camp2023-57158-eng-Vacuum_robot_security_and_privacy_opus.srt

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 [MUSIC]

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 [MUSIC]

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 All right, good evening again, everybody.

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 How's everybody doing tonight?

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 >> [APPLAUSE]

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 >> Yay, wonderful.

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 However, I must tell you, it's already day four.

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 >> [APPLAUSE]

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 >> But to cheer us up,

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 we have a great last talk for today here at Millieways.

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 By the way, the Fettyverse hashtag, as always,

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 is #cccamp23millerways.

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 And who here in the crowd owns a vacuum robot?

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 >> [APPLAUSE]

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 >> I would say not great, not terrible.

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 But wow, I didn't expect that from a hacker crowd.

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 So then, especially for those of you who own one, the next talk is for you.

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 In the next 45 minutes, our speaker, Dennis Gieser,

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 will tell us all the latest news about vacuum robots, their security, and

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 their privacy issues, so that hopefully in the end,

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 your robot will not suck your data.

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 Please give a warm welcome to Dennis and enjoy the talk.

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 >> [APPLAUSE]

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 >> All right, welcome to my talk.

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 Thank you very much for being here at this late time.

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 It's great that you had four days of camp.

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 I mean, I came a little bit late because I had some stuff to do.

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 But it's kind of great here, except for a little bit warm.

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 So my talk today is kind of like an update about making robots security and

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 privacy, and I know people think, wait, that's always the same topic every two

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 years, but I mean, there's a lot of development, so let's do a quick update.

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 So for people who don't know me, which is the slides are kind of a little broken.

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 I'm a PhD student at Northeastern University, and

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 primarily my research field is in wireless and embedded security and privacy.

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 I think due to the amount of many, many robots, vacuum robots which I have,

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 I can call myself a vacuum robot collector.

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 So I think nowadays something like 45 robots.

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 And I have interest in the reverse engineering of interesting devices.

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 And this can be anything, I mean robots obviously, but

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 I've also like smart speakers, look at flash memory and other things.

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 Let me quickly ask this to format kind of weird, a little bit.

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 Is it my laptop?

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 >> It's your laptop.

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 >> Okay, let me fix that maybe real quick.

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 How many security experts do we need to fix issues?

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 Okay.

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 >> How many laptops?

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 >> Yeah, the laptop, it should be 6 x 8.

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 [BLANK_AUDIO]

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 >> Okay, great.

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 All right, perfect.

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 Working with experts, that's great.

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 Okay, so like I said, I am interested in vacuum robot smart speakers and

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 all other interesting IoT devices.

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 Some of my recent work is, some time ago I was looking at Amazon's smart speakers,

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 like EchoDots, and I bought 86 used EchoDots from eBay,

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 from other sources like Kleinenzeig in Germany.

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 I was doing some forensics, and let's say it was very bad news for Amazon.

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 So if you have used IoT devices, don't sell them, or

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 bad people like me might buy them.

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 Some other recent projects, I do a lot of flash forensics.

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 For example, on the left you see like the Pixel Watch, but

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 I look at embedded devices and see what kind of data I can extract from flash

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 memory, but also look at flash memory itself.

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 Surprisingly, a lot of flash memories have their own processor on them, and

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 you can hack the flash from there to maybe do malicious things.

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 So this is kind of like a current research project of me.

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 Another thing which I run is robotinfo.dev,

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 which is basically a website where I do a systematic analysis of robots.

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 For example, which operations system they're running,

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 what kind of sensors they have, if they have vulnerabilities or not.

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 The primary focus of that site is more or less to look at security and privacy.

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 And what I use it also for, kind of like in the back end,

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 to track for the changes.

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 So basically every time there's a new firmware update,

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 there's an automatic process which downloads it, extracts it, and compares it.

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 So we kind of get an idea of what the vendors are doing.

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 One of the sources how I get all this information is basically by buying

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 devices, disassembling them, and kind of start to emulate them.

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 So I have something like 50 or 60 emulated vacuum robots,

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 which are kind of behaving like real robots to the clouds and kind of just look

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 like, okay, do we get pushed firmware updates?

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 Is there anything new?

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 But also on the other side, what we do is we take a look at the app.

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 So we decompile the app and look if anything changes.

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 This is also the basis for further research.

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 I mean, for example, right now I'm working on machine learning models and

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 some other things.

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 By the way, the rack, which you see there is one of my few racks of robots.

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 So I keep a set of robots from basically a reference model from each of the models

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 which we support for routing.

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 And every time there's a new firmware update or if I need to check something,

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 I just go to the rack and just grab one and test the things which I need to test and

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 just put it back.

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 Which also means, and I get this question quite often also on Twitter or X,

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 or via email like, hey, I want to buy a vacuum robot, which cleans the best?

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 I have no idea.

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 I root those devices, but I mean, I'm not actually using them except for one which

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 I use and it does the job good enough, so I have no idea.

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 So don't ask me which one is the best for cleaning X, Y, and Z.

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 All right, so what is the goal of this talk?

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 Well, I want to give you an overview over the development of the vacuum robot

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 hacking over the last five years.

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 And I want to give you some idea about vulnerabilities and

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 backdoors which exist today.

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 And give you some understanding about which routing methods we have.

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 The ultimate goal typically which I have is to get root access onto a device with

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 all this assembly.

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 Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't work, but we try our best to find ways and

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 sneak ways around to kind of get root access.

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 As a side note, generally we have some, I mean,

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 me and the vendors don't hate each other necessarily, but

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 the thing is we have a very competitive kind of setting.

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 So every time they fix something, we fix something, and

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 it's kind of like always competitive thing.

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 So I know, for example, when I was giving this talk at DefCon, but

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 they were watching live and right now we're probably working on firmware updates.

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 So yeah, so some of the devices which are covered in this talk,

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 they are the current Roborock vacuum robots.

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 Some of them just came out kind of very recently.

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 They are more or less all the dreamy robots,

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 like all the new generation, like our generation vacuum robots.

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 We have also a new routing method for all the older ones which came out like one and

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 a half years and before that, so the so-called P models.

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 And everything you see here can be also technically applied to other robots,

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 for example, Dnava robots which are more used in America.

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 Shark AI robots and also some lawn mowers like the ZEGWay.

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 Everything which is like underlined is basically robots which have like cameras

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 which you can access in one way or the other.

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 Right, as a general thing is, I mean, why we just as a comment kind of,

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 why we jumping around on Roborock and dreamy, why not iRobot?

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 The thing is, surprisingly Roborock and dreamy have some of the best value

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 propositions in terms of features and price.

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 But iRobot nowadays, they're very, very good in reducing the amount of hardware

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 which we put into the devices to make it barely work for the use case which it's

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 used to, which means it doesn't make any sense to root them because we don't have

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 any resources anymore to run our own stuff on them.

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 So there's a particular reason why, I mean, technically I have rooted these devices,

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 but I'm not touching them basically.

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 Okay, so about this talk.

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 The result which you see here will be basically the result of 50 months of

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 research and experiments, which is a little bit annoying in the sense of like

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 if you're sitting for this long time on kind of, I wouldn't say zero days,

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 it sounds always like very important, but on vulnerabilities which you can tell

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 anyone and disclose to anyone because basically as soon as they get burned,

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 they basically get burned.

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 This talk is collaborative effort with me and Zun Baeyer.

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 And Zun Baeyer is the developer of ValleTudo.

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 Traditionally, we had the separation of me doing all the routing part and

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 all the hardware stuff and he's basically taking care of the cloud replacement,

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 ValleTudo.

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 Nowadays, we're kind of like, he's also going into routing part because

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 that's the cooler part and he wants to enjoy his life too.

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 So we would be also here if it wasn't the community.

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 So a lot of people from the community support us by testing routing methods,

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 giving feedback to about software, catching things which we

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 messed up potentially, donating devices, donating money.

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 So there's a lot of support from the community.

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 Typically what we do is we don't disclose things to the vendors.

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 So the vendors are kind of unaware of the findings.

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 Well, technically not today because I gave this talk basically at DefCon like

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 five days ago.

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 So they basically weren't aware five days ago and we didn't see any updates so

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 far, so we are still working on that, I assume.

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 But expect firmware updates and patches over the next couple days, I assume.

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 Okay, so what's the motivation of this talk?

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 So why the heck do we want to route devices?

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 Well, one of the things is, for me at least,

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 when I started that is to play with cool hardware.

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 These devices are very powerful.

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 It's basically, imagine for a Raspberry Pi or a smartphone on tires,

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 very compact driving around here in your house.

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 So it's a very interesting platform for devices.

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 The other thing is because it's so powerful,

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 I want to basically stop the devices from constantly phoning home.

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 And phoning home is kind of a thing with these devices, so

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 you can expect a couple hundred megabytes per month in telemetry data,

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 pictures, whatever.

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 The other thing is if people want to use custom software like Home Assistant,

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 it's very, very difficult to integrate these devices in that system

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 without relying on the clouds.

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 And sometimes the cloud can also go down, so there's a lot of problems.

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 One thing which becomes more and more important nowadays is diagnosis of

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 broken devices.

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 This is not necessarily, I mean, it's still an issue in Europe, but

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 in America you have a warranty period of one year.

