From d6837aa121fe08c6108138893e4ab33cbd6fd906 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: adbenitez A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally and stores it
+ A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally, encrypts it and stores it
on the chatmail server. When a chatmail server receives an e-mail for a Delta Chat user
-it forwards the “device token” to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.
The central Delta Chat notification proxy forwards -the “device token” to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), +
The central Delta Chat notification proxy decrypts the device token +and forwards it to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), without ever knowing the IP or e-mail address of Delta Chat users.
As of May 2024, chatmail servers know about “device tokens” -but we plan to encrypt this information to the notification proxy -such that the chatmail server never learns the device token.
-The central Delta Chat notification proxy is small and fully implemented in Rust and forgets about device-tokens as soon as Apple/Google/etc processed them, usually in a matter of milliseconds.
+Note that the device token is encrypted between apps and notification proxy +but it is not signed. +The notification proxy thus never sees e-mail addresses, IP-addresses or +any cryptographic identity information associated with a user’s device (token).
+Resulting from this overall privacy design, even the seizure of a chatmail server, or the full seizure of the central Delta Chat notification proxy would not reveal private information that Push services do not already have.
diff --git a/src/main/assets/help/de/help.html b/src/main/assets/help/de/help.html index 4ee818ed9..5584cb4a2 100644 --- a/src/main/assets/help/de/help.html +++ b/src/main/assets/help/de/help.html @@ -557,16 +557,15 @@Eine Delta-Chat-Anwendung erhält lokal ein „Geräte-Token“ (eine zufällige Zahl) und speichert es +
Eine Delta-Chat-Anwendung erhält lokal ein „Geräte-Token“, verschlüsselt und speichert es auf dem Chatmail-Server.
Wenn ein Chatmail-Server eine E-Mail für einen Delta-Chat-Benutzer erhält -erhält, leitet er den „Geräte-Token“ an den zentralen Delta-Chat-Benachrichtigungs-Proxy weiter.
+erhält, leitet er das verschlüsselte Geräte-Token an den zentralen Delta-Chat-Benachrichtigungs-Proxy weiter.Der zentrale Delta-Chat-Benachrichtigungs-Proxy leitet -das „Geräte-Token“ an den jeweiligen Push-Dienst (Apple, Google, etc.) weiter, +
Der zentrale Delta-Chat-Benachrichtigungs-Proxy entschlüsselt das Geräte-Token und leitet es an den jeweiligen Push-Dienst (Apple, Google, etc.) weiter, ohne jemals die IP- oder E-Mail-Adresse des Delta-Chat-Benutzers zu kennen.
Stand Mai 2024 kennen die Chatmail-Server die Geräte-Token, -aber wir planen, diese Informationen an den Benachrichtigungs-Proxy zu verschlüsseln -zu verschlüsseln, so dass der Chatmail-Server niemals das „Geräte-Token“ erfährt.
-Der zentrale Delta-Chat-Benachrichtigungs-Proxy ist klein und vollständig in Rust implementiert und vergisst die Geräte-Token, sobald Apple/Google/etc. sie verarbeitet hat, normalerweise innerhalb weniger Millisekunden.
+Beachten Sie, dass das Geräte-Token zwischen Anwendungen und dem Benachrichtigungs-Proxy verschlüsselt, +aber nicht signiert ist. +Der Benachrichtigungs-Proxy sieht also niemals E-Mail-Adressen, IP-Adressen oder +irgendwelche kryptografischen Identitätsinformationen, die mit dem Gerät oder dem Geräte-Token eines Nutzers verbunden sind.
+Aufgrund dieses umfassenden Datenschutzkonzepts würde sogar die Beschlagnahmung eines Chatmail-Servers, oder die vollständige Beschlagnahmung des zentralen Delta-Chat-Benachrichtigungsproxys keine privaten Informationen preisgeben, die den zentralen Push-Diensten nicht bereits vorliegen.
diff --git a/src/main/assets/help/en/help.html b/src/main/assets/help/en/help.html index 4a0ee08a5..d1065a39c 100644 --- a/src/main/assets/help/en/help.html +++ b/src/main/assets/help/en/help.html @@ -603,16 +603,16 @@A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally and stores it +
A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally, encrypts it and stores it on the chatmail server.
When a chatmail server receives an e-mail for a Delta Chat user -it forwards the “device token” to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.
+it forwards the encrypted device token to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.The central Delta Chat notification proxy forwards -the “device token” to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), +
The central Delta Chat notification proxy decrypts the device token +and forwards it to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), without ever knowing the IP or e-mail address of Delta Chat users.
As of May 2024, chatmail servers know about “device tokens” -but we plan to encrypt this information to the notification proxy -such that the chatmail server never learns the device token.
-The central Delta Chat notification proxy is small and fully implemented in Rust and forgets about device-tokens as soon as Apple/Google/etc processed them, usually in a matter of milliseconds.
+Note that the device token is encrypted between apps and notification proxy +but it is not signed. +The notification proxy thus never sees e-mail addresses, IP-addresses or +any cryptographic identity information associated with a user’s device (token).
+Resulting from this overall privacy design, even the seizure of a chatmail server, or the full seizure of the central Delta Chat notification proxy would not reveal private information that Push services do not already have.
diff --git a/src/main/assets/help/es/help.html b/src/main/assets/help/es/help.html index 40569acea..5cbcc0ad0 100644 --- a/src/main/assets/help/es/help.html +++ b/src/main/assets/help/es/help.html @@ -597,16 +597,16 @@A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally and stores it +
A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally, encrypts it and stores it on the chatmail server.
When a chatmail server receives an e-mail for a Delta Chat user -it forwards the “device token” to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.
+it forwards the encrypted device token to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.The central Delta Chat notification proxy forwards -the “device token” to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), +
The central Delta Chat notification proxy decrypts the device token +and forwards it to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), without ever knowing the IP or e-mail address of Delta Chat users.
As of May 2024, chatmail servers know about “device tokens” -but we plan to encrypt this information to the notification proxy -such that the chatmail server never learns the device token.
-The central Delta Chat notification proxy is small and fully implemented in Rust and forgets about device-tokens as soon as Apple/Google/etc processed them, usually in a matter of milliseconds.
+Note that the device token is encrypted between apps and notification proxy +but it is not signed. +The notification proxy thus never sees e-mail addresses, IP-addresses or +any cryptographic identity information associated with a user’s device (token).
+Resulting from this overall privacy design, even the seizure of a chatmail server, or the full seizure of the central Delta Chat notification proxy would not reveal private information that Push services do not already have.
diff --git a/src/main/assets/help/fr/help.html b/src/main/assets/help/fr/help.html index 5b8a6c69c..978e4ac9f 100644 --- a/src/main/assets/help/fr/help.html +++ b/src/main/assets/help/fr/help.html @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@Delta Chat is a reliable, decentralized and secure messaging app, -available for mobile and desktop platforms.
+Delta Chat est une application de messagerie fiable, décentralisée et sécurisée, +Disponible pour les plateformes smartphone et ordinateurs de bureau.
-Delta Chat feels like Whatsapp or Telegram but you can also use and regard it as an e-mail app. -You can signup anonymously to a variety of interoperable chatmail servers -which are minimal e-mail servers optimized for fast and secure operations. -Or you may use classic e-mail servers and an existing e-mail account -in which case Delta Chat acts as an e-mail app.
+Delta Chat ressemble à Whatsapp ou Telegram mais vous pouvez aussi l’utiliser et la considérer comme une application e-mail. +Vous pouvez vous inscrire anonymement à une variété de serveurs chatmail interéopérables +Qui sont des serveurs e-mails minimalistes optimisés pour des opérations rapides et sécurisées. +Ou vous pouvez utiliser des serveurs e-mail classiques et utiliser votre compte e-mail +dans ce cas Delta Chat agit comme une application de courriel.
@@ -134,15 +134,15 @@To securely setup contact with others scan an invite QR code -or share an invite link. -This is required when using a (default) chatmail-based chat profile -because chatmail servers reject un-encrypted outgoing messages.
+Pour établir un contact en toute sécurité avec d’autres personnes scanner un code QR d’invitation +ou partager un lien d’invitation. +Cette opération est nécessaire lors de l’utilisation d’un profil de discussion basé sur le chatmail (par défaut). +car les serveurs de chatmail rejettent les messages sortants non chiffrés.
-If you create a chat profile with a classic e-mail address -you may manually create a contact if you know their e-mail address -and then write a message to them -even if the recipient is not using Delta Chat.
+Si vous créez un profil discussion avec une adresse courriel classique +vous pouvez créer manuellement un contact si vous connaissez son adresse courriel +et lui écrire un message +même si le destinataire n’utilise pas Delta Chat.
Profils anonymes de discussion avec des serveurs de chatmail rapides, sécurisés et interopérables +qui offrent des notifications push instantanées pour les appareils iOS et Android.
Pervasive multi-profile and multi-device support on all platforms.
+Fonctionnalités de multi-profil et de multi-appareil supportées sur toutes les plateformes.
Interactive web apps in chats for gaming and collaboration
+web apps dans les chats interactifs pour le gaming et la collaboration
Audited end-to-end encryption -safe against network and server attacks.
+Chiffrement de bout en bout audité +contre les attaques ciblées sur le réseau et les serveurs.
Free and Open Source software, both app and server side. -Built on E-mail and Web Internet Standards, -to avoid “yet another standard syndrome (xkcd 927)”
+Logiciel libre et open source, à la fois appli et côté serveur. +Construit sur des Standards d’Internet et d’e-mail, +pour éviter le syndrome du “standard de plus” (xkcd 927)
Yes, -you can do so under Settings → Profile → Bio. -Your contacts who use Delta Chat will see it -when they view your contact details. -Moreover, it will appear as a classic e-mail signature.
