, - 0x56, 0x4D, 0xA8, 0x2B, 0x0F, 0x26, 0x9B, 0xC7, - 0x0A, 0x74, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x04, 0x29, 0xBA, 0x1D, - 0x1E, 0x51, 0xA2, 0x2C, 0xCE, 0xC3, 0x55, 0x99, - 0xB8, 0xF2, 0x66, 0x91, 0x22, 0x81, 0xF8, 0x36, - 0x5F, 0xFC, 0x2D, 0x03, 0x5A, 0x23, 0x04, 0x34, - 0xA1, 0xA6, 0x4D, 0xC5, 0x9F, 0x70, 0x13, 0xFD, - }; - - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkbuf, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &pubkey) == 0); - } - - { - /* Test vector 12: r = p */ - static const unsigned char pkbuf[33] = { - 0x02, - 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, - 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, - 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, - 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59, - }; - - static const unsigned char msg[32] = { - 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, - 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, - 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, - 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89, - }; - - static const unsigned char sig[64] = { - 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, - 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, - 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, - 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x2F, - 0x1E, 0x51, 0xA2, 0x2C, 0xCE, 0xC3, 0x55, 0x99, - 0xB8, 0xF2, 0x66, 0x91, 0x22, 0x81, 0xF8, 0x36, - 0x5F, 0xFC, 0x2D, 0x03, 0x5A, 0x23, 0x04, 0x34, - 0xA1, 0xA6, 0x4D, 0xC5, 0x9F, 0x70, 0x13, 0xFD, - }; - - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkbuf, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &pubkey) == 0); - } - - { - /* Test vector 13: s = n */ - static const unsigned char pkbuf[33] = { - 0x02, - 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, - 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, - 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, - 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59, - }; - - static const unsigned char msg[32] = { - 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, - 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, - 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, - 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89, - }; - - static const unsigned char sig[64] = { - 0x2A, 0x29, 0x8D, 0xAC, 0xAE, 0x57, 0x39, 0x5A, - 0x15, 0xD0, 0x79, 0x5D, 0xDB, 0xFD, 0x1D, 0xCB, - 0x56, 0x4D, 0xA8, 0x2B, 0x0F, 0x26, 0x9B, 0xC7, - 0x0A, 0x74, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x04, 0x29, 0xBA, 0x1D, - 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, - 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, - 0xBA, 0xAE, 0xDC, 0xE6, 0xAF, 0x48, 0xA0, 0x3B, - 0xBF, 0xD2, 0x5E, 0x8C, 0xD0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41, - }; - - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkbuf, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &pubkey) == 0); - } -} - -void run_oldschnorr_tests(void) { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < 32 * count; i++) { - test_schnorr_end_to_end(); - } - - test_schnorr_sign_verify(); - run_schnorr_compact_test(); -} - -#endif diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include index bf23c26..e2d3f12 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_recovery.h noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/recovery/tests_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/recovery/tests_exhaustive_impl.h if USE_BENCHMARK noinst_PROGRAMS += bench_recover bench_recover_SOURCES = src/bench_recover.c diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h old mode 100755 new mode 100644 index ed356e5..e2576aa --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h @@ -122,48 +122,15 @@ static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_recover(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, cons int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *signature, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *seckey, secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, const void* noncedata) { secp256k1_scalar r, s; - secp256k1_scalar sec, non, msg; - int recid; - int ret = 0; - int overflow = 0; + int ret, recid; VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); ARG_CHECK(signature != NULL); ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); - if (noncefp == NULL) { - noncefp = secp256k1_nonce_function_default; - } - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, &overflow); - /* Fail if the secret key is invalid. */ - if (!overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec)) { - unsigned char nonce32[32]; - unsigned int count = 0; - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&msg, msg32, NULL); - while (1) { - ret = noncefp(nonce32, msg32, seckey, NULL, (void*)noncedata, count); - if (!ret) { - break; - } - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&non, nonce32, &overflow); - if (!overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&non)) { - if (secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &r, &s, &sec, &msg, &non, &recid)) { - break; - } - } - count++; - } - memset(nonce32, 0, 32); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&msg); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&non); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); - } - if (ret) { - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_save(signature, &r, &s, recid); - } else { - memset(signature, 0, sizeof(*signature)); - } + ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_inner(ctx, &r, &s, &recid, msg32, seckey, noncefp, noncedata); + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_save(signature, &r, &s, recid); return ret; } diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/recovery/tests_exhaustive_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/recovery/tests_exhaustive_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a2f381d --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/recovery/tests_exhaustive_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_RECOVERY_EXHAUSTIVE_TESTS_H +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_RECOVERY_EXHAUSTIVE_TESTS_H + +#include "src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_recovery.h" + +void test_exhaustive_recovery_sign(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group) { + int i, j, k; + uint64_t iter = 0; + + /* Loop */ + for (i = 1; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) { /* message */ + for (j = 1; j < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; j++) { /* key */ + if (skip_section(&iter)) continue; + for (k = 1; k < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; k++) { /* nonce */ + const int starting_k = k; + secp256k1_fe r_dot_y_normalized; + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsig; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; + secp256k1_scalar sk, msg, r, s, expected_r; + unsigned char sk32[32], msg32[32]; + int expected_recid; + int recid; + int overflow; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, i); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sk, j); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(sk32, &sk); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(msg32, &msg); + + secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &rsig, msg32, sk32, secp256k1_nonce_function_smallint, &k); + + /* Check directly */ + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &recid, &rsig); + r_from_k(&expected_r, group, k, &overflow); + CHECK(r == expected_r); + CHECK((k * s) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == (i + r * j) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER || + (k * (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - s)) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == (i + r * j) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); + /* The recid's second bit is for conveying overflow (R.x value >= group order). + * In the actual secp256k1 this is an astronomically unlikely event, but in the + * small group used here, it will be the case for all points except the ones where + * R.x=1 (which the group is specifically selected to have). + * Note that this isn't actually useful; full recovery would need to convey + * floor(R.x / group_order), but only one bit is used as that is sufficient + * in the real group. */ + expected_recid = overflow ? 2 : 0; + r_dot_y_normalized = group[k].y; + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r_dot_y_normalized); + /* Also the recovery id is flipped depending if we hit the low-s branch */ + if ((k * s) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == (i + r * j) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) { + expected_recid |= secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r_dot_y_normalized); + } else { + expected_recid |= !secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r_dot_y_normalized); + } + CHECK(recid == expected_recid); + + /* Convert to a standard sig then check */ + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &sig, &rsig); + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &sig); + /* Note that we compute expected_r *after* signing -- this is important + * because our nonce-computing function function might change k during + * signing. */ + r_from_k(&expected_r, group, k, NULL); + CHECK(r == expected_r); + CHECK((k * s) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == (i + r * j) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER || + (k * (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - s)) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == (i + r * j) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); + + /* Overflow means we've tried every possible nonce */ + if (k < starting_k) { + break; + } + } + } + } +} + +void test_exhaustive_recovery_verify(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group) { + /* This is essentially a copy of test_exhaustive_verify, with recovery added */ + int s, r, msg, key; + uint64_t iter = 0; + for (s = 1; s < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; s++) { + for (r = 1; r < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; r++) { + for (msg = 1; msg < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; msg++) { + for (key = 1; key < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; key++) { + secp256k1_ge nonconst_ge; + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsig; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; + secp256k1_pubkey pk; + secp256k1_scalar sk_s, msg_s, r_s, s_s; + secp256k1_scalar s_times_k_s, msg_plus_r_times_sk_s; + int recid = 0; + int k, should_verify; + unsigned char msg32[32]; + + if (skip_section(&iter)) continue; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_s, s); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&r_s, r); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg_s, msg); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sk_s, key); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(msg32, &msg_s); + + /* Verify by hand */ + /* Run through every k value that gives us this r and check that *one* works. + * Note there could be none, there could be multiple, ECDSA is weird. */ + should_verify = 0; + for (k = 0; k < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; k++) { + secp256k1_scalar check_x_s; + r_from_k(&check_x_s, group, k, NULL); + if (r_s == check_x_s) { + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_times_k_s, k); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s_times_k_s, &s_times_k_s, &s_s); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &r_s, &sk_s); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &msg_s); + should_verify |= secp256k1_scalar_eq(&s_times_k_s, &msg_plus_r_times_sk_s); + } + } + /* nb we have a "high s" rule */ + should_verify &= !secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s_s); + + /* We would like to try recovering the pubkey and checking that it matches, + * but pubkey recovery is impossible in the exhaustive tests (the reason + * being that there are 12 nonzero r values, 12 nonzero points, and no + * overlap between the sets, so there are no valid signatures). */ + + /* Verify by converting to a standard signature and calling verify */ + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_save(&rsig, &r_s, &s_s, recid); + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &sig, &rsig); + memcpy(&nonconst_ge, &group[sk_s], sizeof(nonconst_ge)); + secp256k1_pubkey_save(&pk, &nonconst_ge); + CHECK(should_verify == + secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pk)); + } + } + } + } +} + +static void test_exhaustive_recovery(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group) { + test_exhaustive_recovery_sign(ctx, group); + test_exhaustive_recovery_verify(ctx, group); +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_MODULE_RECOVERY_EXHAUSTIVE_TESTS_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/recovery/tests_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/recovery/tests_impl.h index 38a533a..09cae38 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/recovery/tests_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/recovery/tests_impl.h @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ static int recovery_test_nonce_function(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned c } /* On the next run, return a valid nonce, but flip a coin as to whether or not to fail signing. */ memset(nonce32, 1, 32); - return secp256k1_rand_bits(1); + return secp256k1_testrand_bits(1); } void test_ecdsa_recovery_api(void) { @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ void test_ecdsa_recovery_end_to_end(void) { CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &rsignature[3], message, privkey, NULL, extra) == 1); CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, sig, &recid, &rsignature[4]) == 1); CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &signature[4], &rsignature[4]) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[4], &signature[0], 64) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&signature[4], &signature[0], 64) == 0); CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[4], message, &pubkey) == 1); memset(&rsignature[4], 0, sizeof(rsignature[4])); CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsignature[4], sig, recid) == 1); @@ -193,16 +193,16 @@ void test_ecdsa_recovery_end_to_end(void) { /* Parse compact (with recovery id) and recover. */ CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsignature[4], sig, recid) == 1); CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &recpubkey, &rsignature[4], message) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &recpubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, &recpubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); /* Serialize/destroy/parse signature and verify again. */ CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, sig, &recid, &rsignature[4]) == 1); - sig[secp256k1_rand_bits(6)] += 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255); + sig[secp256k1_testrand_bits(6)] += 1 + secp256k1_testrand_int(255); CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsignature[4], sig, recid) == 1); CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &signature[4], &rsignature[4]) == 1); CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[4], message, &pubkey) == 0); /* Recover again */ CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &recpubkey, &rsignature[4], message) == 0 || - memcmp(&pubkey, &recpubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) != 0); + secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, &recpubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) != 0); } /* Tests several edge cases. */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/Makefile.am.include b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/Makefile.am.include new file mode 100644 index 0000000..568bcc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/Makefile.am.include @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/schnorrsig/main_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/schnorrsig/tests_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/schnorrsig/tests_exhaustive_impl.h +if USE_BENCHMARK +noinst_PROGRAMS += bench_schnorrsig +bench_schnorrsig_SOURCES = src/bench_schnorrsig.c +bench_schnorrsig_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) +endif diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/main_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/main_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da747fe --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/main_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,239 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2018-2020 Andrew Poelstra, Jonas Nick * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG_MAIN_ +#define _SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG_MAIN_ + +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h" +#include "hash.h" + +/* Initializes SHA256 with fixed midstate. This midstate was computed by applying + * SHA256 to SHA256("BIP0340/nonce")||SHA256("BIP0340/nonce"). */ +static void secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340_sha256_tagged(secp256k1_sha256 *sha) { + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(sha); + sha->s[0] = 0x46615b35ul; + sha->s[1] = 0xf4bfbff7ul; + sha->s[2] = 0x9f8dc671ul; + sha->s[3] = 0x83627ab3ul; + sha->s[4] = 0x60217180ul; + sha->s[5] = 0x57358661ul; + sha->s[6] = 0x21a29e54ul; + sha->s[7] = 0x68b07b4cul; + + sha->bytes = 64; +} + +/* Initializes SHA256 with fixed midstate. This midstate was computed by applying + * SHA256 to SHA256("BIP0340/aux")||SHA256("BIP0340/aux"). */ +static void secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340_sha256_tagged_aux(secp256k1_sha256 *sha) { + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(sha); + sha->s[0] = 0x24dd3219ul; + sha->s[1] = 0x4eba7e70ul; + sha->s[2] = 0xca0fabb9ul; + sha->s[3] = 0x0fa3166dul; + sha->s[4] = 0x3afbe4b1ul; + sha->s[5] = 0x4c44df97ul; + sha->s[6] = 0x4aac2739ul; + sha->s[7] = 0x249e850aul; + + sha->bytes = 64; +} + +/* algo16 argument for nonce_function_bip340 to derive the nonce exactly as stated in BIP-340 + * by using the correct tagged hash function. */ +static const unsigned char bip340_algo16[16] = "BIP0340/nonce\0\0\0"; + +static int nonce_function_bip340(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *xonly_pk32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data) { + secp256k1_sha256 sha; + unsigned char masked_key[32]; + int i; + + if (algo16 == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + if (data != NULL) { + secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340_sha256_tagged_aux(&sha); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, data, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, masked_key); + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + masked_key[i] ^= key32[i]; + } + } + + /* Tag the hash with algo16 which is important to avoid nonce reuse across + * algorithms. If this nonce function is used in BIP-340 signing as defined + * in the spec, an optimized tagging implementation is used. */ + if (secp256k1_memcmp_var(algo16, bip340_algo16, 16) == 0) { + secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340_sha256_tagged(&sha); + } else { + int algo16_len = 16; + /* Remove terminating null bytes */ + while (algo16_len > 0 && !algo16[algo16_len - 1]) { + algo16_len--; + } + secp256k1_sha256_initialize_tagged(&sha, algo16, algo16_len); + } + + /* Hash (masked-)key||pk||msg using the tagged hash as per the spec */ + if (data != NULL) { + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, masked_key, 32); + } else { + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, key32, 32); + } + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, xonly_pk32, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, msg32, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, nonce32); + return 1; +} + +const secp256k1_nonce_function_hardened secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340 = nonce_function_bip340; + +/* Initializes SHA256 with fixed midstate. This midstate was computed by applying + * SHA256 to SHA256("BIP0340/challenge")||SHA256("BIP0340/challenge"). */ +static void secp256k1_schnorrsig_sha256_tagged(secp256k1_sha256 *sha) { + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(sha); + sha->s[0] = 0x9cecba11ul; + sha->s[1] = 0x23925381ul; + sha->s[2] = 0x11679112ul; + sha->s[3] = 0xd1627e0ful; + sha->s[4] = 0x97c87550ul; + sha->s[5] = 0x003cc765ul; + sha->s[6] = 0x90f61164ul; + sha->s[7] = 0x33e9b66aul; + sha->bytes = 64; +} + +static void secp256k1_schnorrsig_challenge(secp256k1_scalar* e, const unsigned char *r32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *pubkey32) +{ + unsigned char buf[32]; + secp256k1_sha256 sha; + + /* tagged hash(r.x, pk.x, msg32) */ + secp256k1_schnorrsig_sha256_tagged(&sha); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, r32, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, pubkey32, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, msg32, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, buf); + /* Set scalar e to the challenge hash modulo the curve order as per + * BIP340. */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(e, buf, NULL); +} + +int secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *sig64, const unsigned char *msg32, const secp256k1_keypair *keypair, secp256k1_nonce_function_hardened noncefp, void *ndata) { + secp256k1_scalar sk; + secp256k1_scalar e; + secp256k1_scalar k; + secp256k1_gej rj; + secp256k1_ge pk; + secp256k1_ge r; + unsigned char buf[32] = { 0 }; + unsigned char pk_buf[32]; + unsigned char seckey[32]; + int ret = 1; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(sig64 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(keypair != NULL); + + if (noncefp == NULL) { + noncefp = secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340; + } + + ret &= secp256k1_keypair_load(ctx, &sk, &pk, keypair); + /* Because we are signing for a x-only pubkey, the secret key is negated + * before signing if the point corresponding to the secret key does not + * have an even Y. */ + if (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&pk.y)) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&sk, &sk); + } + + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey, &sk); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(pk_buf, &pk.x); + ret &= !!noncefp(buf, msg32, seckey, pk_buf, bip340_algo16, ndata); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&k, buf, NULL); + ret &= !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&k); + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(&k, &secp256k1_scalar_one, !ret); + + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &rj, &k); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&r, &rj); + + /* We declassify r to allow using it as a branch point. This is fine + * because r is not a secret. */ + secp256k1_declassify(ctx, &r, sizeof(r)); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&r.y); + if (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r.y)) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&k, &k); + } + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&r.x); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(&sig64[0], &r.x); + + secp256k1_schnorrsig_challenge(&e, &sig64[0], msg32, pk_buf); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&e, &e, &sk); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&e, &e, &k); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&sig64[32], &e); + + secp256k1_memczero(sig64, 64, !ret); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&k); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sk); + memset(seckey, 0, sizeof(seckey)); + + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const unsigned char *sig64, const unsigned char *msg32, const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pubkey) { + secp256k1_scalar s; + secp256k1_scalar e; + secp256k1_gej rj; + secp256k1_ge pk; + secp256k1_gej pkj; + secp256k1_fe rx; + secp256k1_ge r; + unsigned char buf[32]; + int overflow; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(sig64 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + + if (!secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&rx, &sig64[0])) { + return 0; + } + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, &sig64[32], &overflow); + if (overflow) { + return 0; + } + + if (!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk, pubkey)) { + return 0; + } + + /* Compute e. */ + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(buf, &pk.x); + secp256k1_schnorrsig_challenge(&e, &sig64[0], msg32, buf); + + /* Compute rj = s*G + (-e)*pkj */ + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&e, &e); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pkj, &pk); + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &rj, &pkj, &e, &s); + + secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&r, &rj); + if (secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&r)) { + return 0; + } + + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&r.y); + return !secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r.y) && + secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&rx, &r.x); +} + +#endif diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/tests_exhaustive_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/tests_exhaustive_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4bf0bc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/tests_exhaustive_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,206 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2020 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG_TESTS_EXHAUSTIVE_ +#define _SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG_TESTS_EXHAUSTIVE_ + +#include "include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h" +#include "src/modules/schnorrsig/main_impl.h" + +static const unsigned char invalid_pubkey_bytes[][32] = { + /* 0 */ + { + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 + }, + /* 2 */ + { + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2 + }, + /* order */ + { + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + ((EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER + 0UL) >> 24) & 0xFF, + ((EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER + 0UL) >> 16) & 0xFF, + ((EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER + 0UL) >> 8) & 0xFF, + (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER + 0UL) & 0xFF + }, + /* order + 1 */ + { + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + ((EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER + 1UL) >> 24) & 0xFF, + ((EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER + 1UL) >> 16) & 0xFF, + ((EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER + 1UL) >> 8) & 0xFF, + (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER + 1UL) & 0xFF + }, + /* field size */ + { + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x2F + }, + /* field size + 1 (note that 1 is legal) */ + { + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x30 + }, + /* 2^256 - 1 */ + { + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF + } +}; + +#define NUM_INVALID_KEYS (sizeof(invalid_pubkey_bytes) / sizeof(invalid_pubkey_bytes[0])) + +static int secp256k1_hardened_nonce_function_smallint(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, + const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *xonly_pk32, + const unsigned char *algo16, void* data) { + secp256k1_scalar s; + int *idata = data; + (void)msg32; + (void)key32; + (void)xonly_pk32; + (void)algo16; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s, *idata); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(nonce32, &s); + return 1; +} + +static void test_exhaustive_schnorrsig_verify(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey* pubkeys, unsigned char (*xonly_pubkey_bytes)[32], const int* parities) { + int d; + uint64_t iter = 0; + /* Iterate over the possible public keys to verify against (through their corresponding DL d). */ + for (d = 1; d <= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER / 2; ++d) { + int actual_d; + unsigned k; + unsigned char pk32[32]; + memcpy(pk32, xonly_pubkey_bytes[d - 1], 32); + actual_d = parities[d - 1] ? EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - d : d; + /* Iterate over the possible valid first 32 bytes in the signature, through their corresponding DL k. + Values above EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER/2 refer to the entries in invalid_pubkey_bytes. */ + for (k = 1; k <= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER / 2 + NUM_INVALID_KEYS; ++k) { + unsigned char sig64[64]; + int actual_k = -1; + int e_done[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER] = {0}; + int e_count_done = 0; + if (skip_section(&iter)) continue; + if (k <= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER / 2) { + memcpy(sig64, xonly_pubkey_bytes[k - 1], 32); + actual_k = parities[k - 1] ? EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - k : k; + } else { + memcpy(sig64, invalid_pubkey_bytes[k - 1 - EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER / 2], 32); + } + /* Randomly generate messages until all challenges have been hit. */ + while (e_count_done < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) { + secp256k1_scalar e; + unsigned char msg32[32]; + secp256k1_testrand256(msg32); + secp256k1_schnorrsig_challenge(&e, sig64, msg32, pk32); + /* Only do work if we hit a challenge we haven't tried before. */ + if (!e_done[e]) { + /* Iterate over the possible valid last 32 bytes in the signature. + 0..order=that s value; order+1=random bytes */ + int count_valid = 0, s; + for (s = 0; s <= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER + 1; ++s) { + int expect_valid, valid; + if (s <= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) { + secp256k1_scalar s_s; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_s, s); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(sig64 + 32, &s_s); + expect_valid = actual_k != -1 && s != EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER && + (s_s == (actual_k + actual_d * e) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); + } else { + secp256k1_testrand256(sig64 + 32); + expect_valid = 0; + } + valid = secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig64, msg32, &pubkeys[d - 1]); + CHECK(valid == expect_valid); + count_valid += valid; + } + /* Exactly one s value must verify, unless R is illegal. */ + CHECK(count_valid == (actual_k != -1)); + /* Don't retry other messages that result in the same challenge. */ + e_done[e] = 1; + ++e_count_done; + } + } + } + } +} + +static void test_exhaustive_schnorrsig_sign(const secp256k1_context *ctx, unsigned char (*xonly_pubkey_bytes)[32], const secp256k1_keypair* keypairs, const int* parities) { + int d, k; + uint64_t iter = 0; + /* Loop over keys. */ + for (d = 1; d < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; ++d) { + int actual_d = d; + if (parities[d - 1]) actual_d = EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - d; + /* Loop over nonces. */ + for (k = 1; k < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; ++k) { + int e_done[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER] = {0}; + int e_count_done = 0; + unsigned char msg32[32]; + unsigned char sig64[64]; + int actual_k = k; + if (skip_section(&iter)) continue; + if (parities[k - 1]) actual_k = EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - k; + /* Generate random messages until all challenges have been tried. */ + while (e_count_done < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) { + secp256k1_scalar e; + secp256k1_testrand256(msg32); + secp256k1_schnorrsig_challenge(&e, xonly_pubkey_bytes[k - 1], msg32, xonly_pubkey_bytes[d - 1]); + /* Only do work if we hit a challenge we haven't tried before. */ + if (!e_done[e]) { + secp256k1_scalar expected_s = (actual_k + e * actual_d) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; + unsigned char expected_s_bytes[32]; + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(expected_s_bytes, &expected_s); + /* Invoke the real function to construct a signature. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig64, msg32, &keypairs[d - 1], secp256k1_hardened_nonce_function_smallint, &k)); + /* The first 32 bytes must match the xonly pubkey for the specified k. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(sig64, xonly_pubkey_bytes[k - 1], 32) == 0); + /* The last 32 bytes must match the expected s value. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(sig64 + 32, expected_s_bytes, 32) == 0); + /* Don't retry other messages that result in the same challenge. */ + e_done[e] = 1; + ++e_count_done; + } + } + } + } +} + +static void test_exhaustive_schnorrsig(const secp256k1_context *ctx) { + secp256k1_keypair keypair[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - 1]; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly_pubkey[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - 1]; + int parity[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - 1]; + unsigned char xonly_pubkey_bytes[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - 1][32]; + unsigned i; + + /* Verify that all invalid_pubkey_bytes are actually invalid. */ + for (i = 0; i < NUM_INVALID_KEYS; ++i) { + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk; + CHECK(!