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 And these devices tend to break exactly after one year.

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 And so a lot of people in the US have the issue, okay, we cannot get it

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 repaired under warranty, so we need to find a different way and we can help out

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 people by diagnosing what kind of things might be broken.

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 And the thing which is related to my research is basically to verify the

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 privacy claims of the vendors.

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 So why do we don't trust the great companies who develop these nice IoT

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 products?

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 Well, if you think about these devices, these devices are directly connected to

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 your home network and can talk to everything typically in your home and

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 have some internet connection.

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 I know some people put them in some VLANs and stuff like that, but

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 I mean, let's be realistic, most like 99% of the users probably just put them in

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 their normal Wi-Fi and call it a day.

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 The communication to the cloud is encrypted and

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 you have no idea what the content is.

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 Also, even if the vendor is not malicious,

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 developing secure hardware and software is hard.

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 So nothing says that the vendor can get hacked at one day or that there's some

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 weird kind of vulnerability in the device which can be used remotely.

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 If you remember the Mirai botnets many, many years ago,

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 which basically where IP cameras got hacked from the internet and

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 create like a huge botnet.

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 So we want to kind of figure out if there's some hidden vulnerabilities which

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 the vendor didn't put in on purpose but which exist there.

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 And one of the things why I'm a little bit paranoid is because vendor claims

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 might contradict each other.

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 So I have my favorite go-to example for claims of vendors and

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 I use always Roborock but technically all the other vendors do more or less the same thing.

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 Roborock claim for the S6 Max-V like hey, it's built for privacy,

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 it's certified by the TIF, my favorite company.

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 Nothing is ever duplicated, nothing is ever stored,

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 nothing is ever sent to the cloud, the cameras are only used for AI detection.

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 It never leaves the robot, everything is fine, trust us please.

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 But if you scroll down a little bit more, it says by the way,

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 you can watch your pets remotely from your phone and can talk to it and

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 you can see what's going on in your home and you can drive around in your home and

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 basically watch if everything is okay.

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 So now the question is like okay, on one side nothing is ever sent to the cloud and

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 it's not possible to access the camera, basically the pictures, but

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 on the other side you can access it remotely, so what is it?

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 As a side note, I mean there's different ways to interpret what the exact thing is,

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 but I mean it's very, very unclear here.

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 The other thing is I recently caught how they uploaded pictures of users,

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 well, development devices basically which they gave away for free to users to the

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 cloud and where they used gig workers in Venezuela to kind of label them.

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 Which was a little bit unsettling because most of the users didn't realize that

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 it's somewhere hidden in the terms of service, but the pictures would be used by

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 people and some pictures which were uploaded were like people sitting on the

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 toilet, naked kids, whatever, you can be creative.

237
00:14:31,880 --> 00:14:35,600
 I have some examples from the MIT Tech Review article.

238
00:14:35,600 --> 00:14:38,920
 I was helping the journalists to figure out which device it was because I have

239
00:14:38,920 --> 00:14:43,560
 from all the devices to camera perspective, so I really quickly figured out it's iRobot.

240
00:14:43,560 --> 00:14:45,680
 And it turned out to be actually iRobot.

241
00:14:45,680 --> 00:14:49,320
 And the question is why do we need to know what kind of AC you have,

242
00:14:49,320 --> 00:14:50,840
 what kind of switches you have and everything else?

243
00:14:50,840 --> 00:14:56,720
 So this is basically the stuff which was labeled in Venezuela from the gig workers.

244
00:14:56,720 --> 00:15:00,720
 As a small fun fact, as soon as the article came out or

245
00:15:00,720 --> 00:15:03,520
 as soon as the journalists actually started to send out requests to all the vendors and

246
00:15:03,520 --> 00:15:07,280
 asking about them, that things, many of the vendors panicked and

247
00:15:07,280 --> 00:15:11,280
 started to change their firmwares, apps and also privacy policies.

248
00:15:11,280 --> 00:15:16,200
 So you see a lot of privacy policies being changed around November, December 2022,

249
00:15:16,200 --> 00:15:17,080
 which is kind of interesting.

250
00:15:17,080 --> 00:15:20,760
 The other thing, which is a motivation for me also,

251
00:15:20,760 --> 00:15:23,520
 these kind of devices have more and more sensors.

252
00:15:23,520 --> 00:15:27,360
 So, I mean, at some point we got cameras, which is kind of bad.

253
00:15:27,360 --> 00:15:29,920
 But nowadays some of the robots have even microphones.

254
00:15:29,920 --> 00:15:31,920
 And one of the things which I want to mention here is like,

255
00:15:31,920 --> 00:15:34,480
 when we started five years ago, we were kind of joking like, okay,

256
00:15:34,480 --> 00:15:41,640
 we tried to find a way to use the ultrasonic sensor to basically listen to people.

257
00:15:41,640 --> 00:15:45,120
 Or maybe you can use some other sensor to kind of spy on people.

258
00:15:45,120 --> 00:15:46,960
 But nowadays you don't need to do that.

259
00:15:46,960 --> 00:15:50,200
 The robots come with microphones themselves.

260
00:15:50,200 --> 00:15:53,280
 As a quick note, I know there's some papers out there which claim that you can use

261
00:15:53,280 --> 00:15:58,840
 the ladder to snoop on people by flashing the firmware and stuff like that.

262
00:15:58,840 --> 00:16:02,120
 But I can tell you today that it's not possible that the paper is more or

263
00:16:02,120 --> 00:16:02,760
 less not accurate.

264
00:16:02,760 --> 00:16:06,800
 So I know it's out there, but shocker in academia,

265
00:16:06,800 --> 00:16:10,200
 people might be not super accurate with papers.

266
00:16:10,200 --> 00:16:13,720
 So you cannot use the ladder as a microphone, just as a hint.

267
00:16:13,720 --> 00:16:16,560
 All right, so what are risks of devices with cameras?

268
00:16:16,560 --> 00:16:20,160
 Well, some of the devices might store pictures indefinitely.

269
00:16:20,160 --> 00:16:24,720
 Sad news is also a lot of them do both in cloud and locally.

270
00:16:24,720 --> 00:16:27,520
 There's some ways how I was able to figure that out.

271
00:16:27,520 --> 00:16:31,160
 So far I can't tell you exactly which companies there are, but there's some.

272
00:16:32,320 --> 00:16:37,200
 Also, if you buy used devices from, for example, Amazon Marketplace,

273
00:16:37,200 --> 00:16:39,280
 you need to be a little bit careful.

274
00:16:39,280 --> 00:16:41,360
 You don't know what was installed previously on the device.

275
00:16:41,360 --> 00:16:45,400
 So the previous user might have installed a rootkit.

276
00:16:45,400 --> 00:16:49,280
 The new owner cannot verify the software, and as a result,

277
00:16:49,280 --> 00:16:51,200
 you might have a malicious device in your network.

278
00:16:51,200 --> 00:16:53,800
 So we are in a hacker conference, and I just want to say it's super illegal to do

279
00:16:53,800 --> 00:16:54,640
 that, so don't do that.

280
00:16:54,640 --> 00:16:58,920
 Don't buy devices on Amazon and root them, put some rootkit onto that, and

281
00:16:58,920 --> 00:17:00,160
 send it back to Amazon.

282
00:17:00,160 --> 00:17:03,400
 That's very rude and probably illegal, I assume.

283
00:17:03,400 --> 00:17:05,040
 I hope so, at least.

284
00:17:05,040 --> 00:17:09,680
 Okay, so rooting is more or less the only way how you know that the device is clean

285
00:17:09,680 --> 00:17:10,080
 in a way.

286
00:17:10,080 --> 00:17:15,160
 So one of the things which is kind of interesting,

287
00:17:15,160 --> 00:17:18,560
 especially in Germany from some German press articles.

288
00:17:18,560 --> 00:17:28,120
 Some vendors got a little bit creative in sense of users which are privacy aware.

289
00:17:28,120 --> 00:17:31,800
 And they try to avoid the word camera as far as they can.

290
00:17:31,800 --> 00:17:35,040
 And instead, they try to use the word optical sensor.

291
00:17:35,040 --> 00:17:37,280
 And I have here an article from Golem.

292
00:17:37,280 --> 00:17:40,360
 I don't want to shame Golem, but I mean, many do that.

293
00:17:40,360 --> 00:17:43,200
 And they kind of asked the vendor, and the vendor said, yeah, optical sensor is

294
00:17:43,200 --> 00:17:43,720
 accurate.

295
00:17:43,720 --> 00:17:47,600
 So it's not a shaming thing, it's just like an info thing here.

296
00:17:47,600 --> 00:17:51,400
 So what Roborock kind of said is like, so we don't have cameras in there.

297
00:17:51,400 --> 00:17:54,480
 For privacy reasons, we just put an optical sensor which detects lasers.

298
00:17:54,480 --> 00:17:57,920
 So it's good for your privacy, so don't worry.

299
00:17:57,920 --> 00:17:59,320
 Everything will be fine.

300
00:17:59,320 --> 00:18:04,520
 And I have an output of the optical sensor on the right.