+Oui, +vous pouvez le faire sous Paramètres → Profil → Bio. +Vos contacts qui utilisent Delta Chat le verront +lorsqu’ils consulteront vos coordonnées. +De plus, elle apparaîtra sous la forme d’une signature classique sur vos courriels.
A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally and stores it +
A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally, encrypts it and stores it on the chatmail server.
When a chatmail server receives an e-mail for a Delta Chat user -it forwards the “device token” to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.
+it forwards the encrypted device token to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.The central Delta Chat notification proxy forwards -the “device token” to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), +
The central Delta Chat notification proxy decrypts the device token +and forwards it to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), without ever knowing the IP or e-mail address of Delta Chat users.
As of May 2024, chatmail servers know about “device tokens” -but we plan to encrypt this information to the notification proxy -such that the chatmail server never learns the device token.
-The central Delta Chat notification proxy is small and fully implemented in Rust and forgets about device-tokens as soon as Apple/Google/etc processed them, usually in a matter of milliseconds.
+Note that the device token is encrypted between apps and notification proxy +but it is not signed. +The notification proxy thus never sees e-mail addresses, IP-addresses or +any cryptographic identity information associated with a user’s device (token).
+Resulting from this overall privacy design, even the seizure of a chatmail server, or the full seizure of the central Delta Chat notification proxy would not reveal private information that Push services do not already have.
diff --git a/src/main/assets/help/id/help.html b/src/main/assets/help/id/help.html index 5eb528c8d..88a508286 100644 --- a/src/main/assets/help/id/help.html +++ b/src/main/assets/help/id/help.html @@ -603,16 +603,16 @@A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally and stores it +
A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally, encrypts it and stores it on the chatmail server.
When a chatmail server receives an e-mail for a Delta Chat user -it forwards the “device token” to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.
+it forwards the encrypted device token to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.The central Delta Chat notification proxy forwards -the “device token” to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), +
The central Delta Chat notification proxy decrypts the device token +and forwards it to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), without ever knowing the IP or e-mail address of Delta Chat users.
As of May 2024, chatmail servers know about “device tokens” -but we plan to encrypt this information to the notification proxy -such that the chatmail server never learns the device token.
-The central Delta Chat notification proxy is small and fully implemented in Rust and forgets about device-tokens as soon as Apple/Google/etc processed them, usually in a matter of milliseconds.
+Note that the device token is encrypted between apps and notification proxy +but it is not signed. +The notification proxy thus never sees e-mail addresses, IP-addresses or +any cryptographic identity information associated with a user’s device (token).
+Resulting from this overall privacy design, even the seizure of a chatmail server, or the full seizure of the central Delta Chat notification proxy would not reveal private information that Push services do not already have.
diff --git a/src/main/assets/help/it/help.html b/src/main/assets/help/it/help.html index 55d90deff..901acf6d2 100644 --- a/src/main/assets/help/it/help.html +++ b/src/main/assets/help/it/help.html @@ -597,17 +597,17 @@Un’app Delta Chat ottiene un “gettone del dispositivo” localmente e lo memorizza -sul server chatmail.
+A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally, encrypts it and stores it +on the chatmail server.
Quando un server chatmail riceve un’e-mail per un utente Delta Chat -inoltra il “gettone del dispositivo” al proxy di notifica centrale di Delta Chat.
+When a chatmail server receives an e-mail for a Delta Chat user +it forwards the encrypted device token to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.
Il proxy di notifica centrale di Delta Chat inoltra -il “gettone del dispositivo” al rispettivo servizio Push (Apple, Google, ecc.), -senza mai conoscere l’IP o l’indirizzo e-mail degli utenti Delta Chat.
+The central Delta Chat notification proxy decrypts the device token +and forwards it to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), +without ever knowing the IP or e-mail address of Delta Chat users.
Il Servizio Push centrale (Apple, Google, ecc.) @@ -619,14 +619,15 @@
A partire da Maggio 2024, i server chatmail conoscono i “gettoni del dispositivo” -ma prevediamo di crittografare queste informazioni nel proxy di notifica -in modo tale che il server chatmail non apprenda mai il gettone del dispositivo.
-Il proxy di notifica centrale di Delta Chat è piccolo e completamente implementato in Rust e si dimentica dei gettoni del dispositivo non appena Apple/Google/ecc li elabora, di solito nel giro di pochi millisecondi.
+Note that the device token is encrypted between apps and notification proxy +but it is not signed. +The notification proxy thus never sees e-mail addresses, IP-addresses or +any cryptographic identity information associated with a user’s device (token).
+Come risultato di questo disegno complessivo sulla riservatezza, anche il sequestro di un server chatmail, o il sequestro totale del proxy di notifica centrale di Delta Chat non rivelerebbe informazioni private che i servizi Push non abbiano già.
diff --git a/src/main/assets/help/nl/help.html b/src/main/assets/help/nl/help.html index 9d2d01571..293fa9cd2 100644 --- a/src/main/assets/help/nl/help.html +++ b/src/main/assets/help/nl/help.html @@ -597,16 +597,16 @@A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally and stores it +
A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally, encrypts it and stores it on the chatmail server.
When a chatmail server receives an e-mail for a Delta Chat user -it forwards the “device token” to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.
+it forwards the encrypted device token to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.The central Delta Chat notification proxy forwards -the “device token” to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), +
The central Delta Chat notification proxy decrypts the device token +and forwards it to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), without ever knowing the IP or e-mail address of Delta Chat users.
As of May 2024, chatmail servers know about “device tokens” -but we plan to encrypt this information to the notification proxy -such that the chatmail server never learns the device token.
-The central Delta Chat notification proxy is small and fully implemented in Rust and forgets about device-tokens as soon as Apple/Google/etc processed them, usually in a matter of milliseconds.
+Note that the device token is encrypted between apps and notification proxy +but it is not signed. +The notification proxy thus never sees e-mail addresses, IP-addresses or +any cryptographic identity information associated with a user’s device (token).
+Resulting from this overall privacy design, even the seizure of a chatmail server, or the full seizure of the central Delta Chat notification proxy would not reveal private information that Push services do not already have.
diff --git a/src/main/assets/help/pl/help.html b/src/main/assets/help/pl/help.html index 92fded336..be8a6051f 100644 --- a/src/main/assets/help/pl/help.html +++ b/src/main/assets/help/pl/help.html @@ -494,23 +494,23 @@Aplikacja Delta Chat uzyskuje lokalnie „token urządzenia” i przechowuje go na serwerze chatmail.
+Aplikacja Delta Chat uzyskuje lokalnie „token urządzenia”, szyfruje i przechowuje go na serwerze chatmail.
Kiedy serwer chatmail odbierze wiadomość e-mail od użytkownika Delta Chat, przekazuje „token urządzenia” do centralnego serwera proxy powiadomień Delta Chat.
+Kiedy serwer chatmail odbierze wiadomość e-mail od użytkownika Delta Chat, przekazuje zaszyfrowany token urządzenia do centralnego serwera proxy powiadomień Delta Chat.
Centralny serwer proxy powiadomień Delta Chat przekazuje „token urządzenia” do odpowiedniej usługi Push (Apple, Google itp.), nie znając nawet adresu IP ani adresu e-mail użytkowników Delta Chat.
+Centralny serwer proxy powiadomień Delta Chat deszyfruje token urządzenia i przekazuje go do odpowiedniej usługi Push (Apple, Google itp.), nie znając nawet adresu IP ani adresu e-mail użytkowników Delta Chat.
Centralna usługa Push (Apple, Google itp.) budzi aplikację Delta Chat na twoim urządzeniu, aby sprawdzić w tle nowe wiadomości. Nie zna chatmaila ani adresu e-mail urządzenia, na którym się budzi. Centralne usługi push Apple/Google nigdy nie widzą adresu e-mail (nadawcy ani odbiorcy), a także nigdy nie widzą treści wiadomości (również w formie zaszyfrowanej).
Od maja 2024 r. serwery chatmail znają „tokeny urządzenia”, ale planujemy szyfrować te informacje na serwerze proxy powiadomień, tak aby serwer chatmail nigdy nie poznał tokena urządzenia.
-Centralny serwer proxy powiadomień Delta Chat jest mały i w pełni zaimplementowany w Rust i zapomina o tokenach urządzeń zaraz po ich przetworzeniu przez Apple/Google/itp, zwykle w ciągu kilku milisekund.
+Pamiętaj, że token urządzenia jest szyfrowany między aplikacjami a serwerem proxy powiadomień, ale nie jest podpisany. Serwer proxy powiadomień nigdy nie widzi adresów e-mail, adresów IP ani żadnych kryptograficznych informacji identyfikujących powiązanych z urządzeniem użytkownika (tokenem).
+W wyniku tego ogólnego projektu ochrony prywatności nawet przejęcie serwera chatmail lub pełne przejęcie centralnego serwera proxy powiadomień Delta Chat nie spowodowałoby ujawnienia prywatnych informacji, których usługi Push jeszcze nie posiadają.
W systemie iOS upewnij się, że jest przydzielony dostęp do opcji „Ustawienia » Aplikacje » Delta Chat » Sieć lokalna”
W systemie macOS włącz „Ustawienia systemowe » Prywatność i bezpieczeństwo » Sieć lokalna » Delta Chat”
+W systemie macOS włącz „Preferencje systemowe » Ochrona i prywatność » Sieć lokalna » Delta Chat”
Twój system może mieć „zaporę ogniową”, o której wiadomo, że powoduje problemy (szczególnie w systemie Windows). diff --git a/src/main/assets/help/pt/help.html b/src/main/assets/help/pt/help.html index 99868bc99..884f48110 100644 --- a/src/main/assets/help/pt/help.html +++ b/src/main/assets/help/pt/help.html @@ -597,16 +597,16 @@
A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally and stores it +
A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally, encrypts it and stores it on the chatmail server.