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pk, invalid_pubkey_bytes[i])); + } + + /* Construct keypairs and xonly-pubkeys for the entire group. */ + for (i = 1; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; ++i) { + secp256k1_scalar scalar_i; + unsigned char buf[32]; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&scalar_i, i); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(buf, &scalar_i); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair[i - 1], buf)); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &xonly_pubkey[i - 1], &parity[i - 1], &keypair[i - 1])); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, xonly_pubkey_bytes[i - 1], &xonly_pubkey[i - 1])); + } + + test_exhaustive_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, xonly_pubkey_bytes, keypair, parity); + test_exhaustive_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, xonly_pubkey, xonly_pubkey_bytes, parity); +} + +#endif diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/tests_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/tests_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f522fcb --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/modules/schnorrsig/tests_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,806 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2018-2020 Andrew Poelstra, Jonas Nick * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG_TESTS_ +#define _SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG_TESTS_ + +#include "secp256k1_schnorrsig.h" + +/* Checks that a bit flip in the n_flip-th argument (that has n_bytes many + * bytes) changes the hash function + */ +void nonce_function_bip340_bitflip(unsigned char **args, size_t n_flip, size_t n_bytes) { + unsigned char nonces[2][32]; + CHECK(nonce_function_bip340(nonces[0], args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], args[4]) == 1); + secp256k1_testrand_flip(args[n_flip], n_bytes); + CHECK(nonce_function_bip340(nonces[1], args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], args[4]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(nonces[0], nonces[1], 32) != 0); +} + +/* Tests for the equality of two sha256 structs. This function only produces a + * correct result if an integer multiple of 64 many bytes have been written + * into the hash functions. */ +void test_sha256_eq(const secp256k1_sha256 *sha1, const secp256k1_sha256 *sha2) { + /* Is buffer fully consumed? */ + CHECK((sha1->bytes & 0x3F) == 0); + + CHECK(sha1->bytes == sha2->bytes); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(sha1->s, sha2->s, sizeof(sha1->s)) == 0); +} + +void run_nonce_function_bip340_tests(void) { + unsigned char tag[13] = "BIP0340/nonce"; + unsigned char aux_tag[11] = "BIP0340/aux"; + unsigned char algo16[16] = "BIP0340/nonce\0\0\0"; + secp256k1_sha256 sha; + secp256k1_sha256 sha_optimized; + unsigned char nonce[32]; + unsigned char msg[32]; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char pk[32]; + unsigned char aux_rand[32]; + unsigned char *args[5]; + int i; + + /* Check that hash initialized by + * secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340_sha256_tagged has the expected + * state. */ + secp256k1_sha256_initialize_tagged(&sha, tag, sizeof(tag)); + secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340_sha256_tagged(&sha_optimized); + test_sha256_eq(&sha, &sha_optimized); + + /* Check that hash initialized by + * secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340_sha256_tagged_aux has the expected + * state. */ + secp256k1_sha256_initialize_tagged(&sha, aux_tag, sizeof(aux_tag)); + secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340_sha256_tagged_aux(&sha_optimized); + test_sha256_eq(&sha, &sha_optimized); + + secp256k1_testrand256(msg); + secp256k1_testrand256(key); + secp256k1_testrand256(pk); + secp256k1_testrand256(aux_rand); + + /* Check that a bitflip in an argument results in different nonces. */ + args[0] = msg; + args[1] = key; + args[2] = pk; + args[3] = algo16; + args[4] = aux_rand; + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + nonce_function_bip340_bitflip(args, 0, 32); + nonce_function_bip340_bitflip(args, 1, 32); + nonce_function_bip340_bitflip(args, 2, 32); + /* Flip algo16 special case "BIP0340/nonce" */ + nonce_function_bip340_bitflip(args, 3, 16); + /* Flip algo16 again */ + nonce_function_bip340_bitflip(args, 3, 16); + nonce_function_bip340_bitflip(args, 4, 32); + } + + /* NULL algo16 is disallowed */ + CHECK(nonce_function_bip340(nonce, msg, key, pk, NULL, NULL) == 0); + /* Empty algo16 is fine */ + memset(algo16, 0x00, 16); + CHECK(nonce_function_bip340(nonce, msg, key, pk, algo16, NULL) == 1); + /* algo16 with terminating null bytes is fine */ + algo16[1] = 65; + CHECK(nonce_function_bip340(nonce, msg, key, pk, algo16, NULL) == 1); + /* Other algo16 is fine */ + memset(algo16, 0xFF, 16); + CHECK(nonce_function_bip340(nonce, msg, key, pk, algo16, NULL) == 1); + + /* NULL aux_rand argument is allowed. */ + CHECK(nonce_function_bip340(nonce, msg, key, pk, algo16, NULL) == 1); +} + +void test_schnorrsig_api(void) { + unsigned char sk1[32]; + unsigned char sk2[32]; + unsigned char sk3[32]; + unsigned char msg[32]; + secp256k1_keypair keypairs[3]; + secp256k1_keypair invalid_keypair = { 0 }; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk[3]; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey zero_pk; + unsigned char sig[64]; + + /** setup **/ + secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); + secp256k1_context *sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); + secp256k1_context *vrfy = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + secp256k1_context *both = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + int ecount; + + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + + secp256k1_testrand256(sk1); + secp256k1_testrand256(sk2); + secp256k1_testrand256(sk3); + secp256k1_testrand256(msg); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypairs[0], sk1) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypairs[1], sk2) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypairs[2], sk3) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &pk[0], NULL, &keypairs[0]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &pk[1], NULL, &keypairs[1]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &pk[2], NULL, &keypairs[2]) == 1); + memset(&zero_pk, 0, sizeof(zero_pk)); + + /** main test body **/ + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(none, sig, msg, &keypairs[0], NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(vrfy, sig, msg, &keypairs[0], NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(sign, sig, msg, &keypairs[0], NULL, NULL) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(sign, NULL, msg, &keypairs[0], NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(sign, sig, NULL, &keypairs[0], NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(sign, sig, msg, NULL, NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(sign, sig, msg, &invalid_keypair, NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(sign, sig, msg, &keypairs[0], NULL, NULL) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(none, sig, msg, &pk[0]) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(sign, sig, msg, &pk[0]) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(vrfy, sig, msg, &pk[0]) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(vrfy, NULL, msg, &pk[0]) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(vrfy, sig, NULL, &pk[0]) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(vrfy, sig, msg, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(vrfy, sig, msg, &zero_pk) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(vrfy); + secp256k1_context_destroy(both); +} + +/* Checks that hash initialized by secp256k1_schnorrsig_sha256_tagged has the + * expected state. */ +void test_schnorrsig_sha256_tagged(void) { + char tag[17] = "BIP0340/challenge"; + secp256k1_sha256 sha; + secp256k1_sha256 sha_optimized; + + secp256k1_sha256_initialize_tagged(&sha, (unsigned char *) tag, sizeof(tag)); + secp256k1_schnorrsig_sha256_tagged(&sha_optimized); + test_sha256_eq(&sha, &sha_optimized); +} + +/* Helper function for schnorrsig_bip_vectors + * Signs the message and checks that it's the same as expected_sig. */ +void test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_signing(const unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *pk_serialized, unsigned char *aux_rand, const unsigned char *msg, const unsigned char *expected_sig) { + unsigned char sig[64]; + secp256k1_keypair keypair; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk, pk_expected; + + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk)); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig, msg, &keypair, NULL, aux_rand)); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(sig, expected_sig, 64) == 0); + + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pk_expected, pk_serialized)); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &pk, NULL, &keypair)); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pk, &pk_expected, sizeof(pk)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &pk)); +} + +/* Helper function for schnorrsig_bip_vectors + * Checks that both verify and verify_batch (TODO) return the same value as expected. */ +void test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(const unsigned char *pk_serialized, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *sig, int expected) { + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk; + + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pk, pk_serialized)); + CHECK(expected == secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig, msg32, &pk)); +} + +/* Test vectors according to BIP-340 ("Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1"). See + * https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340/test-vectors.csv. */ +void test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors(void) { + { + /* Test vector 0 */ + const unsigned char sk[32] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03 + }; + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xF9, 0x30, 0x8A, 0x01, 0x92, 0x58, 0xC3, 0x10, + 0x49, 0x34, 0x4F, 0x85, 0xF8, 0x9D, 0x52, 0x29, + 0xB5, 0x31, 0xC8, 0x45, 0x83, 0x6F, 0x99, 0xB0, + 0x86, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x13, 0xBC, 0xE0, 0x36, 0xF9 + }; + unsigned char aux_rand[32] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0xE9, 0x07, 0x83, 0x1F, 0x80, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x10, + 0x69, 0xA5, 0x37, 0x1B, 0x40, 0x24, 0x10, 0x36, + 0x4B, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0x5F, 0x83, 0x07, 0xB0, 0x08, + 0x4C, 0x55, 0xF1, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x15, + 0x25, 0xF6, 0x6A, 0x4A, 0x85, 0xEA, 0x8B, 0x71, + 0xE4, 0x82, 0xA7, 0x4F, 0x38, 0x2D, 0x2C, 0xE5, + 0xEB, 0xEE, 0xE8, 0xFD, 0xB2, 0x17, 0x2F, 0x47, + 0x7D, 0xF4, 0x90, 0x0D, 0x31, 0x05, 0x36, 0xC0 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_signing(sk, pk, aux_rand, msg, sig); + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 1); + } + { + /* Test vector 1 */ + const unsigned char sk[32] = { + 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x51, 0x62, 0x8A, 0xED, 0x2A, 0x6A, + 0xBF, 0x71, 0x58, 0x80, 0x9C, 0xF4, 0xF3, 0xC7, + 0x62, 0xE7, 0x16, 0x0F, 0x38, 0xB4, 0xDA, 0x56, + 0xA7, 0x84, 0xD9, 0x04, 0x51, 0x90, 0xCF, 0xEF + }; + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + unsigned char aux_rand[32] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x68, 0x96, 0xBD, 0x60, 0xEE, 0xAE, 0x29, 0x6D, + 0xB4, 0x8A, 0x22, 0x9F, 0xF7, 0x1D, 0xFE, 0x07, + 0x1B, 0xDE, 0x41, 0x3E, 0x6D, 0x43, 0xF9, 0x17, + 0xDC, 0x8D, 0xCF, 0x8C, 0x78, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x41, + 0x89, 0x06, 0xD1, 0x1A, 0xC9, 0x76, 0xAB, 0xCC, + 0xB2, 0x0B, 0x09, 0x12, 0x92, 0xBF, 0xF4, 0xEA, + 0x89, 0x7E, 0xFC, 0xB6, 0x39, 0xEA, 0x87, 0x1C, + 0xFA, 0x95, 0xF6, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x9E, 0x4B, 0x0A + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_signing(sk, pk, aux_rand, msg, sig); + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 1); + } + { + /* Test vector 2 */ + const unsigned char sk[32] = { + 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, + 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, + 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, + 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x14, 0xE5, 0xC9 + }; + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDD, 0x30, 0x8A, 0xFE, 0xC5, 0x77, 0x7E, 0x13, + 0x12, 0x1F, 0xA7, 0x2B, 0x9C, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0xCC, + 0x01, 0x39, 0x71, 0x53, 0x09, 0xB0, 0x86, 0xC9, + 0x60, 0xE1, 0x8F, 0xD9, 0x69, 0x77, 0x4E, 0xB8 + }; + unsigned char aux_rand[32] = { + 0xC8, 0x7A, 0xA5, 0x38, 0x24, 0xB4, 0xD7, 0xAE, + 0x2E, 0xB0, 0x35, 0xA2, 0xB5, 0xBB, 0xBC, 0xCC, + 0x08, 0x0E, 0x76, 0xCD, 0xC6, 0xD1, 0x69, 0x2C, + 0x4B, 0x0B, 0x62, 0xD7, 0x98, 0xE6, 0xD9, 0x06 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x7E, 0x2D, 0x58, 0xD8, 0xB3, 0xBC, 0xDF, 0x1A, + 0xBA, 0xDE, 0xC7, 0x82, 0x90, 0x54, 0xF9, 0x0D, + 0xDA, 0x98, 0x05, 0xAA, 0xB5, 0x6C, 0x77, 0x33, + 0x30, 0x24, 0xB9, 0xD0, 0xA5, 0x08, 0xB7, 0x5C + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x58, 0x31, 0xAA, 0xEE, 0xD7, 0xB4, 0x4B, 0xB7, + 0x4E, 0x5E, 0xAB, 0x94, 0xBA, 0x9D, 0x42, 0x94, + 0xC4, 0x9B, 0xCF, 0x2A, 0x60, 0x72, 0x8D, 0x8B, + 0x4C, 0x20, 0x0F, 0x50, 0xDD, 0x31, 0x3C, 0x1B, + 0xAB, 0x74, 0x58, 0x79, 0xA5, 0xAD, 0x95, 0x4A, + 0x72, 0xC4, 0x5A, 0x91, 0xC3, 0xA5, 0x1D, 0x3C, + 0x7A, 0xDE, 0xA9, 0x8D, 0x82, 0xF8, 0x48, 0x1E, + 0x0E, 0x1E, 0x03, 0x67, 0x4A, 0x6F, 0x3F, 0xB7 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_signing(sk, pk, aux_rand, msg, sig); + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 1); + } + { + /* Test vector 3 */ + const unsigned char sk[32] = { + 0x0B, 0x43, 0x2B, 0x26, 0x77, 0x93, 0x73, 0x81, + 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x5B, 0xB0, 0x2A, 0x66, 0xEC, 0xD0, + 0x12, 0x77, 0x30, 0x62, 0xCF, 0x3F, 0xA2, 0x54, + 0x9E, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x8E, 0xD2, 0x40, 0x17, 0x10 + }; + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0x25, 0xD1, 0xDF, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x05, 0xF5, 0x25, + 0x3C, 0x40, 0x22, 0xF6, 0x28, 0xA9, 0x96, 0xAD, + 0x3A, 0x0D, 0x95, 0xFB, 0xF2, 0x1D, 0x46, 0x8A, + 0x1B, 0x33, 0xF8, 0xC1, 0x60, 0xD8, 0xF5, 0x17 + }; + unsigned char aux_rand[32] = { + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x7E, 0xB0, 0x50, 0x97, 0x57, 0xE2, 0x46, 0xF1, + 0x94, 0x49, 0x88, 0x56, 0x51, 0x61, 0x1C, 0xB9, + 0x65, 0xEC, 0xC1, 0xA1, 0x87, 0xDD, 0x51, 0xB6, + 0x4F, 0xDA, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0x96, 0x37, 0xD5, 0xEC, + 0x97, 0x58, 0x2B, 0x9C, 0xB1, 0x3D, 0xB3, 0x93, + 0x37, 0x05, 0xB3, 0x2B, 0xA9, 0x82, 0xAF, 0x5A, + 0xF2, 0x5F, 0xD7, 0x88, 0x81, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x27, + 0x71, 0xFC, 0x59, 0x22, 0xEF, 0xC6, 0x6E, 0xA3 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_signing(sk, pk, aux_rand, msg, sig); + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 1); + } + { + /* Test vector 4 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xD6, 0x9C, 0x35, 0x09, 0xBB, 0x99, 0xE4, 0x12, + 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x0F, 0xE8, 0x54, 0x4E, 0x72, 0x83, + 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x30, 0x74, 0x6D, 0x8B, 0xE2, 0xAA, + 0x65, 0x97, 0x5F, 0x29, 0xD2, 0x2D, 0xC7, 0xB9 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x4D, 0xF3, 0xC3, 0xF6, 0x8F, 0xCC, 0x83, 0xB2, + 0x7E, 0x9D, 0x42, 0xC9, 0x04, 0x31, 0xA7, 0x24, + 0x99, 0xF1, 0x78, 0x75, 0xC8, 0x1A, 0x59, 0x9B, + 0x56, 0x6C, 0x98, 0x89, 0xB9, 0x69, 0x67, 0x03 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3B, 0x78, 0xCE, 0x56, 0x3F, + 0x89, 0xA0, 0xED, 0x94, 0x14, 0xF5, 0xAA, 0x28, + 0xAD, 0x0D, 0x96, 0xD6, 0x79, 0x5F, 0x9C, 0x63, + 0x76, 0xAF, 0xB1, 0x54, 0x8A, 0xF6, 0x03, 0xB3, + 0xEB, 0x45, 0xC9, 0xF8, 0x20, 0x7D, 0xEE, 0x10, + 0x60, 0xCB, 0x71, 0xC0, 0x4E, 0x80, 0xF5, 0x93, + 0x06, 0x0B, 0x07, 0xD2, 0x83, 0x08, 0xD7, 0xF4 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 1); + } + { + /* Test vector 5 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xEE, 0xFD, 0xEA, 0x4C, 0xDB, 0x67, 0x77, 0x50, + 0xA4, 0x20, 0xFE, 0xE8, 0x07, 0xEA, 0xCF, 0x21, + 0xEB, 0x98, 0x98, 0xAE, 0x79, 0xB9, 0x76, 0x87, + 0x66, 0xE4, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x4A, 0x2D, 0x4A, 0x34 + }; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk_parsed; + /* No need to check the signature of the test vector as parsing the pubkey already fails */ + CHECK(!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pk_parsed, pk)); + } + { + /* Test vector 6 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0xFF, 0xF9, 0x7B, 0xD5, 0x75, 0x5E, 0xEE, 0xA4, + 0x20, 0x45, 0x3A, 0x14, 0x35, 0x52, 0x35, 0xD3, + 0x82, 0xF6, 0x47, 0x2F, 0x85, 0x68, 0xA1, 0x8B, + 0x2F, 0x05, 0x7A, 0x14, 0x60, 0x29, 0x75, 0x56, + 0x3C, 0xC2, 0x79, 0x44, 0x64, 0x0A, 0xC6, 0x07, + 0xCD, 0x10, 0x7A, 0xE1, 0x09, 0x23, 0xD9, 0xEF, + 0x7A, 0x73, 0xC6, 0x43, 0xE1, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x5E, + 0xBE, 0xAF, 0xA3, 0x4B, 0x1A, 0xC5, 0x53, 0xE2 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 0); + } + { + /* Test vector 7 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x1F, 0xA6, 0x2E, 0x33, 0x1E, 0xDB, 0xC2, 0x1C, + 0x39, 0x47, 0x92, 0xD2, 0xAB, 0x11, 0x00, 0xA7, + 0xB4, 0x32, 0xB0, 0x13, 0xDF, 0x3F, 0x6F, 0xF4, + 0xF9, 0x9F, 0xCB, 0x33, 0xE0, 0xE1, 0x51, 0x5F, + 0x28, 0x89, 0x0B, 0x3E, 0xDB, 0x6E, 0x71, 0x89, + 0xB6, 0x30, 0x44, 0x8B, 0x51, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0xF8, + 0x62, 0x2A, 0x95, 0x4C, 0xFE, 0x54, 0x57, 0x35, + 0xAA, 0xEA, 0x51, 0x34, 0xFC, 0xCD, 0xB2, 0xBD + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 0); + } + { + /* Test vector 8 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x6C, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0x3B, 0xA8, 0x6C, 0x69, 0xEA, + 0x4B, 0x73, 0x76, 0xF3, 0x1A, 0x9B, 0xCB, 0x4F, + 0x74, 0xC1, 0x97, 0x60, 0x89, 0xB2, 0xD9, 0x96, + 0x3D, 0xA2, 0xE5, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x17, 0x77, 0x69, + 0x96, 0x17, 0x64, 0xB3, 0xAA, 0x9B, 0x2F, 0xFC, + 0xB6, 0xEF, 0x94, 0x7B, 0x68, 0x87, 0xA2, 0x26, + 0xE8, 0xD7, 0xC9, 0x3E, 0x00, 0xC5, 0xED, 0x0C, + 0x18, 0x34, 0xFF, 0x0D, 0x0C, 0x2E, 0x6D, 0xA6 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 0); + } + { + /* Test vector 9 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x12, 0x3D, 0xDA, 0x83, 0x28, 0xAF, 0x9C, 0x23, + 0xA9, 0x4C, 0x1F, 0xEE, 0xCF, 0xD1, 0x23, 0xBA, + 0x4F, 0xB7, 0x34, 0x76, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0x94, 0xDC, + 0xB6, 0x5C, 0x64, 0x25, 0xBD, 0x18, 0x60, 0x51 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 0); + } + { + /* Test vector 10 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x76, 0x15, 0xFB, 0xAF, 0x5A, 0xE2, 0x88, 0x64, + 0x01, 0x3C, 0x09, 0x97, 0x42, 0xDE, 0xAD, 0xB4, + 0xDB, 0xA8, 0x7F, 0x11, 0xAC, 0x67, 0x54, 0xF9, + 0x37, 0x80, 0xD5, 0xA1, 0x83, 0x7C, 0xF1, 0x97 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 0); + } + { + /* Test vector 11 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x4A, 0x29, 0x8D, 0xAC, 0xAE, 0x57, 0x39, 0x5A, + 0x15, 0xD0, 0x79, 0x5D, 0xDB, 0xFD, 0x1D, 0xCB, + 0x56, 0x4D, 0xA8, 0x2B, 0x0F, 0x26, 0x9B, 0xC7, + 0x0A, 0x74, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x04, 0x29, 0xBA, 0x1D, + 0x69, 0xE8, 0x9B, 0x4C, 0x55, 0x64, 0xD0, 0x03, + 0x49, 0x10, 0x6B, 0x84, 0x97, 0x78, 0x5D, 0xD7, + 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x13, 0xA8, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x2F, + 0xA7, 0x9D, 0x5F, 0x7F, 0xC4, 0x07, 0xD3, 0x9B + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 0); + } + { + /* Test vector 12 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x2F, + 0x69, 0xE8, 0x9B, 0x4C, 0x55, 0x64, 0xD0, 0x03, + 0x49, 0x10, 0x6B, 0x84, 0x97, 0x78, 0x5D, 0xD7, + 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x13, 0xA8, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x2F, + 0xA7, 0x9D, 0x5F, 0x7F, 0xC4, 0x07, 0xD3, 0x9B + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 0); + } + { + /* Test vector 13 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xDF, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x5F, + 0x36, 0x18, 0x37, 0x26, 0xDB, 0x23, 0x41, 0xBE, + 0x58, 0xFE, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xCE, 0xD8, + 0x43, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2B, 0xA6, 0x59 + }; + const unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x24, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x85, 0xA3, 0x08, 0xD3, + 0x13, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x44, + 0xA4, 0x09, 0x38, 0x22, 0x29, 0x9F, 0x31, 0xD0, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xFA, 0x98, 0xEC, 0x4E, 0x6C, 0x89 + }; + const unsigned char sig[64] = { + 0x6C, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0x3B, 0xA8, 0x6C, 0x69, 0xEA, + 0x4B, 0x73, 0x76, 0xF3, 0x1A, 0x9B, 0xCB, 0x4F, + 0x74, 0xC1, 0x97, 0x60, 0x89, 0xB2, 0xD9, 0x96, + 0x3D, 0xA2, 0xE5, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x17, 0x77, 0x69, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, + 0xBA, 0xAE, 0xDC, 0xE6, 0xAF, 0x48, 0xA0, 0x3B, + 0xBF, 0xD2, 0x5E, 0x8C, 0xD0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41 + }; + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors_check_verify(pk, msg, sig, 0); + } + { + /* Test vector 14 */ + const unsigned char pk[32] = { + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x30 + }; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk_parsed; + /* No need to check the signature of the test vector as parsing the pubkey already fails */ + CHECK(!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pk_parsed, pk)); + } +} + +/* Nonce function that returns constant 0 */ +static int nonce_function_failing(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *xonly_pk32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data) { + (void) msg32; + (void) key32; + (void) xonly_pk32; + (void) algo16; + (void) data; + (void) nonce32; + return 0; +} + +/* Nonce function that sets nonce to 0 */ +static int nonce_function_0(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *xonly_pk32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data) { + (void) msg32; + (void) key32; + (void) xonly_pk32; + (void) algo16; + (void) data; + + memset(nonce32, 0, 32); + return 1; +} + +/* Nonce function that sets nonce to 0xFF...0xFF */ +static int nonce_function_overflowing(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *xonly_pk32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data) { + (void) msg32; + (void) key32; + (void) xonly_pk32; + (void) algo16; + (void) data; + + memset(nonce32, 0xFF, 32); + return 1; +} + +void test_schnorrsig_sign(void) { + unsigned char sk[32]; + secp256k1_keypair keypair; + const unsigned char msg[32] = "this is a msg for a schnorrsig.."; + unsigned char sig[64]; + unsigned char zeros64[64] = { 0 }; + + secp256k1_testrand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk)); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig, msg, &keypair, NULL, NULL) == 1); + + /* Test different nonce functions */ + memset(sig, 1, sizeof(sig)); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig, msg, &keypair, nonce_function_failing, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(sig, zeros64, sizeof(sig)) == 0); + memset(&sig, 1, sizeof(sig)); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig, msg, &keypair, nonce_function_0, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(sig, zeros64, sizeof(sig)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig, msg, &keypair, nonce_function_overflowing, NULL) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(sig, zeros64, sizeof(sig)) != 0); +} + +#define N_SIGS 3 +/* Creates N_SIGS valid signatures and verifies them with verify and + * verify_batch (TODO). Then flips some bits and checks that verification now + * fails. */ +void test_schnorrsig_sign_verify(void) { + unsigned char sk[32]; + unsigned char msg[N_SIGS][32]; + unsigned char sig[N_SIGS][64]; + size_t i; + secp256k1_keypair keypair; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk; + secp256k1_scalar s; + + secp256k1_testrand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk)); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &pk, NULL, &keypair)); + + for (i = 0; i < N_SIGS; i++) { + secp256k1_testrand256(msg[i]); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig[i], msg[i], &keypair, NULL, NULL)); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[i], msg[i], &pk)); + } + + { + /* Flip a few bits in the signature and in the message and check that + * verify and verify_batch (TODO) fail */ + size_t sig_idx = secp256k1_testrand_int(N_SIGS); + size_t byte_idx = secp256k1_testrand_int(32); + unsigned char xorbyte = secp256k1_testrand_int(254)+1; + sig[sig_idx][byte_idx] ^= xorbyte; + CHECK(!secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[sig_idx], msg[sig_idx], &pk)); + sig[sig_idx][byte_idx] ^= xorbyte; + + byte_idx = secp256k1_testrand_int(32); + sig[sig_idx][32+byte_idx] ^= xorbyte; + CHECK(!secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[sig_idx], msg[sig_idx], &pk)); + sig[sig_idx][32+byte_idx] ^= xorbyte; + + byte_idx = secp256k1_testrand_int(32); + msg[sig_idx][byte_idx] ^= xorbyte; + CHECK(!secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[sig_idx], msg[sig_idx], &pk)); + msg[sig_idx][byte_idx] ^= xorbyte; + + /* Check that above bitflips have been reversed correctly */ + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[sig_idx], msg[sig_idx], &pk)); + } + + /* Test overflowing s */ + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig[0], msg[0], &keypair, NULL, NULL)); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[0], msg[0], &pk)); + memset(&sig[0][32], 0xFF, 32); + CHECK(!secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[0], msg[0], &pk)); + + /* Test negative s */ + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig[0], msg[0], &keypair, NULL, NULL)); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[0], msg[0], &pk)); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, &sig[0][32], NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, &s); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&sig[0][32], &s); + CHECK(!secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig[0], msg[0], &pk)); +} +#undef N_SIGS + +void test_schnorrsig_taproot(void) { + unsigned char sk[32]; + secp256k1_keypair keypair; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey internal_pk; + unsigned char internal_pk_bytes[32]; + secp256k1_xonly_pubkey output_pk; + unsigned char output_pk_bytes[32]; + unsigned char tweak[32]; + int pk_parity; + unsigned char msg[32]; + unsigned char sig[64]; + + /* Create output key */ + secp256k1_testrand256(sk); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &internal_pk, NULL, &keypair) == 1); + /* In actual taproot the tweak would be hash of internal_pk */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, tweak, &internal_pk) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, tweak) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &output_pk, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, output_pk_bytes, &output_pk) == 1); + + /* Key spend */ + secp256k1_testrand256(msg); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig, msg, &keypair, NULL, NULL) == 1); + /* Verify key spend */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &output_pk, output_pk_bytes) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx, sig, msg, &output_pk) == 1); + + /* Script spend */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, internal_pk_bytes, &internal_pk) == 1); + /* Verify script spend */ + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &internal_pk, internal_pk_bytes) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, output_pk_bytes, pk_parity, &internal_pk, tweak) == 1); +} + +void run_schnorrsig_tests(void) { + int i; + run_nonce_function_bip340_tests(); + + test_schnorrsig_api(); + test_schnorrsig_sha256_tagged(); + test_schnorrsig_bip_vectors(); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + test_schnorrsig_sign(); + test_schnorrsig_sign_verify(); + } + test_schnorrsig_taproot(); +} + +#endif diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar.h index 1ee50e1..fb3fb18 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #define SECP256K1_SCALAR_H #include "num.h" +#include "util.h" #if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H #include "libsecp256k1-config.h" @@ -15,12 +16,12 @@ #if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) #include "scalar_low.h" -#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_4X64) +#elif defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128) #include "scalar_4x64.h" -#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_8X32) +#elif defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT64) #include "scalar_8x32.h" #else -#error "Please select scalar implementation" +#error "Please select wide multiplication implementation" #endif /** Clear a scalar to prevent the leak of sensitive data. */ @@ -39,6 +40,10 @@ static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(const secp256k1_scalar *a, uns */ static void secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char *bin, int *overflow); +/** Set a scalar from a big endian byte array and returns 1 if it is a valid + * seckey and 0 otherwise. */ +static int secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char *bin); + /** Set a scalar to an unsigned integer. */ static void secp256k1_scalar_set_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int v); @@ -97,14 +102,16 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(secp256k1_num *r); /** Compare two scalars. */ static int secp256k1_scalar_eq(const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -/** Find r1 and r2 such that r1+r2*2^128 = a. */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_split_128(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a); -/** Find r1 and r2 such that r1+r2*lambda = a, and r1 and r2 are maximum 128 bits long (see secp256k1_gej_mul_lambda). */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a); -#endif +/** Find r1 and r2 such that r1+r2*2^128 = k. */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_split_128(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *k); +/** Find r1 and r2 such that r1+r2*lambda = k, + * where r1 and r2 or their negations are maximum 128 bits long (see secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda). */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *k); /** Multiply a and b (without taking the modulus!), divide by 2**shift, and round to the nearest integer. Shift must be at least 256. */ static void secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b, unsigned int shift); +/** If flag is true, set *r equal to *a; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. Both *r and *a must be initialized.*/ +static void secp256k1_scalar_cmov(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, int flag); + #endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h index d378335..73cbd5e 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h @@ -192,9 +192,9 @@ static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { tl = t; \ } \ c0 += tl; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th += (c0 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ + th += (c0 < tl); /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ c1 += th; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < th) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ + c2 += (c1 < th); /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((c1 >= th) || (c2 != 0)); \ } @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { tl = t; \ } \ c0 += tl; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th += (c0 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ + th += (c0 < tl); /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ c1 += th; /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK(c1 >= th); \ } @@ -221,16 +221,16 @@ static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { tl = t; \ } \ th2 = th + th; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE (in case th was 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) */ \ - c2 += (th2 < th) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + c2 += (th2 < th); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((th2 >= th) || (c2 != 0)); \ tl2 = tl + tl; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE (in case the lowest 63 bits of tl were 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) */ \ - th2 += (tl2 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ + th2 += (tl2 < tl); /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ c0 += tl2; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th2 += (c0 < tl2) ? 1 : 0; /* second overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + th2 += (c0 < tl2); /* second overflow is handled on the next line */ \ c2 += (c0 < tl2) & (th2 == 0); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((c0 >= tl2) || (th2 != 0) || (c2 != 0)); \ c1 += th2; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < th2) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + c2 += (c1 < th2); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((c1 >= th2) || (c2 != 0)); \ } @@ -238,15 +238,15 @@ static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { #define sumadd(a) { \ unsigned int over; \ c0 += (a); /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - over = (c0 < (a)) ? 1 : 0; \ + over = (c0 < (a)); \ c1 += over; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < over) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract */ \ + c2 += (c1 < over); /* never overflows by contract */ \ } /** Add a to the number defined by (c0,c1). c1 must never overflow, c2 must be zero. */ #define sumadd_fast(a) { \ c0 += (a); /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c1 += (c0 < (a)) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + c1 += (c0 < (a)); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((c1 != 0) | (c0 >= (a))); \ VERIFY_CHECK(c2 == 0); \ } @@ -912,18 +912,16 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_sqr(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(r, l); } -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -static void secp256k1_scalar_split_128(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - r1->d[0] = a->d[0]; - r1->d[1] = a->d[1]; +static void secp256k1_scalar_split_128(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *k) { + r1->d[0] = k->d[0]; + r1->d[1] = k->d[1]; r1->d[2] = 0; r1->d[3] = 0; - r2->d[0] = a->d[2]; - r2->d[1] = a->d[3]; + r2->d[0] = k->d[2]; + r2->d[1] = k->d[3]; r2->d[2] = 0; r2->d[3] = 0; } -#endif SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_eq(const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { return ((a->d[0] ^ b->d[0]) | (a->d[1] ^ b->d[1]) | (a->d[2] ^ b->d[2]) | (a->d[3] ^ b->d[3])) == 0; @@ -946,4 +944,15 @@ SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(r, 0, (l[(shift - 1) >> 6] >> ((shift - 1) & 0x3f)) & 1); } +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_scalar_cmov(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, int flag) { + uint64_t mask0, mask1; + VG_CHECK_VERIFY(r->d, sizeof(r->d)); + mask0 = flag + ~((uint64_t)0); + mask1 = ~mask0; + r->d[0] = (r->d[0] & mask0) | (a->d[0] & mask1); + r->d[1] = (r->d[1] & mask0) | (a->d[1] & mask1); + r->d[2] = (r->d[2] & mask0) | (a->d[2] & mask1); + r->d[3] = (r->d[3] & mask0) | (a->d[3] & mask1); +} + #endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_8x32_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_8x32_impl.h index 4f9ed61..6853f79 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_8x32_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_8x32_impl.h @@ -271,9 +271,9 @@ static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { tl = t; \ } \ c0 += tl; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th += (c0 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ + th += (c0 < tl); /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ c1 += th; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < th) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ + c2 += (c1 < th); /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((c1 >= th) || (c2 != 0)); \ } @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { tl = t; \ } \ c0 += tl; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th += (c0 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ + th += (c0 < tl); /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ c1 += th; /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK(c1 >= th); \ } @@ -300,16 +300,16 @@ static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { tl = t; \ } \ th2 = th + th; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFE (in case th was 0x7FFFFFFF) */ \ - c2 += (th2 < th) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + c2 += (th2 < th); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((th2 >= th) || (c2 != 0)); \ tl2 = tl + tl; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFE (in case the lowest 63 bits of tl were 0x7FFFFFFF) */ \ - th2 += (tl2 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ + th2 += (tl2 < tl); /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ c0 += tl2; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th2 += (c0 < tl2) ? 1 : 0; /* second overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + th2 += (c0 < tl2); /* second overflow is handled on the next line */ \ c2 += (c0 < tl2) & (th2 == 0); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((c0 >= tl2) || (th2 != 0) || (c2 != 0)); \ c1 += th2; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < th2) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + c2 += (c1 < th2); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((c1 >= th2) || (c2 != 0)); \ } @@ -317,15 +317,15 @@ static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { #define sumadd(a) { \ unsigned int over; \ c0 += (a); /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - over = (c0 < (a)) ? 