301
00:18:04,520 --> 00:18:08,440
 By the way, sorry it says, hello, Defqon, but I was too lazy to create another

302
00:18:08,440 --> 00:18:09,520
 picture for that.

303
00:18:09,520 --> 00:18:12,480
 So yeah, so as you see, there's an output of optical sensors.

304
00:18:12,480 --> 00:18:15,120
 So no camera involved.

305
00:18:15,120 --> 00:18:16,520
 Nothing to see here.

306
00:18:16,520 --> 00:18:17,680
 Right.

307
00:18:17,680 --> 00:18:20,040
 Also, certifications are very important.

308
00:18:20,040 --> 00:18:25,320
 Most of the devices which have cameras have some kind of certification,

309
00:18:25,320 --> 00:18:27,840
 either by TÜV Rheinland or by TÜV Süd.

310
00:18:27,840 --> 00:18:33,560
 So both of them are kind of testing all the devices, and all these devices met

311
00:18:33,560 --> 00:18:35,760
 the European cybersecurity standards.

312
00:18:35,760 --> 00:18:38,280
 So I think we can't end the talk here because all of them are secure, I assume,

313
00:18:38,280 --> 00:18:41,880
 because they got tested.

314
00:18:41,880 --> 00:18:43,560
 Yeah.

315
00:18:43,560 --> 00:18:45,560
 Sadly, yeah, we can't end here.

316
00:18:45,560 --> 00:18:46,040
 All right.

317
00:18:46,040 --> 00:18:47,280
 So what happened so far?

318
00:18:47,280 --> 00:18:50,760
 Let me give you a quick rundown here.

319
00:18:50,760 --> 00:18:55,120
 Let's start with a general observation, like what we saw in the last five years.

320
00:18:55,120 --> 00:19:01,280
 So every time we release a routing method, developers react in weird, sometimes

321
00:19:01,280 --> 00:19:02,400
 different ways.

322
00:19:02,400 --> 00:19:08,440
 So sometimes they even react in a way that they break things.

323
00:19:08,440 --> 00:19:12,720
 And there was some case where they pushed a very quick firmware update which

324
00:19:12,720 --> 00:19:16,360
 started to break hundreds of vacuum robots permanently because they kind of

325
00:19:16,360 --> 00:19:22,280
 started to panic and started to do weird things, which is kind of sad, which we

326
00:19:22,280 --> 00:19:23,960
 want to avoid, obviously.

327
00:19:23,960 --> 00:19:27,600
 The best case for us if they react is that our routing method just fails in a way

328
00:19:27,600 --> 00:19:31,360
 that says, hey, the file system is broken, we don't accept it, we don't boot it,

329
00:19:31,360 --> 00:19:32,760
 so whatever.

330
00:19:32,760 --> 00:19:33,440
 That's the best case.

331
00:19:33,440 --> 00:19:38,360
 So sadly, some vendors started to do things which are a little bit more mean.

332
00:19:38,360 --> 00:19:42,680
 The routing succeeds, everything is fine, but the device will break randomly.

333
00:19:42,680 --> 00:19:46,480
 For example, white cleans, at some point it will just crash, and it's very hard to

334
00:19:46,480 --> 00:19:48,200
 debug.

335
00:19:48,200 --> 00:19:51,520
 In particular cases, it's also so if it detects manipulations or routed

336
00:19:51,520 --> 00:19:55,440
 firmware, it will just destroy itself permanently, so it will just delete its

337
00:19:55,440 --> 00:19:58,640
 keys and it will be kind of like a problem.

338
00:19:58,640 --> 00:20:01,400
 So that's the reason why we need to buy the device in advance to kind of figure

339
00:20:01,400 --> 00:20:03,160
 stuff like that out.

340
00:20:03,160 --> 00:20:07,160
 So let's start with the first work in 2017.

341
00:20:07,160 --> 00:20:13,160
 This was a work together with Dani Wiggema, and it was about the Xiaomi

342
00:20:13,160 --> 00:20:16,800
 first generation and the Roborock S5, which was also kind of like the first

343
00:20:16,800 --> 00:20:18,960
 generation device back then.

344
00:20:18,960 --> 00:20:22,760
 Some of the findings which we found were that the firmware images are unsigned

345
00:20:22,760 --> 00:20:26,480
 and only encrypted with a very weak key, and I think the very weak key was just

346
00:20:26,480 --> 00:20:29,440
 Roborock as the name of the company.

347
00:20:29,440 --> 00:20:32,240
 This by itself wouldn't be a big issue.

348
00:20:32,240 --> 00:20:36,360
 The problem is that you could push custom firmware on the local network,

349
00:20:36,360 --> 00:20:42,360
 and so basically you could just flash the device over the network.

350
00:20:42,360 --> 00:20:45,560
 This is not necessarily a problem for us of people who want to root the devices,

351
00:20:45,560 --> 00:20:48,200
 but it's a bigger problem if you have malicious people who want to do bad

352
00:20:48,200 --> 00:20:49,040
 things.

353
00:20:49,040 --> 00:20:51,840
 Now people might say, okay, I don't have access, so typically attackers don't

354
00:20:51,840 --> 00:20:54,440
 have access to your personal network.

355
00:20:54,440 --> 00:20:59,120
 The problem is if your device is in provisioning mode, basically, so it opens

356
00:20:59,120 --> 00:21:02,440
 its own Wi-Fi access point and waits for you from pushing it into your private

357
00:21:02,440 --> 00:21:05,160
 Wi-Fi, then you can do the same pushing.

358
00:21:05,160 --> 00:21:08,080
 Basically, you can push the firmware onto that too.

359
00:21:08,080 --> 00:21:13,000
 When I was living in Darmstadt, I saw some of my neighbors had Xiaomi vacuum

360
00:21:13,000 --> 00:21:14,880
 robots which were paranoid.

361
00:21:14,880 --> 00:21:18,000
 They didn't put them into their Wi-Fi, so they had open Wi-Fi access points on

362
00:21:18,000 --> 00:21:19,480
 the robot.

363
00:21:19,480 --> 00:21:24,640
 I didn't do it, but technically I could have pushed a malicious firmware onto

364
00:21:24,640 --> 00:21:27,800
 that and just wait one day, they will probably put it in their Wi-Fi, and then

365
00:21:27,800 --> 00:21:29,120
 they would be screwed.

366
00:21:29,120 --> 00:21:29,880
 Still don't do that.

367
00:21:29,880 --> 00:21:32,880
 If you see improvised robots in your neighborhood, don't hack them.

368
00:21:32,880 --> 00:21:34,920
 That's very mean and annoying.

369
00:21:34,920 --> 00:21:37,800
 Anyway, so what's the result of these two facts?

370
00:21:37,800 --> 00:21:41,240
 One of the things is we could root the devices for disassembly, and we could

371
00:21:41,240 --> 00:21:43,440
 start the development of custom software and voice packages.

372
00:21:43,440 --> 00:21:48,480
 A lot of people in Germany apparently are very interested in voice packages.

373
00:21:48,480 --> 00:21:52,960
 I mean, for me, English is fine, but a lot of people got very creative with

374
00:21:52,960 --> 00:21:55,960
 like GLaDOS and some other things.

375
00:21:55,960 --> 00:22:02,200
 This was published on the CCC Congress in 2017 and also DEF CON in 2018, so

376
00:22:02,200 --> 00:22:03,280
 exactly five years ago.

377
00:22:03,280 --> 00:22:07,200
 So as you see, I do that stuff for a very long time already.

378
00:22:07,200 --> 00:22:10,960
 The reaction from that was Roborock, who developed both the devices, was not

379
00:22:10,960 --> 00:22:12,040
 very happy about that.

380
00:22:12,040 --> 00:22:16,360
 So what they started to do is they started to block local firmware updates

381
00:22:16,360 --> 00:22:17,320
 in the firmware.

382
00:22:17,320 --> 00:22:20,880
 Which is technically OK from a cyber security perspective, so I wasn't super

383
00:22:20,880 --> 00:22:22,040
 mad about that.

384
00:22:22,040 --> 00:22:24,960
 But also then what we started to introduce is we basically signed all

385
00:22:24,960 --> 00:22:28,800
 the firmware and voice packages, so we couldn't necessarily create our own

386
00:22:28,800 --> 00:22:29,680
 anymore.

387
00:22:29,680 --> 00:22:33,320
 And each of the device models basically used the firmware encryption keys.

388
00:22:33,320 --> 00:22:38,560
 So we had to basically get every device individually, like every model, and

389
00:22:38,560 --> 00:22:41,520
 extract the keys to kind of look in the firmware.

390
00:22:41,520 --> 00:22:44,360
 One of the things where we got a little bit annoyed about people buying cheap

391
00:22:44,360 --> 00:22:48,440
 devices in China and using them in Europe was basically that they started

392
00:22:48,440 --> 00:22:52,680
 to enforce region locks so that you couldn't import device anymore, but you

393
00:22:52,680 --> 00:22:56,520
 can't run them in Germany for whatever reason.

394
00:22:56,520 --> 00:22:58,800
 I mean, we just want to avoid that.

395
00:22:58,800 --> 00:23:02,840
 However, one of the interesting things is that the hardware mostly remains

396
00:23:02,840 --> 00:23:03,640
 the same.