When a chatmail server receives an e-mail for a Delta Chat user -it forwards the “device token” to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.
+it forwards the encrypted device token to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.The central Delta Chat notification proxy forwards -the “device token” to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), +
The central Delta Chat notification proxy decrypts the device token +and forwards it to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), without ever knowing the IP or e-mail address of Delta Chat users.
As of May 2024, chatmail servers know about “device tokens” -but we plan to encrypt this information to the notification proxy -such that the chatmail server never learns the device token.
-The central Delta Chat notification proxy is small and fully implemented in Rust and forgets about device-tokens as soon as Apple/Google/etc processed them, usually in a matter of milliseconds.
+Note that the device token is encrypted between apps and notification proxy +but it is not signed. +The notification proxy thus never sees e-mail addresses, IP-addresses or +any cryptographic identity information associated with a user’s device (token).
+Resulting from this overall privacy design, even the seizure of a chatmail server, or the full seizure of the central Delta Chat notification proxy would not reveal private information that Push services do not already have.
diff --git a/src/main/assets/help/ru/help.html b/src/main/assets/help/ru/help.html index 94d582eed..59015633a 100644 --- a/src/main/assets/help/ru/help.html +++ b/src/main/assets/help/ru/help.html @@ -600,16 +600,16 @@Приложение Delta Chat локально получает “токен устройства” и сохраняет его +
Приложение Delta Chat локально получает “токен устройства” шифрует его и сохраняет на сервере chatmail.
Когда сервер chatmail получает электронную почту для пользователя Delta Chat -он пересылает “токен устройства” центральному прокси-серверу уведомлений Delta Chat.
+он пересылает “зашифрованный токен устройства” центральному прокси-серверу уведомлений Delta Chat.Центральный прокси-сервер уведомлений Delta Chat пересылает -“токен устройства” в соответствующую службу Push (Apple, Google и т. д.), +
Центральный прокси-сервер уведомлений Delta Chat расшифровывает “токен устройства” и +пересылает его в соответствующую службу Push (Apple, Google и т. д.), даже не зная IP-адрес или адрес электронной почты пользователей Delta Chat.
По состоянию на май 2024 года серверы chatmail знают о “токенах устройства”, -но мы планируем зашифровать эту информацию для прокси-сервера уведомлений -так, чтобы сервер chatmail не смог получить доступ к токену устройства.
-Центральный прокси-сервер уведомлений Delta Chat небольшой и полностью реализован на Rust забывает о токенах устройств, как только Apple/Google/и т. д. обработали их, обычно за несколько миллисекунд.
+Обратите внимание, что токен устройства шифруется между приложениями и прокси-сервером уведомлений, +но не подписывается. +Прокси-сервер уведомлений не получает доступ к адресам электронной почты, IP-адресам +или криптографическим идентификационным данным устройства пользователя (токену).
+В результате такого общего подхода к обеспечению конфиденциальности, даже захват почтового сервера chatmail, или полный захват центрального прокси-сервера уведомлений Delta Chat не раскроет конфиденциальную информацию, которой сервисы Push уже не обладают.
diff --git a/src/main/assets/help/sk/help.html b/src/main/assets/help/sk/help.html index 9691cbc02..3edf13f81 100644 --- a/src/main/assets/help/sk/help.html +++ b/src/main/assets/help/sk/help.html @@ -603,16 +603,16 @@A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally and stores it +
A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally, encrypts it and stores it on the chatmail server.
When a chatmail server receives an e-mail for a Delta Chat user -it forwards the “device token” to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.
+it forwards the encrypted device token to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.The central Delta Chat notification proxy forwards -the “device token” to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), +
The central Delta Chat notification proxy decrypts the device token +and forwards it to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), without ever knowing the IP or e-mail address of Delta Chat users.
As of May 2024, chatmail servers know about “device tokens” -but we plan to encrypt this information to the notification proxy -such that the chatmail server never learns the device token.
-The central Delta Chat notification proxy is small and fully implemented in Rust and forgets about device-tokens as soon as Apple/Google/etc processed them, usually in a matter of milliseconds.
+Note that the device token is encrypted between apps and notification proxy +but it is not signed. +The notification proxy thus never sees e-mail addresses, IP-addresses or +any cryptographic identity information associated with a user’s device (token).
+Resulting from this overall privacy design, even the seizure of a chatmail server, or the full seizure of the central Delta Chat notification proxy would not reveal private information that Push services do not already have.
diff --git a/src/main/assets/help/sq/help.html b/src/main/assets/help/sq/help.html index 12fd37630..dcc4f6360 100644 --- a/src/main/assets/help/sq/help.html +++ b/src/main/assets/help/sq/help.html @@ -605,16 +605,16 @@A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally and stores it +
A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally, encrypts it and stores it on the chatmail server.
When a chatmail server receives an e-mail for a Delta Chat user -it forwards the “device token” to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.
+it forwards the encrypted device token to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.The central Delta Chat notification proxy forwards -the “device token” to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), +
The central Delta Chat notification proxy decrypts the device token +and forwards it to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), without ever knowing the IP or e-mail address of Delta Chat users.
As of May 2024, chatmail servers know about “device tokens” -but we plan to encrypt this information to the notification proxy -such that the chatmail server never learns the device token.
-The central Delta Chat notification proxy is small and fully implemented in Rust and forgets about device-tokens as soon as Apple/Google/etc processed them, usually in a matter of milliseconds.
+Note that the device token is encrypted between apps and notification proxy +but it is not signed. +The notification proxy thus never sees e-mail addresses, IP-addresses or +any cryptographic identity information associated with a user’s device (token).
+Resulting from this overall privacy design, even the seizure of a chatmail server, or the full seizure of the central Delta Chat notification proxy would not reveal private information that Push services do not already have.
diff --git a/src/main/assets/help/uk/help.html b/src/main/assets/help/uk/help.html index d95018f43..48b67e79a 100644 --- a/src/main/assets/help/uk/help.html +++ b/src/main/assets/help/uk/help.html @@ -498,23 +498,23 @@Додаток Delta Chat отримує “токен пристрою” локально і зберігає його на сервері chatmail.
+Додаток Delta Chat отримує “токен пристрою” локально, шифрує його і зберігає на сервері chatmail.
Коли chatmail-сервер отримує електронний лист від користувача Delta Chat він пересилає “токен пристрою” до центрального проксі-сповіщення Delta Chat.
+Коли сервер chatmail отримує електронний лист від користувача Delta Chat він пересилає зашифрований токен пристрою до центрального проксі-сервера сповіщень Delta Chat.
Центральний проксі-сервер сповіщень Delta Chat пересилає “токен пристрою” до відповідного Push-сервісу (Apple, Google тощо), навіть не знаючи IP-адреси чи електронної пошти користувачів Delta Chat.
+Центральний проксі-сервер сповіщень Delta Chat розшифровує токен пристрою і пересилає його до відповідного Push-сервісу (Apple, Google тощо), навіть не знаючи IP-адреси або електронної пошти користувачів Delta Chat.
Центральний Push-сервіс (Apple, Google тощо) запускає додаток Delta Chat на вашому пристрої щоб перевірити наявність нових повідомлень у фоновому режимі. Він не знає про пошту чату або адресу електронної пошти пристрою, який він пробуджує. Центральні служби Apple/Google Push ніколи не бачать адресу електронної пошти (відправника або одержувача) а також ніколи не бачать жодного вмісту повідомлення (навіть в зашифрованому вигляді).
Станом на травень 2024 року chatmail-сервери знають про “токени пристроїв” але ми плануємо зашифрувати цю інформацію для проксі-сповіщень таким чином, щоб сервер чату ніколи не дізнався токен пристрою.
-Центральний проксі для сповіщень Delta Chat невеликий і повністю реалізований на Rust забуває про токени пристроїв, як тільки Apple/Google/etc обробили їх, зазвичай за лічені мілісекунди.
+Зверніть увагу, що токен пристрою шифрується між програмами та проксі-сповіщеннями але не підписується. Таким чином, проксі-служба сповіщень ніколи не бачить адреси електронної пошти, IP-адреси або будь-яку криптографічну ідентифікаційну інформацію, пов’язану з пристроєм користувача (токеном).
+В результаті цього загального дизайну конфіденційності, навіть захоплення chatmail-сервера, або повне вилучення центрального проксі-сервера повідомлень Delta Chat не призведе до розкриття приватної інформації, якої ще не мають Push-сервіси.
要安全地与他人建立联系[扫描邀请二维码 -或分享邀请链接](#howtoe2ee)。 +
要安全地与他人建立联系扫描邀请二维码 +或分享邀请链接。 使用(默认的)基于chatmail的聊天账户时需要这样做 因为chatmail会拒绝未加密的发送信息。
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@跨平台支持 [多配置文件](#多账户)和多设备。
+跨平台支持 多配置文件 和多设备。
交互性 聊天中的网页小程序
@@ -328,24 +328,22 @@您可以在聊天窗口右上角的聊天设置中通过选择 1 分钟到 5 周之间的时间跨度打开“消息定时销毁”。
-Until the setting is turned off again, -each chat member’s Delta Chat app takes care -of deleting the messages -after the selected time span. -The time span begins -when the receiver first sees the message in Delta Chat. -The messages are deleted -both in each email account on the server, -and in the app itself.