1 : 0; \ + over = (c0 < (a)); \ c1 += over; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < over) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract */ \ + c2 += (c1 < over); /* never overflows by contract */ \ } /** Add a to the number defined by (c0,c1). c1 must never overflow, c2 must be zero. */ #define sumadd_fast(a) { \ c0 += (a); /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c1 += (c0 < (a)) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + c1 += (c0 < (a)); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ VERIFY_CHECK((c1 != 0) | (c0 >= (a))); \ VERIFY_CHECK(c2 == 0); \ } @@ -672,26 +672,24 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_sqr(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(r, l); } -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -static void secp256k1_scalar_split_128(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - r1->d[0] = a->d[0]; - r1->d[1] = a->d[1]; - r1->d[2] = a->d[2]; - r1->d[3] = a->d[3]; +static void secp256k1_scalar_split_128(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *k) { + r1->d[0] = k->d[0]; + r1->d[1] = k->d[1]; + r1->d[2] = k->d[2]; + r1->d[3] = k->d[3]; r1->d[4] = 0; r1->d[5] = 0; r1->d[6] = 0; r1->d[7] = 0; - r2->d[0] = a->d[4]; - r2->d[1] = a->d[5]; - r2->d[2] = a->d[6]; - r2->d[3] = a->d[7]; + r2->d[0] = k->d[4]; + r2->d[1] = k->d[5]; + r2->d[2] = k->d[6]; + r2->d[3] = k->d[7]; r2->d[4] = 0; r2->d[5] = 0; r2->d[6] = 0; r2->d[7] = 0; } -#endif SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_eq(const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { return ((a->d[0] ^ b->d[0]) | (a->d[1] ^ b->d[1]) | (a->d[2] ^ b->d[2]) | (a->d[3] ^ b->d[3]) | (a->d[4] ^ b->d[4]) | (a->d[5] ^ b->d[5]) | (a->d[6] ^ b->d[6]) | (a->d[7] ^ b->d[7])) == 0; @@ -718,4 +716,19 @@ SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(r, 0, (l[(shift - 1) >> 5] >> ((shift - 1) & 0x1f)) & 1); } +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_scalar_cmov(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, int flag) { + uint32_t mask0, mask1; + VG_CHECK_VERIFY(r->d, sizeof(r->d)); + mask0 = flag + ~((uint32_t)0); + mask1 = ~mask0; + r->d[0] = (r->d[0] & mask0) | (a->d[0] & mask1); + r->d[1] = (r->d[1] & mask0) | (a->d[1] & mask1); + r->d[2] = (r->d[2] & mask0) | (a->d[2] & mask1); + r->d[3] = (r->d[3] & mask0) | (a->d[3] & mask1); + r->d[4] = (r->d[4] & mask0) | (a->d[4] & mask1); + r->d[5] = (r->d[5] & mask0) | (a->d[5] & mask1); + r->d[6] = (r->d[6] & mask0) | (a->d[6] & mask1); + r->d[7] = (r->d[7] & mask0) | (a->d[7] & mask1); +} + #endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h index 6b336d9..fc75891 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h @@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ #ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_IMPL_H #define SECP256K1_SCALAR_IMPL_H +#ifdef VERIFY +#include +#endif + #include "scalar.h" #include "util.h" @@ -16,14 +20,17 @@ #if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) #include "scalar_low_impl.h" -#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_4X64) +#elif defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128) #include "scalar_4x64_impl.h" -#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_8X32) +#elif defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT64) #include "scalar_8x32_impl.h" #else -#error "Please select scalar implementation" +#error "Please select wide multiplication implementation" #endif +static const secp256k1_scalar secp256k1_scalar_one = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); +static const secp256k1_scalar secp256k1_scalar_zero = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + #ifndef USE_NUM_NONE static void secp256k1_scalar_get_num(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { unsigned char c[32]; @@ -52,6 +59,12 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(secp256k1_num *r) { } #endif +static int secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char *bin) { + int overflow; + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, bin, &overflow); + return (!overflow) & (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(r)); +} + static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *x) { #if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) int i; @@ -243,37 +256,65 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_sc #endif } -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM +/* These parameters are generated using sage/gen_exhaustive_groups.sage. */ #if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) +# if EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 13 +# define EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA 9 +# elif EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 199 +# define EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA 92 +# else +# error No known lambda for the specified exhaustive test group order. +# endif + /** - * Find k1 and k2 given k, such that k1 + k2 * lambda == k mod n; unlike in the - * full case we don't bother making k1 and k2 be small, we just want them to be + * Find r1 and r2 given k, such that r1 + r2 * lambda == k mod n; unlike in the + * full case we don't bother making r1 and r2 be small, we just want them to be * nontrivial to get full test coverage for the exhaustive tests. We therefore - * (arbitrarily) set k2 = k + 5 and k1 = k - k2 * lambda. + * (arbitrarily) set r2 = k + 5 (mod n) and r1 = k - r2 * lambda (mod n). */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - *r2 = (*a + 5) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; - *r1 = (*a + (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - *r2) * EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; +static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *k) { + *r2 = (*k + 5) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; + *r1 = (*k + (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - *r2) * EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; } #else /** * The Secp256k1 curve has an endomorphism, where lambda * (x, y) = (beta * x, y), where - * lambda is {0x53,0x63,0xad,0x4c,0xc0,0x5c,0x30,0xe0,0xa5,0x26,0x1c,0x02,0x88,0x12,0x64,0x5a, - * 0x12,0x2e,0x22,0xea,0x20,0x81,0x66,0x78,0xdf,0x02,0x96,0x7c,0x1b,0x23,0xbd,0x72} + * lambda is: */ +static const secp256k1_scalar secp256k1_const_lambda = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( + 0x5363AD4CUL, 0xC05C30E0UL, 0xA5261C02UL, 0x8812645AUL, + 0x122E22EAUL, 0x20816678UL, 0xDF02967CUL, 0x1B23BD72UL +); + +#ifdef VERIFY +static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda_verify(const secp256k1_scalar *r1, const secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *k); +#endif + +/* + * Both lambda and beta are primitive cube roots of unity. That is lamba^3 == 1 mod n and + * beta^3 == 1 mod p, where n is the curve order and p is the field order. * - * "Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography" (Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone) gives an algorithm - * (algorithm 3.74) to find k1 and k2 given k, such that k1 + k2 * lambda == k mod n, and k1 - * and k2 have a small size. - * It relies on constants a1, b1, a2, b2. These constants for the value of lambda above are: + * Futhermore, because (X^3 - 1) = (X - 1)(X^2 + X + 1), the primitive cube roots of unity are + * roots of X^2 + X + 1. Therefore lambda^2 + lamba == -1 mod n and beta^2 + beta == -1 mod p. + * (The other primitive cube roots of unity are lambda^2 and beta^2 respectively.) + * + * Let l = -1/2 + i*sqrt(3)/2, the complex root of X^2 + X + 1. We can define a ring + * homomorphism phi : Z[l] -> Z_n where phi(a + b*l) == a + b*lambda mod n. The kernel of phi + * is a lattice over Z[l] (considering Z[l] as a Z-module). This lattice is generated by a + * reduced basis {a1 + b1*l, a2 + b2*l} where * * - a1 = {0x30,0x86,0xd2,0x21,0xa7,0xd4,0x6b,0xcd,0xe8,0x6c,0x90,0xe4,0x92,0x84,0xeb,0x15} * - b1 = -{0xe4,0x43,0x7e,0xd6,0x01,0x0e,0x88,0x28,0x6f,0x54,0x7f,0xa9,0x0a,0xbf,0xe4,0xc3} * - a2 = {0x01,0x14,0xca,0x50,0xf7,0xa8,0xe2,0xf3,0xf6,0x57,0xc1,0x10,0x8d,0x9d,0x44,0xcf,0xd8} * - b2 = {0x30,0x86,0xd2,0x21,0xa7,0xd4,0x6b,0xcd,0xe8,0x6c,0x90,0xe4,0x92,0x84,0xeb,0x15} * - * The algorithm then computes c1 = round(b1 * k / n) and c2 = round(b2 * k / n), and gives + * "Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography" (Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone) gives an algorithm + * (algorithm 3.74) to find k1 and k2 given k, such that k1 + k2 * lambda == k mod n, and k1 + * and k2 are small in absolute value. + * + * The algorithm computes c1 = round(b2 * k / n) and c2 = round((-b1) * k / n), and gives * k1 = k - (c1*a1 + c2*a2) and k2 = -(c1*b1 + c2*b2). Instead, we use modular arithmetic, and - * compute k1 as k - k2 * lambda, avoiding the need for constants a1 and a2. + * compute r2 = k2 mod n, and r1 = k1 mod n = (k - r2 * lambda) mod n, avoiding the need for + * the constants a1 and a2. * * g1, g2 are precomputed constants used to replace division with a rounded multiplication * when decomposing the scalar for an endomorphism-based point multiplication. @@ -285,21 +326,21 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar * Cryptography on Sensor Networks Using the MSP430X Microcontroller" (Gouvea, Oliveira, Lopez), * Section 4.3 (here we use a somewhat higher-precision estimate): * d = a1*b2 - b1*a2 - * g1 = round((2^272)*b2/d) - * g2 = round((2^272)*b1/d) + * g1 = round(2^384 * b2/d) + * g2 = round(2^384 * (-b1)/d) + * + * (Note that d is also equal to the curve order, n, here because [a1,b1] and [a2,b2] + * can be found as outputs of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm on inputs n and lambda). * - * (Note that 'd' is also equal to the curve order here because [a1,b1] and [a2,b2] are found - * as outputs of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm on inputs 'order' and 'lambda'). + * The function below splits k into r1 and r2, such that + * - r1 + lambda * r2 == k (mod n) + * - either r1 < 2^128 or -r1 mod n < 2^128 + * - either r2 < 2^128 or -r2 mod n < 2^128 * - * The function below splits a in r1 and r2, such that r1 + lambda * r2 == a (mod order). + * See proof below. */ - -static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { +static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *k) { secp256k1_scalar c1, c2; - static const secp256k1_scalar minus_lambda = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( - 0xAC9C52B3UL, 0x3FA3CF1FUL, 0x5AD9E3FDUL, 0x77ED9BA4UL, - 0xA880B9FCUL, 0x8EC739C2UL, 0xE0CFC810UL, 0xB51283CFUL - ); static const secp256k1_scalar minus_b1 = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0xE4437ED6UL, 0x010E8828UL, 0x6F547FA9UL, 0x0ABFE4C3UL @@ -309,25 +350,167 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar 0x8A280AC5UL, 0x0774346DUL, 0xD765CDA8UL, 0x3DB1562CUL ); static const secp256k1_scalar g1 = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( - 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00003086UL, - 0xD221A7D4UL, 0x6BCDE86CUL, 0x90E49284UL, 0xEB153DABUL + 0x3086D221UL, 0xA7D46BCDUL, 0xE86C90E4UL, 0x9284EB15UL, + 0x3DAA8A14UL, 0x71E8CA7FUL, 0xE893209AUL, 0x45DBB031UL ); static const secp256k1_scalar g2 = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( - 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x0000E443UL, - 0x7ED6010EUL, 0x88286F54UL, 0x7FA90ABFUL, 0xE4C42212UL + 0xE4437ED6UL, 0x010E8828UL, 0x6F547FA9UL, 0x0ABFE4C4UL, + 0x221208ACUL, 0x9DF506C6UL, 0x1571B4AEUL, 0x8AC47F71UL ); - VERIFY_CHECK(r1 != a); - VERIFY_CHECK(r2 != a); + VERIFY_CHECK(r1 != k); + VERIFY_CHECK(r2 != k); /* these _var calls are constant time since the shift amount is constant */ - secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(&c1, a, &g1, 272); - secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(&c2, a, &g2, 272); + secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(&c1, k, &g1, 384); + secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(&c2, k, &g2, 384); secp256k1_scalar_mul(&c1, &c1, &minus_b1); secp256k1_scalar_mul(&c2, &c2, &minus_b2); secp256k1_scalar_add(r2, &c1, &c2); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(r1, r2, &minus_lambda); - secp256k1_scalar_add(r1, r1, a); -} -#endif + secp256k1_scalar_mul(r1, r2, &secp256k1_const_lambda); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(r1, r1); + secp256k1_scalar_add(r1, r1, k); + +#ifdef VERIFY + secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda_verify(r1, r2, k); #endif +} + +#ifdef VERIFY +/* + * Proof for secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda's bounds. + * + * Let + * - epsilon1 = 2^256 * |g1/2^384 - b2/d| + * - epsilon2 = 2^256 * |g2/2^384 - (-b1)/d| + * - c1 = round(k*g1/2^384) + * - c2 = round(k*g2/2^384) + * + * Lemma 1: |c1 - k*b2/d| < 2^-1 + epsilon1 + * + * |c1 - k*b2/d| + * = + * |c1 - k*g1/2^384 + k*g1/2^384 - k*b2/d| + * <= {triangle inequality} + * |c1 - k*g1/2^384| + |k*g1/2^384 - k*b2/d| + * = + * |c1 - k*g1/2^384| + k*|g1/2^384 - b2/d| + * < {rounding in c1 and 0 <= k < 2^256} + * 2^-1 + 2^256 * |g1/2^384 - b2/d| + * = {definition of epsilon1} + * 2^-1 + epsilon1 + * + * Lemma 2: |c2 - k*(-b1)/d| < 2^-1 + epsilon2 + * + * |c2 - k*(-b1)/d| + * = + * |c2 - k*g2/2^384 + k*g2/2^384 - k*(-b1)/d| + * <= {triangle inequality} + * |c2 - k*g2/2^384| + |k*g2/2^384 - k*(-b1)/d| + * = + * |c2 - k*g2/2^384| + k*|g2/2^384 - (-b1)/d| + * < {rounding in c2 and 0 <= k < 2^256} + * 2^-1 + 2^256 * |g2/2^384 - (-b1)/d| + * = {definition of epsilon2} + * 2^-1 + epsilon2 + * + * Let + * - k1 = k - c1*a1 - c2*a2 + * - k2 = - c1*b1 - c2*b2 + * + * Lemma 3: |k1| < (a1 + a2 + 1)/2 < 2^128 + * + * |k1| + * = {definition of k1} + * |k - c1*a1 - c2*a2| + * = {(a1*b2 - b1*a2)/n = 1} + * |k*(a1*b2 - b1*a2)/n - c1*a1 - c2*a2| + * = + * |a1*(k*b2/n - c1) + a2*(k*(-b1)/n - c2)| + * <= {triangle inequality} + * a1*|k*b2/n - c1| + a2*|k*(-b1)/n - c2| + * < {Lemma 1 and Lemma 2} + * a1*(2^-1 + epslion1) + a2*(2^-1 + epsilon2) + * < {rounding up to an integer} + * (a1 + a2 + 1)/2 + * < {rounding up to a power of 2} + * 2^128 + * + * Lemma 4: |k2| < (-b1 + b2)/2 + 1 < 2^128 + * + * |k2| + * = {definition of k2} + * |- c1*a1 - c2*a2| + * = {(b1*b2 - b1*b2)/n = 0} + * |k*(b1*b2 - b1*b2)/n - c1*b1 - c2*b2| + * = + * |b1*(k*b2/n - c1) + b2*(k*(-b1)/n - c2)| + * <= {triangle inequality} + * (-b1)*|k*b2/n - c1| + b2*|k*(-b1)/n - c2| + * < {Lemma 1 and Lemma 2} + * (-b1)*(2^-1 + epslion1) + b2*(2^-1 + epsilon2) + * < {rounding up to an integer} + * (-b1 + b2)/2 + 1 + * < {rounding up to a power of 2} + * 2^128 + * + * Let + * - r2 = k2 mod n + * - r1 = k - r2*lambda mod n. + * + * Notice that r1 is defined such that r1 + r2 * lambda == k (mod n). + * + * Lemma 5: r1 == k1 mod n. + * + * r1 + * == {definition of r1 and r2} + * k - k2*lambda + * == {definition of k2} + * k - (- c1*b1 - c2*b2)*lambda + * == + * k + c1*b1*lambda + c2*b2*lambda + * == {a1 + b1*lambda == 0 mod n and a2 + b2*lambda == 0 mod n} + * k - c1*a1 - c2*a2 + * == {definition of k1} + * k1 + * + * From Lemma 3, Lemma 4, Lemma 5 and the definition of r2, we can conclude that + * + * - either r1 < 2^128 or -r1 mod n < 2^128 + * - either r2 < 2^128 or -r2 mod n < 2^128. + * + * Q.E.D. + */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda_verify(const secp256k1_scalar *r1, const secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *k) { + secp256k1_scalar s; + unsigned char buf1[32]; + unsigned char buf2[32]; + + /* (a1 + a2 + 1)/2 is 0xa2a8918ca85bafe22016d0b917e4dd77 */ + static const unsigned char k1_bound[32] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0xa2, 0xa8, 0x91, 0x8c, 0xa8, 0x5b, 0xaf, 0xe2, 0x20, 0x16, 0xd0, 0xb9, 0x17, 0xe4, 0xdd, 0x77 + }; + + /* (-b1 + b2)/2 + 1 is 0x8a65287bd47179fb2be08846cea267ed */ + static const unsigned char k2_bound[32] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x8a, 0x65, 0x28, 0x7b, 0xd4, 0x71, 0x79, 0xfb, 0x2b, 0xe0, 0x88, 0x46, 0xce, 0xa2, 0x67, 0xed + }; + + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s, &secp256k1_const_lambda, r2); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&s, &s, r1); + VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&s, k)); + + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, r1); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(buf1, r1); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(buf2, &s); + VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(buf1, k1_bound, 32) < 0 || secp256k1_memcmp_var(buf2, k1_bound, 32) < 0); + + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, r2); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(buf1, r2); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(buf2, &s); + VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(buf1, k2_bound, 32) < 0 || secp256k1_memcmp_var(buf2, k2_bound, 32) < 0); +} +#endif /* VERIFY */ +#endif /* !defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) */ #endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_low.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_low.h index 5836feb..2794a7f 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_low.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_low.h @@ -12,4 +12,6 @@ /** A scalar modulo the group order of the secp256k1 curve. */ typedef uint32_t secp256k1_scalar; +#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) (d0) + #endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_low_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_low_impl.h index 910ce3f..a615ec0 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_low_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/scalar_low_impl.h @@ -48,14 +48,17 @@ static void secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int bit, int } static void secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char *b32, int *overflow) { - const int base = 0x100 % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; int i; + int over = 0; *r = 0; for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - *r = ((*r * base) + b32[i]) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; + *r = (*r * 0x100) + b32[i]; + if (*r >= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) { + over = 1; + *r %= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; + } } - /* just deny overflow, it basically always happens */ - if (overflow) *overflow = 0; + if (overflow) *overflow = over; } static void secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(unsigned char *bin, const secp256k1_scalar* a) { @@ -114,4 +117,12 @@ SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_eq(const secp256k1_scalar *a, const return *a == *b; } +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_scalar_cmov(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, int flag) { + uint32_t mask0, mask1; + VG_CHECK_VERIFY(r, sizeof(*r)); + mask0 = flag + ~((uint32_t)0); + mask1 = ~mask0; + *r = (*r & mask0) | (*a & mask1); +} + #endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h index 4cee700..f381e2e 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ #include "scratch.h" static secp256k1_scratch* secp256k1_scratch_create(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, size_t size) { - const size_t base_alloc = ((sizeof(secp256k1_scratch) + ALIGNMENT - 1) / ALIGNMENT) * ALIGNMENT; + const size_t base_alloc = ROUND_TO_ALIGN(sizeof(secp256k1_scratch)); void *alloc = checked_malloc(error_callback, base_alloc + size); secp256k1_scratch* ret = (secp256k1_scratch *)alloc; if (ret != NULL) { @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static secp256k1_scratch* secp256k1_scratch_create(const secp256k1_callback* err static void secp256k1_scratch_destroy(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, secp256k1_scratch* scratch) { if (scratch != NULL) { VERIFY_CHECK(scratch->alloc_size == 0); /* all checkpoints should be applied */ - if (memcmp(scratch->magic, "scratch", 8) != 0) { + if (secp256k1_memcmp_var(scratch->magic, "scratch", 8) != 0) { secp256k1_callback_call(error_callback, "invalid scratch space"); return; } @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static void secp256k1_scratch_destroy(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, } static size_t secp256k1_scratch_checkpoint(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, const secp256k1_scratch* scratch) { - if (memcmp(scratch->magic, "scratch", 8) != 0) { + if (secp256k1_memcmp_var(scratch->magic, "scratch", 8) != 0) { secp256k1_callback_call(error_callback, "invalid scratch space"); return 0; } @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static size_t secp256k1_scratch_checkpoint(const secp256k1_callback* error_callb } static void secp256k1_scratch_apply_checkpoint(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t checkpoint) { - if (memcmp(scratch->magic, "scratch", 8) != 0) { + if (secp256k1_memcmp_var(scratch->magic, "scratch", 8) != 0) { secp256k1_callback_call(error_callback, "invalid scratch space"); return; } @@ -56,10 +56,14 @@ static void secp256k1_scratch_apply_checkpoint(const secp256k1_callback* error_c } static size_t secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, const secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t objects) { - if (memcmp(scratch->magic, "scratch", 8) != 0) { + if (secp256k1_memcmp_var(scratch->magic, "scratch", 8) != 0) { secp256k1_callback_call(error_callback, "invalid scratch space"); return 0; } + /* Ensure that multiplication will not wrap around */ + if (ALIGNMENT > 1 && objects > SIZE_MAX/(ALIGNMENT - 1)) { + return 0; + } if (scratch->max_size - scratch->alloc_size <= objects * (ALIGNMENT - 1)) { return 0; } @@ -68,9 +72,16 @@ static size_t secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(const secp256k1_callback* error_c static void *secp256k1_scratch_alloc(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t size) { void *ret; - size = ROUND_TO_ALIGN(size); + size_t rounded_size; + + rounded_size = ROUND_TO_ALIGN(size); + /* Check that rounding did not wrap around */ + if (rounded_size < size) { + return NULL; + } + size = rounded_size; - if (memcmp(scratch->magic, "scratch", 8) != 0) { + if (secp256k1_memcmp_var(scratch->magic, "scratch", 8) != 0) { secp256k1_callback_call(error_callback, "invalid scratch space"); return NULL; } diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/secp256k1.c b/depend/secp256k1/src/secp256k1.c index 99507ee..d0c298d 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/secp256k1.c +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/secp256k1.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include "include/secp256k1.h" #include "include/secp256k1_preallocated.h" +#include "assumptions.h" #include "util.h" #include "num_impl.h" #include "field_impl.h" @@ -19,6 +20,11 @@ #include "eckey_impl.h" #include "hash_impl.h" #include "scratch_impl.h" +#include "selftest.h" + +#if defined(VALGRIND) +# include +#endif #define ARG_CHECK(cond) do { \ if (EXPECT(!(cond), 0)) { \ @@ -66,18 +72,22 @@ struct secp256k1_context_struct { secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context ecmult_gen_ctx; secp256k1_callback illegal_callback; secp256k1_callback error_callback; + int declassify; }; static const secp256k1_context secp256k1_context_no_precomp_ = { { 0 }, { 0 }, { secp256k1_default_illegal_callback_fn, 0 }, - { secp256k1_default_error_callback_fn, 0 } + { secp256k1_default_error_callback_fn, 0 }, + 0 }; const secp256k1_context *secp256k1_context_no_precomp = &secp256k1_context_no_precomp_; size_t secp256k1_context_preallocated_size(unsigned int flags) { size_t ret = ROUND_TO_ALIGN(sizeof(secp256k1_context)); + /* A return value of 0 is reserved as an indicator for errors when we call this function internally. */ + VERIFY_CHECK(ret != 0); if (EXPECT((flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_MASK) != SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT, 0)) { secp256k1_callback_call(&default_illegal_callback, @@ -111,27 +121,31 @@ secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_preallocated_create(void* prealloc, unsigne size_t prealloc_size; secp256k1_context* ret; - VERIFY_CHECK(prealloc != NULL); + if (!secp256k1_selftest()) { + secp256k1_callback_call(&default_error_callback, "self test failed"); + } + prealloc_size = secp256k1_context_preallocated_size(flags); + if (prealloc_size == 0) { + return NULL; + } + VERIFY_CHECK(prealloc != NULL); ret = (secp256k1_context*)manual_alloc(&prealloc, sizeof(secp256k1_context), base, prealloc_size); ret->illegal_callback = default_illegal_callback; ret->error_callback = default_error_callback; - if (EXPECT((flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_MASK) != SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT, 0)) { - secp256k1_callback_call(&ret->illegal_callback, - "Invalid flags"); - return NULL; - } - secp256k1_ecmult_context_init(&ret->ecmult_ctx); secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_init(&ret->ecmult_gen_ctx); + /* Flags have been checked by secp256k1_context_preallocated_size. */ + VERIFY_CHECK((flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_MASK) == SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT); if (flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN) { secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_build(&ret->ecmult_gen_ctx, &prealloc); } if (flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY) { secp256k1_ecmult_context_build(&ret->ecmult_ctx, &prealloc); } + ret->declassify = !!(flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY); return (secp256k1_context*) ret; } @@ -215,6 +229,20 @@ void secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(const secp256k1_context *ctx, secp256k1_scr secp256k1_scratch_destroy(&ctx->error_callback, scratch); } +/* Mark memory as no-longer-secret for the purpose of analysing constant-time behaviour + * of the software. This is setup for use with valgrind but could be substituted with + * the appropriate instrumentation for other analysis tools. + */ +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_declassify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const void *p, size_t len) { +#if defined(VALGRIND) + if (EXPECT(ctx->declassify,0)) VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(p, len); +#else + (void)ctx; + (void)p; + (void)len; +#endif +} + static int secp256k1_pubkey_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ge* ge, const secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey) { if (sizeof(secp256k1_ge_storage) == 64) { /* When the secp256k1_ge_storage type is exactly 64 byte, use its @@ -258,6 +286,9 @@ int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey* pu if (!secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&Q, input, inputlen)) { return 0; } + if (!secp256k1_ge_is_in_correct_subgroup(&Q)) { + return 0; + } secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &Q); secp256k1_ge_clear(&Q); return 1; @@ -270,7 +301,7 @@ int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *o VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); ARG_CHECK(outputlen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(*outputlen >= ((flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION) ? 33 : 65)); + ARG_CHECK(*outputlen >= ((flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION) ? 33u : 65u)); len = *outputlen; *outputlen = 0; ARG_CHECK(output != NULL); @@ -446,70 +477,102 @@ static int nonce_function_rfc6979(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *m const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979 = nonce_function_rfc6979; const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_default = nonce_function_rfc6979; -int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *signature, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *seckey, secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, const void* noncedata) { - secp256k1_scalar r, s; +static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_inner(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scalar* r, secp256k1_scalar* s, int* recid, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *seckey, secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, const void* noncedata) { secp256k1_scalar sec, non, msg; int ret = 0; - int overflow = 0; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(signature != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); + int is_sec_valid; + unsigned char nonce32[32]; + unsigned int count = 0; + /* Default initialization here is important so we won't pass uninit values to the cmov in the end */ + *r = secp256k1_scalar_zero; + *s = secp256k1_scalar_zero; + if (recid) { + *recid = 0; + } if (noncefp == NULL) { noncefp = secp256k1_nonce_function_default; } - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, &overflow); /* Fail if the secret key is invalid. */ - if (!overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec)) { - unsigned char nonce32[32]; - unsigned int count = 0; - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&msg, msg32, NULL); - while (1) { - ret = noncefp(nonce32, msg32, seckey, NULL, (void*)noncedata, count); - if (!ret) { + is_sec_valid = secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(&sec, seckey); + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(&sec, &secp256k1_scalar_one, !is_sec_valid); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&msg, msg32, NULL); + while (1) { + int is_nonce_valid; + ret = !!noncefp(nonce32, msg32, seckey, NULL, (void*)noncedata, count); + if (!ret) { + break; + } + is_nonce_valid = secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(&non, nonce32); + /* The nonce is still secret here, but it being invalid is is less likely than 1:2^255. */ + secp256k1_declassify(ctx, &is_nonce_valid, sizeof(is_nonce_valid)); + if (is_nonce_valid) { + ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, r, s, &sec, &msg, &non, recid); + /* The final signature is no longer a secret, nor is the fact that we were successful or not. */ + secp256k1_declassify(ctx, &ret, sizeof(ret)); + if (ret) { break; } - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&non, nonce32, &overflow); - if (!overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&non)) { - if (secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &r, &s, &sec, &msg, &non, NULL)) { - break; - } - } - count++; } - memset(nonce32, 0, 32); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&msg); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&non); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); - } - if (ret) { - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(signature, &r, &s); - } else { - memset(signature, 0, sizeof(*signature)); + count++; + } + /* We don't want to declassify is_sec_valid and therefore the range of + * seckey. As a result is_sec_valid is included in ret only after ret was + * used as a branching variable. */ + ret &= is_sec_valid; + memset(nonce32, 0, 32); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&msg); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&non); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(r, &secp256k1_scalar_zero, !ret); + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(s, &secp256k1_scalar_zero, !ret); + if (recid) { + const int zero = 0; + secp256k1_int_cmov(recid, &zero, !ret); } return ret; } +int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *signature, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *seckey, secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, const void* noncedata) { + secp256k1_scalar r, s; + int ret; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(signature != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); + + ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_inner(ctx, &r, &s, NULL, msg32, seckey, noncefp, noncedata); + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(signature, &r, &s); + return ret; +} + int secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const unsigned char *seckey) { secp256k1_scalar sec; int ret; - int overflow; VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, &overflow); - ret = !overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec); + ret = secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(&sec, seckey); secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); return ret; } -int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *seckey) { +static int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create_helper(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ecmult_gen_ctx, secp256k1_scalar *seckey_scalar, secp256k1_ge *p, const unsigned char *seckey) { secp256k1_gej pj; + int ret; + + ret = secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(seckey_scalar, seckey); + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(seckey_scalar, &secp256k1_scalar_one, !ret); + + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ecmult_gen_ctx, &pj, seckey_scalar); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(p, &pj); + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *seckey) { secp256k1_ge p; - secp256k1_scalar sec; - int overflow; + secp256k1_scalar seckey_scalar; int ret = 0; VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); @@ -517,28 +580,31 @@ int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *p ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, &overflow); - ret = !overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec); - if (ret) { - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pj, &sec); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&p, &pj); - secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &p); - } - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); + ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create_helper(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &seckey_scalar, &p, seckey); + secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &p); + secp256k1_memczero(pubkey, sizeof(*pubkey), !ret); + + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&seckey_scalar); return ret; } -int secp256k1_ec_privkey_negate(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey) { +int secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey) { secp256k1_scalar sec; + int ret = 0; VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, NULL); + ret = secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(&sec, seckey); + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(&sec, &secp256k1_scalar_zero, !ret); secp256k1_scalar_negate(&sec, &sec); secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey, &sec); secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); - return 1; + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_ec_privkey_negate(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey) { + return secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(ctx, seckey); } int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey) { @@ -556,54 +622,64 @@ int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *p return ret; } -int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey, const unsigned char *tweak) { + +static int secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add_helper(secp256k1_scalar *sec, const unsigned char *tweak) { secp256k1_scalar term; + int overflow = 0; + int ret = 0; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&term, tweak, &overflow); + ret = (!overflow) & secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_add(sec, &term); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&term); + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey, const unsigned char *tweak) { secp256k1_scalar sec; int ret = 0; - int overflow = 0; VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); ARG_CHECK(tweak != NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&term, tweak, &overflow); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, NULL); - - ret = !overflow && secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_add(&sec, &term); - memset(seckey, 0, 32); - if (ret) { - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey, &sec); - } + ret = secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(&sec, seckey); + ret &= secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add_helper(&sec, tweak); + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(&sec, &secp256k1_scalar_zero, !ret); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey, &sec); secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&term); return ret; } +int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey, const unsigned char *tweak) { + return secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(ctx, seckey, tweak); +} + +static int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add_helper(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ecmult_ctx, secp256k1_ge *p, const unsigned char *tweak) { + secp256k1_scalar term; + int overflow = 0; + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&term, tweak, &overflow); + return !overflow && secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_add(ecmult_ctx, p, &term); +} + int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *tweak) { secp256k1_ge p; - secp256k1_scalar term; int ret = 0; - int overflow = 0; VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); ARG_CHECK(tweak != NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&term, tweak, &overflow); - ret = !overflow && secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &p, pubkey); + ret = secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &p, pubkey); memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); + ret = ret && secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add_helper(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &p, tweak); if (ret) { - if (secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_add(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &p, &term)) { - secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &p); - } else { - ret = 0; - } + secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &p); } return ret; } -int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey, const unsigned char *tweak) { +int secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey, const unsigned char *tweak) { secp256k1_scalar factor; secp256k1_scalar sec; int ret = 0; @@ -613,18 +689,20 @@ int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char * ARG_CHECK(tweak != NULL); secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&factor, tweak, &overflow); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, NULL); - ret = !overflow && secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_mul(&sec, &factor); - memset(seckey, 0, 32); - if (ret) { - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey, &sec); - } + ret = secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(&sec, seckey); + ret &= (!overflow) & secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_mul(&sec, &factor); + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(&sec, &secp256k1_scalar_zero, !ret); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey, &sec); secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); secp256k1_scalar_clear(&factor); return ret; } +int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey, const unsigned char *tweak) { + return secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(ctx, seckey, tweak); +} + int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *tweak) { secp256k1_ge p; secp256k1_scalar factor; @@ -685,18 +763,18 @@ int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey * # include "modules/ecdh/main_impl.h" #endif -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG -# include "modules/schnorrsig/main_impl.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_OLDSCHNORR -# include "modules/oldschnorr/main_impl.h" +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_MULTISET +# include "modules/multiset/main_impl.h" #endif #ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY # include "modules/recovery/main_impl.h" #endif -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_MULTISET -# include "modules/multiset/main_impl.h" +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS +# include "modules/extrakeys/main_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG +# include "modules/schnorrsig/main_impl.h" #endif diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/selftest.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/selftest.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e37510 --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/selftest.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2020 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_SELFTEST_H +#define SECP256K1_SELFTEST_H + +#include "hash.h" + +#include + +static int secp256k1_selftest_sha256(void) { + static const char *input63 = "For this sample, this 63-byte string will be used as input data"; + static const unsigned char output32[32] = { + 0xf0, 0x8a, 0x78, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xee, 0x08, 0x2b, 0x05, 0x2a, 0xe0, 0x70, 0x8f, 0x32, 0xfa, 0x1e, + 0x50, 0xc5, 0xc4, 0x21, 0xaa, 0x77, 0x2b, 0xa5, 0xdb, 0xb4, 0x06, 0xa2, 0xea, 0x6b, 0xe3, 0x42, + }; + unsigned char out[32]; + secp256k1_sha256 hasher; + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&hasher); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)input63, 63); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&hasher, out); + return secp256k1_memcmp_var(out, output32, 32) == 0; +} + +static int secp256k1_selftest(void) { + return secp256k1_selftest_sha256(); +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_SELFTEST_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/testrand.