397
00:23:03,640 --> 00:23:07,960
 So if you bought every two years a vacuum robot from Roborock and you take

398
00:23:07,960 --> 00:23:10,760
 the PCBs out and compare them to each other, the layout was more or less the

399
00:23:10,760 --> 00:23:11,040
 same.

400
00:23:11,040 --> 00:23:16,320
 So they sell you more or less the same hardware configuration all over again

401
00:23:16,320 --> 00:23:18,200
 every two years or every year even.

402
00:23:18,200 --> 00:23:20,360
 So that's their business model, I guess.

403
00:23:20,360 --> 00:23:23,200
 They can't charge you for updates, but they can charge you for new hardware,

404
00:23:23,200 --> 00:23:25,000
 just as a side note.

405
00:23:25,000 --> 00:23:27,920
 Anyway, the problem which we had now is we needed to disassemble the device,

406
00:23:27,920 --> 00:23:30,240
 which was kind of like a problem.

407
00:23:30,240 --> 00:23:31,080
 I have here an example.

408
00:23:31,080 --> 00:23:33,880
 So basically you need to completely unscrew the device.

409
00:23:33,880 --> 00:23:36,960
 You need to solder maybe a few things.

410
00:23:36,960 --> 00:23:45,680
 One of the good things here was that we figured out a way to bypass that,

411
00:23:45,680 --> 00:23:47,320
 which required assembly.

412
00:23:47,320 --> 00:23:52,760
 And this worked for the robot S6, S5 Max, S7, and also others.

413
00:23:52,760 --> 00:23:57,920
 The initial idea which we had was that we accessed the U-boot shell by UART.

414
00:23:57,920 --> 00:24:00,520
 Sadly, they figured that out at some point and fixed that.

415
00:24:00,520 --> 00:24:04,160
 And the new approach was that we get the device into bootloader mode and just

416
00:24:04,160 --> 00:24:05,880
 patch the file system over USB.

417
00:24:05,880 --> 00:24:09,720
 And this turned out to be the more efficient way to do that.

418
00:24:09,720 --> 00:24:10,720
 Again, there's advantages.

419
00:24:10,720 --> 00:24:12,880
 We need to disassemble the device, which is annoying.

420
00:24:12,880 --> 00:24:16,240
 But that's the price of doing business, I guess.

421
00:24:16,240 --> 00:24:20,320
 One of the interesting facts is that this method still works until today.

422
00:24:20,320 --> 00:24:29,000
 For all the other 16-based devices, so for example, S6 Pro Ultra and Q7.

423
00:24:29,000 --> 00:24:32,400
 When they saw that we have a new way to root the devices, they reacted again.

424
00:24:32,400 --> 00:24:33,720
 And we're not necessarily happy.

425
00:24:33,720 --> 00:24:36,600
 So as mentioned before, they locked the bootloader down so

426
00:24:36,600 --> 00:24:38,800
 we don't have a U-boot shell anymore.

427
00:24:38,800 --> 00:24:42,280
 And then they basically got through the book of all security methods and started

428
00:24:42,280 --> 00:24:45,200
 to introduce things like Secure Boot, SA Linux.

429
00:24:45,200 --> 00:24:47,000
 They introduced the M-variety.

430
00:24:47,000 --> 00:24:54,560
 And even newer device have encrypted file systems where the user data and

431
00:24:54,560 --> 00:24:55,520
 applications encrypted.

432
00:24:55,520 --> 00:24:58,480
 So we can't even figure out, OK, what is the application actually doing?

433
00:24:58,480 --> 00:25:02,160
 So we only see a partial of the portion of the system.

434
00:25:02,160 --> 00:25:08,080
 And they started to use Trust Zone where they stored the keys in OPT, basically.

435
00:25:08,080 --> 00:25:10,840
 Which has also the risk if you do any sketchy things,

436
00:25:10,840 --> 00:25:12,440
 where the keys just get wiped.

437
00:25:12,440 --> 00:25:15,840
 So you need to be careful with that.

438
00:25:15,840 --> 00:25:19,200
 One thing which we introduced at some point were custom LF binary signatures,

439
00:25:19,200 --> 00:25:20,000
 which I never saw before.

440
00:25:20,000 --> 00:25:24,280
 So they basically were assigning all LF binaries which exist in a system.

441
00:25:24,280 --> 00:25:28,600
 And every time you try to execute an unsigned binary, it just wouldn't execute.

442
00:25:28,600 --> 00:25:30,520
 It would get a second thought.

443
00:25:30,520 --> 00:25:35,120
 So in 2021, we fight back.

444
00:25:35,120 --> 00:25:41,600
 So this was a thing which I presented at DEF CON.

445
00:25:41,600 --> 00:25:44,000
 Oh, this is actually not accurate.

446
00:25:44,000 --> 00:25:46,880
 I presented at DEF CON 21.

447
00:25:46,880 --> 00:25:47,920
 Not here.

448
00:25:47,920 --> 00:25:53,560
 And the method was basically to bypass the LF binary verification and security.

449
00:25:53,560 --> 00:25:58,600
 So one of the ideas was to modify the configuration partition.

450
00:25:58,600 --> 00:26:01,680
 But it required basically the desoldering of the EMMC flash strip,

451
00:26:01,680 --> 00:26:04,720
 which most of the people can't do or don't want to do,

452
00:26:04,720 --> 00:26:07,440
 because it will very likely brick your device.

453
00:26:07,440 --> 00:26:08,720
 Or you need some ISP access.

454
00:26:08,720 --> 00:26:12,800
 So this was a very specific method for a very specifically specific people

455
00:26:12,800 --> 00:26:14,320
 who are good with soldering.

456
00:26:14,320 --> 00:26:16,280
 But it's not a broad thing.

457
00:26:16,280 --> 00:26:20,680
 And that was the reason why we said, OK, we want to maybe take a look

458
00:26:20,680 --> 00:26:24,800
 at different vendors for now and just wait until Roborock kind of cools down

459
00:26:24,800 --> 00:26:29,080
 and kind of gets more relaxed and stops being mean.

460
00:26:29,080 --> 00:26:33,760
 And one thing which we found was a new vendor, which is Dreamy.

461
00:26:33,760 --> 00:26:35,920
 And we have very similar devices to Roborock.

462
00:26:35,920 --> 00:26:37,240
 Basically, they were powerful.

463
00:26:37,240 --> 00:26:39,200
 They had cameras.

464
00:26:39,200 --> 00:26:40,920
 They had an extremely easy routing method,

465
00:26:40,920 --> 00:26:43,000
 basically, before disassembling.

466
00:26:43,000 --> 00:26:46,520
 And we were able to basically flash them over USB.

467
00:26:46,520 --> 00:26:48,480
 One of the problems with the flashing over USB part

468
00:26:48,480 --> 00:26:50,000
 was that some devices got soft-bricked.

469
00:26:50,000 --> 00:26:53,880
 But I think we solve that problem nowadays.

470
00:26:53,880 --> 00:26:58,400
 So how did Roborock react onto our Defqon talk back then?

471
00:26:58,400 --> 00:27:03,960
 Well, I got a very nice email from the Roborock CEO one day after my talk.

472
00:27:03,960 --> 00:27:04,960
 Oh, thank you for the talk.

473
00:27:04,960 --> 00:27:08,080
 Our engineers watched the talk live and are fixing right now

474
00:27:08,080 --> 00:27:09,440
 all the vulnerabilities.

475
00:27:09,440 --> 00:27:14,120
 So that's the reason why I know that we are watching those talks.

476
00:27:14,120 --> 00:27:16,480
 What we did now is we encrypted all the partitions,

477
00:27:16,480 --> 00:27:21,000
 except the system partition, which we can do for technical reasons.

478
00:27:21,000 --> 00:27:23,600
 They started to obfuscate the ALF binary signature.

479
00:27:23,600 --> 00:27:27,440
 So we cannot find it that easily and patch it.

480
00:27:27,440 --> 00:27:31,280
 And we started to add custom code into the random libraries

481
00:27:31,280 --> 00:27:33,640
 to kind of detect if we try to bypass the traffic.

482
00:27:33,640 --> 00:27:37,240
 So one of the ways how we kind of disconnected us from the cloud

483
00:27:37,240 --> 00:27:41,680
 is that we redirect traffic via DNS to the robot itself

484
00:27:41,680 --> 00:27:43,680
 so that basically nothing goes to the cloud.

485
00:27:43,680 --> 00:27:45,360
 Everything stays on the robot.

486
00:27:45,360 --> 00:27:48,960
 And they figured out, hey, you still wanted to expel traffic from the robot.

487
00:27:48,960 --> 00:27:50,320
 So how can we do that?

488
00:27:50,320 --> 00:27:52,960
 We just have a detection, which detects

489
00:27:52,960 --> 00:27:57,560
 if you want to upload something to your roborock.com domain.

490
00:27:57,560 --> 00:28:00,120
 And if you do that, it has some obfuscated way

491
00:28:00,120 --> 00:28:03,120
 to kind of do DNS queries on itself in the libcurl library.