+在再次关闭该设置之前, +每个聊天成员的 Delta Chat 应用都会负责 +在选定的时间跨度后删除消息。 +时间跨度从 +接收者首次在 Delta Chat 中看到消息时开始。 +消息将在 +服务器上的每个电子邮件帐户中以及应用本身中删除。
请注意,只有当您信任您的聊天伙伴时,您才可以依赖“消息定时销毁”; 不怀好意的人可能会拍照,或者在删除之前以其他方式保存、复制或转发消息。
-Apart from that, -if one chat partner uninstalls Delta Chat, -the messages will not get deleted from their email account. -They will most likely also not be decryptable anymore -(as long as they were encrypted in the first place).
+除此之外, +如果一个聊天伙伴卸载了 Delta Chat, +消息将不会从他们的电子邮件帐户中删除。 +它们很可能也无法再解密 +(只要它们首先是加密的)。
Use Background Connection: If you are not using a Push service, -you may disable “battery optimizations” for Delta Chat, -allowing it to fetch messages in the background. -However, there could be delays from minutes to hours. -Some Android vendors even restrict apps completely -(see dontkillmyapp.com) -and Delta Chat might not show incoming messages -until you manually open the app again.
+使用后台连接:如果你没有使用推送服务, +你可以禁用 Delta Chat 的“电池优化”, +允许它在后台获取消息。 +但是,可能会有几分钟到几小时的延迟。 +一些 Android 供应商甚至完全限制应用 +(请参阅 dontkillmyapp.com), +并且 Delta Chat 可能不会显示传入的消息, +直到你手动再次打开应用为止。
Force Background Connection: This is the fallback option -if the previous options are not available or do not achieve “instant delivery”. -Enabling it causes a permanent notification on your phone -which may sometimes be “minified” with recent Android phones.
+强制后台连接:如果之前的选项不可用或无法实现“即时传递”, +这是后备选项。 +启用它会在你的手机上导致永久通知, +这有时可能会被最新的 Android 手机“最小化”。
Both “Background Connection” options are energy-efficient and -safe to try if you experience messages arrive only with long delays.
+如果消息到达时间延迟较长, +则“后台连接”选项都节能且安全,可以尝试。
Delta Chat Push Notification support avoids leakage of private information. -It does not leak e-mail, IP address or message content (not even encrypted) -to any system involved in the delivery of Push Notifications.
+Delta Chat 推送通知支持避免了私人信息的泄露。 +它不会将电子邮件、IP 地址或消息内容(甚至加密后的内容) +泄露给参与推送通知传递的任何系统。
-Here is how Delta Chat apps perform Push Notification delivery:
+以下是 Delta Chat 应用如何执行推送通知传递:
A Delta Chat app obtains a “device token” locally and stores it -on the chatmail server.
+Delta Chat 应用在本地获取“设备令牌”,对其进行加密并将其存储在 +Chatmail 服务器上。
When a chatmail server receives an e-mail for a Delta Chat user -it forwards the “device token” to the central Delta Chat notification proxy.
+当 Chatmail 服务器收到 Delta Chat 用户的电子邮件时, +它会将加密的设备令牌转发到中央 Delta Chat 通知代理。
The central Delta Chat notification proxy forwards -the “device token” to the respective Push service (Apple, Google, etc.), -without ever knowing the IP or e-mail address of Delta Chat users.
+中央 Delta Chat 通知代理解密设备令牌 +并将其转发到相应的推送服务(Apple、Google 等), +而永远不知道 Delta Chat 用户的 IP 或电子邮件地址。
The central Push Service (Apple, Google, etc.) -wakes up the Delta Chat app on your device -to check for new messages in the background. -It does not know about the chatmail or e-mail address of the device it wakes up. -The central Apple/Google Push services never see an e-mail address (sender or receiver) -and also never see any message content (also not in encrypted forms).
+中央推送服务(Apple、Google 等) +唤醒你设备上的 Delta Chat 应用 +,以便在后台检查新消息。 +它不知道它唤醒的设备的 Chatmail 或电子邮件地址。 +中央 Apple/Google 推送服务永远不会看到电子邮件地址(发件人或收件人), +也永远不会看到任何消息内容(也包括未加密的形式)。
As of May 2024, chatmail servers know about “device tokens” -but we plan to encrypt this information to the notification proxy -such that the chatmail server never learns the device token.
+中央 Delta Chat 通知代理体积小,完全用 Rust 实现 +,并在 Apple/Google 等处理设备令牌后立即忘记它们, +通常在几毫秒内。
-The central Delta Chat notification proxy is small and fully implemented in Rust -and forgets about device-tokens as soon as Apple/Google/etc processed them, -usually in a matter of milliseconds.
+请注意,设备令牌在应用和通知代理之间加密, +但未签名。 +因此,通知代理永远不会看到与用户设备(令牌)关联的电子邮件地址、IP 地址或 +任何加密身份信息。
-Resulting from this overall privacy design, even the seizure of a chatmail server, -or the full seizure of the central Delta Chat notification proxy -would not reveal private information that Push services do not already have.
+由此产生的整体隐私设计,即使查封 Chatmail 服务器, +或完全查封中央 Delta Chat 通知代理 +也不会泄露推送服务尚未拥有的私人信息。
-Delta Chat is a free and open source decentralized messenger with free server choice, -but we want users to reliably experience “instant delivery” of messages, -like they experience from Whatsapp, Signal or Telegram apps, -without asking questions up-front that are more suited to expert users or developers.
+Delta Chat 是一款免费且开源的去中心化即时通讯应用,用户可以自由选择服务器, +但我们希望用户可靠地体验到“即时消息传递”, +就像他们从 Whatsapp、Signal 或 Telegram 应用体验到的那样, +而无需预先提出更适合专家用户或开发人员的问题。
-Note that Delta Chat has a small and privacy-preserving Push Notification system -that achieves “instant delivery” of messages for all chatmail servers -including a potential one you might setup yourself without our permission. -Welcome to the power of the interoperable and massive chatmail and e-mail system :)
+请注意,Delta Chat 具有小型且隐私保护的推送通知系统, +可为所有 Chatmail 服务器实现“即时消息传递”, +包括你可能在未经我们许可的情况下自行设置的服务器。 +欢迎来到可互操作且庞大的 Chatmail 和电子邮件系统的力量 :)
Autocrypt is used for automatically -establishing end-to-end encryption with contacts and group chats. -Autocrypt uses a limited and secure subset of the OpenPGP standard. -End-to-End encrypted messages are marked with a padlock -.
+Autocrypt 用于自动 +与联系人和群组聊天建立端到端加密。 +Autocrypt 使用 OpenPGP 标准的有限且安全子集。 +端到端加密消息标有挂锁 +。
-Secure-Join protocols -are used for establishing chats with guaranteed end-to-end encryption -which protects against network attacks and compromised servers. -Chats marked with a green checkmark +
安全加入协议 +用于建立具有保证的端到端加密的聊天, +从而防止网络攻击和受损服务器。 +标有绿色复选标记的聊天 -guarantee end-to-end encrypted messages.
+保证端到端加密消息。 -All end-to-end encrypted messages carry a padlock:
+所有端到端加密的消息都带有挂锁:
-End-to-end encryption is guaranteed if there is a green checkmark next to the chat title:
+如果聊天标题旁边有绿色复选标记,则保证端到端加密:
If you have a second communication channel with your chat partner, -like a video chat or a different messenger, -you can generate an invite link.
+如果你与你的聊天伙伴有第二个通信渠道, +例如视频聊天或不同的即时通讯应用, +你可以生成邀请链接。
-If you are together in person, -you can show a QR code to your chat partner.
+如果你们面对面在一起, +你可以向你的聊天伙伴展示二维码。
For Group invitations, -tap the chat group title to see its member list, -and select “QR Invite code”.
+对于群组邀请, +点击聊天群组标题以查看其成员列表, +然后选择“QR 邀请码”。
For direct 1:1 chat invitations, -tap the QR Code icon -on the Delta Chat app main screen.
+对于直接 1:1 聊天邀请, +点击 Delta Chat 应用主屏幕上的二维码图标 。
Let your chat partner scan the QR image -with their Delta Chat app, -or click “Copy” or “Share” to create an invite link -and share it with your chat partner.
+让你的聊天伙伴用他们的 Delta Chat 应用扫描二维码图像, +或点击“复制”或“分享”以创建邀请链接 +并与你的聊天伙伴分享。
-Now wait while Secure-Join network messages are exchanged between both devices.
+现在等待 安全加入网络消息在两个设备之间交换。
If both devices are online, -both sides will eventually see a (group or direct) chat with a green checkmark - -next to the title.
+如果两个设备都处于在线状态, +双方最终都会看到一个(群组或直接)聊天,标题旁边带有绿色复选标记 +。
如果其中一个设备处于离线状态,则只有当设备再次连接互联网且安全加入网络协议完成时,绿色复选标记才会出现。
@@ -715,171 +711,167 @@Chat titles with green checkmarks - -mean that all messages in the chat will be end-to-end encrypted -and can not be read or altered by compromised e-mail servers or Internet providers. -Joining green-checkmarked group chats -safely spreads everybody’s encryption information (and green checkmarks) -in a manner that guarantees end-to-end encryption in the group and among members.
+带有绿色复选标记的聊天标题 + +表示聊天中的所有消息都将进行端到端加密, +并且不会被受损的电子邮件服务器或互联网提供商读取或更改。 +加入带有绿色复选标记的群组聊天 +可以安全地传播每个人的加密信息(和绿色复选标记), +从而保证群组和成员之间的端到端加密。
-Contact profiles with green checkmarks - -mean that messaging a contact is currently guaranteed to be end-to-end encrypted. -Every green-checkmarked contact either did a direct QR-scan with you -or was introduced by a another green-checkmarked contact. -Introductions happen automatically when adding members to groups. -Whoever adds a contact to a green-checkmarked group becomes an introducer -to those members who didn’t yet know about the added contact. -In a contact profile you can tap on the “Introduced by …” text repeatedly -until you get to the one with whom you directly did a QR-scan.