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/testrand.h index f1f9be0..a76003d 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/testrand.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/testrand.h @@ -14,25 +14,34 @@ /* A non-cryptographic RNG used only for test infrastructure. */ /** Seed the pseudorandom number generator for testing. */ -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_rand_seed(const unsigned char *seed16); +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_testrand_seed(const unsigned char *seed16); /** Generate a pseudorandom number in the range [0..2**32-1]. */ -static uint32_t secp256k1_rand32(void); +static uint32_t secp256k1_testrand32(void); /** Generate a pseudorandom number in the range [0..2**bits-1]. Bits must be 1 or * more. */ -static uint32_t secp256k1_rand_bits(int bits); +static uint32_t secp256k1_testrand_bits(int bits); /** Generate a pseudorandom number in the range [0..range-1]. */ -static uint32_t secp256k1_rand_int(uint32_t range); +static uint32_t secp256k1_testrand_int(uint32_t range); /** Generate a pseudorandom 32-byte array. */ -static void secp256k1_rand256(unsigned char *b32); +static void secp256k1_testrand256(unsigned char *b32); /** Generate a pseudorandom 32-byte array with long sequences of zero and one bits. */ -static void secp256k1_rand256_test(unsigned char *b32); +static void secp256k1_testrand256_test(unsigned char *b32); /** Generate pseudorandom bytes with long sequences of zero and one bits. */ -static void secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(unsigned char *bytes, size_t len); +static void secp256k1_testrand_bytes_test(unsigned char *bytes, size_t len); + +/** Flip a single random bit in a byte array */ +static void secp256k1_testrand_flip(unsigned char *b, size_t len); + +/** Initialize the test RNG using (hex encoded) array up to 16 bytes, or randomly if hexseed is NULL. */ +static void secp256k1_testrand_init(const char* hexseed); + +/** Print final test information. */ +static void secp256k1_testrand_finish(void); #endif /* SECP256K1_TESTRAND_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/testrand_impl.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/testrand_impl.h index 30a91e5..3392566 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/testrand_impl.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/testrand_impl.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #define SECP256K1_TESTRAND_IMPL_H #include +#include #include #include "testrand.h" @@ -19,11 +20,11 @@ static int secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed_used = 8; static uint64_t secp256k1_test_rng_integer; static int secp256k1_test_rng_integer_bits_left = 0; -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_rand_seed(const unsigned char *seed16) { +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_testrand_seed(const unsigned char *seed16) { secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&secp256k1_test_rng, seed16, 16); } -SECP256K1_INLINE static uint32_t secp256k1_rand32(void) { +SECP256K1_INLINE static uint32_t secp256k1_testrand32(void) { if (secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed_used == 8) { secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&secp256k1_test_rng, (unsigned char*)(&secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed[0]), sizeof(secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed)); secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed_used = 0; @@ -31,10 +32,10 @@ SECP256K1_INLINE static uint32_t secp256k1_rand32(void) { return secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed[secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed_used++]; } -static uint32_t secp256k1_rand_bits(int bits) { +static uint32_t secp256k1_testrand_bits(int bits) { uint32_t ret; if (secp256k1_test_rng_integer_bits_left < bits) { - secp256k1_test_rng_integer |= (((uint64_t)secp256k1_rand32()) << secp256k1_test_rng_integer_bits_left); + secp256k1_test_rng_integer |= (((uint64_t)secp256k1_testrand32()) << secp256k1_test_rng_integer_bits_left); secp256k1_test_rng_integer_bits_left += 32; } ret = secp256k1_test_rng_integer; @@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ static uint32_t secp256k1_rand_bits(int bits) { return ret; } -static uint32_t secp256k1_rand_int(uint32_t range) { +static uint32_t secp256k1_testrand_int(uint32_t range) { /* We want a uniform integer between 0 and range-1, inclusive. * B is the smallest number such that range <= 2**B. * two mechanisms implemented here: @@ -76,25 +77,25 @@ static uint32_t secp256k1_rand_int(uint32_t range) { mult = 1; } while(1) { - uint32_t x = secp256k1_rand_bits(bits); + uint32_t x = secp256k1_testrand_bits(bits); if (x < trange) { return (mult == 1) ? x : (x % range); } } } -static void secp256k1_rand256(unsigned char *b32) { +static void secp256k1_testrand256(unsigned char *b32) { secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&secp256k1_test_rng, b32, 32); } -static void secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(unsigned char *bytes, size_t len) { +static void secp256k1_testrand_bytes_test(unsigned char *bytes, size_t len) { size_t bits = 0; memset(bytes, 0, len); while (bits < len * 8) { int now; uint32_t val; - now = 1 + (secp256k1_rand_bits(6) * secp256k1_rand_bits(5) + 16) / 31; - val = secp256k1_rand_bits(1); + now = 1 + (secp256k1_testrand_bits(6) * secp256k1_testrand_bits(5) + 16) / 31; + val = secp256k1_testrand_bits(1); while (now > 0 && bits < len * 8) { bytes[bits / 8] |= val << (bits % 8); now--; @@ -103,8 +104,55 @@ static void secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(unsigned char *bytes, size_t len) { } } -static void secp256k1_rand256_test(unsigned char *b32) { - secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(b32, 32); +static void secp256k1_testrand256_test(unsigned char *b32) { + secp256k1_testrand_bytes_test(b32, 32); +} + +static void secp256k1_testrand_flip(unsigned char *b, size_t len) { + b[secp256k1_testrand_int(len)] ^= (1 << secp256k1_testrand_int(8)); +} + +static void secp256k1_testrand_init(const char* hexseed) { + unsigned char seed16[16] = {0}; + if (hexseed && strlen(hexseed) != 0) { + int pos = 0; + while (pos < 16 && hexseed[0] != 0 && hexseed[1] != 0) { + unsigned short sh; + if ((sscanf(hexseed, "%2hx", &sh)) == 1) { + seed16[pos] = sh; + } else { + break; + } + hexseed += 2; + pos++; + } + } else { + FILE *frand = fopen("/dev/urandom", "r"); + if ((frand == NULL) || fread(&seed16, 1, sizeof(seed16), frand) != sizeof(seed16)) { + uint64_t t = time(NULL) * (uint64_t)1337; + fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: could not read 16 bytes from /dev/urandom; falling back to insecure PRNG\n"); + seed16[0] ^= t; + seed16[1] ^= t >> 8; + seed16[2] ^= t >> 16; + seed16[3] ^= t >> 24; + seed16[4] ^= t >> 32; + seed16[5] ^= t >> 40; + seed16[6] ^= t >> 48; + seed16[7] ^= t >> 56; + } + if (frand) { + fclose(frand); + } + } + + printf("random seed = %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x\n", seed16[0], seed16[1], seed16[2], seed16[3], seed16[4], seed16[5], seed16[6], seed16[7], seed16[8], seed16[9], seed16[10], seed16[11], seed16[12], seed16[13], seed16[14], seed16[15]); + secp256k1_testrand_seed(seed16); +} + +static void secp256k1_testrand_finish(void) { + unsigned char run32[32]; + secp256k1_testrand256(run32); + printf("random run = %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x\n", run32[0], run32[1], run32[2], run32[3], run32[4], run32[5], run32[6], run32[7], run32[8], run32[9], run32[10], run32[11], run32[12], run32[13], run32[14], run32[15]); } #endif /* SECP256K1_TESTRAND_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/tests.c b/depend/secp256k1/src/tests.c index 85a371f..209ca92 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/tests.c +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/tests.c @@ -32,17 +32,6 @@ void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) #include "contrib/lax_der_parsing.c" #include "contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.c" -#if !defined(VG_CHECK) -# if defined(VALGRIND) -# include -# define VG_UNDEF(x,y) VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED((x),(y)) -# define VG_CHECK(x,y) VALGRIND_CHECK_MEM_IS_DEFINED((x),(y)) -# else -# define VG_UNDEF(x,y) -# define VG_CHECK(x,y) -# endif -#endif - static int count = 64; static secp256k1_context *ctx = NULL; @@ -65,7 +54,7 @@ static void uncounting_illegal_callback_fn(const char* str, void* data) { void random_field_element_test(secp256k1_fe *fe) { do { unsigned char b32[32]; - secp256k1_rand256_test(b32); + secp256k1_testrand256_test(b32); if (secp256k1_fe_set_b32(fe, b32)) { break; } @@ -74,7 +63,7 @@ void random_field_element_test(secp256k1_fe *fe) { void random_field_element_magnitude(secp256k1_fe *fe) { secp256k1_fe zero; - int n = secp256k1_rand_int(9); + int n = secp256k1_testrand_int(9); secp256k1_fe_normalize(fe); if (n == 0) { return; @@ -92,11 +81,12 @@ void random_group_element_test(secp256k1_ge *ge) { secp256k1_fe fe; do { random_field_element_test(&fe); - if (secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(ge, &fe, secp256k1_rand_bits(1))) { + if (secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(ge, &fe, secp256k1_testrand_bits(1))) { secp256k1_fe_normalize(&ge->y); break; } } while(1); + ge->infinity = 0; } void random_group_element_jacobian_test(secp256k1_gej *gej, const secp256k1_ge *ge) { @@ -118,7 +108,7 @@ void random_scalar_order_test(secp256k1_scalar *num) { do { unsigned char b32[32]; int overflow = 0; - secp256k1_rand256_test(b32); + secp256k1_testrand256_test(b32); secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(num, b32, &overflow); if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(num)) { continue; @@ -131,7 +121,7 @@ void random_scalar_order(secp256k1_scalar *num) { do { unsigned char b32[32]; int overflow = 0; - secp256k1_rand256(b32); + secp256k1_testrand256(b32); secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(num, b32, &overflow); if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(num)) { continue; @@ -140,6 +130,12 @@ void random_scalar_order(secp256k1_scalar *num) { } while(1); } +void random_scalar_order_b32(unsigned char *b32) { + secp256k1_scalar num; + random_scalar_order(&num); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(b32, &num); +} + void run_context_tests(int use_prealloc) { secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; secp256k1_pubkey zero_pubkey; @@ -187,8 +183,10 @@ void run_context_tests(int use_prealloc) { ecount2 = 10; secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount2); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, NULL); - CHECK(vrfy->error_callback.fn != sign->error_callback.fn); + /* set error callback (to a function that still aborts in case malloc() fails in secp256k1_context_clone() below) */ + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, secp256k1_default_illegal_callback_fn, NULL); + CHECK(sign->error_callback.fn != vrfy->error_callback.fn); + CHECK(sign->error_callback.fn == secp256k1_default_illegal_callback_fn); /* check if sizes for cloning are consistent */ CHECK(secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone_size(none) == secp256k1_context_preallocated_size(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE)); @@ -244,7 +242,8 @@ void run_context_tests(int use_prealloc) { } /* Verify that the error callback makes it across the clone. */ - CHECK(vrfy->error_callback.fn != sign->error_callback.fn); + CHECK(sign->error_callback.fn != vrfy->error_callback.fn); + CHECK(sign->error_callback.fn == secp256k1_default_illegal_callback_fn); /* And that it resets back to default. */ secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, NULL, NULL); CHECK(vrfy->error_callback.fn == sign->error_callback.fn); @@ -366,8 +365,8 @@ void run_scratch_tests(void) { CHECK(scratch->alloc_size != 0); CHECK(scratch->alloc_size % ALIGNMENT == 0); - /* Allocating another 500 bytes fails */ - CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_alloc(&none->error_callback, scratch, 500) == NULL); + /* Allocating another 501 bytes fails */ + CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_alloc(&none->error_callback, scratch, 501) == NULL); CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(&none->error_callback, scratch, 0) == 1000 - adj_alloc); CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(&none->error_callback, scratch, 1) == 1000 - adj_alloc - (ALIGNMENT - 1)); CHECK(scratch->alloc_size != 0); @@ -400,6 +399,18 @@ void run_scratch_tests(void) { secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(none, scratch); CHECK(ecount == 5); + /* Test that large integers do not wrap around in a bad way */ + scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(none, 1000); + /* Try max allocation with a large number of objects. Only makes sense if + * ALIGNMENT is greater than 1 because otherwise the objects take no extra + * space. */ + CHECK(ALIGNMENT <= 1 || !secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(&none->error_callback, scratch, (SIZE_MAX / (ALIGNMENT - 1)) + 1)); + /* Try allocating SIZE_MAX to test wrap around which only happens if + * ALIGNMENT > 1, otherwise it returns NULL anyway because the scratch + * space is too small. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_alloc(&none->error_callback, scratch, SIZE_MAX) == NULL); + secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(none, scratch); + /* cleanup */ secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(none, NULL); /* no-op */ secp256k1_context_destroy(none); @@ -431,14 +442,14 @@ void run_sha256_tests(void) { secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&hasher); secp256k1_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i]), strlen(inputs[i])); secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&hasher, out); - CHECK(memcmp(out, outputs[i], 32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(out, outputs[i], 32) == 0); if (strlen(inputs[i]) > 0) { - int split = secp256k1_rand_int(strlen(inputs[i])); + int split = secp256k1_testrand_int(strlen(inputs[i])); secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&hasher); secp256k1_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i]), split); secp256k1_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i] + split), strlen(inputs[i]) - split); secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&hasher, out); - CHECK(memcmp(out, outputs[i], 32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(out, outputs[i], 32) == 0); } } } @@ -475,14 +486,14 @@ void run_hmac_sha256_tests(void) { secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(keys[i]), strlen(keys[i])); secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i]), strlen(inputs[i])); secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hasher, out); - CHECK(memcmp(out, outputs[i], 32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(out, outputs[i], 32) == 0); if (strlen(inputs[i]) > 0) { - int split = secp256k1_rand_int(strlen(inputs[i])); + int split = secp256k1_testrand_int(strlen(inputs[i])); secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(keys[i]), strlen(keys[i])); secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i]), split); secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i] + split), strlen(inputs[i]) - split); secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hasher, out); - CHECK(memcmp(out, outputs[i], 32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(out, outputs[i], 32) == 0); } } } @@ -509,21 +520,21 @@ void run_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_tests(void) { secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, key1, 64); for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, out, 32); - CHECK(memcmp(out, out1[i], 32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(out, out1[i], 32) == 0); } secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, key1, 65); for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, out, 32); - CHECK(memcmp(out, out1[i], 32) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(out, out1[i], 32) != 0); } secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, key2, 64); for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, out, 32); - CHECK(memcmp(out, out2[i], 32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(out, out2[i], 32) == 0); } secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); } @@ -547,7 +558,7 @@ void test_rand_bits(int rand32, int bits) { /* Multiply the output of all rand calls with the odd number m, which should not change the uniformity of its distribution. */ for (i = 0; i < rounds[usebits]; i++) { - uint32_t r = (rand32 ? secp256k1_rand32() : secp256k1_rand_bits(bits)); + uint32_t r = (rand32 ? secp256k1_testrand32() : secp256k1_testrand_bits(bits)); CHECK((((uint64_t)r) >> bits) == 0); for (m = 0; m < sizeof(mults) / sizeof(mults[0]); m++) { uint32_t rm = r * mults[m]; @@ -572,7 +583,7 @@ void test_rand_int(uint32_t range, uint32_t subrange) { uint64_t x = 0; CHECK((range % subrange) == 0); for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) { - uint32_t r = secp256k1_rand_int(range); + uint32_t r = secp256k1_testrand_int(range); CHECK(r < range); r = r % subrange; x |= (((uint64_t)1) << r); @@ -604,7 +615,7 @@ void run_rand_int(void) { #ifndef USE_NUM_NONE void random_num_negate(secp256k1_num *num) { - if (secp256k1_rand_bits(1)) { + if (secp256k1_testrand_bits(1)) { secp256k1_num_negate(num); } } @@ -648,11 +659,11 @@ void test_num_add_sub(void) { secp256k1_num n2; secp256k1_num n1p2, n2p1, n1m2, n2m1; random_num_order_test(&n1); /* n1 = R1 */ - if (secp256k1_rand_bits(1)) { + if (secp256k1_testrand_bits(1)) { random_num_negate(&n1); } random_num_order_test(&n2); /* n2 = R2 */ - if (secp256k1_rand_bits(1)) { + if (secp256k1_testrand_bits(1)) { random_num_negate(&n2); } secp256k1_num_add(&n1p2, &n1, &n2); /* n1p2 = R1 + R2 */ @@ -843,7 +854,7 @@ void scalar_test(void) { while (i < 256) { secp256k1_scalar t; int j; - int now = secp256k1_rand_int(15) + 1; + int now = secp256k1_testrand_int(15) + 1; if (now + i > 256) { now = 256 - i; } @@ -920,7 +931,7 @@ void scalar_test(void) { secp256k1_num rnum; secp256k1_num rnum2; unsigned char cone[1] = {0x01}; - unsigned int shift = 256 + secp256k1_rand_int(257); + unsigned int shift = 256 + secp256k1_testrand_int(257); secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(&r, &s1, &s2, shift); secp256k1_num_mul(&rnum, &s1num, &s2num); secp256k1_num_shift(&rnum, shift - 1); @@ -938,7 +949,7 @@ void scalar_test(void) { random_scalar_order_test(&r); for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) { int low; - int shift = 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(15); + int shift = 1 + secp256k1_testrand_int(15); int expected = r.d[0] % (1 << shift); low = secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&r, shift); CHECK(expected == low); @@ -986,7 +997,7 @@ void scalar_test(void) { secp256k1_scalar b; int i; /* Test add_bit. */ - int bit = secp256k1_rand_bits(8); + int bit = secp256k1_testrand_bits(8); secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&b, 1); CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&b)); for (i = 0; i < bit; i++) { @@ -1077,11 +1088,31 @@ void scalar_test(void) { } +void run_scalar_set_b32_seckey_tests(void) { + unsigned char b32[32]; + secp256k1_scalar s1; + secp256k1_scalar s2; + + /* Usually set_b32 and set_b32_seckey give the same result */ + random_scalar_order_b32(b32); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s1, b32, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(&s2, b32) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&s1, &s2) == 1); + + memset(b32, 0, sizeof(b32)); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(&s2, b32) == 0); + memset(b32, 0xFF, sizeof(b32)); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(&s2, b32) == 0); +} + void run_scalar_tests(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < 128 * count; i++) { scalar_test(); } + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + run_scalar_set_b32_seckey_tests(); + } { /* (-1)+1 should be zero. */ @@ -1097,16 +1128,43 @@ void run_scalar_tests(void) { #ifndef USE_NUM_NONE { - /* A scalar with value of the curve order should be 0. */ + /* Test secp256k1_scalar_set_b32 boundary conditions */ secp256k1_num order; - secp256k1_scalar zero; + secp256k1_scalar scalar; unsigned char bin[32]; + unsigned char bin_tmp[32]; int overflow = 0; + /* 2^256-1 - order */ + static const secp256k1_scalar all_ones_minus_order = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( + 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00000001UL, + 0x45512319UL, 0x50B75FC4UL, 0x402DA173UL, 0x2FC9BEBEUL + ); + + /* A scalar set to 0s should be 0. */ + memset(bin, 0, 32); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&scalar, bin, &overflow); + CHECK(overflow == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&scalar)); + + /* A scalar with value of the curve order should be 0. */ secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(&order); secp256k1_num_get_bin(bin, 32, &order); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&zero, bin, &overflow); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&scalar, bin, &overflow); CHECK(overflow == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&zero)); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&scalar)); + + /* A scalar with value of the curve order minus one should not overflow. */ + bin[31] -= 1; + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&scalar, bin, &overflow); + CHECK(overflow == 0); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(bin_tmp, &scalar); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(bin, bin_tmp, 32) == 0); + + /* A scalar set to all 1s should overflow. */ + memset(bin, 0xFF, 32); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&scalar, bin, &overflow); + CHECK(overflow == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&scalar, &all_ones_minus_order)); } #endif @@ -1710,7 +1768,7 @@ void run_scalar_tests(void) { void random_fe(secp256k1_fe *x) { unsigned char bin[32]; do { - secp256k1_rand256(bin); + secp256k1_testrand256(bin); if (secp256k1_fe_set_b32(x, bin)) { return; } @@ -1720,7 +1778,7 @@ void random_fe(secp256k1_fe *x) { void random_fe_test(secp256k1_fe *x) { unsigned char bin[32]; do { - secp256k1_rand256_test(bin); + secp256k1_testrand256_test(bin); if (secp256k1_fe_set_b32(x, bin)) { return; } @@ -1788,18 +1846,18 @@ void run_field_convert(void) { CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&fe, &fe2)); /* Check conversion from fe. */ secp256k1_fe_get_b32(b322, &fe); - CHECK(memcmp(b322, b32, 32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(b322, b32, 32) == 0); secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&fes2, &fe); - CHECK(memcmp(&fes2, &fes, sizeof(fes)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&fes2, &fes, sizeof(fes)) == 0); } -int fe_memcmp(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { +int fe_secp256k1_memcmp_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { secp256k1_fe t = *b; #ifdef VERIFY t.magnitude = a->magnitude; t.normalized = a->normalized; #endif - return memcmp(a, &t, sizeof(secp256k1_fe)); + return secp256k1_memcmp_var(a, &t, sizeof(secp256k1_fe)); } void run_field_misc(void) { @@ -1822,16 +1880,16 @@ void run_field_misc(void) { q = x; secp256k1_fe_cmov(&x, &z, 0); #ifdef VERIFY - CHECK(!x.normalized && x.magnitude == z.magnitude); + CHECK(x.normalized && x.magnitude == 1); #endif secp256k1_fe_cmov(&x, &x, 1); - CHECK(fe_memcmp(&x, &z) != 0); - CHECK(fe_memcmp(&x, &q) == 0); + CHECK(fe_secp256k1_memcmp_var(&x, &z) != 0); + CHECK(fe_secp256k1_memcmp_var(&x, &q) == 0); secp256k1_fe_cmov(&q, &z, 1); #ifdef VERIFY CHECK(!q.normalized && q.magnitude == z.magnitude); #endif - CHECK(fe_memcmp(&q, &z) == 0); + CHECK(fe_secp256k1_memcmp_var(&q, &z) == 0); secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&x); secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&z); CHECK(!secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&x, &z)); @@ -1845,7 +1903,7 @@ void run_field_misc(void) { secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&q); secp256k1_fe_cmov(&q, &z, (j&1)); #ifdef VERIFY - CHECK(!q.normalized && q.magnitude == (j+2)); + CHECK((q.normalized != (j&1)) && q.magnitude == ((j&1) ? z.magnitude : 1)); #endif } secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&z); @@ -1855,9 +1913,9 @@ void run_field_misc(void) { secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&zs, &z); secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&zs, &xs, 0); secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&zs, &zs, 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&xs, &zs, sizeof(xs)) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&xs, &zs, sizeof(xs)) != 0); secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&ys, &xs, 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&xs, &ys, sizeof(xs)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&xs, &ys, sizeof(xs)) == 0); secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&x, &xs); secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&y, &ys); secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&z, &zs); @@ -1913,7 +1971,7 @@ void run_field_inv_all_var(void) { secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(xi, x, 0); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { size_t j; - size_t len = secp256k1_rand_int(15) + 1; + size_t len = secp256k1_testrand_int(15) + 1; for (j = 0; j < len; j++) { random_fe_non_zero(&x[j]); } @@ -2044,17 +2102,12 @@ void ge_equals_gej(const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_gej *b) { void test_ge(void) { int i, i1; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM int runs = 6; -#else - int runs = 4; -#endif - /* Points: (infinity, p1, p1, -p1, -p1, p2, p2, -p2, -p2, p3, p3, -p3, -p3, p4, p4, -p4, -p4). - * The second in each pair of identical points uses a random Z coordinate in the Jacobian form. - * All magnitudes are randomized. - * All 17*17 combinations of points are added to each other, using all applicable methods. - * - * When the endomorphism code is compiled in, p5 = lambda*p1 and p6 = lambda^2*p1 are added as well. + /* 25 points are used: + * - infinity + * - for each of four random points p1 p2 p3 p4, we add the point, its + * negation, and then those two again but with randomized Z coordinate. + * - The same is then done for lambda*p1 and lambda^2*p1. */ secp256k1_ge *ge = (secp256k1_ge *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_ge) * (1 + 4 * runs)); secp256k1_gej *gej = (secp256k1_gej *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_gej) * (1 + 4 * runs)); @@ -2069,14 +2122,12 @@ void test_ge(void) { int j; secp256k1_ge g; random_group_element_test(&g); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM if (i >= runs - 2) { secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&g, &ge[1]); } if (i >= runs - 1) { secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&g, &g); } -#endif ge[1 + 4 * i] = g; ge[2 + 4 * i] = g; secp256k1_ge_neg(&ge[3 + 4 * i], &g); @@ -2173,6 +2224,9 @@ void test_ge(void) { /* Normal doubling. */ secp256k1_gej_double_var(&resj, &gej[i2], NULL); ge_equals_gej(&ref, &resj); + /* Constant-time doubling. */ + secp256k1_gej_double(&resj, &gej[i2]); + ge_equals_gej(&ref, &resj); } /* Test adding opposites. */ @@ -2202,7 +2256,7 @@ void test_ge(void) { gej_shuffled[i] = gej[i]; } for (i = 0; i < 4 * runs + 1; i++) { - int swap = i + secp256k1_rand_int(4 * runs + 1 - i); + int swap = i + secp256k1_testrand_int(4 * runs + 1 - i); if (swap != i) { secp256k1_gej t = gej_shuffled[i]; gej_shuffled[i] = gej_shuffled[swap]; @@ -2258,6 +2312,39 @@ void test_ge(void) { free(zinv); } + +void test_intialized_inf(void) { + secp256k1_ge p; + secp256k1_gej pj, npj, infj1, infj2, infj3; + secp256k1_fe zinv; + + /* Test that adding P+(-P) results in a fully initalized infinity*/ + random_group_element_test(&p); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pj, &p); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&npj, &pj); + + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&infj1, &pj, &npj, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&infj1)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj1.x)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj1.y)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj1.z)); + + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&infj2, &npj, &p, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&infj2)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj2.x)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj2.y)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj2.z)); + + secp256k1_fe_set_int(&zinv, 1); + secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(&infj3, &npj, &p, &zinv); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&infj3)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj3.x)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj3.y)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&infj3.z)); + + +} + void test_add_neg_y_diff_x(void) { /* The point of this test is to check that we can add two points * whose y-coordinates are negatives of each other but whose x @@ -2331,6 +2418,7 @@ void run_ge(void) { test_ge(); } test_add_neg_y_diff_x(); + test_intialized_inf(); } void test_ec_combine(void) { @@ -2354,7 +2442,7 @@ void test_ec_combine(void) { secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&Q, &Qj); secp256k1_pubkey_save(&sd, &Q); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &sd2, d, i) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&sd, &sd2, sizeof(sd)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&sd, &sd2, sizeof(sd)) == 0); } } @@ -2520,7 +2608,6 @@ void test_point_times_order(const secp256k1_gej *point) { secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &res2, point, &nx, &nx); /* calc res2 = (order - x) * point + (order - x) * G; */ secp256k1_gej_add_var(&res1, &res1, &res2, NULL); CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&res1)); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_valid_var(&res1) == 0); secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res3, &res1); CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&res3)); CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(&res3) == 0); @@ -2539,6 +2626,87 @@ void test_point_times_order(const secp256k1_gej *point) { ge_equals_ge(&res3, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); } +/* These scalars reach large (in absolute value) outputs when fed to secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda. + * + * They are computed as: + * - For a in [-2, -1, 0, 1, 2]: + * - For b in [-3, -1, 1, 3]: + * - Output (a*LAMBDA + (ORDER+b)/2) % ORDER + */ +static const secp256k1_scalar scalars_near_split_bounds[20] = { + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0xd938a566, 0x7f479e3e, 0xb5b3c7fa, 0xefdb3749, 0x3aa0585c, 0xc5ea2367, 0xe1b660db, 0x0209e6fc), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0xd938a566, 0x7f479e3e, 0xb5b3c7fa, 0xefdb3749, 0x3aa0585c, 0xc5ea2367, 0xe1b660db, 0x0209e6fd), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0xd938a566, 0x7f479e3e, 0xb5b3c7fa, 0xefdb3749, 0x3aa0585c, 0xc5ea2367, 0xe1b660db, 0x0209e6fe), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0xd938a566, 0x7f479e3e, 0xb5b3c7fa, 0xefdb3749, 0x3aa0585c, 0xc5ea2367, 0xe1b660db, 0x0209e6ff), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0x2c9c52b3, 0x3fa3cf1f, 0x5ad9e3fd, 0x77ed9ba5, 0xb294b893, 0x3722e9a5, 0x00e698ca, 0x4cf7632d), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0x2c9c52b3, 0x3fa3cf1f, 0x5ad9e3fd, 0x77ed9ba5, 0xb294b893, 0x3722e9a5, 0x00e698ca, 0x4cf7632e), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0x2c9c52b3, 0x3fa3cf1f, 0x5ad9e3fd, 0x77ed9ba5, 0xb294b893, 0x3722e9a5, 0x00e698ca, 0x4cf7632f), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0x2c9c52b3, 0x3fa3cf1f, 0x5ad9e3fd, 0x77ed9ba5, 0xb294b893, 0x3722e9a5, 0x00e698ca, 0x4cf76330), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0x7fffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xd576e735, 0x57a4501d, 0xdfe92f46, 0x681b209f), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0x7fffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xd576e735, 0x57a4501d, 0xdfe92f46, 0x681b20a0), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0x7fffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xd576e735, 0x57a4501d, 0xdfe92f46, 0x681b20a1), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0x7fffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xd576e735, 0x57a4501d, 0xdfe92f46, 0x681b20a2), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0xd363ad4c, 0xc05c30e0, 0xa5261c02, 0x88126459, 0xf85915d7, 0x7825b696, 0xbeebc5c2, 0x833ede11), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0xd363ad4c, 0xc05c30e0, 0xa5261c02, 0x88126459, 0xf85915d7, 0x7825b696, 0xbeebc5c2, 0x833ede12), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0xd363ad4c, 0xc05c30e0, 0xa5261c02, 0x88126459, 0xf85915d7, 0x7825b696, 0xbeebc5c2, 0x833ede13), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0xd363ad4c, 0xc05c30e0, 0xa5261c02, 0x88126459, 0xf85915d7, 0x7825b696, 0xbeebc5c2, 0x833ede14), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0x26c75a99, 0x80b861c1, 0x4a4c3805, 0x1024c8b4, 0x704d760e, 0xe95e7cd3, 0xde1bfdb1, 0xce2c5a42), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0x26c75a99, 0x80b861c1, 0x4a4c3805, 0x1024c8b4, 0x704d760e, 0xe95e7cd3, 0xde1bfdb1, 0xce2c5a43), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0x26c75a99, 0x80b861c1, 0x4a4c3805, 0x1024c8b4, 0x704d760e, 0xe95e7cd3, 0xde1bfdb1, 0xce2c5a44), + SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0x26c75a99, 0x80b861c1, 0x4a4c3805, 0x1024c8b4, 0x704d760e, 0xe95e7cd3, 0xde1bfdb1, 0xce2c5a45) +}; + +void test_ecmult_target(const secp256k1_scalar* target, int mode) { + /* Mode: 0=ecmult_gen, 1=ecmult, 2=ecmult_const */ + secp256k1_scalar n1, n2; + secp256k1_ge p; + secp256k1_gej pj, p1j, p2j, ptj; + static const secp256k1_scalar zero = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + + /* Generate random n1,n2 such that n1+n2 = -target. */ + random_scalar_order_test(&n1); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&n2, &n1, target); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&n2, &n2); + + /* Generate a random input point. */ + if (mode != 0) { + random_group_element_test(&p); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pj, &p); + } + + /* EC multiplications */ + if (mode == 0) { + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &p1j, &n1); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &p2j, &n2); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &ptj, target); + } else if (mode == 1) { + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &p1j, &pj, &n1, &zero); + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &p2j, &pj, &n2, &zero); + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &ptj, &pj, target, &zero); + } else { + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&p1j, &p, &n1, 256); + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&p2j, &p, &n2, 256); + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&ptj, &p, target, 256); + } + + /* Add them all up: n1*P + n2*P + target*P = (n1+n2+target)*P = (n1+n1-n1-n2)*P = 0. */ + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&ptj, &ptj, &p1j, NULL); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&ptj, &ptj, &p2j, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&ptj)); +} + +void run_ecmult_near_split_bound(void) { + int i; + unsigned j; + for (i = 0; i < 4*count; ++i) { + for (j = 0; j < sizeof(scalars_near_split_bounds) / sizeof(scalars_near_split_bounds[0]); ++j) { + test_ecmult_target(&scalars_near_split_bounds[j], 0); + test_ecmult_target(&scalars_near_split_bounds[j], 1); + test_ecmult_target(&scalars_near_split_bounds[j], 2); + } + } +} + void run_point_times_order(void) { int i; secp256k1_fe x = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2); @@ -2552,7 +2720,6 @@ void run_point_times_order(void) { secp256k1_gej j; CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(&p)); secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&j, &p); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_valid_var(&j)); test_point_times_order(&j); } secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x, &x); @@ -2925,14 +3092,16 @@ void test_ecmult_multi(secp256k1_scratch *scratch, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_func e void test_ecmult_multi_batch_single(secp256k1_ecmult_multi_func ecmult_multi) { secp256k1_scalar szero; - secp256k1_scalar sc[32]; - secp256k1_ge pt[32]; + secp256k1_scalar sc; + secp256k1_ge pt; secp256k1_gej r; ecmult_multi_data data; secp256k1_scratch *scratch_empty; - data.sc = sc; - data.pt = pt; + random_group_element_test(&pt); + random_scalar_order(&sc); + data.sc = ≻ + data.pt = &pt; secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&szero, 0); /* Try to multiply 1 point, but scratch space is empty.