492
00:28:03,120 --> 00:28:06,720
 So at some point, we noticed, wait, we have still traffic going off

493
00:28:06,720 --> 00:28:09,760
 to Roborock, even though we have blocked all the domains.

494
00:28:09,760 --> 00:28:12,440
 And so we figured out that they introduced some sneaky way

495
00:28:12,440 --> 00:28:14,920
 to still exfutrate log files and some other stuff,

496
00:28:14,920 --> 00:28:17,760
 even if the device is rooted.

497
00:28:17,760 --> 00:28:18,480
 We figured it out.

498
00:28:18,480 --> 00:28:19,360
 We patch it nowadays.

499
00:28:19,360 --> 00:28:20,680
 But this is one of the things.

500
00:28:20,680 --> 00:28:24,920
 They try to find ways to bypass our routing methods.

501
00:28:24,920 --> 00:28:27,880
 And notice they love obfuscation.

502
00:28:27,880 --> 00:28:30,040
 They use XOR everywhere they can use it.

503
00:28:30,040 --> 00:28:34,600
 So it's kind of like it gets a little bit annoying from time to time.

504
00:28:34,600 --> 00:28:39,120
 So how does their stuff look like?

505
00:28:39,120 --> 00:28:44,760
 So as mentioned, they noticed check for L signatures in the kernel.

506
00:28:44,760 --> 00:28:49,760
 So basically, they use the doMMap function,

507
00:28:49,760 --> 00:28:55,680
 which basically creates a memory area for if you try to run a program.

508
00:28:55,680 --> 00:28:59,280
 And if the file is not signed correctly, it will basically secfault.

509
00:28:59,280 --> 00:29:01,320
 So every time you try to execute your own custom binary,

510
00:29:01,320 --> 00:29:04,040
 it will just secfault. Nothing happens.

511
00:29:04,040 --> 00:29:07,520
 And they got really creative in naming the functions.

512
00:29:07,520 --> 00:29:09,760
 So I have an example on the right, which is basically

513
00:29:09,760 --> 00:29:12,960
 the doMMap function from the S8.

514
00:29:12,960 --> 00:29:16,960
 And they started to use names like clock set rate DSP0.

515
00:29:16,960 --> 00:29:18,520
 There's no DSP0, by the way.

516
00:29:18,520 --> 00:29:20,080
 Or clock set, whatever thing.

517
00:29:20,080 --> 00:29:22,520
 So these functions are actually just to verify the signature.

518
00:29:22,520 --> 00:29:26,560
 But they named them in the super weird way so that we would think,

519
00:29:26,560 --> 00:29:28,960
 oh, that's probably something important, so we don't touch it.

520
00:29:28,960 --> 00:29:32,480
 But in reality, that's where obfuscated signature check.

521
00:29:32,480 --> 00:29:34,120
 And they do some weird other stuff.

522
00:29:34,120 --> 00:29:36,480
 So I think they use some code obfuscation tools

523
00:29:36,480 --> 00:29:39,360
 to basically try to get a soft track.

524
00:29:39,360 --> 00:29:43,160
 So at the same time, Dreamy started also to panic directly after the talk.

525
00:29:43,160 --> 00:29:45,040
 So they did a lot of changes in their firmware.

526
00:29:45,040 --> 00:29:51,920
 They removed the UART lock-in shell and the UBoot shell.

527
00:29:51,920 --> 00:29:54,280
 So they just patched UBoot.

528
00:29:54,280 --> 00:29:57,840
 And they pushed changes, which started apparently to break robots

529
00:29:57,840 --> 00:30:00,040
 if their firmware version was too old.

530
00:30:00,040 --> 00:30:00,800
 So it was kind of weird.

531
00:30:00,800 --> 00:30:04,800
 So we got a lot of feedback back from people who didn't have rooted vacuum

532
00:30:04,800 --> 00:30:08,680
 robots, but their device was bricked from a firmware update.

533
00:30:08,680 --> 00:30:10,760
 And especially this happened outside of the warranty.

534
00:30:10,760 --> 00:30:13,960
 So they kind of parametric devices.

535
00:30:13,960 --> 00:30:16,800
 One of the fun facts is because we compared firmware updates,

536
00:30:16,800 --> 00:30:21,040
 we found a way simpler routing methods which we weren't aware of.

537
00:30:21,040 --> 00:30:25,920
 So they patched something where we didn't know that it was there.

538
00:30:25,920 --> 00:30:28,880
 And it was very helpful because one thing which we noticed

539
00:30:28,880 --> 00:30:31,360
 was that they removed this function.

540
00:30:31,360 --> 00:30:34,000
 And what it does is if you press the reset button for one second,

541
00:30:34,000 --> 00:30:36,560
 it will pop a lock-in shell.

542
00:30:36,560 --> 00:30:39,520
 And we had no idea because we thought, OK, we removed the lock-in shell,

543
00:30:39,520 --> 00:30:42,320
 so we need to do the USB and whatever.

544
00:30:42,320 --> 00:30:44,320
 And then we noticed, wait, they removed that.

545
00:30:44,320 --> 00:30:46,680
 And it took many, many months until it got actually

546
00:30:46,680 --> 00:30:50,240
 pushed into all the devices which were newly produced.

547
00:30:50,240 --> 00:30:51,880
 And we saw that and we were like, oh, wait,

548
00:30:51,880 --> 00:30:55,880
 there's a way safer method because now you can connect over UART,

549
00:30:55,880 --> 00:30:58,560
 press the reset button for one second, and just get a lock-in shell.

550
00:30:58,560 --> 00:31:00,440
 And you can lock in with a particular password.

551
00:31:00,440 --> 00:31:02,400
 So this was very helpful.

552
00:31:02,400 --> 00:31:04,320
 So thanks for showing us this thing.

553
00:31:04,320 --> 00:31:06,040
 That's not the only time it just happened.

554
00:31:06,040 --> 00:31:09,680
 So we found a couple other things which were also kind of useful.

555
00:31:09,680 --> 00:31:10,480
 Right.

556
00:31:10,480 --> 00:31:11,920
 But we started to panic even more.

557
00:31:11,920 --> 00:31:16,600
 And they introduced like a secure boot and have set the if-uses,

558
00:31:16,600 --> 00:31:19,120
 which was kind of being expected.

559
00:31:19,120 --> 00:31:23,840
 They signed the system partition and are doing the verification

560
00:31:23,840 --> 00:31:25,800
 of a U-boot, which is the bootloader.

561
00:31:25,800 --> 00:31:28,760
 And they started to pair the kernel with a particular version

562
00:31:28,760 --> 00:31:30,840
 of the system partition.

563
00:31:30,840 --> 00:31:33,960
 And this is kind of important for the thing which we did next.

564
00:31:33,960 --> 00:31:39,800
 They basically introduced the judge countermeasures.

565
00:31:39,800 --> 00:31:43,600
 So judge countermeasurements, what is that?

566
00:31:43,600 --> 00:31:46,760
 This is one of the things which we introduced in 2020

567
00:31:46,760 --> 00:31:47,560
 in all new firmwares.

568
00:31:47,560 --> 00:31:50,640
 So if you have a firmware which is newer than-- or a device also

569
00:31:50,640 --> 00:31:54,080
 which is newer than 2022, you have it.

570
00:31:54,080 --> 00:31:57,480
 Rooted firmwares would start to crash randomly.

571
00:31:57,480 --> 00:32:00,120
 And it was super weird for us to debug that.

572
00:32:00,120 --> 00:32:02,240
 And at the end of the day, we figured it out.

573
00:32:02,240 --> 00:32:03,400
 But this was super annoying.

574
00:32:03,400 --> 00:32:04,920
 And it was super mean by them.

575
00:32:04,920 --> 00:32:06,640
 And I think it was directed directly at us.

576
00:32:06,640 --> 00:32:08,440
 This was not a thing against other vendors.

577
00:32:08,440 --> 00:32:10,680
 It was directly directed at us.

578
00:32:10,680 --> 00:32:11,840
 So what does it do?

579
00:32:11,840 --> 00:32:15,880
 So they bake the expected SHA-256 hash of the root file

580
00:32:15,880 --> 00:32:17,800
 system into the kernel.

581
00:32:17,800 --> 00:32:21,160
 Then as soon as you run the cleaning process,

582
00:32:21,160 --> 00:32:23,040
 at some random time in the cleaning process,

583
00:32:23,040 --> 00:32:26,040
 it will compute the hash of the actual system partition,

584
00:32:26,040 --> 00:32:29,880
 compared if it matches to the hash which the kernel expects.

585
00:32:29,880 --> 00:32:31,880
 If the hash is not correct, they will just

586
00:32:31,880 --> 00:32:36,440
 start spawning your threads and run malloc in a loop, which

587
00:32:36,440 --> 00:32:38,360
 will basically cause the whole memory--

588
00:32:38,360 --> 00:32:41,240
 that you get the memory leak, basically, randomly.

589
00:32:41,240 --> 00:32:42,520
 This can be after five minutes.

590
00:32:42,520 --> 00:32:43,480
 This can be after 10 minutes.

591
00:32:43,480 --> 00:32:45,020
 But the robot will at some point crash

592
00:32:45,020 --> 00:32:46,880
 and just stop at some point.