- -Note that in a contact profile you may see and tap introducers -but there is no green checkmark in the profile title. -This usually means that the contact “sent a message from another device”.
- -For more in-depth discussion of “guaranteed end-to-end encryption” -please see Secure-Join protocols -and specifically read about “Verified Groups”, the technical term -of what is called here “green-checkmarked” or “guaranteed end-to-end encrypted” chats.
+带有绿色复选标记的联系人配置文件 + +表示当前保证与联系人的消息传递是端到端加密的。 +每个带有绿色复选标记的联系人要么直接与你进行了 二维码扫描, +要么由另一个带有绿色复选标记的联系人介绍。 +当向群组添加成员时,介绍会自动发生。 +任何将联系人添加到带有绿色复选标记的群组的人都成为 +那些还不认识添加的联系人的成员的介绍人。 +在联系人配置文件中,你可以反复点击“由…介绍”文本 +,直到你到达直接与你进行 二维码扫描 的那个人。
+ +请注意,在联系人配置文件中,你可能会看到并点击介绍人,
但在配置文件标题中没有绿色复选标记。
这通常意味着联系人“从另一台设备发送了消息”。
有关“保证的端到端加密”的更深入讨论, +请参阅 安全加入协议, +并专门阅读有关“已验证群组”的内容,这是 +此处所谓的“带有绿色复选标记”或“保证的端到端加密”聊天的技术术语。
Your chat with a contact lost guaranteed end-to-end encryption. -The green checkmark was removed for this chat and contact when you see this warning. -If you find the sudden drop of guaranteed end-to-end encryption -surprising for this contact then don’t accept the warning! -Instead check with your contact through a second channel -like a video call, other messenger or a phone call, -to find out what happened.
+你与联系人的聊天失去了保证的端到端加密。 +当你看到此警告时,此聊天的绿色复选标记和联系人已被删除。 +如果你发现保证的端到端加密突然下降 +对于此联系人来说很意外,请不要接受警告! +相反,请通过第二个渠道( +如视频通话、其他即时通讯应用或电话)与你的联系人核实 +,以找出发生了什么。
-If your contact actually caused the drop of guaranteed end-to-end encryption -please see the next paragraphs for common reasons and their mitigations. -Regardless, all other green-checkmarked chats remain guaranteed end-to-end encrypted -even if the contact is a member there.
+如果你的联系人实际上导致了保证的端到端加密下降, +请参阅以下段落,了解常见原因及其缓解措施。 +无论如何,所有其他带有绿色复选标记的聊天都保持保证的端到端加密, +即使该联系人是那里的成员。
-Your contact is using Delta Chat on a second device (phone or laptop)
+你的联系人在第二台设备(手机或笔记本电脑)上使用 Delta Chat
-If they have another device with a Delta Chat app running, -they should remove the profile from the new device -and add it as a second device as described here. -As soon as they message you afterwards, the warning will be gone -and guaranteed encryption is established with both devices of your contact.
+如果他们有另一台运行 Delta Chat 应用的设备, +他们应该从新设备中删除配置文件, +并按照此处所述将其添加为第二台设备。 +在他们之后给你发消息后,警告将消失, +并且保证的加密将在你的联系人的两台设备之间建立。
-Your contact reinstalled Delta Chat using their old account login
+你的联系人使用他们的旧帐户登录名重新安装了 Delta Chat
-If they have a backup file, -they should remove the profile from the new device -and rather import the backup file to re-create their profile. -As soon as they message you afterwards, the warning will be gone -and guaranteed encryption is re-established for this contact.
+如果他们有备份文件, +他们应该从新设备中删除配置文件, +而是导入备份文件以重新创建他们的配置文件。 +在他们之后给你发消息后,警告将消失, +并且保证的加密将为此联系人重新建立。
-If they don’t have a backup file, it’s best to perform a QR scan -with your chat partner to re-establish guaranteed end-to-end encryption.
+如果他们没有备份文件,最好与你的聊天伙伴执行 二维码扫描, +以重新建立保证的端到端加密。
-Your contact sent a mail through a webmail interface or another e-mail app -and will get back to using Delta Chat soon again.
+你的联系人通过 Webmail 界面或其他电子邮件应用发送了邮件, +并且将很快恢复使用 Delta Chat。
-If you are sure that the contact sometimes uses webmail, -or another mail app lacking end-to-end encryption, -then you may accept the warning. -As soon as your contact uses Delta Chat again, -guaranteed end-to-end encryption will be automatically re-established.
+如果你确定联系人有时使用 Webmail, +或其他缺少端到端加密的邮件应用, +那么你可以接受警告。 +一旦你的联系人再次使用 Delta Chat, +保证的端到端加密将自动重新建立。
-Your contact stopped using Delta Chat entirely
+你的联系人完全停止使用 Delta Chat
-Sometimes remaining in contact is more important than end-to-end encryption. -“Transport Layer Encryption” (TLS) may still meaningfully protect -the confidentiality of your messages between your device and the e-mail server. -But without end-to-end encryption you and your contact are trusting your e-mail server -to not read or manipulate your messages, and to not hand them to third parties.
+有时保持联系比端到端加密更重要。 +“传输层加密” (TLS) 可能仍然有意义地保护 +你的设备和电子邮件服务器之间消息的机密性。 +但是,如果没有端到端加密,你和你的联系人将信任你的电子邮件服务器 +不会读取或操纵你的消息,也不会将其交给第三方。
-In any case, you can not do much else than accept the warning. -Please also remove the contact from any active green-checkmarked group -which you can find in “Shared chats” in the Contact profile. -This spares your contact from getting “unreadable” messages.
+在任何情况下,你都无法做太多其他事情,只能接受警告。 +另请从任何活动的带有绿色复选标记的群组中删除该联系人, +你可以在联系人配置文件中的“共享聊天”中找到这些群组。 +这可以避免你的联系人收到“无法读取”的消息。
-If the contact removed Delta Chat because of buggy or undesirable behaviour, -please consider posting to our support forum -to help us identify and address common problems. Thanks!
+如果联系人因为错误或不良行为而删除了 Delta Chat, +请考虑发布到我们的 支持论坛, +以帮助我们识别和解决常见问题。 谢谢!
-Yes.
+是的。
-When we talk about an “end-to-end encrypted message” -we always mean a whole message is encrypted, -including all the attachments -and attachment metadata such as filenames.
+当我们谈论“端到端加密消息”时, +我们始终指的是整个消息都已加密, +包括所有附件和附件元数据,例如文件名。
Yes, Delta Chat uses a secure subset of OpenPGP -and only displays a padlock security indicator on a message -if the whole message is properly encrypted and signed. -For example, “Detached signatures” are not treated as secure.
+是的,Delta Chat 使用 OpenPGP 的安全子集, +并且仅在消息上显示挂锁安全指示器 +,前提是整个消息都已正确加密和签名。 +例如,“分离签名”不被视为安全。
-OpenPGP is not insecure by itself. -Most publically discussed OpenPGP security problems -actually stem from bad usability or bad implementations of tools or apps (or both). -It is particularly important to distinguish between OpenPGP, the IETF encryption standard, -and GnuPG (GPG), a command line tool implementing OpenPGP. -Many public critiques of OpenPGP actually discuss GnuPG which Delta Chat has never used. -Delta Chat rather uses the OpenPGP Rust implementation rPGP, -available as an independent “pgp” package, -and security-audited in 2019.
+OpenPGP 本身并不不安全。 +大多数公开讨论的 OpenPGP 安全问题 +实际上都源于工具或应用的糟糕可用性或糟糕实现(或两者兼而有之)。 +区分 OpenPGP(IETF 加密标准) +和 GnuPG (GPG)(实现 OpenPGP 的命令行工具)尤为重要。 +许多对 OpenPGP 的公开批评实际上是在讨论 GnuPG,而 Delta Chat 从未使用过 GnuPG。 +Delta Chat 而是使用 OpenPGP Rust 实现 rPGP, +作为 独立的“pgp”软件包 提供, +并且 在 2019 年进行了安全审计。
-We aim, along with other OpenPGP implementors, -to further improve security characteristics by implementing the -new IETF OpenPGP Crypto-Refresh -which was thankfully adopted in summer 2023.
+我们的目标是与其他 OpenPGP 实现者一起, +通过实施 新的 IETF OpenPGP Crypto-Refresh +来进一步提高安全特性,该标准已于 2023 年夏季获得通过,令人欣慰。
Yes, we are following efforts like MLS -or Saltpack -but adopting them would mean breaking end-to-end encryption interoperability -with all other e-mail apps that typically support OpenPGP encryption. -So it would not be a light decision to take -and there must be tangible improvements for users.
+是的,我们正在关注 MLS +或 Saltpack 等工作, +但采用它们将意味着破坏与 +通常支持 OpenPGP 加密的所有其他电子邮件应用的端到端加密互操作性。 +因此,这不是一个可以轻易做出的决定, +并且必须为用户带来切实的改进。
-Delta Chat takes a holistic “usable security” approach -and works with a wide range of activist groupings as well as -renowned researchers such as TeamUSEC -to improve actual user outcomes against security threats. -The wire protocol and standard for establishing end-to-end encryption is -only one part of “user outcomes”, -see also our answers to device-seizure -and message-metadata questions.
+Delta Chat 采用整体“可用安全性”方法, +并与广泛的活动家团体以及 +TeamUSEC 等知名研究人员合作 +,以改进针对安全威胁的实际用户结果。 +用于建立端到端加密的线路协议和标准 +只是“用户结果”的一部分, +另请参阅我们对 设备查封 +和 消息元数据 问题的回答。
Delta Chat also never was vulnerable to the “Direct Exfiltration” EFAIL attack
-because it only decrypts multipart/encrypted
messages
-which contain exactly one encrypted and signed part,
-as defined by the Autocrypt Level 1 specification.