*/ @@ -2946,12 +3115,10 @@ void test_secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(void) { CHECK(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(0) == 0); for(i = 1; i <= PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW; i++) { -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM /* Bucket_window of 8 is not used with endo */ if (i == 8) { continue; } -#endif CHECK(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(i)) == i); if (i != PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW) { CHECK(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(i)+1) > i); @@ -2964,7 +3131,7 @@ void test_secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(void) { * for a given scratch space. */ void test_ecmult_multi_pippenger_max_points(void) { - size_t scratch_size = secp256k1_rand_int(256); + size_t scratch_size = secp256k1_testrand_int(256); size_t max_size = secp256k1_pippenger_scratch_size(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW-1)+512, 12); secp256k1_scratch *scratch; size_t n_points_supported; @@ -3076,7 +3243,7 @@ void test_ecmult_multi_batching(void) { data.pt = pt; secp256k1_gej_neg(&r2, &r2); - /* Test with empty scratch space. It should compute the correct result using + /* Test with empty scratch space. It should compute the correct result using * ecmult_mult_simple algorithm which doesn't require a scratch space. */ scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, 0); CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(&ctx->error_callback, &ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &scG, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, n_points)); @@ -3190,16 +3357,14 @@ void test_constant_wnaf(const secp256k1_scalar *number, int w) { int skew; int bits = 256; secp256k1_scalar num = *number; + secp256k1_scalar scalar_skew; secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&x, 0); secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&shift, 1 << w); - /* With USE_ENDOMORPHISM on we only consider 128-bit numbers */ -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) { secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&num, 8); } bits = 128; -#endif skew = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf, &num, w, bits); for (i = WNAF_SIZE_BITS(bits, w); i >= 0; --i) { @@ -3220,7 +3385,8 @@ void test_constant_wnaf(const secp256k1_scalar *number, int w) { secp256k1_scalar_add(&x, &x, &t); } /* Skew num because when encoding numbers as odd we use an offset */ - secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(&num, skew == 2, 1); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&scalar_skew, 1 << (skew == 2)); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&num, &num, &scalar_skew); CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&x, &num)); } @@ -3233,12 +3399,9 @@ void test_fixed_wnaf(const secp256k1_scalar *number, int w) { secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&x, 0); secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&shift, 1 << w); - /* With USE_ENDOMORPHISM on we only consider 128-bit numbers */ -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) { secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&num, 8); } -#endif skew = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(wnaf, &num, w); for (i = WNAF_SIZE(w)-1; i >= 0; --i) { @@ -3332,13 +3495,32 @@ void run_wnaf(void) { int i; secp256k1_scalar n = {{0}}; + test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); /* Sanity check: 1 and 2 are the smallest odd and even numbers and should * have easier-to-diagnose failure modes */ n.d[0] = 1; test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); n.d[0] = 2; test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); - /* Test 0 */ + /* Test -1, because it's a special case in wnaf_const */ + n = secp256k1_scalar_one; + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&n, &n); + test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); + + /* Test -2, which may not lead to overflows in wnaf_const */ + secp256k1_scalar_add(&n, &secp256k1_scalar_one, &secp256k1_scalar_one); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&n, &n); + test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); + + /* Test (1/2) - 1 = 1/-2 and 1/2 = (1/-2) + 1 + as corner cases of negation handling in wnaf_const */ + secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&n, &n); + test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); + + secp256k1_scalar_add(&n, &n, &secp256k1_scalar_one); + test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); + + /* Test 0 for fixed wnaf */ test_fixed_wnaf_small(); /* Random tests */ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { @@ -3403,7 +3585,7 @@ void test_ecmult_gen_blind(void) { secp256k1_ge pge; random_scalar_order_test(&key); secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pgej, &key); - secp256k1_rand256(seed32); + secp256k1_testrand256(seed32); b = ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.blind; i = ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.initial; secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, seed32); @@ -3435,16 +3617,18 @@ void run_ecmult_gen_blind(void) { } } -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM /***** ENDOMORPHISH TESTS *****/ -void test_scalar_split(void) { - secp256k1_scalar full; - secp256k1_scalar s1, slam; +void test_scalar_split(const secp256k1_scalar* full) { + secp256k1_scalar s, s1, slam; const unsigned char zero[32] = {0}; unsigned char tmp[32]; - random_scalar_order_test(&full); - secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&s1, &slam, &full); + secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&s1, &slam, full); + + /* check slam*lambda + s1 == full */ + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s, &secp256k1_const_lambda, &slam); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&s, &s, &s1); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&s, full)); /* check that both are <= 128 bits in size */ if (secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s1)) { @@ -3455,15 +3639,32 @@ void test_scalar_split(void) { } secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(tmp, &s1); - CHECK(memcmp(zero, tmp, 16) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zero, tmp, 16) == 0); secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(tmp, &slam); - CHECK(memcmp(zero, tmp, 16) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zero, tmp, 16) == 0); } + void run_endomorphism_tests(void) { - test_scalar_split(); + unsigned i; + static secp256k1_scalar s; + test_scalar_split(&secp256k1_scalar_zero); + test_scalar_split(&secp256k1_scalar_one); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s,&secp256k1_scalar_one); + test_scalar_split(&s); + test_scalar_split(&secp256k1_const_lambda); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&s, &secp256k1_const_lambda, &secp256k1_scalar_one); + test_scalar_split(&s); + + for (i = 0; i < 100U * count; ++i) { + secp256k1_scalar full; + random_scalar_order_test(&full); + test_scalar_split(&full); + } + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(scalars_near_split_bounds) / sizeof(scalars_near_split_bounds[0]); ++i) { + test_scalar_split(&scalars_near_split_bounds[i]); + } } -#endif void ec_pubkey_parse_pointtest(const unsigned char *input, int xvalid, int yvalid) { unsigned char pubkeyc[65]; @@ -3505,7 +3706,7 @@ void ec_pubkey_parse_pointtest(const unsigned char *input, int xvalid, int yvali CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pubkeyo, &outl, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); VG_CHECK(pubkeyo, outl); CHECK(outl == 33); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkeyo[1], &pubkeyc[1], 32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkeyo[1], &pubkeyc[1], 32) == 0); CHECK((pubkeyclen != 33) || (pubkeyo[0] == pubkeyc[0])); if (ypass) { /* This test isn't always done because we decode with alternative signs, so the y won't match. */ @@ -3521,7 +3722,7 @@ void ec_pubkey_parse_pointtest(const unsigned char *input, int xvalid, int yvali VG_CHECK(pubkeyo, outl); CHECK(outl == 65); CHECK(pubkeyo[0] == 4); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkeyo[1], input, 64) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkeyo[1], input, 64) == 0); } CHECK(ecount == 0); } else { @@ -3890,7 +4091,7 @@ void run_eckey_edge_case_test(void) { VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, orderc) == 0); VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); /* Maximum value is too large, reject. */ memset(ctmp, 255, 32); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 0); @@ -3898,7 +4099,7 @@ void run_eckey_edge_case_test(void) { VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp) == 0); VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); /* Zero is too small, reject. */ memset(ctmp, 0, 32); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 0); @@ -3906,7 +4107,7 @@ void run_eckey_edge_case_test(void) { VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp) == 0); VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); /* One must be accepted. */ ctmp[31] = 0x01; CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 1); @@ -3914,7 +4115,7 @@ void run_eckey_edge_case_test(void) { VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp) == 1); VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); pubkey_one = pubkey; /* Group order + 1 is too large, reject. */ memcpy(ctmp, orderc, 32); @@ -3924,7 +4125,7 @@ void run_eckey_edge_case_test(void) { VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp) == 0); VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); /* -1 must be accepted. */ ctmp[31] = 0x40; CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 1); @@ -3932,60 +4133,80 @@ void run_eckey_edge_case_test(void) { VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp) == 1); VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); pubkey_negone = pubkey; /* Tweak of zero leaves the value unchanged. */ memset(ctmp2, 0, 32); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp, ctmp2) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(orderc, ctmp, 31) == 0 && ctmp[31] == 0x40); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp, ctmp2) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(orderc, ctmp, 31) == 0 && ctmp[31] == 0x40); memcpy(&pubkey2, &pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); /* Multiply tweak of zero zeroizes the output. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, ctmp, ctmp2) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(zeros, ctmp, 32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(ctx, ctmp, ctmp2) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zeros, ctmp, 32) == 0); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); memcpy(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)); - /* Overflowing key tweak zeroizes. */ + /* If seckey_tweak_add or seckey_tweak_mul are called with an overflowing + seckey, the seckey is zeroized. */ + memcpy(ctmp, orderc, 32); + memset(ctmp2, 0, 32); + ctmp2[31] = 0x01; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp2) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp, ctmp2) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zeros, ctmp, 32) == 0); + memcpy(ctmp, orderc, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(ctx, ctmp, ctmp2) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zeros, ctmp, 32) == 0); + /* If seckey_tweak_add or seckey_tweak_mul are called with an overflowing + tweak, the seckey is zeroized. */ memcpy(ctmp, orderc, 32); ctmp[31] = 0x40; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp, orderc) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(zeros, ctmp, 32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp, orderc) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zeros, ctmp, 32) == 0); memcpy(ctmp, orderc, 32); ctmp[31] = 0x40; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, ctmp, orderc) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(zeros, ctmp, 32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(ctx, ctmp, orderc) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zeros, ctmp, 32) == 0); memcpy(ctmp, orderc, 32); ctmp[31] = 0x40; + /* If pubkey_tweak_add or pubkey_tweak_mul are called with an overflowing + tweak, the pubkey is zeroized. */ CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, orderc) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); memcpy(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey, orderc) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); memcpy(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)); - /* Private key tweaks results in a key of zero. */ + /* If the resulting key in secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add and + * secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add is 0 the functions fail and in the latter + * case the pubkey is zeroized. */ + memcpy(ctmp, orderc, 32); + ctmp[31] = 0x40; + memset(ctmp2, 0, 32); ctmp2[31] = 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp2, ctmp) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(zeros, ctmp2, 32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp2, ctmp) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(zeros, ctmp2, 32) == 0); ctmp2[31] = 1; CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); memcpy(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)); /* Tweak computation wraps and results in a key of 1. */ ctmp2[31] = 2; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp2, ctmp) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(ctmp2, zeros, 31) == 0 && ctmp2[31] == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp2, ctmp) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(ctmp2, zeros, 31) == 0 && ctmp2[31] == 1); ctmp2[31] = 2; CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 1); ctmp2[31] = 1; CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey2, ctmp2) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); /* Tweak mul * 2 = 1+1. */ CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 1); ctmp2[31] = 2; CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey2, ctmp2) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); /* Test argument errors. */ ecount = 0; secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); @@ -3994,12 +4215,12 @@ void run_eckey_edge_case_test(void) { memset(&pubkey, 0, 32); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 0); CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); memcpy(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)); memset(&pubkey2, 0, 32); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey2, ctmp2) == 0); CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey2, zeros, sizeof(pubkey2)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey2, zeros, sizeof(pubkey2)) == 0); /* Plain argument errors. */ ecount = 0; CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 1); @@ -4022,16 +4243,16 @@ void run_eckey_edge_case_test(void) { CHECK(ecount == 2); ecount = 0; memset(ctmp2, 0, 32); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, NULL, ctmp2) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(ctx, NULL, ctmp2) == 0); CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp, NULL) == 0); CHECK(ecount == 2); ecount = 0; memset(ctmp2, 0, 32); ctmp2[31] = 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, NULL, ctmp2) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(ctx, NULL, ctmp2) == 0); CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, ctmp, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(ctx, ctmp, NULL) == 0); CHECK(ecount == 2); ecount = 0; CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, NULL, ctmp) == 0); @@ -4039,7 +4260,7 @@ void run_eckey_edge_case_test(void) { memset(&pubkey, 1, sizeof(pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, NULL) == 0); CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); /* secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine tests. */ ecount = 0; pubkeys[0] = &pubkey_one; @@ -4050,28 +4271,28 @@ void run_eckey_edge_case_test(void) { VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeys, 0) == 0); VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); CHECK(ecount == 1); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, NULL, pubkeys, 1) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); CHECK(ecount == 2); memset(&pubkey, 255, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, NULL, 1) == 0); VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); CHECK(ecount == 3); pubkeys[0] = &pubkey_negone; memset(&pubkey, 255, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeys, 1) == 1); VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); CHECK(ecount == 3); len = 33; CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, ctmp, &len, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, ctmp2, &len, &pubkey_negone, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(ctmp, ctmp2, 33) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(ctmp, ctmp2, 33) == 0); /* Result is infinity. */ pubkeys[0] = &pubkey_one; pubkeys[1] = &pubkey_negone; @@ -4079,7 +4300,7 @@ void run_eckey_edge_case_test(void) { VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeys, 2) == 0); VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); CHECK(ecount == 3); /* Passes through infinity but comes out one. */ pubkeys[2] = &pubkey_one; @@ -4087,23 +4308,58 @@ void run_eckey_edge_case_test(void) { VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeys, 3) == 1); VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); CHECK(ecount == 3); len = 33; CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, ctmp, &len, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, ctmp2, &len, &pubkey_one, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(ctmp, ctmp2, 33) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(ctmp, ctmp2, 33) == 0); /* Adds to two. */ pubkeys[1] = &pubkey_one; memset(&pubkey, 255, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeys, 2) == 1); VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); CHECK(ecount == 3); secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, NULL, NULL); } +void run_eckey_negate_test(void) { + unsigned char seckey[32]; + unsigned char seckey_tmp[32]; + + random_scalar_order_b32(seckey); + memcpy(seckey_tmp, seckey, 32); + + /* Verify negation changes the key and changes it back */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(ctx, seckey) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(seckey, seckey_tmp, 32) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(ctx, seckey) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(seckey, seckey_tmp, 32) == 0); + + /* Check that privkey alias gives same result */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(ctx, seckey) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_negate(ctx, seckey_tmp) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(seckey, seckey_tmp, 32) == 0); + + /* Negating all 0s fails */ + memset(seckey, 0, 32); + memset(seckey_tmp, 0, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(ctx, seckey) == 0); + /* Check that seckey is not modified */ + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(seckey, seckey_tmp, 32) == 0); + + /* Negating an overflowing seckey fails and the seckey is zeroed. In this + * test, the seckey has 16 random bytes to ensure that ec_seckey_negate + * doesn't just set seckey to a constant value in case of failure. */ + random_scalar_order_b32(seckey); + memset(seckey, 0xFF, 16); + memset(seckey_tmp, 0, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(ctx, seckey) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(seckey, seckey_tmp, 32) == 0); +} + void random_sign(secp256k1_scalar *sigr, secp256k1_scalar *sigs, const secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *msg, int *recid) { secp256k1_scalar nonce; do { @@ -4123,7 +4379,7 @@ void test_ecdsa_sign_verify(void) { random_scalar_order_test(&key); secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pubj, &key); secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pub, &pubj); - getrec = secp256k1_rand_bits(1); + getrec = secp256k1_testrand_bits(1); random_sign(&sigr, &sigs, &key, &msg, getrec?&recid:NULL); if (getrec) { CHECK(recid >= 0 && recid < 4); @@ -4190,7 +4446,7 @@ static int nonce_function_test_retry(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char int is_empty_signature(const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig) { static const unsigned char res[sizeof(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature)] = {0}; - return memcmp(sig, res, sizeof(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature)) == 0; + return secp256k1_memcmp_var(sig, res, sizeof(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature)) == 0; } void test_ecdsa_end_to_end(void) { @@ -4223,54 +4479,68 @@ void test_ecdsa_end_to_end(void) { CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, privkey) == 1); /* Verify exporting and importing public key. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pubkeyc, &pubkeyclen, &pubkey, secp256k1_rand_bits(1) == 1 ? SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED : SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pubkeyc, &pubkeyclen, &pubkey, secp256k1_testrand_bits(1) == 1 ? SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED : SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED)); memset(&pubkey, 0, sizeof(pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeyc, pubkeyclen) == 1); /* Verify negation changes the key and changes it back */ memcpy(&pubkey_tmp, &pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(ctx, &pubkey_tmp) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey_tmp, &pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey_tmp, &pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) != 0); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(ctx, &pubkey_tmp) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey_tmp, &pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey_tmp, &pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); /* Verify private key import and export. */ - CHECK(ec_privkey_export_der(ctx, seckey, &seckeylen, privkey, secp256k1_rand_bits(1) == 1)); + CHECK(ec_privkey_export_der(ctx, seckey, &seckeylen, privkey, secp256k1_testrand_bits(1) == 1)); CHECK(ec_privkey_import_der(ctx, privkey2, seckey, seckeylen) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(privkey, privkey2, 32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(privkey, privkey2, 32) == 0); /* Optionally tweak the keys using addition. */ - if (secp256k1_rand_int(3) == 0) { + if (secp256k1_testrand_int(3) == 0) { int ret1; int ret2; + int ret3; unsigned char rnd[32]; + unsigned char privkey_tmp[32]; secp256k1_pubkey pubkey2; - secp256k1_rand256_test(rnd); - ret1 = secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, privkey, rnd); + secp256k1_testrand256_test(rnd); + memcpy(privkey_tmp, privkey, 32); + ret1 = secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(ctx, privkey, rnd); ret2 = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, rnd); + /* Check that privkey alias gives same result */ + ret3 = secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, privkey_tmp, rnd); CHECK(ret1 == ret2); + CHECK(ret2 == ret3); if (ret1 == 0) { return; } + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(privkey, privkey_tmp, 32) == 0); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey2, privkey) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); } /* Optionally tweak the keys using multiplication. */ - if (secp256k1_rand_int(3) == 0) { + if (secp256k1_testrand_int(3) == 0) { int ret1; int ret2; + int ret3; unsigned char rnd[32]; + unsigned char privkey_tmp[32]; secp256k1_pubkey pubkey2; - secp256k1_rand256_test(rnd); - ret1 = secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, privkey, rnd); + secp256k1_testrand256_test(rnd); + memcpy(privkey_tmp, privkey, 32); + ret1 = secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(ctx, privkey, rnd); ret2 = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey, rnd); + /* Check that privkey alias gives same result */ + ret3 = secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, privkey_tmp, rnd); CHECK(ret1 == ret2); + CHECK(ret2 == ret3); if (ret1 == 0) { return; } + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(privkey, privkey_tmp, 32) == 0); CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey2, privkey) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); } /* Sign. */ @@ -4282,13 +4552,13 @@ void test_ecdsa_end_to_end(void) { extra[31] = 0; extra[0] = 1; CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature[3], message, privkey, NULL, extra) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[0], &signature[4], sizeof(signature[0])) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[0], &signature[1], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[0], &signature[2], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[0], &signature[3], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[1], &signature[2], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[1], &signature[3], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[2], &signature[3], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&signature[0], &signature[4], sizeof(signature[0])) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&signature[0], &signature[1], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&signature[0], &signature[2], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&signature[0], &signature[3], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&signature[1], &signature[2], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&signature[1], &signature[3], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&signature[2], &signature[3], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); /* Verify. */ CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[0], message, &pubkey) == 1); CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[1], message, &pubkey) == 1); @@ -4309,7 +4579,7 @@ void test_ecdsa_end_to_end(void) { secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(&signature[5], &r, &s); CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(ctx, NULL, &signature[5])); CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[5], message, &pubkey) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[5], &signature[0], 64) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&signature[5], &signature[0], 64) == 0); /* Serialize/parse DER and verify again */ CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, sig, &siglen, &signature[0]) == 1); @@ -4319,7 +4589,7 @@ void test_ecdsa_end_to_end(void) { /* Serialize/destroy/parse DER and verify again. */ siglen = 74; CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, sig, &siglen, &signature[0]) == 1); - sig[secp256k1_rand_int(siglen)] += 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255); + sig[secp256k1_testrand_int(siglen)] += 1 + secp256k1_testrand_int(255); CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &signature[0], sig, siglen) == 0 || secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[0], message, &pubkey) == 0); } @@ -4329,23 +4599,23 @@ void test_random_pubkeys(void) { secp256k1_ge elem2; unsigned char in[65]; /* Generate some randomly sized pubkeys. */ - size_t len = secp256k1_rand_bits(2) == 0 ? 65 : 33; - if (secp256k1_rand_bits(2) == 0) { - len = secp256k1_rand_bits(6); + size_t len = secp256k1_testrand_bits(2) == 0 ? 65 : 33; + if (secp256k1_testrand_bits(2) == 0) { + len = secp256k1_testrand_bits(6); } if (len == 65) { - in[0] = secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? 4 : (secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? 6 : 7); + in[0] = secp256k1_testrand_bits(1) ? 4 : (secp256k1_testrand_bits(1) ? 6 : 7); } else { - in[0] = secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? 2 : 3; + in[0] = secp256k1_testrand_bits(1) ? 2 : 3; } - if (secp256k1_rand_bits(3) == 0) { - in[0] = secp256k1_rand_bits(8); + if (secp256k1_testrand_bits(3) == 0) { + in[0] = secp256k1_testrand_bits(8); } if (len > 1) { - secp256k1_rand256(&in[1]); + secp256k1_testrand256(&in[1]); } if (len > 33) { - secp256k1_rand256(&in[33]); + secp256k1_testrand256(&in[33]); } if (secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&elem, in, len)) { unsigned char out[65]; @@ -4356,7 +4626,7 @@ void test_random_pubkeys(void) { /* If the pubkey can be parsed, it should round-trip... */ CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&elem, out, &size, len == 33)); CHECK(size == len); - CHECK(memcmp(&in[1], &out[1], len-1) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&in[1], &out[1], len-1) == 0); /* ... except for the type of hybrid inputs. */ if ((in[0] != 6) && (in[0] != 7)) { CHECK(in[0] == out[0]); @@ -4367,7 +4637,7 @@ void test_random_pubkeys(void) { CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&elem2, in, size)); ge_equals_ge(&elem,&elem2); /* Check that the X9.62 hybrid type is checked. */ - in[0] = secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? 6 : 7; + in[0] = secp256k1_testrand_bits(1) ? 6 : 7; res = secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&elem2, in, size); if (firstb == 2 || firstb == 3) { if (in[0] == firstb + 4) { @@ -4379,7 +4649,7 @@ void test_random_pubkeys(void) { if (res) { ge_equals_ge(&elem,&elem2); CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&elem, out, &size, 0)); - CHECK(memcmp(&in[1], &out[1], 64) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&in[1], &out[1], 64) == 0); } } } @@ -4435,21 +4705,21 @@ int test_ecdsa_der_parse(const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, int certainly_ parsed_der = secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig_der, sig, siglen); if (parsed_der) { ret |= (!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, compact_der, &sig_der)) << 0; - valid_der = (memcmp(compact_der, zeroes, 32) != 0) && (memcmp(compact_der + 32, zeroes, 32) != 0); + valid_der = (secp256k1_memcmp_var(compact_der, zeroes, 32) != 0) && (secp256k1_memcmp_var(compact_der + 32, zeroes, 32) != 0); } if (valid_der) { ret |= (!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, roundtrip_der, &len_der, &sig_der)) << 1; - roundtrips_der = (len_der == siglen) && memcmp(roundtrip_der, sig, siglen) == 0; + roundtrips_der = (len_der == siglen) && secp256k1_memcmp_var(roundtrip_der, sig, siglen) == 0; } parsed_der_lax = ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax(ctx, &sig_der_lax, sig, siglen); if (parsed_der_lax) { ret |= (!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, compact_der_lax, &sig_der_lax)) << 10; - valid_der_lax = (memcmp(compact_der_lax, zeroes, 32) != 0) && (memcmp(compact_der_lax + 32, zeroes, 32) != 0); + valid_der_lax = (secp256k1_memcmp_var(compact_der_lax, zeroes, 32) != 0) && (secp256k1_memcmp_var(compact_der_lax + 32, zeroes, 32) != 0); } if (valid_der_lax) { ret |= (!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, roundtrip_der_lax, &len_der_lax, &sig_der_lax)) << 11; - roundtrips_der_lax = (len_der_lax == siglen) && memcmp(roundtrip_der_lax, sig, siglen) == 0; + roundtrips_der_lax = (len_der_lax == siglen) && secp256k1_memcmp_var(roundtrip_der_lax, sig, siglen) == 0; } if (certainly_der) { @@ -4465,7 +4735,7 @@ int test_ecdsa_der_parse(const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, int certainly_ if (valid_der) { ret |= (!roundtrips_der_lax) << 12; ret |= (len_der != len_der_lax) << 13; - ret |= ((len_der != len_der_lax) || (memcmp(roundtrip_der_lax, roundtrip_der, len_der) != 0)) << 14; + ret |= ((len_der != len_der_lax) || (secp256k1_memcmp_var(roundtrip_der_lax, roundtrip_der, len_der) != 0)) << 14; } ret |= (roundtrips_der != roundtrips_der_lax) << 15; if (parsed_der) { @@ -4482,19 +4752,19 @@ int test_ecdsa_der_parse(const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, int certainly_ if (valid_openssl) { unsigned char tmp[32] = {0}; BN_bn2bin(r, tmp + 32 - BN_num_bytes(r)); - valid_openssl = memcmp(tmp, max_scalar, 32) < 0; + valid_openssl = secp256k1_memcmp_var(tmp, max_scalar, 32) < 0; } if (valid_openssl) { unsigned char tmp[32] = {0}; BN_bn2bin(s, tmp + 32 - BN_num_bytes(s)); - valid_openssl = memcmp(tmp, max_scalar, 32) < 0; + valid_openssl = secp256k1_memcmp_var(tmp, max_scalar, 32) < 0; } } len_openssl = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig_openssl, NULL); if (len_openssl <= 2048) { unsigned char *ptr = roundtrip_openssl; CHECK(i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig_openssl, &ptr) == len_openssl); - roundtrips_openssl = valid_openssl && ((size_t)len_openssl == siglen) && (memcmp(roundtrip_openssl, sig, siglen) == 0); + roundtrips_openssl = valid_openssl && ((size_t)len_openssl == siglen) && (secp256k1_memcmp_var(roundtrip_openssl, sig, siglen) == 0); } else { len_openssl = 0; } @@ -4506,7 +4776,7 @@ int test_ecdsa_der_parse(const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, int certainly_ ret |= (roundtrips_der != roundtrips_openssl) << 7; if (roundtrips_openssl) { ret |= (len_der != (size_t)len_openssl) << 8; - ret |= ((len_der != (size_t)len_openssl) || (memcmp(roundtrip_der, roundtrip_openssl, len_der) != 0)) << 9; + ret |= ((len_der != (size_t)len_openssl) || (secp256k1_memcmp_var(roundtrip_der, roundtrip_openssl, len_der) != 0)) << 9; } #endif return ret; @@ -4526,27 +4796,27 @@ static void assign_big_endian(unsigned char *ptr, size_t ptrlen, uint32_t val) { static void damage_array(unsigned char *sig, size_t *len) { int pos; - int action = secp256k1_rand_bits(3); + int action = secp256k1_testrand_bits(3); if (action < 1 && *len > 3) { /* Delete a byte. */ - pos = secp256k1_rand_int(*len); + pos = secp256k1_testrand_int(*len); memmove(sig + pos, sig + pos + 1, *len - pos - 1); (*len)--; return; } else if (action < 2 && *len < 2048) { /* Insert a byte. */ - pos = secp256k1_rand_int(1 + *len); + pos = secp256k1_testrand_int(1 + *len); memmove(sig + pos + 1, sig + pos, *len - pos); - sig[pos] = secp256k1_rand_bits(8); + sig[pos] = secp256k1_testrand_bits(8); (*len)++; return; } else if (action < 4) { /* Modify a byte. */ - sig[secp256k1_rand_int(*len)] += 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255); + sig[secp256k1_testrand_int(*len)] += 1 + secp256k1_testrand_int(255); return; } else { /* action < 8 */ /* Modify a bit. */ - sig[secp256k1_rand_int(*len)] ^= 1 << secp256k1_rand_bits(3); + sig[secp256k1_testrand_int(*len)] ^= 1 << secp256k1_testrand_bits(3); return; } } @@ -4559,23 +4829,23 @@ static void random_ber_signature(unsigned char *sig, size_t *len, int* certainly int n; *len = 0; - der = secp256k1_rand_bits(2) == 0; + der = secp256k1_testrand_bits(2) == 0; *certainly_der = der; *certainly_not_der = 0; - indet = der ? 0 : secp256k1_rand_int(10) == 0; + indet = der ? 0 : secp256k1_testrand_int(10) == 0; for (n = 0; n < 2; n++) { /* We generate two classes of numbers: nlow==1 "low" ones (up to 32 bytes), nlow==0 "high" ones (32 bytes with 129 top bits set, or larger than 32 bytes) */ - nlow[n] = der ? 1 : (secp256k1_rand_bits(3) != 0); + nlow[n] = der ? 1 : (secp256k1_testrand_bits(3) != 0); /* The length of the number in bytes (the first byte of which will always be nonzero) */ - nlen[n] = nlow[n] ? secp256k1_rand_int(33) : 32 + secp256k1_rand_int(200) * secp256k1_rand_int(8) / 8; + nlen[n] = nlow[n] ? secp256k1_testrand_int(33) : 32 + secp256k1_testrand_int(200) * secp256k1_testrand_int(8) / 8; CHECK(nlen[n] <= 232); /* The top bit of the number. */ - nhbit[n] = (nlow[n] == 0 && nlen[n] == 32) ? 1 : (nlen[n] == 0 ? 0 : secp256k1_rand_bits(1)); + nhbit[n] = (nlow[n] == 0 && nlen[n] == 32) ? 1 : (nlen[n] == 0 ? 0 : secp256k1_testrand_bits(1)); /* The top byte of the number (after the potential hardcoded 16 0xFF characters for "high" 32 bytes numbers) */ - nhbyte[n] = nlen[n] == 0 ? 0 : (nhbit[n] ? 128 + secp256k1_rand_bits(7) : 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(127)); + nhbyte[n] = nlen[n] == 0 ? 0 : (nhbit[n] ? 128 + secp256k1_testrand_bits(7) : 1 + secp256k1_testrand_int(127)); /* The number of zero bytes in front of the number (which is 0 or 1 in case of DER, otherwise we extend up to 300 bytes) */ - nzlen[n] = der ? ((nlen[n] == 0 || nhbit[n]) ? 1 : 0) : (nlow[n] ? secp256k1_rand_int(3) : secp256k1_rand_int(300 - nlen[n]) * secp256k1_rand_int(8) / 8); + nzlen[n] = der ? ((nlen[n] == 0 || nhbit[n]) ? 1 : 0) : (nlow[n] ? secp256k1_testrand_int(3) : secp256k1_testrand_int(300 - nlen[n]) * secp256k1_testrand_int(8) / 8); if (nzlen[n] > ((nlen[n] == 0 || nhbit[n]) ? 1 : 0)) { *certainly_not_der = 1; } @@ -4584,7 +4854,7 @@ static void random_ber_signature(unsigned char *sig, size_t *len, int* certainly nlenlen[n] = nlen[n] + nzlen[n] < 128 ? 0 : (nlen[n] + nzlen[n] < 256 ? 1 : 2); if (!der) { /* nlenlen[n] max 127 bytes */ - int add = secp256k1_rand_int(127 - nlenlen[n]) * secp256k1_rand_int(16) * secp256k1_rand_int(16) / 256; + int add = secp256k1_testrand_int(127 - nlenlen[n]) * secp256k1_testrand_int(16) * secp256k1_testrand_int(16) / 256; nlenlen[n] += add; if (add != 0) { *certainly_not_der = 1; @@ -4598,7 +4868,7 @@ static void random_ber_signature(unsigned char *sig, size_t *len, int* certainly CHECK(tlen <= 856); /* The length of the garbage inside the tuple. */ - elen = (der || indet) ? 0 : secp256k1_rand_int(980 - tlen) * secp256k1_rand_int(8) / 8; + elen = (der || indet) ? 0 : secp256k1_testrand_int(980 - tlen) * secp256k1_testrand_int(8) / 8; if (elen != 0) { *certainly_not_der = 1; } @@ -4606,7 +4876,7 @@ static void random_ber_signature(unsigned char *sig, size_t *len, int* certainly CHECK(tlen <= 980); /* The length of the garbage after the end of the tuple. */ - glen = der ? 