593
00:32:46,880 --> 00:32:48,640
 And this is extremely difficult to debug,

594
00:32:48,640 --> 00:32:52,360
 because the thing is there's no locks.

595
00:32:52,360 --> 00:32:54,480
 You can't run trace the whole time, because it just

596
00:32:54,480 --> 00:32:55,200
 happens randomly.

597
00:32:55,200 --> 00:32:56,800
 So at some point, we figured it out.

598
00:32:56,800 --> 00:32:59,240
 But this was extremely annoying.

599
00:32:59,240 --> 00:33:01,960
 It cost me weeks of reverse engineering

600
00:33:01,960 --> 00:33:04,800
 and figuring out what's going on, basically comparing firmwares.

601
00:33:04,800 --> 00:33:06,160
 Why it doesn't crash with this firmware?

602
00:33:06,160 --> 00:33:07,360
 Why it crashed with this firmware?

603
00:33:07,360 --> 00:33:08,800
 What changed?

604
00:33:08,800 --> 00:33:11,160
 That's just very sad.

605
00:33:11,160 --> 00:33:13,920
 Anyway, so that was the past.

606
00:33:13,920 --> 00:33:15,120
 We figured it out.

607
00:33:15,120 --> 00:33:19,640
 So let's talk about the current state of robot security.

608
00:33:19,640 --> 00:33:21,560
 I want to just use one device, which

609
00:33:21,560 --> 00:33:24,320
 I think is the one which has the most protections

610
00:33:24,320 --> 00:33:25,720
 and is the most secure one.

611
00:33:25,720 --> 00:33:29,120
 And that's the Roborock S8 Pro Ultra.

612
00:33:29,120 --> 00:33:32,440
 That's the current flagship model by Roborock.

613
00:33:32,440 --> 00:33:36,000
 So that's the newest kind of thing which we have.

614
00:33:36,000 --> 00:33:41,920
 This device runs an all-winner MR813,

615
00:33:41,920 --> 00:33:46,000
 which is a quad-core sock and runs a couple more MCUs.

616
00:33:46,000 --> 00:33:49,520
 It has either 502 megabytes of RAM or 1 gigabyte of RAM.

617
00:33:49,520 --> 00:33:51,400
 The reason why they have two different things

618
00:33:51,400 --> 00:33:52,840
 is I think they started with 1 gigabyte

619
00:33:52,840 --> 00:33:54,640
 and figured out they can get away with 512.

620
00:33:54,640 --> 00:33:58,920
 So it's kind of like a cost-cutting measurement.

621
00:33:58,920 --> 00:34:03,560
 And they have 4 gigabyte of flash.

622
00:34:03,560 --> 00:34:05,360
 This device has two cameras.

623
00:34:05,360 --> 00:34:07,120
 One LIDAR sensor and two line lasers.

624
00:34:07,120 --> 00:34:09,680
 So it's kind of interesting from a platform.

625
00:34:09,680 --> 00:34:11,680
 And security-wise, we checked everything in the book.

626
00:34:11,680 --> 00:34:13,920
 Basically, secure boot, the MBRT-protected root of S,

627
00:34:13,920 --> 00:34:18,840
 everything encrypted, SA Linux, and ALF signatures.

628
00:34:18,840 --> 00:34:20,040
 All right.

629
00:34:20,040 --> 00:34:23,160
 I want to give you a short rundown

630
00:34:23,160 --> 00:34:27,560
 about the boot process of the S8 Ultra.

631
00:34:27,560 --> 00:34:29,200
 It looks a little bit complicated,

632
00:34:29,200 --> 00:34:34,280
 but it's important to kind of understand that for our attack.

633
00:34:34,280 --> 00:34:35,680
 Let me just get a quick drink here.

634
00:34:35,680 --> 00:34:40,920
 All right.

635
00:34:40,920 --> 00:34:43,520
 So we start at the boot ROM, which is basically

636
00:34:43,520 --> 00:34:45,520
 baked into the SOC.

637
00:34:45,520 --> 00:34:48,600
 The boot ROM checks the baked in hash,

638
00:34:48,600 --> 00:34:52,520
 which is like in the effuses of the TOC0, which is kind

639
00:34:52,520 --> 00:34:54,440
 of like the first-stage bootloader.

640
00:34:54,440 --> 00:34:56,280
 The first-stage bootloader initializes the RAM,

641
00:34:56,280 --> 00:34:58,960
 so from there we can do other things.

642
00:34:58,960 --> 00:35:00,800
 Then TOC0, or the first-stage bootloader,

643
00:35:00,800 --> 00:35:02,280
 checks the signature of TOC1, which

644
00:35:02,280 --> 00:35:07,480
 is like a technical term here, which launches the trust zone

645
00:35:07,480 --> 00:35:11,160
 component, which is OPT, which then verifies and launches

646
00:35:11,160 --> 00:35:13,040
 your boot.

647
00:35:13,040 --> 00:35:15,680
 You would guess it's a boot configuration.

648
00:35:15,680 --> 00:35:19,000
 Then verifies and launches the actual Linux kernel.

649
00:35:19,000 --> 00:35:21,200
 The Linux kernel has baked in the DMVariety key,

650
00:35:21,200 --> 00:35:24,920
 which will basically verify and mount the root file system.

651
00:35:24,920 --> 00:35:28,440
 And the Linux kernel has also the ALF binary signature thing,

652
00:35:28,440 --> 00:35:31,480
 which will basically check all the in-head software, which

653
00:35:31,480 --> 00:35:33,480
 will be launched after that.

654
00:35:33,480 --> 00:35:35,720
 The in-head software itself will talk again to trust zone,

655
00:35:35,720 --> 00:35:37,220
 and it will get the keys for the partitions,

656
00:35:37,220 --> 00:35:39,920
 and will start to decrypt the software partition,

657
00:35:39,920 --> 00:35:42,480
 and will decrypt the user data partition.

658
00:35:42,480 --> 00:35:45,280
 So basically what this means is everything

659
00:35:45,280 --> 00:35:49,440
 checked everything else, which is kind of an issue.

660
00:35:49,440 --> 00:35:50,680
 Or does it?

661
00:35:50,680 --> 00:35:52,080
 So the question is, is everything

662
00:35:52,080 --> 00:35:53,520
 actually checked by everything?

663
00:35:53,520 --> 00:35:56,720
 Well, there's one thing which is a little bit questionable,

664
00:35:56,720 --> 00:35:59,000
 and this is the U-Boot portion.

665
00:35:59,000 --> 00:36:00,600
 So what is U-Boot?

666
00:36:00,600 --> 00:36:03,360
 It's the de facto default bootloader for embedded devices,

667
00:36:03,360 --> 00:36:05,720
 so you find it in all the embedded devices, more or less.

668
00:36:05,720 --> 00:36:07,840
 It's very powerful software.

669
00:36:07,840 --> 00:36:10,320
 It does some setup of hardware.

670
00:36:10,320 --> 00:36:13,040
 It sets also the command line arguments for the kernel.

671
00:36:13,040 --> 00:36:15,360
 It verifies the kernel and boots it.

672
00:36:15,360 --> 00:36:18,680
 And the important thing here is it uses an environment

673
00:36:18,680 --> 00:36:19,600
 to configure itself.

674
00:36:19,600 --> 00:36:20,880
 And why we need to use this environment

675
00:36:20,880 --> 00:36:22,320
 is if you do firmware updates, you

676
00:36:22,320 --> 00:36:24,200
 don't want to do it on the operating system which

677
00:36:24,200 --> 00:36:25,120
 you're running right now.

678
00:36:25,120 --> 00:36:27,980
 You want to do it on a copy, and then just switch to copy.

679
00:36:27,980 --> 00:36:31,520
 So you need to have the mechanism to switch between both.

680
00:36:31,520 --> 00:36:34,220
 So this is like the AB booting.

681
00:36:34,220 --> 00:36:36,160
 And it supports a very powerful command set.

682
00:36:36,160 --> 00:36:38,600
 For example, it allows you to loading partitions into memories

683
00:36:38,600 --> 00:36:40,000
 which you need for the kernel load.

684
00:36:40,000 --> 00:36:42,160
 It allows you to access memory, and it allows you also

685
00:36:42,160 --> 00:36:44,080
 to change memory.

686
00:36:44,080 --> 00:36:48,400
 So access memory and changing memory.

687
00:36:48,400 --> 00:36:49,920
 Can we do anything with that?

688
00:36:49,920 --> 00:36:53,840
 Well, the question is, can we ask U-Boot very nicely

689
00:36:53,840 --> 00:36:55,180
 to just modify itself?

690
00:36:55,180 --> 00:36:57,240
 And so the theory would be here, well,

691
00:36:57,240 --> 00:36:58,860
 can we use the read and write commands

692
00:36:58,860 --> 00:37:01,740
 to overwrite instructions in the sense of can we just

693
00:37:01,740 --> 00:37:03,440
 patch the signature functions?

694
00:37:03,440 --> 00:37:05,240
 And so what we need to do here is

695
00:37:05,240 --> 00:37:06,280
 we need to do a little bit of math.