Delta Chat 也从未容易受到“直接泄露”EFAIL 攻击,
+因为它只解密 multipart/encrypted
消息,
+这些消息正好包含一个加密和签名的部分,
+如 Autocrypt Level 1 规范所定义。
Even if your messages are not guaranteed to be end-to-end encrypted, -they are still protected from Internet providers like cell or cable companies. -However, your and your recipient’s e-mail providers -may read, analyze or even modify your messages, -including any attachments, -if they are not end-to-end encrypted.
+即使你的消息未保证端到端加密, +它们仍然受到互联网提供商(如手机或有线电视公司)的保护。 +但是,你的和你的接收者的电子邮件提供商 +可能会读取、分析甚至修改你的消息, +包括任何附件, +如果它们未进行端到端加密。
-Delta Chat by default uses strict -TLS encryption -which secures connections between your device and your e-mail provider. -All of Delta Chat’s TLS-handling has been independently security audited. -Moreover, the connection between your and the recipient’s e-mail provider -will typically be transport-encrypted as well. -If the involved e-mail servers support MTA-STS -then transport encryption will be enforced between e-mail providers -in which case Delta Chat communications will never be exposed in cleartext to the Internet -even if the message was not end-to-end encrypted.
+Delta Chat 默认使用严格的 +TLS 加密, +这可以保护你的设备和电子邮件提供商之间的连接安全。 +Delta Chat 的所有 TLS 处理都经过了独立的 安全审计。 +此外,你的和接收者的电子邮件提供商之间的连接 +通常也会进行传输加密。 +如果所涉及的电子邮件服务器支持 MTA-STS, +则将在电子邮件提供商之间强制执行传输加密, +在这种情况下,即使消息未进行端到端加密,Delta Chat 通信也永远不会以明文形式暴露给互联网。
-Note that maintaining guaranteed end-to-end encryption on top of TLS encryption -provides pervasive safety between your and the recipient’s devices. -Not even your e-mail or Internet provider will be able to read or modify your messages.
+请注意,在 TLS 加密之上保持保证的端到端加密 +可在你的和接收者的设备之间提供普遍的安全性。 +即使你的电子邮件或互联网提供商也无法读取或修改你的消息。
Delta Chat protects most message metadata by putting the following information -into the end-to-end encrypted part of messages:
+Delta Chat 通过将以下信息放入消息的端到端加密部分来保护大多数消息元数据:
Chat-Disposition-Notification-To
)Ephemeral-Timer
)Chat-Disposition-Notification-To
)Ephemeral-Timer
)Chat-Group-Member-Removed
, Chat-Group-Member-Added
Secure-Join
header containing secure join commandsSecure-Join
标头E-Mail servers do not get access to this protected metadata -but they do see the message date as well as the message size, -and, more importantly, the sender and receiver addresses. -E-mail servers need receiver addresses to route and -deliver messages to recipient’s devices.
+电子邮件服务器无法访问此受保护的元数据, +但它们可以看到消息日期以及消息大小, +更重要的是,可以看到发件人和收件人地址。 +电子邮件服务器需要收件人地址来路由和 +将消息传递到接收者的设备。
Both for protecting against metadata-collecting e-mail servers -as well as against the threat of device seizure -we recommend to use a chatmail server -to create pseudonymous temporary profiles through QR-code scans. -Note that Delta Chat apps on all platforms support multiple profiles -so you can easily use situation-specific profiles next to your “main” profile -with the knowledge that all their data, along with all metadata, will be deleted. -Moreover, if a device is seized then contacts using temporary profiles -can not be identified easily, as compared to messengers which reveal -phone numbers in chat groups which in turn are often associated with legal identities.
+为了防止收集元数据的电子邮件服务器 +以及设备查封的威胁, +我们建议使用 Chatmail 服务器 +通过二维码扫描创建匿名临时配置文件。 +请注意,所有平台上的 Delta Chat 应用都支持多配置文件, +因此你可以轻松地在你“主要”配置文件旁边使用特定于情况的配置文件, +并且知道它们的所有数据以及所有元数据都将被删除。 +此外,如果设备被查封,则与使用临时配置文件的联系人 +相比,无法轻易识别,因为即时通讯应用会在聊天群组中显示 +电话号码,而电话号码通常与合法身份相关联。
-You may check the end-to-end encryption status manually in the “Encryption” dialog -(user profile on Android/iOS or right-click a user’s chat-list item on desktop). -Delta Chat shows two fingerprints there. -If the same fingerprints appear on your own and your contact’s device, -the connection is safe.
+你可以在“加密”对话框中手动检查端到端加密状态 +(Android/iOS 上的用户配置文件或桌面上的用户聊天列表项上右键单击)。 +Delta Chat 在此处显示两个指纹。 +如果相同的指纹出现在你自己的设备和你联系人的设备上, +则连接是安全的。
-A little padlock in a message bubble denotes -that the message was properly end-to-end encrypted from the given sender. -If there is no padlock, the message was not properly end-to-end encrypted -most likely because the sender uses an app or webmail interface -without support for end-to-end–encryption.
+消息气泡中的小挂锁表示 +消息已从给定的发件人正确进行端到端加密。 +如果没有挂锁,则消息未正确进行端到端加密, +最可能是因为发件人使用的应用或 Webmail 界面 +不支持端到端加密。
-If a contact uses a non-Autocrypt e-mail app, -all messages involving this contact (in a group or 1:1 chat) -will not be end-to-end encrypted, and thus not show a “padlock” with messages. -Note that even if your contacts use Delta Chat on their account, -they might also use a non-Autocrypt e-mail app on that account -which then may cause intermittently unencrypted messages. -Replying unencrypted to unencrypted messages is mandated by Autocrypt -to prevent unreadable messages on the side of your contacts -and their non-Autocrypt e-mail app.
+如果联系人使用非 Autocrypt 电子邮件应用, +则涉及此联系人(在群组或 1:1 聊天中)的所有消息 +将不会进行端到端加密,因此消息中不会显示“挂锁”。 +请注意,即使你的联系人在其帐户上使用 Delta Chat, +他们也可能在该帐户上使用非 Autocrypt 电子邮件应用, +这可能会导致间歇性未加密的消息。 +回复未加密的消息是 Autocrypt 强制执行的 +,以防止你的联系人及其非 Autocrypt 电子邮件应用端出现无法读取的消息。
-If you need a safely end-to-end encrypted chat with a contact -who is using their e-mail account both with Delta Chat and non-Autocrypt apps (e.g. webmail), -it’s best to setup guaranteed end-to-end encryption with them -and then create a guaranteed end-to-end encrypted group chat with you two as members. -In this group chat all messages will be end-to-end encrypted -even if the direct chat between you two has a -“… sent a message from another device” warning.
+如果你需要与 +同时使用 Delta Chat 和非 Autocrypt 应用(例如 Webmail)的电子邮件帐户的联系人进行安全端到端加密的聊天, +最好与他们设置 保证的端到端加密, +然后创建一个由你二人作为成员的保证的端到端加密的群组聊天。 +在此群组聊天中,所有消息都将进行端到端加密, +即使你二人之间的直接聊天有 +“…从另一台设备发送了消息” 警告
-The best way to ensure every message is end-to-end encrypted, -and metadata deleted as quickly as possible -is using chats with guaranteed end-to-end encryption -and turning on disappearing messages.
+确保每条消息都进行端到端加密, +并尽快删除元数据的最佳方法是 +使用具有保证的端到端加密的聊天 +并开启 阅后即焚消息。
-Guaranteed end-to-end encrypted chats protect against MITM attacks -and turning on disappearing messages deletes the messages -on the server after a user-configured time.
+保证的端到端加密聊天可防止 MITM 攻击, +而开启阅后即焚消息会在用户配置的时间后删除服务器上的消息。
-If you don’t need a longer-lived copy of your messages on the server, -you can also turn on “delete messages from server automatically”.
+如果你不需要在服务器上保留消息的长期副本, +你还可以开启 “自动从服务器删除消息”。
It is possible that Delta Chat evolves to support Perfect Forward Secrecy, -because OpenPGP is just a container for encrypted messages -but encryption key management (and thus key rotation or key “ratcheting”) -could be organized in flexible ways. -See Seqouia’s PFS prototype -for existing experiments in the OpenPGP implementor community.
+Delta Chat 可能会发展为支持完美前向保密, +因为 OpenPGP 只是加密消息的容器, +但密钥管理(以及密钥轮换或密钥“棘轮”) +可以以灵活的方式组织。 +请参阅 Seqouia 的 PFS 原型, +了解 OpenPGP 实现者社区中现有的实验。
-It depends on what is important to you. -Delta Chat does not support PFS like Signal does -but it provides guaranteed end-to-end encrypted chats -that are safe against compromised servers or corrupted networks. -Signal and most other PFS-supporting messengers do not provide -a practical scheme for protecting chat groups from network attacks -which are arguably more worrysome -than a potential attacker who seizes your phone and private encryption setup -but somehow not your messages, yet has a full record of all -past encrypted messages.
+这取决于对你而言重要的是什么。 +Delta Chat 不支持像 Signal 那样的 PFS, +但它提供了 保证的端到端加密聊天, +可以安全地抵御受损的服务器或损坏的网络。 +Signal 和大多数其他支持 PFS 的即时通讯应用 +没有提供实用的方案来保护聊天群组免受网络攻击, +而网络攻击可以说比 +潜在的攻击者查封你的手机和私有加密设置 +但不知何故没有你的消息,却完整记录了所有 +过去的加密消息更令人担忧。
-In any case, Delta Chat’s end-to-end encryption uses a secure subset of OpenPGP -which has been independently security-audited.