0 : secp256k1_rand_int(990 - tlen) * secp256k1_rand_int(8) / 8; + glen = der ? 0 : secp256k1_testrand_int(990 - tlen) * secp256k1_testrand_int(8) / 8; if (glen != 0) { *certainly_not_der = 1; } @@ -4621,7 +4891,7 @@ static void random_ber_signature(unsigned char *sig, size_t *len, int* certainly } else { int tlenlen = tlen < 128 ? 0 : (tlen < 256 ? 1 : 2); if (!der) { - int add = secp256k1_rand_int(127 - tlenlen) * secp256k1_rand_int(16) * secp256k1_rand_int(16) / 256; + int add = secp256k1_testrand_int(127 - tlenlen) * secp256k1_testrand_int(16) * secp256k1_testrand_int(16) / 256; tlenlen += add; if (add != 0) { *certainly_not_der = 1; @@ -4672,13 +4942,13 @@ static void random_ber_signature(unsigned char *sig, size_t *len, int* certainly nlen[n]--; } /* Generate remaining random bytes of number */ - secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(sig + *len, nlen[n]); + secp256k1_testrand_bytes_test(sig + *len, nlen[n]); *len += nlen[n]; nlen[n] = 0; } /* Generate random garbage inside tuple. */ - secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(sig + *len, elen); + secp256k1_testrand_bytes_test(sig + *len, elen); *len += elen; /* Generate end-of-contents bytes. */ @@ -4690,7 +4960,7 @@ static void random_ber_signature(unsigned char *sig, size_t *len, int* certainly CHECK(tlen + glen <= 1121); /* Generate random garbage outside tuple. */ - secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(sig + *len, glen); + secp256k1_testrand_bytes_test(sig + *len, glen); *len += glen; tlen += glen; CHECK(tlen <= 1121); @@ -5022,11 +5292,11 @@ void test_ecdsa_edge_cases(void) { CHECK(!is_empty_signature(&sig)); CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig2, msg, key, nonce_function_rfc6979, extra) == 1); CHECK(!is_empty_signature(&sig2)); - CHECK(memcmp(&sig, &sig2, sizeof(sig)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&sig, &sig2, sizeof(sig)) == 0); /* The default nonce function is deterministic. */ CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig2, msg, key, NULL, extra) == 1); CHECK(!is_empty_signature(&sig2)); - CHECK(memcmp(&sig, &sig2, sizeof(sig)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&sig, &sig2, sizeof(sig)) == 0); /* The default nonce function changes output with different messages. */ for(i = 0; i < 256; i++) { int j; @@ -5073,12 +5343,12 @@ void test_ecdsa_edge_cases(void) { VG_CHECK(nonce3,32); CHECK(nonce_function_rfc6979(nonce4, zeros, zeros, zeros, (void *)zeros, 0) == 1); VG_CHECK(nonce4,32); - CHECK(memcmp(nonce, nonce2, 32) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(nonce, nonce3, 32) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(nonce, nonce4, 32) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(nonce2, nonce3, 32) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(nonce2, nonce4, 32) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(nonce3, nonce4, 32) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(nonce, nonce2, 32) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(nonce, nonce3, 32) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(nonce, nonce4, 32) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(nonce2, nonce3, 32) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(nonce2, nonce4, 32) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(nonce3, nonce4, 32) != 0); } @@ -5107,7 +5377,7 @@ EC_KEY *get_openssl_key(const unsigned char *key32) { unsigned char privkey[300]; size_t privkeylen; const unsigned char* pbegin = privkey; - int compr = secp256k1_rand_bits(1); + int compr = secp256k1_testrand_bits(1); EC_KEY *ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1); CHECK(ec_privkey_export_der(ctx, privkey, &privkeylen, key32, compr)); CHECK(d2i_ECPrivateKey(&ec_key, &pbegin, privkeylen)); @@ -5128,7 +5398,7 @@ void test_ecdsa_openssl(void) { unsigned char message[32]; unsigned char signature[80]; unsigned char key32[32]; - secp256k1_rand256_test(message); + secp256k1_testrand256_test(message); secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&msg, message, NULL); random_scalar_order_test(&key); secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(key32, &key); @@ -5162,11 +5432,6 @@ void run_ecdsa_openssl(void) { # include "modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h" #endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_OLDSCHNORR -# include "modules/oldschnorr/tests_impl.h" -#endif - #ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_MULTISET # include "modules/multiset/tests_impl.h" #endif @@ -5175,10 +5440,185 @@ void run_ecdsa_openssl(void) { # include "modules/recovery/tests_impl.h" #endif -int main(int argc, char **argv) { - unsigned char seed16[16] = {0}; - unsigned char run32[32] = {0}; +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS +# include "modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG +# include "modules/schnorrsig/tests_impl.h" +#endif + +void run_secp256k1_memczero_test(void) { + unsigned char buf1[6] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}; + unsigned char buf2[sizeof(buf1)]; + + /* secp256k1_memczero(..., ..., 0) is a noop. */ + memcpy(buf2, buf1, sizeof(buf1)); + secp256k1_memczero(buf1, sizeof(buf1), 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(buf1, buf2, sizeof(buf1)) == 0); + + /* secp256k1_memczero(..., ..., 1) zeros the buffer. */ + memset(buf2, 0, sizeof(buf2)); + secp256k1_memczero(buf1, sizeof(buf1) , 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(buf1, buf2, sizeof(buf1)) == 0); +} + +void int_cmov_test(void) { + int r = INT_MAX; + int a = 0; + + secp256k1_int_cmov(&r, &a, 0); + CHECK(r == INT_MAX); + + r = 0; a = INT_MAX; + secp256k1_int_cmov(&r, &a, 1); + CHECK(r == INT_MAX); + + a = 0; + secp256k1_int_cmov(&r, &a, 1); + CHECK(r == 0); + + a = 1; + secp256k1_int_cmov(&r, &a, 1); + CHECK(r == 1); + + r = 1; a = 0; + secp256k1_int_cmov(&r, &a, 0); + CHECK(r == 1); + +} + +void fe_cmov_test(void) { + static const secp256k1_fe zero = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + static const secp256k1_fe one = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); + static const secp256k1_fe max = SECP256K1_FE_CONST( + 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, + 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL + ); + secp256k1_fe r = max; + secp256k1_fe a = zero; + + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&r, &a, 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &max, sizeof(r)) == 0); + + r = zero; a = max; + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&r, &a, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &max, sizeof(r)) == 0); + + a = zero; + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&r, &a, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &zero, sizeof(r)) == 0); + + a = one; + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&r, &a, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &one, sizeof(r)) == 0); + + r = one; a = zero; + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&r, &a, 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &one, sizeof(r)) == 0); +} + +void fe_storage_cmov_test(void) { + static const secp256k1_fe_storage zero = SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + static const secp256k1_fe_storage one = SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); + static const secp256k1_fe_storage max = SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST( + 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, + 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL + ); + secp256k1_fe_storage r = max; + secp256k1_fe_storage a = zero; + + secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&r, &a, 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &max, sizeof(r)) == 0); + + r = zero; a = max; + secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&r, &a, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &max, sizeof(r)) == 0); + + a = zero; + secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&r, &a, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &zero, sizeof(r)) == 0); + + a = one; + secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&r, &a, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &one, sizeof(r)) == 0); + + r = one; a = zero; + secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&r, &a, 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &one, sizeof(r)) == 0); +} +void scalar_cmov_test(void) { + static const secp256k1_scalar zero = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + static const secp256k1_scalar one = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); + static const secp256k1_scalar max = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( + 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, + 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL + ); + secp256k1_scalar r = max; + secp256k1_scalar a = zero; + + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(&r, &a, 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &max, sizeof(r)) == 0); + + r = zero; a = max; + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(&r, &a, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &max, sizeof(r)) == 0); + + a = zero; + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(&r, &a, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &zero, sizeof(r)) == 0); + + a = one; + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(&r, &a, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &one, sizeof(r)) == 0); + + r = one; a = zero; + secp256k1_scalar_cmov(&r, &a, 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &one, sizeof(r)) == 0); +} + +void ge_storage_cmov_test(void) { + static const secp256k1_ge_storage zero = SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + static const secp256k1_ge_storage one = SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); + static const secp256k1_ge_storage max = SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST( + 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, + 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, + 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, + 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL + ); + secp256k1_ge_storage r = max; + secp256k1_ge_storage a = zero; + + secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&r, &a, 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &max, sizeof(r)) == 0); + + r = zero; a = max; + secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&r, &a, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &max, sizeof(r)) == 0); + + a = zero; + secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&r, &a, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &zero, sizeof(r)) == 0); + + a = one; + secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&r, &a, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &one, sizeof(r)) == 0); + + r = one; a = zero; + secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&r, &a, 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&r, &one, sizeof(r)) == 0); +} + +void run_cmov_tests(void) { + int_cmov_test(); + fe_cmov_test(); + fe_storage_cmov_test(); + scalar_cmov_test(); + ge_storage_cmov_test(); +} + +int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* Disable buffering for stdout to improve reliability of getting * diagnostic information. Happens right at the start of main because * setbuf must be used before any other operation on the stream. */ @@ -5191,52 +5631,20 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { if (argc > 1) { count = strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0); } + printf("test count = %i\n", count); /* find random seed */ - if (argc > 2) { - int pos = 0; - const char* ch = argv[2]; - while (pos < 16 && ch[0] != 0 && ch[1] != 0) { - unsigned short sh; - if ((sscanf(ch, "%2hx", &sh)) == 1) { - seed16[pos] = sh; - } else { - break; - } - ch += 2; - pos++; - } - } else { - FILE *frand = fopen("/dev/urandom", "r"); - if ((frand == NULL) || fread(&seed16, 1, sizeof(seed16), frand) != sizeof(seed16)) { - uint64_t t = time(NULL) * (uint64_t)1337; - fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: could not read 16 bytes from /dev/urandom; falling back to insecure PRNG\n"); - seed16[0] ^= t; - seed16[1] ^= t >> 8; - seed16[2] ^= t >> 16; - seed16[3] ^= t >> 24; - seed16[4] ^= t >> 32; - seed16[5] ^= t >> 40; - seed16[6] ^= t >> 48; - seed16[7] ^= t >> 56; - } - if (frand) { - fclose(frand); - } - } - secp256k1_rand_seed(seed16); - - printf("test count = %i\n", count); - printf("random seed = %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x\n", seed16[0], seed16[1], seed16[2], seed16[3], seed16[4], seed16[5], seed16[6], seed16[7], seed16[8], seed16[9], seed16[10], seed16[11], seed16[12], seed16[13], seed16[14], seed16[15]); + secp256k1_testrand_init(argc > 2 ? argv[2] : NULL); /* initialize */ run_context_tests(0); run_context_tests(1); run_scratch_tests(); ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - if (secp256k1_rand_bits(1)) { - secp256k1_rand256(run32); - CHECK(secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? run32 : NULL)); + if (secp256k1_testrand_bits(1)) { + unsigned char rand32[32]; + secp256k1_testrand256(rand32); + CHECK(secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, secp256k1_testrand_bits(1) ? rand32 : NULL)); } run_rand_bits(); @@ -5270,6 +5678,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* ecmult tests */ run_wnaf(); run_point_times_order(); + run_ecmult_near_split_bound(); run_ecmult_chain(); run_ecmult_constants(); run_ecmult_gen_blind(); @@ -5278,9 +5687,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { run_ec_combine(); /* endomorphism tests */ -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM run_endomorphism_tests(); -#endif /* EC point parser test */ run_ec_pubkey_parse_test(); @@ -5288,6 +5695,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* EC key edge cases */ run_eckey_edge_case_test(); + /* EC key arithmetic test */ + run_eckey_negate_test(); + #ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH /* ecdh tests */ run_ecdh_tests(); @@ -5309,19 +5719,25 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { run_multiset_tests(); #endif -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_OLDSCHNORR - /* Oldschnorr tests */ - printf("running oldschnorr tests\n"); - run_oldschnorr_tests(); -#endif - #ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY /* ECDSA pubkey recovery tests */ run_recovery_tests(); #endif - secp256k1_rand256(run32); - printf("random run = %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x\n", run32[0], run32[1], run32[2], run32[3], run32[4], run32[5], run32[6], run32[7], run32[8], run32[9], run32[10], run32[11], run32[12], run32[13], run32[14], run32[15]); +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS + run_extrakeys_tests(); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG + run_schnorrsig_tests(); +#endif + + /* util tests */ + run_secp256k1_memczero_test(); + + run_cmov_tests(); + + secp256k1_testrand_finish(); /* shutdown */ secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx); diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/tests_exhaustive.c b/depend/secp256k1/src/tests_exhaustive.c index 8cca1ce..f4d5b8e 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/tests_exhaustive.c +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/tests_exhaustive.c @@ -18,18 +18,15 @@ #ifndef EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER /* see group_impl.h for allowable values */ #define EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER 13 -#define EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA 9 /* cube root of 1 mod 13 */ #endif #include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "assumptions.h" #include "group.h" #include "secp256k1.c" #include "testrand_impl.h" -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY -#include "src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h" -#include "include/secp256k1_recovery.h" -#endif +static int count = 2; /** stolen from tests.c */ void ge_equals_ge(const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_ge *b) { @@ -61,7 +58,7 @@ void ge_equals_gej(const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_gej *b) { void random_fe(secp256k1_fe *x) { unsigned char bin[32]; do { - secp256k1_rand256(bin); + secp256k1_testrand256(bin); if (secp256k1_fe_set_b32(x, bin)) { return; } @@ -69,6 +66,15 @@ void random_fe(secp256k1_fe *x) { } /** END stolen from tests.c */ +static uint32_t num_cores = 1; +static uint32_t this_core = 0; + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int skip_section(uint64_t* iter) { + if (num_cores == 1) return 0; + *iter += 0xe7037ed1a0b428dbULL; + return ((((uint32_t)*iter ^ (*iter >> 32)) * num_cores) >> 32) != this_core; +} + int secp256k1_nonce_function_smallint(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data, unsigned int attempt) { @@ -89,93 +95,93 @@ int secp256k1_nonce_function_smallint(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned cha return 1; } -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -void test_exhaustive_endomorphism(const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { +void test_exhaustive_endomorphism(const secp256k1_ge *group) { int i; - for (i = 0; i < order; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) { secp256k1_ge res; secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&res, &group[i]); ge_equals_ge(&group[i * EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER], &res); } } -#endif -void test_exhaustive_addition(const secp256k1_ge *group, const secp256k1_gej *groupj, int order) { +void test_exhaustive_addition(const secp256k1_ge *group, const secp256k1_gej *groupj) { int i, j; + uint64_t iter = 0; /* Sanity-check (and check infinity functions) */ CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&group[0])); CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&groupj[0])); - for (i = 1; i < order; i++) { + for (i = 1; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) { CHECK(!secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&group[i])); CHECK(!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&groupj[i])); } /* Check all addition formulae */ - for (j = 0; j < order; j++) { + for (j = 0; j < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; j++) { secp256k1_fe fe_inv; + if (skip_section(&iter)) continue; secp256k1_fe_inv(&fe_inv, &groupj[j].z); - for (i = 0; i < order; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) { secp256k1_ge zless_gej; secp256k1_gej tmp; /* add_var */ secp256k1_gej_add_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], &groupj[j], NULL); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % order], &tmp); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER], &tmp); /* add_ge */ if (j > 0) { secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&tmp, &groupj[i], &group[j]); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % order], &tmp); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER], &tmp); } /* add_ge_var */ secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], &group[j], NULL); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % order], &tmp); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER], &tmp); /* add_zinv_var */ zless_gej.infinity = groupj[j].infinity; zless_gej.x = groupj[j].x; zless_gej.y = groupj[j].y; secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], &zless_gej, &fe_inv); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % order], &tmp); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER], &tmp); } } /* Check doubling */ - for (i = 0; i < order; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) { secp256k1_gej tmp; - if (i > 0) { - secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(&tmp, &groupj[i]); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(2 * i) % order], &tmp); - } + secp256k1_gej_double(&tmp, &groupj[i]); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(2 * i) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER], &tmp); secp256k1_gej_double_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], NULL); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(2 * i) % order], &tmp); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(2 * i) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER], &tmp); } /* Check negation */ - for (i = 1; i < order; i++) { + for (i = 1; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) { secp256k1_ge tmp; secp256k1_gej tmpj; secp256k1_ge_neg(&tmp, &group[i]); - ge_equals_ge(&group[order - i], &tmp); + ge_equals_ge(&group[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - i], &tmp); secp256k1_gej_neg(&tmpj, &groupj[i]); - ge_equals_gej(&group[order - i], &tmpj); + ge_equals_gej(&group[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - i], &tmpj); } } -void test_exhaustive_ecmult(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, const secp256k1_gej *groupj, int order) { +void test_exhaustive_ecmult(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, const secp256k1_gej *groupj) { int i, j, r_log; - for (r_log = 1; r_log < order; r_log++) { - for (j = 0; j < order; j++) { - for (i = 0; i < order; i++) { + uint64_t iter = 0; + for (r_log = 1; r_log < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; r_log++) { + for (j = 0; j < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; j++) { + if (skip_section(&iter)) continue; + for (i = 0; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) { secp256k1_gej tmp; secp256k1_scalar na, ng; secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&na, i); secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ng, j); secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &tmp, &groupj[r_log], &na, &ng); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(i * r_log + j) % order], &tmp); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(i * r_log + j) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER], &tmp); if (i > 0) { secp256k1_ecmult_const(&tmp, &group[i], &ng, 256); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(i * j) % order], &tmp); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(i * j) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER], &tmp); } } } @@ -194,14 +200,16 @@ static int ecmult_multi_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t return 1; } -void test_exhaustive_ecmult_multi(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { +void test_exhaustive_ecmult_multi(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group) { int i, j, k, x, y; + uint64_t iter = 0; secp256k1_scratch *scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, 4096); - for (i = 0; i < order; i++) { - for (j = 0; j < order; j++) { - for (k = 0; k < order; k++) { - for (x = 0; x < order; x++) { - for (y = 0; y < order; y++) { + for (i = 0; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; j++) { + for (k = 0; k < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; k++) { + for (x = 0; x < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; x++) { + if (skip_section(&iter)) continue; + for (y = 0; y < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; y++) { secp256k1_gej tmp; secp256k1_scalar g_sc; ecmult_multi_data data; @@ -213,7 +221,7 @@ void test_exhaustive_ecmult_multi(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ data.pt[1] = group[y]; secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(&ctx->error_callback, &ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &tmp, &g_sc, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 2); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(i * x + j * y + k) % order], &tmp); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(i * x + j * y + k) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER], &tmp); } } } @@ -222,22 +230,23 @@ void test_exhaustive_ecmult_multi(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ secp256k1_scratch_destroy(&ctx->error_callback, scratch); } -void r_from_k(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_ge *group, int k) { +void r_from_k(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_ge *group, int k, int* overflow) { secp256k1_fe x; unsigned char x_bin[32]; k %= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; x = group[k].x; secp256k1_fe_normalize(&x); secp256k1_fe_get_b32(x_bin, &x); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, x_bin, NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, x_bin, overflow); } -void test_exhaustive_verify(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { +void test_exhaustive_verify(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group) { int s, r, msg, key; - for (s = 1; s < order; s++) { - for (r = 1; r < order; r++) { - for (msg = 1; msg < order; msg++) { - for (key = 1; key < order; key++) { + uint64_t iter = 0; + for (s = 1; s < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; s++) { + for (r = 1; r < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; r++) { + for (msg = 1; msg < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; msg++) { + for (key = 1; key < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; key++) { secp256k1_ge nonconst_ge; secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; secp256k1_pubkey pk; @@ -246,6 +255,8 @@ void test_exhaustive_verify(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *gr int k, should_verify; unsigned char msg32[32]; + if (skip_section(&iter)) continue; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_s, s); secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&r_s, r); secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg_s, msg); @@ -255,9 +266,9 @@ void test_exhaustive_verify(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *gr /* Run through every k value that gives us this r and check that *one* works. * Note there could be none, there could be multiple, ECDSA is weird. */ should_verify = 0; - for (k = 0; k < order; k++) { + for (k = 0; k < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; k++) { secp256k1_scalar check_x_s; - r_from_k(&check_x_s, group, k); + r_from_k(&check_x_s, group, k, NULL); if (r_s == check_x_s) { secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_times_k_s, k); secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s_times_k_s, &s_times_k_s, &s_s); @@ -282,13 +293,15 @@ void test_exhaustive_verify(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *gr } } -void test_exhaustive_sign(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { +void test_exhaustive_sign(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group) { int i, j, k; + uint64_t iter = 0; /* Loop */ - for (i = 1; i < order; i++) { /* message */ - for (j = 1; j < order; j++) { /* key */ - for (k = 1; k < order; k++) { /* nonce */ + for (i = 1; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) { /* message */ + for (j = 1; j < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; j++) { /* key */ + if (skip_section(&iter)) continue; + for (k = 1; k < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; k++) { /* nonce */ const int starting_k = k; secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; secp256k1_scalar sk, msg, r, s, expected_r; @@ -304,10 +317,10 @@ void test_exhaustive_sign(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *grou /* Note that we compute expected_r *after* signing -- this is important * because our nonce-computing function function might change k during * signing. */ - r_from_k(&expected_r, group, k); + r_from_k(&expected_r, group, k, NULL); CHECK(r == expected_r); - CHECK((k * s) % order == (i + r * j) % order || - (k * (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - s)) % order == (i + r * j) % order); + CHECK((k * s) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == (i + r * j) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER || + (k * (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - s)) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == (i + r * j) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); /* Overflow means we've tried every possible nonce */ if (k < starting_k) { @@ -328,184 +341,114 @@ void test_exhaustive_sign(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *grou } #ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY -void test_exhaustive_recovery_sign(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { - int i, j, k; - - /* Loop */ - for (i = 1; i < order; i++) { /* message */ - for (j = 1; j < order; j++) { /* key */ - for (k = 1; k < order; k++) { /* nonce */ - const int starting_k = k; - secp256k1_fe r_dot_y_normalized; - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsig; - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; - secp256k1_scalar sk, msg, r, s, expected_r; - unsigned char sk32[32], msg32[32]; - int expected_recid; - int recid; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, i); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sk, j); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(sk32, &sk); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(msg32, &msg); - - secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &rsig, msg32, sk32, secp256k1_nonce_function_smallint, &k); +#include "src/modules/recovery/tests_exhaustive_impl.h" +#endif - /* Check directly */ - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &recid, &rsig); - r_from_k(&expected_r, group, k); - CHECK(r == expected_r); - CHECK((k * s) % order == (i + r * j) % order || - (k * (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - s)) % order == (i + r * j) % order); - /* In computing the recid, there is an overflow condition that is disabled in - * scalar_low_impl.h `secp256k1_scalar_set_b32` because almost every r.y value - * will exceed the group order, and our signing code always holds out for r - * values that don't overflow, so with a proper overflow check the tests would - * loop indefinitely. */ - r_dot_y_normalized = group[k].y; - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r_dot_y_normalized); - /* Also the recovery id is flipped depending if we hit the low-s branch */ - if ((k * s) % order == (i + r * j) % order) { - expected_recid = secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r_dot_y_normalized) ? 1 : 0; - } else { - expected_recid = secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r_dot_y_normalized) ? 0 : 1; - } - CHECK(recid == expected_recid); +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS +#include "src/modules/extrakeys/tests_exhaustive_impl.h" +#endif - /* Convert to a standard sig then check */ - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &sig, &rsig); - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &sig); - /* Note that we compute expected_r *after* signing -- this is important - * because our nonce-computing function function might change k during - * signing. */ - r_from_k(&expected_r, group, k); - CHECK(r == expected_r); - CHECK((k * s) % order == (i + r * j) % order || - (k * (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - s)) % order == (i + r * j) % order); +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG +#include "src/modules/schnorrsig/tests_exhaustive_impl.h" +#endif - /* Overflow means we've tried every possible nonce */ - if (k < starting_k) { - break; - } - } +int main(int argc, char** argv) { + int i; + secp256k1_gej groupj[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER]; + secp256k1_ge group[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER]; + unsigned char rand32[32]; + secp256k1_context *ctx; + + /* Disable buffering for stdout to improve reliability of getting + * diagnostic information. Happens right at the start of main because + * setbuf must be used before any other operation on the stream. */ + setbuf(stdout, NULL); + /* Also disable buffering for stderr because it's not guaranteed that it's + * unbuffered on all systems. */ + setbuf(stderr, NULL); + + printf("Exhaustive tests for order %lu\n", (unsigned long)EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); + + /* find iteration count */ + if (argc > 1) { + count = strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0); + } + printf("test count = %i\n", count); + + /* find random seed */ + secp256k1_testrand_init(argc > 2 ? argv[2] : NULL); + + /* set up split processing */ + if (argc > 4) { + num_cores = strtol(argv[3], NULL, 0); + this_core = strtol(argv[4], NULL, 0); + if (num_cores < 1 || this_core >= num_cores) { + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [count] [seed] [numcores] [thiscore]\n", argv[0]); + return 1; } + printf("running tests for core %lu (out of [0..