696
00:37:06,280 --> 00:37:08,520
 So we need to figure out where the signature function is

697
00:37:08,520 --> 00:37:09,760
 actually in the memory.

698
00:37:09,760 --> 00:37:11,760
 We need to figure out where U-Boot is basically

699
00:37:11,760 --> 00:37:13,760
 relocating itself, which is a kind of technical thing which

700
00:37:13,760 --> 00:37:14,760
 U-Boot is doing.

701
00:37:14,760 --> 00:37:17,440
 And we need to calculate the exact place in memory.

702
00:37:17,440 --> 00:37:19,920
 And then we can use this command basically

703
00:37:19,920 --> 00:37:24,080
 which writes this E0 1 6 at this particular memory address.

704
00:37:24,080 --> 00:37:26,040
 And this basically overwrites all the instructions

705
00:37:26,040 --> 00:37:28,320
 of the signature check function.

706
00:37:28,320 --> 00:37:30,400
 Which means, so what's the consequence of that?

707
00:37:30,400 --> 00:37:34,440
 Well, if we supply U-Boot with malicious config,

708
00:37:34,440 --> 00:37:36,560
 what it will do is it will basically

709
00:37:36,560 --> 00:37:40,720
 ask U-Boot to patch itself very nicely, which

710
00:37:40,720 --> 00:37:42,740
 will disable the verify function so we can

711
00:37:42,740 --> 00:37:44,520
 start to modify the kernel.

712
00:37:44,520 --> 00:37:45,960
 Because we have modified the kernel,

713
00:37:45,960 --> 00:37:48,480
 we can basically disable the elf signature verification.

714
00:37:48,480 --> 00:37:51,280
 And we can disable the root file system verification.

715
00:37:51,280 --> 00:37:53,640
 And from there, we can just pull out the keys from upt

716
00:37:53,640 --> 00:37:56,600
 and we have everything compromised basically at this point.

717
00:37:56,600 --> 00:37:57,800
 So we can run our own kernels.

718
00:37:57,800 --> 00:37:59,720
 We can run our own file systems.

719
00:37:59,720 --> 00:38:03,680
 So what we did achieve with that method generally,

720
00:38:03,680 --> 00:38:06,160
 well, we bypassed the secure boot process.

721
00:38:06,160 --> 00:38:07,400
 We can modify the kernel.

722
00:38:07,400 --> 00:38:10,040
 We can remove all these checks which are in there.

723
00:38:10,040 --> 00:38:11,880
 We can also disable the ELINOS, which sometimes

724
00:38:11,880 --> 00:38:13,000
 gets a little bit annoying.

725
00:38:13,000 --> 00:38:16,080
 And we can modify the root file system.

726
00:38:16,080 --> 00:38:18,320
 From there, we can start to install custom software

727
00:38:18,320 --> 00:38:20,400
 and get SSH access.

728
00:38:20,400 --> 00:38:22,680
 One quick comment here is it's not limited only

729
00:38:22,680 --> 00:38:23,680
 on all WinRSOC.

730
00:38:23,680 --> 00:38:25,920
 So this attack method surprisingly

731
00:38:25,920 --> 00:38:27,800
 works for many, many other devices.

732
00:38:27,800 --> 00:38:29,520
 So I tested this on other robots.

733
00:38:29,520 --> 00:38:30,680
 I tested it on smart speakers.

734
00:38:30,680 --> 00:38:31,840
 I tested it on media devices.

735
00:38:31,840 --> 00:38:34,120
 So this works generally wherever you have U-Boot.

736
00:38:34,120 --> 00:38:37,640
 You can use the memory commands to just overwrite and patch

737
00:38:37,640 --> 00:38:40,000
 U-Boot itself basically as long as you have access to somehow

738
00:38:40,000 --> 00:38:42,280
 to your environment partition, which brings us

739
00:38:42,280 --> 00:38:43,080
 to the next problem.

740
00:38:43,080 --> 00:38:45,920
 So how can we modify the environment partition?

741
00:38:45,920 --> 00:38:48,240
 So the problem is without root access,

742
00:38:48,240 --> 00:38:51,240
 we cannot modify it for obvious reasons.

743
00:38:51,240 --> 00:38:53,160
 And we cannot also modify root file system

744
00:38:53,160 --> 00:38:55,520
 if you don't have shell access to the device.

745
00:38:55,520 --> 00:38:58,360
 And one thing which I can do, but probably most of the people

746
00:38:58,360 --> 00:39:01,000
 in here can do, is to disorder the flash memory, which

747
00:39:01,000 --> 00:39:02,320
 is kind of a little bit dangerous

748
00:39:02,320 --> 00:39:05,480
 and will definitely void your warranty.

749
00:39:05,480 --> 00:39:07,160
 So the good news is I figured out a way

750
00:39:07,160 --> 00:39:08,560
 to do that for each of the devices.

751
00:39:08,560 --> 00:39:12,720
 So for the old P models, we have a new method,

752
00:39:12,720 --> 00:39:15,840
 which is the USB stick method, which I will explain in a minute.

753
00:39:15,840 --> 00:39:18,640
 For the newer devices, we use like FEL boot.

754
00:39:18,640 --> 00:39:20,600
 So we get it into bootloader.

755
00:39:20,600 --> 00:39:22,880
 And for all the Robrock devices, we

756
00:39:22,880 --> 00:39:25,080
 have a thing which we call scary FEL boot.

757
00:39:25,080 --> 00:39:27,440
 And I will explain why it's scary.

758
00:39:27,440 --> 00:39:30,000
 So as a quick recap for people who saw the presentation

759
00:39:30,000 --> 00:39:32,640
 two years ago, Dreamy is very, very nice

760
00:39:32,640 --> 00:39:34,440
 and gave us lots of debug pins, which

761
00:39:34,440 --> 00:39:36,820
 are accessible without completely disassembling the device.

762
00:39:36,820 --> 00:39:38,760
 You just need to basically remove a cover

763
00:39:38,760 --> 00:39:40,480
 and you have access there.

764
00:39:40,480 --> 00:39:42,760
 And all the new devices have exactly the same pinout.

765
00:39:42,760 --> 00:39:44,800
 So if you have a routing adapter,

766
00:39:44,800 --> 00:39:46,320
 which you can get today for free here,

767
00:39:46,320 --> 00:39:50,040
 if I have still some left, you can just connect to that

768
00:39:50,040 --> 00:39:53,600
 and you get access to your UART, USB, and some other things.

769
00:39:53,600 --> 00:39:58,360
 So let's talk about the USB stick method.

770
00:39:58,360 --> 00:40:02,880
 So Dreamy left a back drawer in all the P models

771
00:40:02,880 --> 00:40:03,800
 for whatever reason.

772
00:40:03,800 --> 00:40:05,400
 I think they just forgot about that.

773
00:40:05,400 --> 00:40:07,760
 There's this script which gets executed as soon as you

774
00:40:07,760 --> 00:40:10,520
 attach an empty USB stick.

775
00:40:10,520 --> 00:40:12,640
 And this is how it looks like.

776
00:40:12,640 --> 00:40:14,840
 So basically, if you attach an empty USB stick,

777
00:40:14,840 --> 00:40:16,960
 there's a function which will try to check something.

778
00:40:16,960 --> 00:40:18,280
 But as you see, this function is basically

779
00:40:18,280 --> 00:40:19,440
 doing exactly the same thing.

780
00:40:19,440 --> 00:40:20,880
 You just pop a login shell.

781
00:40:20,880 --> 00:40:23,840
 So if you just attach an empty USB stick,

782
00:40:23,840 --> 00:40:25,960
 they forgot to do the actual authentication.

783
00:40:25,960 --> 00:40:27,920
 So you have a shell and from there

784
00:40:27,920 --> 00:40:30,600
 you can just do the old methods of routing.

785
00:40:30,600 --> 00:40:32,320
 Very, very easy.

786
00:40:32,320 --> 00:40:34,480
 And so after locking, you can just patch the environment

787
00:40:34,480 --> 00:40:35,560
 and install custom software.

788
00:40:35,560 --> 00:40:37,040
 It's super trivial.

789
00:40:37,040 --> 00:40:39,080
 The sad news is, apparently for the new models,

790
00:40:39,080 --> 00:40:39,800
 we didn't forget that.

791
00:40:39,800 --> 00:40:41,200
 So I assume they have two branches which

792
00:40:41,200 --> 00:40:42,200
 at some point separated.

793
00:40:42,200 --> 00:40:44,360
 They did the implementation of the authentication

794
00:40:44,360 --> 00:40:46,760
 of the new models, but they forgot to patch it back.

795
00:40:46,760 --> 00:40:51,920
 So they have, I think, some weird issues with their code

796
00:40:51,920 --> 00:40:53,760
 management.

797
00:40:53,760 --> 00:40:58,800
 For the new RuboRub models, we have this method of FEL boot,

798
00:40:58,800 --> 00:40:59,840
 FEL root.

799
00:40:59,840 --> 00:41:02,440
 And basically what it does is we need to use some adapter.

800
00:41:02,440 --> 00:41:04,800
 We need to use a cable to just get it into bootloader mode.