+在任何情况下,Delta Chat 的端到端加密都使用 OpenPGP 的安全子集, +该子集已 通过独立的安全审计。
Yes. +
是的。 The best way is to send an Autocrypt Setup Message from the other e-mail client. Look for something like Start Autocrypt Setup Transfer in the settings of the other client and follow the instructions shown there.
-Alternatively, you can import the key manually in “Settings -> Advanced settings -> Import secret keys”. -Caution: Make sure the key is not protected by a password, or remove the password beforehand.
+或者,你可以在“设置 -> 高级设置 -> 导入私钥”中手动导入密钥。 +注意:确保密钥未受密码保护,或事先删除密码。
-If you don’t have a key or don’t even know you would need one - don’t worry: Delta Chat generates keys as needed, you don’t have to hit a button for it.
+如果你没有密钥,甚至不知道你需要密钥 - 不用担心:Delta Chat 会根据需要生成密钥,你无需点击按钮。
最可能的原因是您的密钥被加密了和/或使用了密码。Delta Chat 不支持这样的密钥。您可以移除密码,之后再尝试导入。如果想保留密码,您 需要创建电子邮件别名来使用 Delta Chat ,这样 Delta Chat 的密钥是绑定到这个电子邮件别名上的
-Another common error is having the wrong file ending.
-Use the ASCII armored format and an .asc
file ending.
另一个常见错误是文件扩展名错误。
+使用 ASCII 编码格式和 .asc
文件扩展名。
Delta Chat 支持常见的 OpenPGP 私钥格式。然而,不可能使每种来源的私钥都被完整支持。这不是 Delta Chat 的主要目标。实际上,大多数新用户在使用 Delta Chat 之前根本没有密钥。不过,我们确实在尝试支持尽可能多的私钥来源。
@@ -1144,61 +1132,58 @@The Delta Chat project underwent four independent security audits and one -independent security analysis, from most recent to older:
+Delta Chat 项目经历了四次独立的安全性审计和一次 +独立的安全性分析,从最近到最旧:
2024 March, we received a deep security analysis from the Applied Cryptography -research group at ETH Zuerich and addressed all raised issues. -See our blog post about Hardening Guaranteed End-to-End encryption for more detailed information and the -Cryptographic Analysis of Delta Chat -research paper published afterwards.
-2023 April, we fixed security and privacy issues with the “web -apps shared in a chat” feature, related to failures of sandboxing -especially with Chromium. We subsequently got an independent security -audit from Cure53 and all issues found were fixed in the 1.36 app series released in April 2023. -See here for the full background story on end-to-end security in the web.
-2023 March, Cure53 analyzed both the transport encryption of -Delta Chat’s network connections and a reproducible mail server setup as -recommended on this site. -You can read more about the audit on our blog -or read the full report here.
-2020, Include Security analyzed Delta -Chat’s Rust core, -IMAP, -SMTP, and -TLS libraries. -It did not find any critical or high-severity issues. -The report raised a few medium-severity weaknesses - -they are no threat to Delta Chat users on their own -because they depend on the environment in which Delta Chat is used. -For usability and compatibility reasons, -we can not mitigate all of them -and decided to provide security recommendations to threatened users. -You can read the full report here.
-2019, Include Security analyzed Delta -Chat’s PGP and -RSA libraries. -It found no critical issues, -but two high-severity issues that we subsequently fixed. -It also revealed one medium-severity and some less severe issues, -but there was no way to exploit these vulnerabilities in the Delta Chat implementation. -Some of them we nevertheless fixed since the audit was concluded. -You can read the full report here.
+2024 年 3 月,我们收到了苏黎世联邦理工学院应用密码学 +研究小组的深入安全性分析,并解决了所有提出的问题。 +有关更多详细信息,请参阅我们关于 加强保证的端到端加密 的博客文章以及 +之后发表的 Delta Chat 密码学分析 +研究论文。
+2023 年 4 月,我们修复了“在聊天中共享的 Web 应用”的安全性 +和隐私问题,这些问题与沙箱故障有关,尤其是在 Chromium 中。 随后,我们获得了 Cure53 的独立安全 +审计,并且在 2023 年 4 月发布的 1.36 应用系列中修复了发现的所有问题。 +请参阅 此处,了解有关 Web 中端到端安全性的完整背景故事。
+2023 年 3 月,Cure53 分析了 Delta Chat 网络连接的传输加密和一个可重现的邮件服务器设置,如 +本网站 推荐的那样。 +你可以在 我们的博客 上阅读有关审计的更多信息 +,或在此处阅读 完整报告。
+2020 年,Include Security 分析了 Delta Chat 的 Rust 核心、 +IMAP、 +SMTP 和 +TLS 库。 +它没有发现任何严重或高严重性问题。 +该报告提出了一些中等严重性的弱点 - +它们本身不会对 Delta Chat 用户构成威胁, +因为它们取决于 Delta Chat 使用的环境。 +出于可用性和兼容性原因, +我们无法减轻所有这些弱点, +并决定向受威胁的用户提供安全建议。 +你可以在 此处阅读完整报告。
+2019 年,Include Security 分析了 Delta +Chat 的 PGP 和 +RSA 库。 +它没有发现任何严重问题, +但发现了两个高严重性问题,我们随后修复了这些问题。 +它还揭示了一个中等严重性和一些不太严重的问题, +但在 Delta Chat 实现中无法利用这些漏洞。 +尽管如此,自审计结束以来,我们仍然修复了其中一些问题。 +你可以在 此处阅读完整报告。
Yes. Delta Chat 1.36 comes with a new, experimental function for using the same profile on different devices:
+是的。 Delta Chat 1.36 comes with a new, experimental function for using the same profile on different devices:
Make sure both devices are on the same Wi-Fi or network
+确保两台设备都在同一个 Wi-Fi 或网络中
On the first device, go to Settings → Add Second Device, unlock the screen if needed -and wait a moment until a QR code is shown
+在第一台设备上,转到设置 → 添加第二台设备,如果需要,解锁屏幕 +并稍等片刻,直到显示二维码
On the second device, install Delta Chat
+在第二台设备上,安装 Delta Chat
On the second device, start Delta Chat, select Add as Second Device, and scan the QR code from the old device
+在第二台设备上,启动 Delta Chat,选择添加为第二台设备,然后扫描旧设备上的二维码
Transfer should start after a few seconds and during transfer both devices will show the progress. -Wait until it is finished on both devices.
+传输应在几秒钟后开始,并且在传输过程中,两台设备都将显示进度。 +等待直到两台设备都完成。
In contrast to many other messengers, after successful transfer, -both devices are completely independent. -One device is not needed for the other to work.
+与其他许多即时通讯应用不同,在成功传输后, +两台设备完全独立。 +一台设备不是另一台设备工作的必要条件。
Double-check both devices are in the same Wi-Fi or network
+仔细检查两台设备是否在同一个 Wi-Fi 或网络中
On Windows, go to Control Panel / Network and Internet -and make sure, Private Network is selected as “Network profile type” -(after transfer, you can change back to the original value)
+在 Windows 上,转到控制面板 / 网络和 Internet +并确保专用网络被选为“网络配置文件类型” +(传输后,你可以更改回原始值)
On iOS, make sure “System Settings / Apps / Delta Chat / Local Network” access is granted
+在 iOS 上,确保授予“系统设置 / 应用 / Delta Chat / 本地网络”访问权限
On macOS, enable “System Settings / Privacy & Security / Local Network / Delta Chat”
+在 macOS 上,启用“系统设置 / 隐私和安全 / 本地网络 / Delta Chat”
Your system might have a “personal firewall”, -which is known to cause problems (especially on Windows). -Disable the personal firewall for Delta Chat on both ends and try again
+你的系统可能具有“个人防火墙”, +已知这会引起问题(尤其是在 Windows 上)。 +在两端禁用个人防火墙以用于 Delta Chat,然后重试
Guest Networks may not allow devices to communicate with each other. -If possible, use a non-guest network.
+访客网络可能不允许设备相互通信。 +如果可能,请使用非访客网络。
Ensure there is enough storage on the destination device
+确保目标设备上有足够的存储空间
If transfer started, make sure, the devices stay active and do not fall asleep. -Do not exit Delta Chat. -(we try hard to make the app work in background, but systems tend to kill apps, unfortunately)
+如果传输已开始,请确保设备保持活动状态,并且不会进入睡眠状态。 +不要退出 Delta Chat。 +(我们努力使应用在后台工作,但不幸的是,系统倾向于杀死应用)
Delta Chat is already logged in on the destination device? -You can use multiple profiles per device, just add another profile
+目标设备上已登录 Delta Chat? +你可以在每台设备上使用多个配置文件,只需添加另一个配置文件
If you still have problems or if you cannot scan a QR code -try the manual transfer described below
+如果你仍然遇到问题,或者无法扫描二维码 +,请尝试下面描述的手动传输
This method is only recommended if “Add Second Device” as described above does not work.
+仅当上述“添加第二台设备”方法不起作用时,才建议使用此方法。
In Delta Chat, you can share webxdc apps, attachments with an .xdc
file
-extension. They can do very different things, and make Delta Chat a truly
-extendable messenger.
在 Delta Chat 中,你可以共享 Webxdc 应用,即带有 .xdc
文件扩展名的附件。
+它们可以做非常不同的事情,并使 Delta Chat 成为真正的可扩展即时通讯应用。
We are very grateful for feedback on these features - do you want to share -your ideas? Join the Forum to contribute. -You may conveniently login via Delta Chat and a QR code scan, -another rather stable experiment we run on the side (sic!).