%lu])\n", (unsigned long)this_core, (unsigned long)num_cores - 1); } -} -void test_exhaustive_recovery_verify(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { - /* This is essentially a copy of test_exhaustive_verify, with recovery added */ - int s, r, msg, key; - for (s = 1; s < order; s++) { - for (r = 1; r < order; r++) { - for (msg = 1; msg < order; msg++) { - for (key = 1; key < order; key++) { - secp256k1_ge nonconst_ge; - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsig; - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; - secp256k1_pubkey pk; - secp256k1_scalar sk_s, msg_s, r_s, s_s; - secp256k1_scalar s_times_k_s, msg_plus_r_times_sk_s; - int recid = 0; - int k, should_verify; - unsigned char msg32[32]; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_s, s); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&r_s, r); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg_s, msg); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sk_s, key); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(msg32, &msg_s); + while (count--) { + /* Build context */ + ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + secp256k1_testrand256(rand32); + CHECK(secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, rand32)); + + /* Generate the entire group */ + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&groupj[0]); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&group[0], &groupj[0]); + for (i = 1; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) { + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&groupj[i], &groupj[i - 1], &secp256k1_ge_const_g); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&group[i], &groupj[i]); + if (count != 0) { + /* Set a different random z-value for each Jacobian point, except z=1 + is used in the last iteration. */ + secp256k1_fe z; + random_fe(&z); + secp256k1_gej_rescale(&groupj[i], &z); + } - /* Verify by hand */ - /* Run through every k value that gives us this r and check that *one* works. - * Note there could be none, there could be multiple, ECDSA is weird. */ - should_verify = 0; - for (k = 0; k < order; k++) { - secp256k1_scalar check_x_s; - r_from_k(&check_x_s, group, k); - if (r_s == check_x_s) { - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_times_k_s, k); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s_times_k_s, &s_times_k_s, &s_s); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &r_s, &sk_s); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &msg_s); - should_verify |= secp256k1_scalar_eq(&s_times_k_s, &msg_plus_r_times_sk_s); - } - } - /* nb we have a "high s" rule */ - should_verify &= !secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s_s); + /* Verify against ecmult_gen */ + { + secp256k1_scalar scalar_i; + secp256k1_gej generatedj; + secp256k1_ge generated; - /* We would like to try recovering the pubkey and checking that it matches, - * but pubkey recovery is impossible in the exhaustive tests (the reason - * being that there are 12 nonzero r values, 12 nonzero points, and no - * overlap between the sets, so there are no valid signatures). */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&scalar_i, i); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &generatedj, &scalar_i); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&generated, &generatedj); - /* Verify by converting to a standard signature and calling verify */ - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_save(&rsig, &r_s, &s_s, recid); - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &sig, &rsig); - memcpy(&nonconst_ge, &group[sk_s], sizeof(nonconst_ge)); - secp256k1_pubkey_save(&pk, &nonconst_ge); - CHECK(should_verify == - secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pk)); - } + CHECK(group[i].infinity == 0); + CHECK(generated.infinity == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&generated.x, &group[i].x)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&generated.y, &group[i].y)); } } - } -} -#endif - -int main(void) { - int i; - secp256k1_gej groupj[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER]; - secp256k1_ge group[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER]; - /* Build context */ - secp256k1_context *ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + /* Run the tests */ + test_exhaustive_endomorphism(group); + test_exhaustive_addition(group, groupj); + test_exhaustive_ecmult(ctx, group, groupj); + test_exhaustive_ecmult_multi(ctx, group); + test_exhaustive_sign(ctx, group); + test_exhaustive_verify(ctx, group); - /* TODO set z = 1, then do num_tests runs with random z values */ +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY + test_exhaustive_recovery(ctx, group); +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS + test_exhaustive_extrakeys(ctx, group); +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG + test_exhaustive_schnorrsig(ctx); +#endif - /* Generate the entire group */ - secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&groupj[0]); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&group[0], &groupj[0]); - for (i = 1; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) { - /* Set a different random z-value for each Jacobian point */ - secp256k1_fe z; - random_fe(&z); - - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&groupj[i], &groupj[i - 1], &secp256k1_ge_const_g); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&group[i], &groupj[i]); - secp256k1_gej_rescale(&groupj[i], &z); - - /* Verify against ecmult_gen */ - { - secp256k1_scalar scalar_i; - secp256k1_gej generatedj; - secp256k1_ge generated; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&scalar_i, i); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &generatedj, &scalar_i); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&generated, &generatedj); - - CHECK(group[i].infinity == 0); - CHECK(generated.infinity == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&generated.x, &group[i].x)); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&generated.y, &group[i].y)); - } + secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx); } - /* Run the tests */ -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - test_exhaustive_endomorphism(group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); -#endif - test_exhaustive_addition(group, groupj, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); - test_exhaustive_ecmult(ctx, group, groupj, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); - test_exhaustive_ecmult_multi(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); - test_exhaustive_sign(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); - test_exhaustive_verify(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); + secp256k1_testrand_finish(); -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY - test_exhaustive_recovery_sign(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); - test_exhaustive_recovery_verify(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); -#endif - - secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx); + printf("no problems found\n"); return 0; } - diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/util.h b/depend/secp256k1/src/util.h index d5fa39c..2a9eb5a 100644 --- a/depend/secp256k1/src/util.h +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/util.h @@ -69,6 +69,25 @@ static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_callback_call(const secp256k1_callback * #define VERIFY_SETUP(stmt) #endif +/* Define `VG_UNDEF` and `VG_CHECK` when VALGRIND is defined */ +#if !defined(VG_CHECK) +# if defined(VALGRIND) +# include +# define VG_UNDEF(x,y) VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED((x),(y)) +# define VG_CHECK(x,y) VALGRIND_CHECK_MEM_IS_DEFINED((x),(y)) +# else +# define VG_UNDEF(x,y) +# define VG_CHECK(x,y) +# endif +#endif + +/* Like `VG_CHECK` but on VERIFY only */ +#if defined(VERIFY) +#define VG_CHECK_VERIFY(x,y) VG_CHECK((x), (y)) +#else +#define VG_CHECK_VERIFY(x,y) +#endif + static SECP256K1_INLINE void *checked_malloc(const secp256k1_callback* cb, size_t size) { void *ret = malloc(size); if (ret == NULL) { @@ -151,13 +170,110 @@ static SECP256K1_INLINE void *manual_alloc(void** prealloc_ptr, size_t alloc_siz # define I64uFORMAT "llu" #endif -#if defined(HAVE___INT128) -# if defined(__GNUC__) -# define SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT __extension__ -# else -# define SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT +#if defined(__GNUC__) +# define SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT __extension__ +#else +# define SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT +#endif + +/* If SECP256K1_{LITTLE,BIG}_ENDIAN is not explicitly provided, infer from various other system macros. */ +#if !defined(SECP256K1_LITTLE_ENDIAN) && !defined(SECP256K1_BIG_ENDIAN) +/* Inspired by https://github.com/rofl0r/endianness.h/blob/9853923246b065a3b52d2c43835f3819a62c7199/endianness.h#L52L73 */ +# if (defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && defined(__ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__) || \ + defined(_X86_) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || \ + defined(__i486__) || defined(__i586__) || defined(__i686__) || \ + defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL) || \ + defined(__ARMEL__) || defined(__AARCH64EL__) || \ + (defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ == 1) || \ + (defined(_LITTLE_ENDIAN) && _LITTLE_ENDIAN == 1) || \ + defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_ARM) /* MSVC */ +# define SECP256K1_LITTLE_ENDIAN # endif +# if (defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && defined(__ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__) && __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__) || \ + defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB) || \ + defined(__MICROBLAZEEB__) || defined(__ARMEB__) || defined(__AARCH64EB__) || \ + (defined(__BIG_ENDIAN__) && __BIG_ENDIAN__ == 1) || \ + (defined(_BIG_ENDIAN) && _BIG_ENDIAN == 1) +# define SECP256K1_BIG_ENDIAN +# endif +#endif +#if defined(SECP256K1_LITTLE_ENDIAN) == defined(SECP256K1_BIG_ENDIAN) +# error Please make sure that either SECP256K1_LITTLE_ENDIAN or SECP256K1_BIG_ENDIAN is set, see src/util.h. +#endif + +/* Zero memory if flag == 1. Flag must be 0 or 1. Constant time. */ +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_memczero(void *s, size_t len, int flag) { + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s; + /* Access flag with a volatile-qualified lvalue. + This prevents clang from figuring out (after inlining) that flag can + take only be 0 or 1, which leads to variable time code. */ + volatile int vflag = flag; + unsigned char mask = -(unsigned char) vflag; + while (len) { + *p &= ~mask; + p++; + len--; + } +} + +/** Semantics like memcmp. Variable-time. + * + * We use this to avoid possible compiler bugs with memcmp, e.g. + * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=95189 + */ +static SECP256K1_INLINE int secp256k1_memcmp_var(const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t n) { + const unsigned char *p1 = s1, *p2 = s2; + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + int diff = p1[i] - p2[i]; + if (diff != 0) { + return diff; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/** If flag is true, set *r equal to *a; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. Both *r and *a must be initialized and non-negative.*/ +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_int_cmov(int *r, const int *a, int flag) { + unsigned int mask0, mask1, r_masked, a_masked; + /* Access flag with a volatile-qualified lvalue. + This prevents clang from figuring out (after inlining) that flag can + take only be 0 or 1, which leads to variable time code. */ + volatile int vflag = flag; + + /* Casting a negative int to unsigned and back to int is implementation defined behavior */ + VERIFY_CHECK(*r >= 0 && *a >= 0); + + mask0 = (unsigned int)vflag + ~0u; + mask1 = ~mask0; + r_masked = ((unsigned int)*r & mask0); + a_masked = ((unsigned int)*a & mask1); + + *r = (int)(r_masked | a_masked); +} + +/* If USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_{INT128,INT64} is set, use that wide multiplication implementation. + * Otherwise use the presence of __SIZEOF_INT128__ to decide. + */ +#if defined(USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT128) +# define SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128 1 +#elif defined(USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT64) +# define SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT64 1 +#elif defined(UINT128_MAX) || defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) +# define SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128 1 +#else +# define SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT64 1 +#endif +#if defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128) +# if !defined(UINT128_MAX) && defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT typedef unsigned __int128 uint128_t; +SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT typedef __int128 int128_t; +#define UINT128_MAX ((uint128_t)(-1)) +#define INT128_MAX ((int128_t)(UINT128_MAX >> 1)) +#define INT128_MIN (-INT128_MAX - 1) +/* No (U)INT128_C macros because compilers providing __int128 do not support 128-bit literals. */ +# endif #endif #endif /* SECP256K1_UTIL_H */ diff --git a/depend/secp256k1/src/valgrind_ctime_test.c b/depend/secp256k1/src/valgrind_ctime_test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3169e36 --- /dev/null +++ b/depend/secp256k1/src/valgrind_ctime_test.c @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2020 Gregory Maxwell * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#include +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "assumptions.h" +#include "util.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH +# include "include/secp256k1_ecdh.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY +# include "include/secp256k1_recovery.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS +# include "include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG +#include "include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h" +#endif + +int main(void) { + secp256k1_context* ctx; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + size_t siglen = 74; + size_t outputlen = 33; + int i; + int ret; + unsigned char msg[32]; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char sig[74]; + unsigned char spubkey[33]; +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature recoverable_signature; + int recid; +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS + secp256k1_keypair keypair; +#endif + + if (!RUNNING_ON_VALGRIND) { + fprintf(stderr, "This test can only usefully be run inside valgrind.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: libtool --mode=execute valgrind ./valgrind_ctime_test\n"); + exit(1); + } + + /** In theory, testing with a single secret input should be sufficient: + * If control flow depended on secrets the tool would generate an error. + */ + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + key[i] = i + 65; + } + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + msg[i] = i + 1; + } + + ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN + | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY + | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY); + + /* Test keygen. */ + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32); + ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, key); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, spubkey, &outputlen, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); + + /* Test signing. */ + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32); + ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature, msg, key, NULL, NULL); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&signature, sizeof(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature)); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, sig, &siglen, &signature)); + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH + /* Test ECDH. */ + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32); + ret = secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, msg, &pubkey, key, NULL, NULL); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret == 1); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY + /* Test signing a recoverable signature. */ + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32); + ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &recoverable_signature, msg, key, NULL, NULL); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&recoverable_signature, sizeof(recoverable_signature)); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, sig, &recid, &recoverable_signature)); + CHECK(recid >= 0 && recid <= 3); +#endif + + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32); + ret = secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, key); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret == 1); + + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32); + ret = secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(ctx, key); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret == 1); + + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(msg, 32); + ret = secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(ctx, key, msg); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret == 1); + + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(msg, 32); + ret = secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(ctx, key, msg); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret == 1); + + /* Test context randomisation. Do this last because it leaves the context tainted. */ + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32); + ret = secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, key); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret); + + /* Test keypair_create and keypair_xonly_tweak_add. */ +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32); + ret = secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, key); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret == 1); + + /* The tweak is not treated as a secret in keypair_tweak_add */ + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(msg, 32); + ret = secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, msg); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret == 1); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32); + ret = secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, key); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret == 1); + ret = secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(ctx, sig, msg, &keypair, NULL, NULL); + VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret)); + CHECK(ret == 1); +#endif + + secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx); + return 0; +} diff --git a/oldschnorr.go b/oldschnorr.go deleted file mode 100644 index e1088e0..0000000 --- a/oldschnorr.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,234 +0,0 @@ -package secp256k1 - -// #include "./depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_oldschnorr.h" -import "C" -import ( - "bytes" - "encoding/hex" - "github.com/pkg/errors" -) - -const ( - // SerializedSchnorrPublicKeyCompressedSize defines the length in bytes of SerializedSchnorrPublicKeyCompressed - SerializedSchnorrPublicKeyCompressedSize = 33 - - // SerializedSchnorrPublicKeyUncompressedSize defines the length in bytes of SerializedSchnorrPublicKeyUncompressed - SerializedSchnorrPublicKeyUncompressedSize = 65 - - // SerializedSchnorrSignatureSize defines the length in bytes of SerializedSchnorrSignature - SerializedSchnorrSignatureSize = 64 -) - -// SchnorrPublicKey is a PublicKey type used to sign and verify Schnorr signatures. -// The struct itself is an opaque data type that should only be created via the supplied methods. -type SchnorrPublicKey struct { - pubkey C.secp256k1_pubkey -} - -// SchnorrSignature is a type representing a Schnorr Signature. -// The struct itself is an opaque data type that should only be created via the supplied methods. -type SchnorrSignature struct { - signature [SerializedSchnorrSignatureSize]byte -} - -// SerializedSchnorrPublicKey is a is a byte array representing the storage representation of a compressed or uncompressed SchnorrPublicKey -type SerializedSchnorrPublicKey []byte - -// SerializedSchnorrSignature is a is a byte array representing the storage representation of a SchnorrSignature -type SerializedSchnorrSignature [SerializedSchnorrSignatureSize]byte - -// IsEqual returns true if target is the same as key. -func (key *SchnorrPublicKey) IsEqual(target *SchnorrPublicKey) bool { - if key == nil && target == nil { - return true - } - if key == nil || target == nil { - return false - } - serializedKey, err1 := key.SerializeCompressed() - serializedTarget, err2 := target.SerializeCompressed() - - if err1 != nil && err2 != nil { // They're both zeroed, shouldn't happen if a constructor is used. - return true - } - if err1 != nil || err2 != nil { - return false - } - return bytes.Equal(serializedKey, serializedTarget) -} - -// IsEqual returns true if target is the same as signature. -func (signature *SchnorrSignature) IsEqual(target *SchnorrSignature) bool { - if signature == nil && target == nil { - return true - } - if signature == nil || target == nil { - return false - } - return *signature.Serialize() == *target.Serialize() -} - -// String returns the SerializedSchnorrPublicKey as the hexadecimal string -func (serialized *SerializedSchnorrPublicKey) String() string { - return hex.EncodeToString(*serialized) -} - -// String returns the SerializedSchnorrSignature as the hexadecimal string -func (serialized *SerializedSchnorrSignature) String() string { - return hex.EncodeToString(serialized[:]) -} - -// String returns the SchnorrSignature as the hexadecimal string -func (signature *SchnorrSignature) String() string { - return signature.Serialize().String() -} - -// Serialize returns a 64 byte serialized signature -func (signature *SchnorrSignature) Serialize() *SerializedSchnorrSignature { - ret := SerializedSchnorrSignature(signature.signature) - return &ret -} - -// DeserializeSchnorrSignature deserializes a 64 byte serialized schnorr signature into a SchnorrSignature type. -func DeserializeSchnorrSignature(serializedSignature *SerializedSchnorrSignature) *SchnorrSignature { - return &SchnorrSignature{signature: *serializedSignature} -} - -// DeserializeSchnorrSignatureFromSlice returns a SchnorrSignature type from a serialized signature slice. -// will verify that it's SerializedSchnorrSignatureSize bytes long -func DeserializeSchnorrSignatureFromSlice(data []byte) (signature *SchnorrSignature, err error) { - if len(data) != SerializedSchnorrSignatureSize { - return nil, errors.Errorf("invalid schnorr signature length got %d, expected %d", len(data), - SerializedSchnorrSignatureSize) - } - signature = &SchnorrSignature{} - copy(signature.signature[:], data) - return -} - -// String returns the SchnorrPublicKey as the hexadecimal string -func (key *SchnorrPublicKey) String() string { - serialized, err := key.SerializeCompressed() - if err != nil { // This can only happen if the user calls this function skipping a constructor. i.e. `SchnorrPublicKey{}.String()` - return "" - } - return serialized.String() -} - -// SchnorrPublicKey generates a PublicKey for the corresponding private key. -func (key *PrivateKey) SchnorrPublicKey() (*SchnorrPublicKey, error) { - pubkey := SchnorrPublicKey{} - cPtrPrivateKey := (*C.uchar)(&key.privateKey[0]) - ret := C.secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(context, &pubkey.pubkey, cPtrPrivateKey) - if ret != 1 { - return nil, errors.New("failed Generating an SchnorrPublicKey. You should call `DeserializePrivateKey` before calling this") - } - return &pubkey, nil -} - -// SchnorrSign creates a schnorr signature using the private key and the input hashed message. -// Notice: the [32] byte array *MUST* be a hash of a message. -func (key *PrivateKey) SchnorrSign(hash *Hash) (*SchnorrSignature, error) { - signature := SchnorrSignature{} - cPtrSig := (*C.uchar)(&signature.signature[0]) - cPtrHash := (*C.uchar)(&hash[0]) - cPtrPrivKey := (*C.uchar)(&key.privateKey[0]) - ret := C.secp256k1_schnorr_sign(context, cPtrSig, cPtrHash, cPtrPrivKey, nil, nil) - if ret != 1 { - return nil, errors.New("failed Signing. You should call `DeserializePrivateKey` before calling this") - } - return &signature, nil -} - -// SchnorrVerify verifies a schnorr signature using the public key and the input hashed message. -// Notice: the [32] byte array *MUST* be a hash of a message you hashed yourself. -func (key *SchnorrPublicKey) SchnorrVerify(hash *Hash, signature *SchnorrSignature) bool { - cPtrHash := (*C.uchar)(&hash[0]) - cPtrSig := (*C.uchar)(&signature.signature[0]) - return C.secp256k1_schnorr_verify(context, cPtrSig, cPtrHash, &key.pubkey) == 1 -} - -// DeserializeSchnorrPubKey deserializes a serialized schnorr public key, verifying it's valid. -// it supports both compressed(33 bytes) and uncompressed(65 bytes) public keys. -// it does not support hybrid(65 bytes) keys. -func DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(serializedPubKey SerializedSchnorrPublicKey) (*SchnorrPublicKey, error) { - key := SchnorrPublicKey{} - cPtr := (*C.uchar)(&serializedPubKey[0]) - cLen := C.size_t(len(serializedPubKey)) - if !supportedKey(serializedPubKey) { - return nil, errors.New("unsupported public key format") - } - ret := C.secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(C.secp256k1_context_no_precomp, &key.pubkey, cPtr, cLen) - if ret != 1 { - return nil, errors.New("failed parsing the public key") - } - return &key, nil -} - -// SerializeCompressed serializes a schnorr public key into a compressed form (33 bytes) -func (key *SchnorrPublicKey) SerializeCompressed() (compressedPubKey SerializedSchnorrPublicKey, err error) { - return key.serializeInternal(C.SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) -} - -// SerializeUncompressed serializes a schnorr public key into a uncompressed form (65 bytes) -func (key *SchnorrPublicKey) SerializeUncompressed() (uncompressedPubKey SerializedSchnorrPublicKey, err error) { - return key.serializeInternal(C.SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED) -} - -// Add a tweak to the public key by doing `key + tweak*Generator`. this adds it in place. -// This is meant for creating BIP-32(HD) wallets -func (key *SchnorrPublicKey) Add(tweak [32]byte) error { - cPtrTweak := (*C.uchar)(&tweak[0]) - ret := C.secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(context, &key.pubkey, cPtrTweak) - if ret != 1 { - return errors.New("failed adding to the public key. Tweak is bigger than the order or the complement of the private key") - } - return nil -} - -// Negate a public key in place. -// Equivalent to negating the private key and then generating the public key. -func (key *SchnorrPublicKey) Negate() { - ret := C.secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(C.secp256k1_context_no_precomp, &key.pubkey) - if ret != 1 { - panic("failed Negating the public key. Should never happen") - } -} - -// Should only be called with 33/65 byte data slice -// and only with SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED/SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED as flags. -func (key *SchnorrPublicKey) serializeInternal(flag C.uint) (SerializedSchnorrPublicKey, error) { - data := [65]byte{} - cPtr := (*C.uchar)(&data[0]) - cLen := C.size_t(len(data)) - if isZeroed(key.pubkey.data[:32]) || isZeroed(key.pubkey.data[32:]) { - return nil, errors.New("the public key is zeroed, which isn't a valid SchnorrPublicKey") - } - - ret := C.secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(C.secp256k1_context_no_precomp, cPtr, &cLen, &key.pubkey, flag) - if ret != 1 { - panic("failed serializing a pubkey. Should never happen (upstream promise to return 1)") - } else if cLen != SerializedSchnorrPublicKeyCompressedSize && cLen != SerializedSchnorrPublicKeyUncompressedSize { - panic("Returned length doesn't match compressed length(33) nor uncompressed length(65), should never happen") - } - return data[:cLen], nil -} - -func supportedKey(key []byte) bool { - if len(key) == SerializedSchnorrPublicKeyCompressedSize && (key[0] == 0x02 || key[0] == 0x03) { - return true - } else if len(key) == SerializedSchnorrPublicKeyUncompressedSize && key[0] == 0x04 { - return true - } else { - return false - } -} - -func isZeroed(slice []C.uchar) bool { - for _, byte := range slice { - if byte != 0 { - return false - } - } - return true -} diff --git a/schnorr_keypair.go b/schnorr_keypair.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4addcd4 --- /dev/null +++ b/schnorr_keypair.go @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +package secp256k1 + +// #include "./depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h" +// #include "./depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h" +import "C" +import "C" +import ( + "crypto/rand" + "encoding/hex" + "fmt" + "github.com/pkg/errors" + "unsafe" +) + +// errZeroedKeyPair is the error returned when using a zeroed pubkey +var errZeroedKeyPair = errors.New("the key pair is zeroed, which isn't a valid SchnorrKeyPair") + +// SchnorrKeyPair is a type representing a pair of Secp256k1 private and public keys. +// This can be used to create Schnorr signatures +type SchnorrKeyPair struct { + keypair C.secp256k1_keypair +} + +// SerializedPrivateKey is a byte array representing the storage representation of a SchnorrKeyPair +type SerializedPrivateKey [SerializedPrivateKeySize]byte + +// String returns the SchnorrKeyPair as the hexadecimal string +func (key SerializedPrivateKey) String() string { + return hex.EncodeToString(key[:]) +} + +// String returns the SchnorrKeyPair as the hexadecimal string +func (key SchnorrKeyPair) String() string { + return key.SerializePrivateKey().String() +} + +// DeserializePrivateKey returns a SchnorrKeyPair type from a 32 byte private key. +// will verify it's a valid private key(Group Order > key > 0) +func DeserializePrivateKey(data *SerializedPrivateKey) (*SchnorrKeyPair, error) { + key := SchnorrKeyPair{} + cPtrPrivateKey := (*C.uchar)(&data[0]) + + ret := C.secp256k1_keypair_create(context, &key.keypair, cPtrPrivateKey) + if ret != 1 { + return nil, errors.New("invalid SchnorrKeyPair (zero or bigger than the group order)") + } + return &key, nil +} + +// DeserializePrivateKeyFromSlice returns a SchnorrKeyPair type from a serialized private key slice. +// will verify that it's 32 byte and it's a valid private key(Group Order > key > 0) +func DeserializePrivateKeyFromSlice(data []byte) (key *SchnorrKeyPair, err error) { + if len(data) != SerializedPrivateKeySize { + return nil, errors.Errorf("invalid private key length got %d, expected %d", len(data), + SerializedPrivateKeySize) + } + + serializedKey := &SerializedPrivateKey{} + copy(serializedKey[:], data) + return DeserializePrivateKey(serializedKey) +} + +// GeneratePrivateKey generates a random valid private key from `crypto/rand` +func GeneratePrivateKey() (key *SchnorrKeyPair, err error) { + rawKey := SerializedPrivateKey{} + for { + n, err := rand.Read(rawKey[:]) + if err != nil || n != len(rawKey) { + return nil, err + } + key, err = DeserializePrivateKey(&rawKey) + if err == nil { + return key, nil + } + } +} + +// SerializePrivateKey returns the private key in the keypair. +func (key *SchnorrKeyPair) SerializePrivateKey() *SerializedPrivateKey { + // TODO: Replace with upstream function when merged: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/pull/845 + ret := SerializedPrivateKey{} + for i := 0; i < 32; i++ { + ret[i] = byte(key.keypair.data[i]) + } + return &ret +} + +// Add a tweak to the public key by doing `key + tweak % Group Order` and adjust the pub/priv keys according to parity. this adds it in place. +// This is meant for creating BIP-32(HD) wallets +func (key *SchnorrKeyPair) Add(tweak [32]byte) error { + if key.isZeroed() { + return errors.WithStack(errZeroedKeyPair) + } + cPtrTweak := (*C.uchar)(&tweak[0]) + ret := C.secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(context, &key.keypair, cPtrTweak) + if ret != 1 { + return errors.New("failed Adding to private key. Tweak is bigger than the order or the complement of the private key") + } + return nil +} + +// SchnorrPublicKey generates a PublicKey for the corresponding private key. +func (key *SchnorrKeyPair) SchnorrPublicKey() (*SchnorrPublicKey, error) { + pubkey, _, err := key.schnorrPublicKeyInternal() + return pubkey, err +} + +func (key *SchnorrKeyPair) schnorrPublicKeyInternal() (pubkey *SchnorrPublicKey, wasOdd bool, err error) { + if key.isZeroed() { + return nil, false, errors.WithStack(errZeroedKeyPair) + } + pubkey = &SchnorrPublicKey{} + cParity := C.int(42) + ret := C.secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(context, &pubkey.pubkey, &cParity, &key.keypair) + if ret != 1 { + return nil, false, errors.New("the keypair contains invalid data") + } + + return pubkey, parityBitToBool(cParity), nil + +} + +// SchnorrSign creates a schnorr signature using the private key and the input hashed message. +// Notice: the [32] byte array *MUST* be a hash of a message. +func (key *SchnorrKeyPair) SchnorrSign(hash *Hash) (*SchnorrSignature, error) { + var auxilaryRand [32]byte + n, err := rand.Read(auxilaryRand[:]) + if err != nil || n != len(auxilaryRand) { + return nil, err + } + return key.schnorrSignInternal(hash, &auxilaryRand) +} + +func (key *SchnorrKeyPair) schnorrSignInternal(hash *Hash, auxiliaryRand *[32]byte) (*SchnorrSignature, error) { + if key.isZeroed() { + return nil, errors.WithStack(errZeroedKeyPair) + } + signature := SchnorrSignature{} + cPtrSig := (*C.uchar)(&signature.signature[0]) + cPtrHash := (*C.uchar)(&hash[0]) + cPtrAux := unsafe.Pointer(auxiliaryRand) + ret := C.secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(context, cPtrSig, cPtrHash, &key.keypair, C.secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340, cPtrAux) + if ret != 1 { + return nil, errors.New("failed Signing. You should call `DeserializePrivateKey` before calling this") + } + return &signature, nil + +} +func (key *SchnorrKeyPair) isZeroed() bool { + return isZeroed(key.keypair.data[:32]) || isZeroed(key.keypair.data[32:64]) || isZeroed(key.keypair.data[64:]) +} + +func parityBitToBool(parity C.int) bool { + switch parity { + case 0: + return false + case 1: + return true + default: + panic(fmt.Sprintf("should never happen, parity should always be 1 or 0, instead got: %d", int(parity))) + } +} diff --git a/schnorr_pubkey.go b/schnorr_pubkey.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c06e0d --- /dev/null +++ b/schnorr_pubkey.go @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +package secp256k1 + +// #include "./depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h" +// #include "./depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h" +import "C" +import ( + "encoding/hex" + "fmt" + "github.com/pkg/errors" +) + +// SerializedSchnorrPublicKeySize defines the length in bytes of a SerializedSchnorrPublicKey +const SerializedSchnorrPublicKeySize = 32 + +// errZeroedPubkey is the error returned when using a zeroed pubkey +var errZeroedPubkey = errors.New("the public key is zeroed, which isn't a valid SchnorrPublicKey") + +// SchnorrPublicKey is a PublicKey type used to sign and verify Schnorr signatures. +// The struct itself is an opaque data type that should only be created via the supplied methods. +type SchnorrPublicKey struct { + pubkey C.secp256k1_xonly_pubkey +} + +// SerializedSchnorrPublicKey is a is a byte array representing the storage representation of a compressed or uncompressed SchnorrPublicKey +type SerializedSchnorrPublicKey [SerializedSchnorrPublicKeySize]byte + +// IsEqual returns true if target is the same as key. +func (key *SchnorrPublicKey) IsEqual(target *SchnorrPublicKey) bool { + if key == nil && target == nil { + return true + } + if key == nil || target == nil { + return false + } + serializedKey, err1 := key.Serialize() + if err1 != nil && !errors.Is(err1, errZeroedPubkey) { + panic(errors.Wrap(err1, "Unexpected error when serrializing key")) + } + serializedTarget, err2 := target.Serialize() + if err2 != nil && !errors.Is(err2, errZeroedPubkey) { + panic(errors.Wrap(err1, "Unexpected error when serrializing key")) + } + + if errors.Is(err1, errZeroedPubkey) && errors.Is(err2, errZeroedPubkey) { // They're both zeroed, shouldn't happen if a constructor is used. + return true + } + if errors.Is(err1, errZeroedPubkey) || errors.Is(err2, errZeroedPubkey) { // Only one of them is zeroed + return false + } + return *serializedKey == *serializedTarget +} + +// String returns the SerializedSchnorrPublicKey as a hexadecimal string +func (serialized SerializedSchnorrPublicKey) String() string { + return hex.EncodeToString(serialized[:]) +} + +// String returns the SchnorrPublicKey as the hexadecimal string +func (key SchnorrPublicKey) String() string { + serialized, err := key.Serialize() + if err != nil { // This can only happen if the user calls this function skipping a constructor. i.e. `SchnorrPublicKey{}.String()` + return "" + } + return serialized.String() +} + +// SchnorrVerify verifies a schnorr signature using the public key and the input hashed message. +// Notice: the [32] byte array *MUST* be a hash of a message you hashed yourself. +func (key *SchnorrPublicKey) SchnorrVerify(hash *Hash, signature *SchnorrSignature) bool { + cPtrHash := (*C.uchar)(&hash[0]) + cPtrSig := (*C.uchar)(&signature.signature[0]) + return C.secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(context, cPtrSig, cPtrHash, &key.pubkey) == 1 +} + +// DeserializeSchnorrPubKey deserializes a serialized schnorr public key, verifying it's valid. +// it supports both compressed(33 bytes) and uncompressed(65 bytes) public keys. +// it does not support hybrid(65 bytes) keys. +func DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(serializedPubKey []byte) (*SchnorrPublicKey, error) { + if len(serializedPubKey) != SerializedSchnorrPublicKeySize { + return nil, errors.New(fmt.Sprintf("serializedPubKey has to be %d bytes, instead got :%d", SerializedSchnorrPublicKeySize, len(serializedPubKey))) + } + key := SchnorrPublicKey{} + cPtr := (*C.uchar)(&serializedPubKey[0]) + ret := C.secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(C.secp256k1_context_no_precomp, &key.pubkey, cPtr) + if ret != 1 { + return nil, errors.New("failed parsing the public key") + } + return &key, nil +} + +// Serialize serializes a schnorr public key +func (key *SchnorrPublicKey) Serialize() (*SerializedSchnorrPublicKey, error) { + serialized := SerializedSchnorrPublicKey{} + cPtr := (*C.uchar)(&serialized[0]) + if isZeroed(key.pubkey.data[:]) { + return nil, errZeroedPubkey + } + + ret := C.secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(C.secp256k1_context_no_precomp, cPtr, &key.pubkey) + if ret != 1 { + panic("failed serializing a pubkey. Should never happen (upstream promise to return 1)") + } + return &serialized, nil +} + +// Add a tweak to the public key by doing `key + tweak*Generator`. this adds it in place. +// This is meant for creating BIP-32(HD) wallets +func (key *SchnorrPublicKey) Add(tweak [32]byte) error { + _, err := key.addInternal(tweak) + return err +} + +func (key *SchnorrPublicKey) addInternal(tweak [32]byte) (bool, error) { + cPtrTweak := (*C.uchar)(&tweak[0]) + fullKey := C.secp256k1_pubkey{} + ret := C.secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(context, &fullKey, &key.pubkey, cPtrTweak) + if ret != 1 { + return false, errors.New("failed adding to the public key. Tweak is bigger than the order or the complement of the private key") + } + var cParity C.int + ret = C.secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(context, &key.pubkey, &cParity, &fullKey) + if ret != 1 { + panic("Should never fail. we just created the public key so it can't be invalid") + } + return parityBitToBool(cParity), nil +} + +func isZeroed(slice []C.uchar) bool { + for _, byte := range slice { + if byte != 0 { + return false + } + } + return true +} diff --git a/schnorr_signature.go b/schnorr_signature.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..52f5e0d --- /dev/null +++ b/schnorr_signature.go @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +package secp256k1 + +import ( + "encoding/hex" + "github.com/pkg/errors" +) + +const ( + // SerializedSchnorrSignatureSize defines the length in bytes of SerializedSchnorrSignature + SerializedSchnorrSignatureSize = 64 +) + +// SchnorrSignature is a type representing a Schnorr Signature. +// The struct itself is an opaque data type that should only be created via the supplied methods. +type SchnorrSignature struct { + signature [SerializedSchnorrSignatureSize]byte +} + +// SerializedSchnorrSignature is a is a byte array representing the storage representation of a SchnorrSignature +type SerializedSchnorrSignature [SerializedSchnorrSignatureSize]byte + +// IsEqual returns true if target is the same as signature. +func (signature *SchnorrSignature) IsEqual(target *SchnorrSignature) bool { + if signature == nil && target == nil { + return true + } + if signature == nil || target == nil { + return false + } + return *signature.Serialize() == *target.Serialize() +} + +// String returns the SerializedSchnorrSignature as the hexadecimal string +func (serialized SerializedSchnorrSignature) String() string { + return hex.EncodeToString(serialized[:]) +} + +// String returns the SchnorrSignature as the hexadecimal string +func (signature SchnorrSignature) String() string { + return signature.Serialize().String() +} + +// Serialize returns a 64 byte serialized signature +func (signature *SchnorrSignature) Serialize() *SerializedSchnorrSignature { + ret := SerializedSchnorrSignature(signature.signature) + return &ret +} + +// DeserializeSchnorrSignature deserializes a 64 byte serialized schnorr signature into a SchnorrSignature type. +func DeserializeSchnorrSignature(serializedSignature *SerializedSchnorrSignature) *SchnorrSignature { + return &SchnorrSignature{signature: *serializedSignature} +} + +// DeserializeSchnorrSignatureFromSlice returns a SchnorrSignature type from a serialized signature slice. +// will verify that it's SerializedSchnorrSignatureSize bytes long +func DeserializeSchnorrSignatureFromSlice(data []byte) (signature *SchnorrSignature, err error) { + if len(data) != SerializedSchnorrSignatureSize { + return nil, errors.Errorf("invalid schnorr signature length got %d, expected %d", len(data), + SerializedSchnorrSignatureSize) + } + signature = &SchnorrSignature{} + copy(signature.signature[:], data) + return +} diff --git a/secp256k1.go b/secp256k1.go index 99cd384..4b0710e 100644 --- a/secp256k1.go +++ b/secp256k1.go @@ -3,17 +3,11 @@ package secp256k1 // // **This is CGO's build system. CGO parses the following comments as build instructions.