+我们非常感谢您对这些功能的反馈 - 您想分享您的想法吗? 加入 论坛 以做出贡献。 +你可以通过 Delta Chat 和二维码扫描方便地登录, +这是我们顺便运行的另一个相当稳定的实验(sic!)。
https://meet.jit.si/$ROOM
. The $ROOM
variable will be a random value;
-this way, you will have a new random jitsi room every time you call someone.https://meet.jit.si/$ROOM
。 $ROOM
变量将是一个随机值;
+这样,每次你呼叫某人时,你都会有一个新的随机 Jitsi 房间。Change your address in “Settings → Advanced → Password and Account” and -enter the password of your new e-mail account (and if necessary, server settings). -You will get an information notice about the fact that you are moving to a new address. -An additional notice will also show up in your “Device messages” chat.
+在“设置 → 高级 → 密码和帐户”中更改你的地址, +然后输入你的新电子邮件帐户的密码(如有必要,还需输入服务器设置)。 +你将收到有关你正在迁移到新地址的信息通知。 +在你的“设备消息”聊天中也会显示一条附加通知。
If possible, let your old e-mail provider forward all messages to your new address.
+如果可能,让你的旧电子邮件提供商将所有消息转发到你的新地址。
Tell your contacts that you changed your address. -Writing to guaranteed end-to-end encrypted chats and groups, -will make them notice your move automatically -and they will continue chatting with you using your new address.
+告诉你的联系人你已更改地址。 +向保证的端到端加密聊天和群组发送消息, +将使他们自动注意到你的迁移, +并且他们将继续使用你的新地址与你聊天。
Note that Delta Chat will not retrieve messages anymore from your old e-mail provider. -If you didn’t configure your e-mail provider to forward messages (step 2.) -only those contacts to whom you sent a message in a guaranteed end-to-end encrypted chat -will send messages to your new address.
+请注意,Delta Chat 将不再从你的旧电子邮件提供商处检索消息。 +如果你没有配置你的电子邮件提供商转发消息(步骤 2), +则只有你在保证的端到端加密聊天中向其发送消息的联系人 +才会将消息发送到你的新地址。
-To learn more about this the details behind this, read our blogpost on -it.
+要了解有关此操作背后细节的更多信息,请阅读我们关于 +它的博客文章。
根据使用的操作系统,系统可能会要求您向本应用授予权限。下面 Delta Chat 使用各类权限进行的操作:
默认情况下, Delta Chat 会显示所有电子邮件。
-At “Settings → Advanced → Show Classic E-Mails”, -you can change this. You have these options:
+在“设置 → 高级 → 显示经典电子邮件”中, +你可以更改此设置。 你有以下选项:
是的,收到的 HTML 邮件会有一个 “显示完整消息 “按钮。 发出的邮件始终使用纯文本。
-Delta Chat sets (and encrypts!) the classic e-mail subject -automatically to the group name or to the sender name.
+Delta Chat 会自动将经典电子邮件主题设置为群组名称或发件人姓名, +并对其进行加密!
-So if you want to set the subject yourself, -for example for a formal e-mail to a business contact, -you can create a group -with only yourself and the recipient(s). -Set the Chat Title to the Subject you want, -and then send your e-mail as the first message. -If the recipients don’t use Delta Chat, -it will look like a normal, -formal e-mail to them. -You will get bonus professionalism points -if you set a signature text.
+因此,如果你想自己设置主题, +例如, для正式给商业联系人发送电子邮件, +你可以创建一个只有你和收件人的群组。 +将聊天标题设置为你想要的主题, +然后将你的电子邮件作为第一条消息发送。 +如果收件人不使用 Delta Chat, +则对他们来说,它看起来就像一封普通的 +正式电子邮件。 +如果你设置了签名文本,你将获得额外的专业加分。
If you use a default chat profile -you can simply uninstall the app. -This will automatically trigger deletion of all associated account data on the chatmail server. -For more info, please refer to nine.testrun.org account-deletion for the default onboarding server, -or the respective page from your chosen 3rd party chatmail server.
+如果你使用默认聊天配置文件, +则只需卸载该应用即可。 +这将自动触发删除 Chatmail 服务器上的所有关联帐户数据。 +有关更多信息,请参阅默认入职服务器的 nine.testrun.org 帐户删除, +或你选择的 第三方 Chatmail 服务器 的相应页面。
-If you have set up your chat profile on multiple devices -you need to remove it from all devices.
+如果你已在多台设备上设置了聊天配置文件, +则需要从所有设备中删除它。
-If you are using more than one account, -but don’t want to get rid of all of them, -you can remove it in the account switcher menu (on android and iOS), -or in the sidebar with a right click (in the desktop client).
+如果你使用多个帐户, +但不希望删除所有帐户, +则可以在帐户切换器菜单(在 Android 和 iOS 上)中删除它, +或者在侧边栏中右键单击(在桌面客户端中)。
-Accounts on classic e-mail providers -will not be deleted automatically; -how you can delete your account depends on your e-mail provider. -We don’t have any control over e-mail accounts at those providers, -so unfortunately we can’t help you with that.
+传统电子邮件提供商 上的帐户 +不会自动删除; +如何删除你的帐户取决于你的电子邮件提供商。 +我们无法控制这些提供商的电子邮件帐户, +因此很遗憾,我们无法在这方面为你提供帮助。
-If you want to continue using a classic e-mail account with other apps, -but uninstall Delta Chat, -it is recommended to leave any group chat before uninstalling Delta Chat. -Otherwise you might receive undecryptable messages from those group chats.
+如果你想继续将传统电子邮件帐户与其他应用一起使用, +但卸载 Delta Chat, +建议在卸载 Delta Chat 之前退出任何群组聊天。 +否则,你可能会收到来自这些群组聊天的无法解密的消息。
Delta Chat is available for all major and some minor platforms:
+Delta Chat 适用于所有主要平台和一些次要平台:
The official website, https://delta.chat/download shows all options in detail
+官方网站,https://delta.chat/download 详细显示所有选项
If unavailable, use the mirror at https://deltachat.github.io/deltachat-pages
+如果不可用,请使用 镜像 https://deltachat.github.io/deltachat-pages
Open one of the following app stores and search for “Delta Chat”: -Google Play Store, F-Droid, Huawei App Gallery, Amazon App Store, iOS and macOS App Store, Microsoft Store
+打开以下 应用商店之一并搜索“Delta Chat”: +Google Play 商店、F-Droid、华为应用商店、亚马逊应用商店、iOS 和 macOS 应用商店、Microsoft Store
Check the package manager of your Linux distributions
+检查你的 Linux 发行版的 软件包管理器
Android APKs are also available on https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-android/releases
+Android APK 也可在 https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-android/releases 上获得
Delta Chat 没有接受风险投资,也没有负债累累,更没有承受产生巨额利润或将用户及其朋友和家人卖给广告商(或更糟)的压力。我们宁愿使用目前来自欧盟和美国的公共资金,来帮助我们努力建立一个基于自由开源社区开发的、去中心化的、多样化的聊天消息软件生态系统。
-Concretely, Delta Chat developments have so far been funded from these sources, -ordered chronologically:
+具体而言,Delta Chat 的开发迄今为止已从以下来源获得资金, +按时间顺序排列:
从 2021 年底到 2023 年 3 月,我们从美国民主、人权和劳工局(DRL)获得了互联网自由资金(50 万美元)。这笔资金支持了我们的长期目标,即让Delta Chat 更好用,并与全球范围内的各种电子邮件服务器兼容,而且在经常受到互联网审查制度影响的地方更具弹性和安全性。
2023-2024 we successfully completed the OTF-funded -Secure Chatmail project, -allowing us to introduce guaranteed encryption, -creating a chatmail server network -and providing “instant onboarding” in all apps released from April 2024 on.
+2023-2024 年,我们成功完成了 OTF 资助的 +安全 Chatmail 项目, +使我们能够引入保证的加密, +创建一个 Chatmail 服务器网络, +并在 2024 年 4 月起发布的所有应用中提供“即时入职”。
In 2023 and 2024 we got accepted in the Next Generation Internet (NGI) -program for our work in webxdc PUSH, -along with collaboration partners working on -webxdc evolve, -webxdc XMPP, -DeltaTouch and -DeltaTauri. -All of these projects are partially completed or to be completed in early 2025.
+在 2023 年和 2024 年,我们的 WebXDC PUSH 工作已在下一代互联网 (NGI) 中获得认可, +并与致力于 +WebXDC evolve、 +WebXDC XMPP、 +DeltaTouch 和 +DeltaTauri 的合作伙伴合作。 +所有这些项目都已部分完成或将在 2025 年初完成。
我们有时会收到个人的一次性捐款。 例如,2021 年,一位慷慨的人士以 “继续保持良好的发展态势!”为主题通过银行向我们捐赠了4千欧元💜。 我们用这些钱来资助发展活动或支付不容易预测或从公共基金中报销的临时费用。收到更多的捐款也有助于我们作为一个贡献者社区变得更加独立和长期可持续。
@@ -1877,7 +1829,7 @@上面提到的钱款资助主要是由在弗赖堡(德国)的 merlinux GmbH 组织的,分发给了来自世界各地的十多位贡献者。
-请参阅 [Delta Chat 捐款渠道](捐款) +
请参阅 Delta Chat 捐款渠道 以了解货币捐款和其他捐款的可能性。
diff --git a/src/main/res/values-ca/strings.xml b/src/main/res/values-ca/strings.xml index c31d923a5..9ead47361 100644 --- a/src/main/res/values-ca/strings.xml +++ b/src/main/res/values-ca/strings.xml @@ -127,6 +127,10 @@