** // // Including the headers and code, and defining the default macros // #cgo CFLAGS: -I./depend/secp256k1 -I./depend/secp256k1/src/ -// #cgo CFLAGS: -DSECP256K1_BUILD=1 -DECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE=15 -DUSE_ENDOMORPHISM=1 -DENABLE_MODULE_OLDSCHNORR=1 -DENABLE_MODULE_MULTISET=1 +// #cgo CFLAGS: -DSECP256K1_BUILD=1 -DECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE=15 -DENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG=1 -DENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS=1 -DENABLE_MODULE_MULTISET=1 // // Consider using libgmp. these macros are set to use the slower in-project implementation of nums // #cgo CFLAGS: -DUSE_NUM_NONE=1 -DUSE_FIELD_INV_BUILTIN=1 -DUSE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN=1 -DECMULT_GEN_PREC_BITS=4 // // x86_64 can use the Assembly implementation. // #cgo amd64 CFLAGS: -DUSE_ASM_X86_64=1 -// // check if 32 bit -// #cgo 386 amd64p32 arm armbe mips mipsle mips64p32 mips64p32le ppc s390 sparc CFLAGS: -DUSE_FIELD_10X26=1 -DUSE_SCALAR_8X32=1 -// // check if 64 bit -// #cgo amd64 arm64 arm64be ppc64 ppc64le mips64 mips64le s390x sparc64 CFLAGS: -DUSE_FIELD_5X52=1 -DUSE_SCALAR_4X64=1 -DHAVE___INT128=1 -// // check if Big Endian -// #cgo arm64be armbe mips mips64 mips64p32 ppc s390 s390x sparc sparc64 CFLAGS: -DWORDS_BIGENDIAN=1 // #include "./depend/secp256k1/include/secp256k1.h" // #include "./depend/secp256k1/src/secp256k1.c" import "C" @@ -82,91 +76,3 @@ func (hash *Hash) SetBytes(newHash []byte) error { func (hash *Hash) String() string { return hex.EncodeToString(hash[:]) } - -// PrivateKey is a type representing a Secp256k1 private key. -// This private key can be used to create Schnorr/ECDSA signatures -type PrivateKey struct { - privateKey [SerializedPrivateKeySize]byte -} - -// SerializedPrivateKey is a byte array representing the storage representation of a PrivateKey -type SerializedPrivateKey [SerializedPrivateKeySize]byte - -// String returns the PrivateKey as the hexadecimal string -func (key *SerializedPrivateKey) String() string { - return hex.EncodeToString(key[:]) -} - -// String returns the PrivateKey as the hexadecimal string -func (key *PrivateKey) String() string { - return key.Serialize().String() -} - -// DeserializePrivateKey returns a PrivateKey type from a 32 byte private key. -// will verify it's a valid private key(Group Order > key > 0) -func DeserializePrivateKey(data *SerializedPrivateKey) (key *PrivateKey, err error) { - cPtr := (*C.uchar)(&data[0]) - - ret := C.secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(C.secp256k1_context_no_precomp, cPtr) - if ret != 1 { - return nil, errors.New("invalid PrivateKey (zero or bigger than the group order)") - } - - return &PrivateKey{*data}, nil -} - -// DeserializePrivateKeyFromSlice returns a PrivateKey type from a serialized private key slice. -// will verify that it's 32 byte and it's a valid private key(Group Order > key > 0) -func DeserializePrivateKeyFromSlice(data []byte) (key *PrivateKey, err error) { - if len(data) != SerializedPrivateKeySize { - return nil, errors.Errorf("invalid private key length got %d, expected %d", len(data), - SerializedPrivateKeySize) - } - - serializedKey := &SerializedPrivateKey{} - copy(serializedKey[:], data) - return DeserializePrivateKey(serializedKey) -} - -// GeneratePrivateKey generates a random valid private key from `crypto/rand` -func GeneratePrivateKey() (key *PrivateKey, err error) { - key = &PrivateKey{} - cPtr := (*C.uchar)(&key.privateKey[0]) - for { - n, tmpErr := rand.Read(key.privateKey[:]) - if tmpErr != nil || n != len(key.privateKey) { - return nil, tmpErr - } - ret := C.secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(C.secp256k1_context_no_precomp, cPtr) - if ret == 1 { - return - } - } -} - -// Serialize a private key -func (key *PrivateKey) Serialize() *SerializedPrivateKey { - ret := SerializedPrivateKey(key.privateKey) - return &ret -} - -// Negate a private key in place. -func (key *PrivateKey) Negate() { - cPtr := (*C.uchar)(&key.privateKey[0]) - ret := C.secp256k1_ec_privkey_negate(C.secp256k1_context_no_precomp, cPtr) - if ret != 1 { - panic("Failed Negating the private key. Should never happen") - } -} - -// Add a tweak to the public key by doing `key + tweak % Group Order`. this adds it in place. -// This is meant for creating BIP-32(HD) wallets -func (key *PrivateKey) Add(tweak [32]byte) error { - cPtrKey := (*C.uchar)(&key.privateKey[0]) - cPtrTweak := (*C.uchar)(&tweak[0]) - ret := C.secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(C.secp256k1_context_no_precomp, cPtrKey, cPtrTweak) - if ret != 1 { - return errors.New("failed Adding to private key. Tweak is bigger than the order or the complement of the private key") - } - return nil -} diff --git a/secp256k1_test.go b/secp256k1_test.go index a9744dd..08c480f 100644 --- a/secp256k1_test.go +++ b/secp256k1_test.go @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ package secp256k1 import ( - "bytes" "encoding/hex" "fmt" "math/big" @@ -20,33 +19,56 @@ func intTo32Bytes(i *big.Int) [32]byte { return res } -func fastGeneratePrivateKey(t *testing.T, r *rand.Rand) (key *PrivateKey) { - buf := SerializedPrivateKey{} +func negateSecp256k1Tweak(tweak []byte) { + bigTweak := new(big.Int).SetBytes(tweak) + bigTweak.Neg(bigTweak) + bigTweak.Mod(bigTweak, Secp256k1Order) + res := intTo32Bytes(bigTweak) + copy(tweak, res[:]) +} + +func fastGenerateTweak(t *testing.T, r *rand.Rand) *[32]byte { + buf := [32]byte{} for { n, err := r.Read(buf[:]) if err != nil || n != len(buf) { - t.Fatalf("Failed generating a privatekey '%s'", err) + t.Fatalf("Failed generating 32 random bytes '%s'", err) } - privkey, err := DeserializePrivateKey(&buf) + _, err = DeserializePrivateKey((*SerializedPrivateKey)(&buf)) if err == nil { - return privkey + return &buf } } } +func fastGenerateKeyPair(t *testing.T, r *rand.Rand) (key *SchnorrKeyPair) { + buf := fastGenerateTweak(t, r) + keypair, err := DeserializePrivateKey((*SerializedPrivateKey)(buf)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("A valid tweak should be a valid private key: '%s'", err) + } + return keypair +} + +func setPrivateKey(keypair *SchnorrKeyPair, bytes []byte) { + for i := 0; i < len(bytes); i++ { + keypair.keypair.data[i] = _Ctype_uchar(bytes[i]) + } +} + func TestParseSerializePrivateKey(t *testing.T) { r := rand.New(rand.NewSource(1)) for i := 0; i < loopsN; i++ { - privkey := fastGeneratePrivateKey(t, r) + keypair := fastGenerateKeyPair(t, r) - serialized := privkey.Serialize() + serialized := keypair.SerializePrivateKey() privkey2, err := DeserializePrivateKey(serialized) if err != nil { t.Errorf("Failed parsing privateKey '%s'", err) } - if *privkey != *privkey2 { - t.Errorf("Privkeys aren't equal '%s' '%s'", privkey2, privkey) + if *keypair != *privkey2 { + t.Errorf("Privkeys aren't equal '%s' '%s'", privkey2, keypair) } } } @@ -60,228 +82,156 @@ func TestGeneratePrivateKey(t *testing.T) { func TestPrivateKey_Add_Fail(t *testing.T) { r := rand.New(rand.NewSource(1)) - privkey := fastGeneratePrivateKey(t, r) - privkeyInverse := *privkey - privkeyInverse.Negate() - err := privkey.Add(privkeyInverse.privateKey) + keypair := fastGenerateKeyPair(t, r) + privkeyInverse := keypair.SerializePrivateKey() + negateSecp256k1Tweak(privkeyInverse[:]) + err := keypair.Add(*privkeyInverse) if err == nil { - t.Errorf("Adding the inverse of itself should fail, '%s', '%s', '%s'", privkey, privkeyInverse, err) + t.Errorf("Adding the inverse of itself should fail, '%s', '%s', '%s'", keypair, privkeyInverse, err) } - privkey = fastGeneratePrivateKey(t, r) + keypair = fastGenerateKeyPair(t, r) oufOfBounds := [32]byte{0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF} - err = privkey.Add(oufOfBounds) + err = keypair.Add(oufOfBounds) if err == nil { - t.Errorf("Adding a tweak bigger than the order should fail, '%s', '%x' '%s'", privkey, oufOfBounds, err) + t.Errorf("Adding a tweak bigger than the order should fail, '%s', '%x' '%s'", keypair, oufOfBounds, err) } } func TestPrivateKey_Add(t *testing.T) { r := rand.New(rand.NewSource(1)) - privkey := fastGeneratePrivateKey(t, r) - pubkey, err := privkey.SchnorrPublicKey() + keypair := fastGenerateKeyPair(t, r) + pubkey, wasOdd, err := keypair.schnorrPublicKeyInternal() if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } - originalPubKey := *pubkey - originalPrivatekey := *privkey - privkeyBig := new(big.Int).SetBytes(privkey.privateKey[:]) + privkeyBig := new(big.Int).SetBytes(keypair.SerializePrivateKey()[:]) seedBig := big.Int{} - seeds := make([]big.Int, loopsN) - privkeyBigOriginal := new(big.Int).Set(privkeyBig) for i := 0; i < loopsN; i++ { - seed := fastGeneratePrivateKey(t, r) - err := privkey.Add(seed.privateKey) - if err != nil { - t.Errorf("failed adding seed: '%s' to key: '%s'", seed, privkey) + if wasOdd { // Schnorr secret keys are always even + privkeyBig.Neg(privkeyBig) } - err = pubkey.Add(seed.privateKey) - if err != nil { // This shouldn't fail if the same operation for the privateKey didn't fail. - t.Error(err) - } - seedBig.SetBytes(seed.privateKey[:]) + seed := *fastGenerateTweak(t, r) + seedBig.SetBytes(seed[:]) + privkeyBig.Add(privkeyBig, &seedBig) privkeyBig.Mod(privkeyBig, Secp256k1Order) - if intTo32Bytes(privkeyBig) != privkey.privateKey { - t.Errorf("Add operation failed, '%s' != '%s'", intTo32Bytes(privkeyBig), privkey.privateKey) - } - tmpPubKey, err := privkey.SchnorrPublicKey() - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed generating pubkey from '%s'. '%s'", privkey, err) - } - if !pubkey.IsEqual(tmpPubKey) { - t.Fatalf("tweaked pubkey '%s' doesn't match tweaked privateKey '%s', '%s'", pubkey, tmpPubKey, privkey) - } - seeds[i].Set(&seedBig) - } - - for i := 0; i < loopsN; i++ { - slicedSeed := seeds[i].Bytes() - seed := [32]byte{} - copy(seed[32-len(slicedSeed):], slicedSeed) - // By negating before and after it has the same affect as subtracting - // -(-A+B) = A-B - privkey.Negate() - err := privkey.Add(seed) + err := keypair.Add(seed) if err != nil { - t.Errorf("failed adding seed: '%x' to key: '%s' i: '%d'", seed, privkey, i) + t.Fatalf("failed adding seed: '%s' to key: '%s'", seed, keypair) } - privkey.Negate() - - pubkey.Negate() - err = pubkey.Add(seed) + wasOdd, err = pubkey.addInternal(seed) if err != nil { // This shouldn't fail if the same operation for the privateKey didn't fail. t.Fatal(err) } - pubkey.Negate() - t.Logf("seed: big: %x, array: %x", seeds[i].Bytes(), seed) - privkeyBig.Sub(privkeyBig, &seeds[i]) - privkeyBig.Mod(privkeyBig, Secp256k1Order) - if intTo32Bytes(privkeyBig) != privkey.privateKey { - t.Fatalf("Add operation failed, '%x' != '%s'", intTo32Bytes(privkeyBig), privkey) - } - tmpPubKey, err := privkey.SchnorrPublicKey() + tmpPubKey, err := keypair.SchnorrPublicKey() if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed generating pubkey from '%s' '%s'", err, privkey) + t.Fatalf("Failed generating pubkey from '%s'. '%s'", keypair, err) + } + + if intTo32Bytes(privkeyBig) != *keypair.SerializePrivateKey() { + t.Fatalf("Add operation failed, i=%d '%x' != '%s'", i, intTo32Bytes(privkeyBig), keypair.SerializePrivateKey()) } if !pubkey.IsEqual(tmpPubKey) { - t.Errorf("tweaked pubkey '%s' doesn't match tweaked privateKey '%s', '%s'", pubkey, privkey, tmpPubKey) + t.Fatalf("tweaked pubkey '%s' doesn't match tweaked privateKey '%s', '%s'", pubkey, tmpPubKey, keypair) } } - if privkey.privateKey != originalPrivatekey.privateKey { - t.Errorf("resulting privateKey: '%s' doesn't match original: '%s'", privkey, originalPrivatekey) - } - if privkeyBigOriginal.Cmp(privkeyBig) != 0 { - t.Errorf("resulting bigint privateKey: '%x' doesn't match original: '%x'", privkeyBig.Bytes(), privkeyBigOriginal.Bytes()) - } - - if !pubkey.IsEqual(&originalPubKey) { - t.Errorf("resulting privateKey: '%s' doesn't match original: '%s'", privkey, originalPrivatekey) - } } func TestParseSchnorrPubKeyFail(t *testing.T) { - r := rand.New(rand.NewSource(1)) - zeros := [65]byte{} - _, err := DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(zeros[:]) - if err == nil { - t.Errorf("Shouldn't parse 65 zeros as a pubkey '%x'", zeros) - } - _, err = DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(zeros[:33]) - if err == nil { - t.Errorf("Shouldn't parse 33 zeros as a pubkey '%x'", zeros[:33]) + zeros := [32]byte{} + max := [32]byte{} + for i := range max { + max[i] = 0xff } - zeros[0] = 0x04 - _, err = DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(zeros[:]) - if err == nil { - t.Errorf("Shouldn't parse zeroed x and y as pubkey '%x'", zeros) - } - pubkey, err := fastGeneratePrivateKey(t, r).SchnorrPublicKey() - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed generating a random pubkey: '%s'", err) - } - compressed, err := pubkey.SerializeCompressed() - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed serializing a pubkey: '%s' '%s'", pubkey, err) - } - oddnessByte := compressed[0] - compressed[0] = 0x07 - _, err = DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(compressed[:]) - if err == nil { - t.Errorf("Shouldn't parse a compressed key starting with 0x07 '%x'", compressed) - } - uncompressed, err := pubkey.SerializeUncompressed() - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed serializing a pubkey: '%s' '%s'", pubkey, err) - } - uncompressed[0] = oddnessByte - _, err = DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(uncompressed[:]) + _, err := DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(zeros[:]) if err == nil { - t.Errorf("Shouldn't parse an uncompressed key starting with 0x2/0x03 '%x'", uncompressed) + t.Errorf("Shouldn't parse 32 zeros as a pubkey '%x'", zeros) } - uncompressed[0] = oddnessByte + 0x04 - _, err = DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(uncompressed[:]) + _, err = DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(zeros[:30]) if err == nil { - t.Errorf("Shouldn't parse a weird hybrid pubkey '%x'", uncompressed) + t.Errorf("Shouldn't parse 30 zeros as a pubkey '%x'", zeros[:30]) } - uncompressed[0] = 0x04 - uncompressed[64] += 0x01 - _, err = DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(uncompressed[:]) + _, err = DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(max[:]) if err == nil { - t.Errorf("Shouldn't parse a point with invalid y coordinate '%x'", uncompressed) + t.Errorf("Shouldn't parse 32 0xFF as a pubkey '%x' (it's above the field order)", max) } } func TestSchnorrPublicKey_SerializeFail(t *testing.T) { pubkey := SchnorrPublicKey{} - _, err := pubkey.SerializeCompressed() + _, err := pubkey.Serialize() if err == nil { t.Errorf("Zeroed public key isn't serializable as compressed") } - _, err = pubkey.SerializeUncompressed() - if err == nil { - t.Errorf("Zeroed public key isn't serializable as uncompressed") - } } func TestBadPrivateKeyPublicKeyFail(t *testing.T) { r := rand.New(rand.NewSource(1)) - goodPrivateKey := fastGeneratePrivateKey(t, r) - goodPublicKey, err := goodPrivateKey.SchnorrPublicKey() + goodKeyPair := fastGenerateKeyPair(t, r) + goodPublicKey, err := goodKeyPair.SchnorrPublicKey() if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed generating pubkey from: '%s'. '%s'", goodPrivateKey, err) + t.Fatalf("Failed generating pubkey from: '%s'. '%s'", goodKeyPair, err) } goodPublicKeyBackup := *goodPublicKey - goodPrivateKeyBackup := *goodPrivateKey - msg := Hash(fastGeneratePrivateKey(t, r).privateKey) - privkey := PrivateKey{} - - _, err1 := privkey.SchnorrPublicKey() - _, err2 := privkey.SchnorrSign(&msg) - _, err3 := DeserializePrivateKey(privkey.Serialize()) - err4 := goodPrivateKey.Add(privkey.privateKey) - err5 := goodPublicKey.Add(privkey.privateKey) - if err1 == nil || err2 == nil || err3 == nil { - t.Errorf("A zeroed key is invalid, err1: '%s', err2: '%s', err3: '%s'", err1, err2, err3) - } - if err4 != nil || err5 != nil { - t.Errorf("It should be possible to add zero to a key, err4: '%s', err5: '%s'", err4, err5) - } - copy(privkey.privateKey[:], Secp256k1Order.Bytes()) - _, err1 = privkey.SchnorrPublicKey() - _, err2 = privkey.SchnorrSign(&msg) - _, err3 = DeserializePrivateKey(privkey.Serialize()) - *goodPrivateKey = goodPrivateKeyBackup + goodKeyPairBackup := *goodKeyPair + msg := Hash(*fastGenerateTweak(t, r)) + keypair := SchnorrKeyPair{} + var zeros32 [32]byte + + _, err1 := keypair.SchnorrPublicKey() + _, err2 := keypair.SchnorrSign(&msg) + err3 := keypair.Add(zeros32) + _, err4 := DeserializePrivateKey(keypair.SerializePrivateKey()) + if err1 == nil || err2 == nil || err3 == nil || err4 == nil { + t.Errorf("A zeroed key is invalid, err1: '%s', err2: '%s', err3: '%s', err4: '%s'", err1, err2, err3, err4) + } + + err5 := goodKeyPair.Add(zeros32) + err6 := goodPublicKey.Add(zeros32) + if err5 != nil || err6 != nil { + t.Errorf("It should be possible to add zero to a key, err4: '%s', err5: '%s'", err5, err6) + } + + setPrivateKey(&keypair, Secp256k1Order.Bytes()) + _, err1 = keypair.SchnorrPublicKey() + _, err2 = keypair.SchnorrSign(&msg) + _, err3 = DeserializePrivateKey(keypair.SerializePrivateKey()) + *goodKeyPair = goodKeyPairBackup *goodPublicKey = goodPublicKeyBackup - err4 = goodPrivateKey.Add(privkey.privateKey) - err5 = goodPublicKey.Add(privkey.privateKey) + err4 = goodKeyPair.Add(intTo32Bytes(Secp256k1Order)) + err5 = goodPublicKey.Add(intTo32Bytes(Secp256k1Order)) if err1 == nil || err2 == nil || err3 == nil || err4 == nil || err5 == nil { t.Errorf("the group order isn't a valid key, err1: '%s', err2: '%s', err3: '%s', err4: '%s', err5: '%s'", err1, err2, err3, err4, err5) } + keypair = *fastGenerateKeyPair(t, r) orderPlusOne := new(big.Int).SetInt64(1) orderPlusOne.Add(orderPlusOne, Secp256k1Order) - copy(privkey.privateKey[:], orderPlusOne.Bytes()) - _, err1 = privkey.SchnorrPublicKey() - _, err2 = privkey.SchnorrSign(&msg) - _, err3 = DeserializePrivateKey(privkey.Serialize()) - *goodPrivateKey = goodPrivateKeyBackup + setPrivateKey(&keypair, orderPlusOne.Bytes()) + orderPlusOneArray := intTo32Bytes(orderPlusOne) + _, err = DeserializePrivateKeyFromSlice(orderPlusOneArray[:]) + if err1 == nil || err2 == nil || err3 == nil || err4 == nil { + t.Errorf("A key bigger than the group order isn't a valid key, err: '%s'", err) + } + *goodKeyPair = goodKeyPairBackup *goodPublicKey = goodPublicKeyBackup - err4 = goodPrivateKey.Add(privkey.privateKey) - err5 = goodPublicKey.Add(privkey.privateKey) - if err1 == nil || err2 == nil || err3 == nil || err4 == nil || err5 == nil { - t.Errorf("A key bigger than the group order isn't a valid key, err1: '%s', err2: '%s', err3: '%s', err4: '%s', err5: '%s'", err1, err2, err3, err4, err5) - } - OrderMinusOne := new(big.Int).SetInt64(1) - orderPlusOne.Sub(Secp256k1Order, OrderMinusOne) - copy(privkey.privateKey[:], orderPlusOne.Bytes()) - _, err1 = privkey.SchnorrPublicKey() - _, err2 = privkey.SchnorrSign(&msg) - _, err3 = DeserializePrivateKey(privkey.Serialize()) - *goodPrivateKey = goodPrivateKeyBackup + + err1 = goodKeyPair.Add(intTo32Bytes(orderPlusOne)) + err2 = goodPublicKey.Add(intTo32Bytes(orderPlusOne)) + if err1 == nil || err2 == nil { + t.Errorf("A tweak bigger than the group order isn't a valid tweak, err1: '%s', err2: '%s'", err1, err2) + } + orderMinusOne := new(big.Int).Sub(Secp256k1Order, new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) + orderPlusOne = nil + setPrivateKey(&keypair, orderMinusOne.Bytes()) + _, err1 = keypair.SchnorrPublicKey() + _, err2 = keypair.SchnorrSign(&msg) + _, err3 = DeserializePrivateKey(keypair.SerializePrivateKey()) + *goodKeyPair = goodKeyPairBackup *goodPublicKey = goodPublicKeyBackup - err4 = goodPrivateKey.Add(privkey.privateKey) - err5 = goodPublicKey.Add(privkey.privateKey) + err4 = goodKeyPair.Add(intTo32Bytes(orderMinusOne)) + err5 = goodPublicKey.Add(intTo32Bytes(orderMinusOne)) if err1 != nil || err2 != nil || err3 != nil || err4 != nil || err5 != nil { t.Errorf("Group order - 1 should be a valid key, err1: '%s', err2: '%s', err3: '%s', err4: '%s', err5: '%s'", err1, err2, err3, err4, err5) } @@ -290,27 +240,21 @@ func TestBadPrivateKeyPublicKeyFail(t *testing.T) { func TestParseSchnorrPubKey(t *testing.T) { r := rand.New(rand.NewSource(1)) for i := 0; i < loopsN; i++ { - privkey := fastGeneratePrivateKey(t, r) - pubkey, err := privkey.SchnorrPublicKey() + keypair := fastGenerateKeyPair(t, r) + pubkey, err := keypair.SchnorrPublicKey() if err != nil { - t.Errorf("Failed Generating a pubkey from privateKey: '%s'. '%s'", privkey, err) - } - serializedCompressed, err1 := pubkey.SerializeCompressed() - serializedUncompressed, err2 := pubkey.SerializeUncompressed() - if err1 != nil || err2 != nil { - t.Errorf("Failed serializing the key: %s, errors: %s, '%s'", pubkey, err1, err2) + t.Errorf("Failed Generating a pubkey from privateKey: '%s'. '%s'", keypair, err) } - pubkeyNew1, err := DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(serializedCompressed[:]) + serializedPubkey, err := pubkey.Serialize() if err != nil { - t.Errorf("Failed Parsing the compressed public key from privkey: '%s'. '%s'", pubkeyNew1, err) + t.Errorf("Failed serializing the key: %s, error: '%s'", pubkey, err) } - pubkeyNew2, err := DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(serializedUncompressed[:]) + pubkeyNew1, err := DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(serializedPubkey[:]) if err != nil { - t.Errorf("Failed Parsing the uncompressed public key from privkey: '%s'. '%s'", pubkeyNew2, err) + t.Errorf("Failed Parsing the compressed public key from keypair: '%s'. '%s'", pubkeyNew1, err) } - - if !pubkey.IsEqual(pubkeyNew1) || !pubkey.IsEqual(pubkeyNew2) { - t.Errorf("Pubkeys aren't the same: '%s', '%s', '%s'", pubkey, pubkeyNew1, pubkeyNew2) + if !pubkey.IsEqual(pubkeyNew1) { + t.Errorf("Pubkeys aren't the same: '%s', '%s',", pubkey, pubkeyNew1) } } } @@ -318,27 +262,27 @@ func TestParseSchnorrPubKey(t *testing.T) { func TestSignVerifyParseSchnorr(t *testing.T) { r := rand.New(rand.NewSource(1)) for i := 0; i < loopsN; i++ { - privkey := fastGeneratePrivateKey(t, r) + keypair := fastGenerateKeyPair(t, r) - pubkey, err := privkey.SchnorrPublicKey() + pubkey, err := keypair.SchnorrPublicKey() if err != nil { - t.Errorf("Failed generating a pubkey, privateKey: '%s', error: %s", privkey, err) + t.Errorf("Failed generating a pubkey, privateKey: '%s', error: %s", keypair, err) } msg := Hash{} n, err := r.Read(msg[:]) if err != nil || n != 32 { t.Errorf("Failed generating a msg. read: '%d' bytes. .'%s'", n, err) } - sig1, err := privkey.SchnorrSign(&msg) + sig1, err := keypair.SchnorrSign(&msg) if err != nil { - t.Errorf("Failed signing schnorr: key: '%s', msg: '%s', error: '%s'", privkey, msg, err) + t.Errorf("Failed signing schnorr: key: '%s', msg: '%s', error: '%s'", keypair, msg, err) } - sig2, err := privkey.SchnorrSign(&msg) + sig2, err := keypair.SchnorrSign(&msg) if err != nil { - t.Errorf("Failed signing schnorr: key: '%s', msg: '%s', error: '%s'", privkey, msg, err) + t.Errorf("Failed signing schnorr: key: '%s', msg: '%s', error: '%s'", keypair, msg, err) } - if *sig1 != *sig2 { - t.Errorf("Signing isn't deterministic '%s' '%s'", sig1, sig2) + if *sig1 == *sig2 { + t.Errorf("Signing uses auxilary randomness, the odds of 2 signatures being the same is 1/2^128 '%s' '%s'", sig1, sig2) } serialized := sig1.Serialize() sigDeserialized := DeserializeSchnorrSignature(serialized) @@ -346,7 +290,10 @@ func TestSignVerifyParseSchnorr(t *testing.T) { t.Errorf("Failed Deserializing schnorr signature '%s'", serialized) } if !pubkey.SchnorrVerify(&msg, sig1) { - t.Errorf("Failed verifying schnorr signature privateKey: '%s' pubkey: '%s' signature: '%s'", privkey, pubkey, sig1) + t.Errorf("Failed verifying schnorr signature privateKey: '%s' pubkey: '%s' signature: '%s'", keypair, pubkey, sig1) + } + if !pubkey.SchnorrVerify(&msg, sig2) { + t.Errorf("Failed verifying schnorr signature privateKey: '%s' pubkey: '%s' signature: '%s'", keypair, pubkey, sig2) } } } @@ -365,157 +312,188 @@ func decodeHex(hexStr string) []byte { } func TestSchnorrSignatureVerify(t *testing.T) { - // Test vectors taken from https://github.com/sipa/bips/blob/bip-schnorr/bip-schnorr/test-vectors.csv + // Test vectors taken from https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340/test-vectors.csv tests := []struct { + secKey []byte pubKey []byte + auxRand []byte message []byte signature []byte valid bool }{ { - decodeHex("0279BE667EF9DCBBAC55A06295CE870B07029BFCDB2DCE28D959F2815B16F81798"), + decodeHex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003"), + decodeHex("F9308A019258C31049344F85F89D5229B531C845836F99B08601F113BCE036F9"), decodeHex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"), - decodeHex("787A848E71043D280C50470E8E1532B2DD5D20EE912A45DBDD2BD1DFBF187EF67031A98831859DC34DFFEEDDA86831842CCD0079E1F92AF177F7F22CC1DCED05"), + decodeHex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"), + decodeHex("E907831F80848D1069A5371B402410364BDF1C5F8307B0084C55F1CE2DCA821525F66A4A85EA8B71E482A74F382D2CE5EBEEE8FDB2172F477DF4900D310536C0"), true, }, { - decodeHex("02DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + decodeHex("B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C762E7160F38B4DA56A784D9045190CFEF"), + decodeHex("DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + decodeHex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001"), decodeHex("243F6A8885A308D313198A2E03707344A4093822299F31D0082EFA98EC4E6C89"), - decodeHex("2A298DACAE57395A15D0795DDBFD1DCB564DA82B0F269BC70A74F8220429BA1D1E51A22CCEC35599B8F266912281F8365FFC2D035A230434A1A64DC59F7013FD"), + decodeHex("6896BD60EEAE296DB48A229FF71DFE071BDE413E6D43F917DC8DCF8C78DE33418906D11AC976ABCCB20B091292BFF4EA897EFCB639EA871CFA95F6DE339E4B0A"), true, }, { - decodeHex("03FAC2114C2FBB091527EB7C64ECB11F8021CB45E8E7809D3C0938E4B8C0E5F84B"), - decodeHex("5E2D58D8B3BCDF1ABADEC7829054F90DDA9805AAB56C77333024B9D0A508B75C"), - decodeHex("00DA9B08172A9B6F0466A2DEFD817F2D7AB437E0D253CB5395A963866B3574BE00880371D01766935B92D2AB4CD5C8A2A5837EC57FED7660773A05F0DE142380"), + decodeHex("C90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B14E5C9"), + decodeHex("DD308AFEC5777E13121FA72B9CC1B7CC0139715309B086C960E18FD969774EB8"), + decodeHex("C87AA53824B4D7AE2EB035A2B5BBBCCC080E76CDC6D1692C4B0B62D798E6D906"), + decodeHex("7E2D58D8B3BCDF1ABADEC7829054F90DDA9805AAB56C77333024B9D0A508B75C"), + decodeHex("5831AAEED7B44BB74E5EAB94BA9D4294C49BCF2A60728D8B4C200F50DD313C1BAB745879A5AD954A72C45A91C3A51D3C7ADEA98D82F8481E0E1E03674A6F3FB7"), true, }, - { - decodeHex("03DEFDEA4CDB677750A420FEE807EACF21EB9898AE79B9768766E4FAA04A2D4A34"), - decodeHex("4DF3C3F68FCC83B27E9D42C90431A72499F17875C81A599B566C9889B9696703"), - decodeHex("00000000000000000000003B78CE563F89A0ED9414F5AA28AD0D96D6795F9C6302A8DC32E64E86A333F20EF56EAC9BA30B7246D6D25E22ADB8C6BE1AEB08D49D"), + { // test fails if msg is reduced modulo p or n + decodeHex("0B432B2677937381AEF05BB02A66ECD012773062CF3FA2549E44F58ED2401710"), + decodeHex("25D1DFF95105F5253C4022F628A996AD3A0D95FBF21D468A1B33F8C160D8F517"), + decodeHex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"), + decodeHex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"), + decodeHex("7EB0509757E246F19449885651611CB965ECC1A187DD51B64FDA1EDC9637D5EC97582B9CB13DB3933705B32BA982AF5AF25FD78881EBB32771FC5922EFC66EA3"), true, }, { - decodeHex("031B84C5567B126440995D3ED5AABA0565D71E1834604819FF9C17F5E9D5DD078F"), - decodeHex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"), - decodeHex("52818579ACA59767E3291D91B76B637BEF062083284992F2D95F564CA6CB4E3530B1DA849C8E8304ADC0CFE870660334B3CFC18E825EF1DB34CFAE3DFC5D8187"), + nil, + decodeHex("D69C3509BB99E412E68B0FE8544E72837DFA30746D8BE2AA65975F29D22DC7B9"), + nil, + decodeHex("4DF3C3F68FCC83B27E9D42C90431A72499F17875C81A599B566C9889B9696703"), + decodeHex("00000000000000000000003B78CE563F89A0ED9414F5AA28AD0D96D6795F9C6376AFB1548AF603B3EB45C9F8207DEE1060CB71C04E80F593060B07D28308D7F4"), true, }, - { - decodeHex("03FAC2114C2FBB091527EB7C64ECB11F8021CB45E8E7809D3C0938E4B8C0E5F84B"), - decodeHex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"), - decodeHex("570DD4CA83D4E6317B8EE6BAE83467A1BF419D0767122DE409394414B05080DCE9EE5F237CBD108EABAE1E37759AE47F8E4203DA3532EB28DB860F33D62D49BD"), - true, + { //public key not on the curve + nil, + decodeHex("EEFDEA4CDB677750A420FEE807EACF21EB9898AE79B9768766E4FAA04A2D4A34"), + nil, + decodeHex("243F6A8885A308D313198A2E03707344A4093822299F31D0082EFA98EC4E6C89"), + decodeHex("6CFF5C3BA86C69EA4B7376F31A9BCB4F74C1976089B2D9963DA2E5543E17776969E89B4C5564D00349106B8497785DD7D1D713A8AE82B32FA79D5F7FC407D39B"), + false, }, - { - decodeHex("02DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + { // has_even_y(R) is false + nil, + decodeHex("DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + nil, decodeHex("243F6A8885A308D313198A2E03707344A4093822299F31D0082EFA98EC4E6C89"), - decodeHex("2A298DACAE57395A15D0795DDBFD1DCB564DA82B0F269BC70A74F8220429BA1DFA16AEE06609280A19B67A24E1977E4697712B5FD2943914ECD5F730901B4AB7"), + decodeHex("FFF97BD5755EEEA420453A14355235D382F6472F8568A18B2F057A14602975563CC27944640AC607CD107AE10923D9EF7A73C643E166BE5EBEAFA34B1AC553E2"), false, }, - { - decodeHex("03FAC2114C2FBB091527EB7C64ECB11F8021CB45E8E7809D3C0938E4B8C0E5F84B"), - decodeHex("5E2D58D8B3BCDF1ABADEC7829054F90DDA9805AAB56C77333024B9D0A508B75C"), - decodeHex("00DA9B08172A9B6F0466A2DEFD817F2D7AB437E0D253CB5395A963866B3574BED092F9D860F1776A1F7412AD8A1EB50DACCC222BC8C0E26B2056DF2F273EFDEC"), + { // negated message + nil, + decodeHex("DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + nil, + decodeHex("243F6A8885A308D313198A2E03707344A4093822299F31D0082EFA98EC4E6C89"), + decodeHex("1FA62E331EDBC21C394792D2AB1100A7B432B013DF3F6FF4F99FCB33E0E1515F28890B3EDB6E7189B630448B515CE4F8622A954CFE545735AAEA5134FCCDB2BD"), false, }, - { - decodeHex("0279BE667EF9DCBBAC55A06295CE870B07029BFCDB2DCE28D959F2815B16F81798"), - decodeHex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"), - decodeHex("787A848E71043D280C50470E8E1532B2DD5D20EE912A45DBDD2BD1DFBF187EF68FCE5677CE7A623CB20011225797CE7A8DE1DC6CCD4F754A47DA6C600E59543C"), + { // negated s value + nil, + decodeHex("DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + nil, + decodeHex("243F6A8885A308D313198A2E03707344A4093822299F31D0082EFA98EC4E6C89"), + decodeHex("6CFF5C3BA86C69EA4B7376F31A9BCB4F74C1976089B2D9963DA2E5543E177769961764B3AA9B2FFCB6EF947B6887A226E8D7C93E00C5ED0C1834FF0D0C2E6DA6"), false, }, - { - decodeHex("03DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + { // sG - eP is infinite. Test fails in single verification if has_even_y(inf) is defined as true and x(inf) as 0 + nil, + decodeHex("DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + nil, decodeHex("243F6A8885A308D313198A2E03707344A4093822299F31D0082EFA98EC4E6C89"), - decodeHex("2A298DACAE57395A15D0795DDBFD1DCB564DA82B0F269BC70A74F8220429BA1D1E51A22CCEC35599B8F266912281F8365FFC2D035A230434A1A64DC59F7013FD"), + decodeHex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000123DDA8328AF9C23A94C1FEECFD123BA4FB73476F0D594DCB65C6425BD186051"), false, }, - { - decodeHex("03DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + { // sG - eP is infinite. Test fails in single verification if has_even_y(inf) is defined as true and x(inf) as 1 + nil, + decodeHex("DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + nil, decodeHex("243F6A8885A308D313198A2E03707344A4093822299F31D0082EFA98EC4E6C89"), - decodeHex("00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009E9D01AF988B5CEDCE47221BFA9B222721F3FA408915444A4B489021DB55775F"), + decodeHex("00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000017615FBAF5AE28864013C099742DEADB4DBA87F11AC6754F93780D5A1837CF197"), false, }, - { - decodeHex("03DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + { // sig[0:32] is not an X coordinate on the curve + nil, + decodeHex("DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + nil, decodeHex("243F6A8885A308D313198A2E03707344A4093822299F31D0082EFA98EC4E6C89"), - decodeHex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001D37DDF0254351836D84B1BD6A795FD5D523048F298C4214D187FE4892947F728"), + decodeHex("4A298DACAE57395A15D0795DDBFD1DCB564DA82B0F269BC70A74F8220429BA1D69E89B4C5564D00349106B8497785DD7D1D713A8AE82B32FA79D5F7FC407D39B"), false, }, - { - decodeHex("03DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + { // sig[0:32] is equal to field size + nil, + decodeHex("DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + nil, decodeHex("243F6A8885A308D313198A2E03707344A4093822299F31D0082EFA98EC4E6C89"), - decodeHex("4A298DACAE57395A15D0795DDBFD1DCB564DA82B0F269BC70A74F8220429BA1D1E51A22CCEC35599B8F266912281F8365FFC2D035A230434A1A64DC59F7013FD"), + decodeHex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC2F69E89B4C5564D00349106B8497785DD7D1D713A8AE82B32FA79D5F7FC407D39B"), false, }, - { - decodeHex("03DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + { // sig[32:64] is equal to curve order + nil, + decodeHex("DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + nil, decodeHex("243F6A8885A308D313198A2E03707344A4093822299F31D0082EFA98EC4E6C89"), - decodeHex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC2F1E51A22CCEC35599B8F266912281F8365FFC2D035A230434A1A64DC59F7013FD"), + decodeHex("6CFF5C3BA86C69EA4B7376F31A9BCB4F74C1976089B2D9963DA2E5543E177769FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAAEDCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141"), false, }, - { - decodeHex("03DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659"), + { // public key is not a valid X coordinate because it exceeds the field size + nil, + decodeHex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC30"), + nil, decodeHex("243F6A8885A308D313198A2E03707344A4093822299F31D0082EFA98EC4E6C89"), - decodeHex("2A298DACAE57395A15D0795DDBFD1DCB564DA82B0F269BC70A74F8220429BA1DFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAAEDCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141"), + decodeHex("6CFF5C3BA86C69EA4B7376F31A9BCB4F74C1976089B2D9963DA2E5543E17776969E89B4C5564D00349106B8497785DD7D1D713A8AE82B32FA79D5F7FC407D39B"), false, }, } msg32 := Hash{} for i, test := range tests { - pubkey, err := DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(test.pubKey) - if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } sig, err := DeserializeSchnorrSignatureFromSlice(test.signature) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } - err = msg32.SetBytes(test.message) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } - valid := pubkey.SchnorrVerify(&msg32, sig) - if valid != test.valid { - t.Errorf("Schnorr test vector '%d' expected verification: '%t', got: '%t'", i, valid, test.valid) + pubkey, err := DeserializeSchnorrPubKey(test.pubKey) + if err != nil && test.valid { + t.Fatalf("Schnorr test vector '%d': %s, pubkey: %x", i, err, test.pubKey) + } + if err == nil { + valid := pubkey.SchnorrVerify(&msg32, sig) + if valid != test.valid { + t.Errorf("Schnorr test vector '%d' expected verification: '%t', got: '%t'", i, valid, test.valid) + } + } + if test.secKey != nil { + var auxRandPtr *[32]byte + keypair, err := DeserializePrivateKeyFromSlice(test.secKey) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if test.auxRand != nil { + auxRandPtr = &[32]byte{} + if len(auxRandPtr) != len(test.auxRand) { + t.Fatalf("Schnorr test vector '%d': invalid auxilary randomness length: %d != %d", i, len(auxRandPtr), len(test.auxRand)) + } + copy(auxRandPtr[:], test.auxRand) + } + + newSig, err := keypair.schnorrSignInternal(&msg32, auxRandPtr) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if !newSig.IsEqual(sig) { + t.Errorf("Schnorr test vector '%d' expected sig: %s. got: %s", i, sig, newSig) + } } - } -} - -func TestDeterministicSchnorrSignatureGen(t *testing.T) { - // Test vector from Bitcoin-ABC - - privKey, err := DeserializePrivateKeyFromSlice(decodeHex("12b004fff7f4b69ef8650e767f18f11ede158148b425660723b9f9a66e61f747")) - if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } - - msg := Hash{} - err = msg.SetBytes(decodeHex("5255683da567900bfd3e786ed8836a4e7763c221bf1ac20ece2a5171b9199e8a")) - if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } - sig, err := privKey.SchnorrSign(&msg) - if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } - serializedSig := sig.Serialize() - if !bytes.Equal(serializedSig[:32], decodeHex("2c56731ac2f7a7e7f11518fc7722a166b02438924ca9d8b4d111347b81d07175")) || - !bytes.Equal(serializedSig[32:], decodeHex("71846de67ad3d913a8fdf9d8f3f73161a4c48ae81cb183b214765feb86e255ce")) { - t.Error("Failed to generate deterministic schnorr signature") } } func TestSchnorrPublicKey_IsEqual(t *testing.T) { r := rand.New(rand.NewSource(1)) - goodPrivateKey := fastGeneratePrivateKey(t, r) - goodPublicKey, err := goodPrivateKey.SchnorrPublicKey() + goodKeyPair := fastGenerateKeyPair(t, r) + goodPublicKey, err := goodKeyPair.SchnorrPublicKey() if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed generating pubkey from: '%s'. '%s'", goodPrivateKey, err) + t.Fatalf("Failed generating pubkey from: '%s'. '%s'", goodKeyPair, err) } badPublicKey := SchnorrPublicKey{} if badPublicKey.IsEqual(goodPublicKey) { @@ -537,10 +515,10 @@ func TestSchnorrPublicKey_IsEqual(t *testing.T) { if !copyGoodPubkey.IsEqual(goodPublicKey) { t.Errorf("A pubkey and its copy should be the same") } - goodPrivateKey2 := fastGeneratePrivateKey(t, r) - goodPublicKey2, err := goodPrivateKey2.SchnorrPublicKey() + goodKeyPair2 := fastGenerateKeyPair(t, r) + goodPublicKey2, err := goodKeyPair2.SchnorrPublicKey() if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed generating pubkey from: '%s'. '%s'", goodPrivateKey2, err) + t.Fatalf("Failed generating pubkey from: '%s'. '%s'", goodKeyPair2, err) } if goodPublicKey.IsEqual(goodPublicKey2) {