801
00:41:04,800 --> 00:41:07,920
 So we need to short the boot selection pin down to ground.

802
00:41:07,920 --> 00:41:11,280
 And then we have custom Phoenix Suite image,

803
00:41:11,280 --> 00:41:15,160
 which will basically give us fast boot interface

804
00:41:15,160 --> 00:41:16,320
 to access the flash memory.

805
00:41:16,320 --> 00:41:18,160
 So it's actually not really a firmware update.

806
00:41:18,160 --> 00:41:19,700
 It's kind of like a weird, sketchy thing

807
00:41:19,700 --> 00:41:22,480
 which got zombie together out of different parts, which

808
00:41:22,480 --> 00:41:23,240
 barely works.

809
00:41:23,240 --> 00:41:26,440
 But it works perfectly fine for whatever we try to do.

810
00:41:26,440 --> 00:41:28,280
 So what it allows us to automatically patch

811
00:41:28,280 --> 00:41:31,040
 the bootloader and the environment.

812
00:41:31,040 --> 00:41:34,320
 And it allows us to send the root file system and the kernel

813
00:41:34,320 --> 00:41:36,640
 onto the robots via USB.

814
00:41:36,640 --> 00:41:38,000
 And it's very, very safe.

815
00:41:38,000 --> 00:41:39,880
 So so far, we had zero brick robots.

816
00:41:39,880 --> 00:41:41,240
 And even if the robot is brick, we

817
00:41:41,240 --> 00:41:43,880
 can recover any robot by doing this method without erasing

818
00:41:43,880 --> 00:41:46,320
 data which existed before.

819
00:41:46,320 --> 00:41:50,640
 There's a how-to on my website, which you can just look at.

820
00:41:50,640 --> 00:41:52,440
 It's lots of pictures.

821
00:41:52,440 --> 00:41:53,840
 So it should be very trivial.

822
00:41:53,840 --> 00:41:56,720
 If you want to get adapters, there's some [INAUDIBLE]

823
00:41:56,720 --> 00:41:57,400
 online.

824
00:41:57,400 --> 00:41:58,760
 But you also can get some from me.

825
00:41:58,760 --> 00:42:00,040
 I have still some parts left.

826
00:42:00,040 --> 00:42:02,840
 So in case you were interested, just hit me up.

827
00:42:02,840 --> 00:42:06,320
 Let's talk about the scary FL root.

828
00:42:06,320 --> 00:42:08,120
 So the problem which we have with Roborock,

829
00:42:08,120 --> 00:42:09,160
 we're a little bit smarter.

830
00:42:09,160 --> 00:42:12,480
 They don't give us any debug pins outside, except for USB.

831
00:42:12,480 --> 00:42:15,440
 And so I got a little desperate.

832
00:42:15,440 --> 00:42:17,200
 So the first approach which I typically do

833
00:42:17,200 --> 00:42:19,600
 is I need to complete the device down.

834
00:42:19,600 --> 00:42:23,120
 So I spend $1,000, get the device assembled,

835
00:42:23,120 --> 00:42:24,240
 remove the PCB.

836
00:42:24,240 --> 00:42:26,240
 One thing which I typically do is I remove also

837
00:42:26,240 --> 00:42:29,360
 the main processor, which is like 400-something pins,

838
00:42:29,360 --> 00:42:33,680
 and start to map out where the tracks are going.

839
00:42:33,680 --> 00:42:38,080
 I remove also the EMMC on the backside and do the same thing.

840
00:42:38,080 --> 00:42:41,280
 So then the big question is like, OK, I take both pictures,

841
00:42:41,280 --> 00:42:45,160
 put them above each other in my favorite hacking tool, MSPaint,

842
00:42:45,160 --> 00:42:48,400
 and look at the data sheet and just map down, OK,

843
00:42:48,400 --> 00:42:49,120
 where are the pins.

844
00:42:49,120 --> 00:42:51,680
 So you see there, I started to kind of map down, like, oh, OK,

845
00:42:51,680 --> 00:42:54,120
 I have like RX, TX, FEL.

846
00:42:54,120 --> 00:42:56,480
 I have like the data lines of the UART.

847
00:42:56,480 --> 00:42:58,440
 And the same thing I do at the front.

848
00:42:58,440 --> 00:43:00,360
 So basically I run all the things down

849
00:43:00,360 --> 00:43:03,400
 and figure out where are the traces for what,

850
00:43:03,400 --> 00:43:04,920
 so that I have some idea.

851
00:43:04,920 --> 00:43:07,320
 And one of the things I noticed is actually

852
00:43:07,320 --> 00:43:11,840
 I can get access to all the EMMC data lines and pins

853
00:43:11,840 --> 00:43:15,040
 which I need to access EMMC memory from the holes

854
00:43:15,040 --> 00:43:15,600
 of the buttons.

855
00:43:15,600 --> 00:43:17,520
 So basically I will just do a quick thing

856
00:43:17,520 --> 00:43:19,400
 in more that don't have much time.

857
00:43:19,400 --> 00:43:21,040
 Basically if you just assemble the device,

858
00:43:21,040 --> 00:43:23,480
 you just remove-- without disassembling the device,

859
00:43:23,480 --> 00:43:28,200
 you just remove the one cover, and you remove the rubber cover,

860
00:43:28,200 --> 00:43:30,520
 and you can access everything from this hole

861
00:43:30,520 --> 00:43:32,600
 without touching any screws on the back.

862
00:43:32,600 --> 00:43:34,320
 So you don't need to disassemble the device.

863
00:43:34,320 --> 00:43:37,240
 You don't trash any warranty seals.

864
00:43:37,240 --> 00:43:41,400
 You can access everything from the holes of the buttons.

865
00:43:41,400 --> 00:43:43,040
 I think my presentation is gone.

866
00:43:43,040 --> 00:43:43,680
 Is this my laptop?

867
00:43:43,680 --> 00:43:57,240
 OK, no, OK, that's me.

868
00:43:57,240 --> 00:43:58,000
 Sorry about that.

869
00:43:58,000 --> 00:44:02,540
 OK.

870
00:44:02,540 --> 00:44:10,780
 This is a faster way to do that, actually.

871
00:44:10,780 --> 00:44:16,980
 All right, I promise I will be very quick for the last five

872
00:44:16,980 --> 00:44:20,380
 minutes because I'm running a little bit of the time.

873
00:44:20,380 --> 00:44:25,180
 OK, so the good news was that I can access all the pins from--

874
00:44:25,180 --> 00:44:32,060
 I'm so sorry.

875
00:44:32,060 --> 00:44:33,700
 I promise it worked better at Defqon.

876
00:44:33,700 --> 00:44:38,720
 OK.

877
00:44:38,720 --> 00:44:48,460
 So was it scary?

878
00:44:48,460 --> 00:44:52,860
 Basically we can route the device now without tear down.

879
00:44:52,860 --> 00:44:54,820
 We can access it from under the cover.

880
00:44:54,820 --> 00:44:58,300
 And that applies both for S8 and S8 for Ultra.

881
00:44:58,300 --> 00:45:00,660
 What we can do with that is if you short the data zero pin

882
00:45:00,660 --> 00:45:04,260
 to ground at boot up, it can't load the file system,

883
00:45:04,260 --> 00:45:05,260
 even the bootloader.

884
00:45:05,260 --> 00:45:06,500
 And it will go into bootloader mode,

885
00:45:06,500 --> 00:45:07,420
 which is kind of great for us.

886
00:45:07,420 --> 00:45:10,060
 And then we can just splash it again over USB.

887
00:45:10,060 --> 00:45:12,580
 So it's basically the same approach as for the L10 Ultra

888
00:45:12,580 --> 00:45:14,260
 or the ARM models.

889
00:45:14,260 --> 00:45:18,300
 And there will be also how to do that very easily.

890
00:45:18,300 --> 00:45:19,620
 The question is why is it scary?

891
00:45:19,620 --> 00:45:22,220
 And the scary part is you need to basically find

892
00:45:22,220 --> 00:45:23,860
 where the trace is and then kind of market it

893
00:45:23,860 --> 00:45:24,940
 in this presentation.

894
00:45:24,940 --> 00:45:26,780
 And you need to scratch off the solder mask

895
00:45:26,780 --> 00:45:28,100
 and access the copper trace.

896
00:45:28,100 --> 00:45:29,540
 I would give you a demonstration,

897
00:45:29,540 --> 00:45:31,460
 but I think I'm running definitely out of time.

898
00:45:31,460 --> 00:45:34,300
 So maybe hit me up later and I can just show you

899
00:45:34,300 --> 00:45:36,580
 with a microscope how to do that.

900
00:45:36,580 --> 00:45:38,900
 Don't do this method by the way if you feel uncomfortable.

901
00:45:38,900 --> 00:45:40,660
 As an alternative, you can still tear it down.

902
00:45:40,660 --> 00:45:42,180
 So before you break your device,

903
00:45:42,180 --> 00:45:44,220
 it might be safer to disassemble it

904
00:45:44,220 --> 00:45:46,260
 and just connect to the actual pin on the back

905
00:45:46,260 --> 00:45:47,500
 of the mainboard.

906
00:45:47,500 --> 00:45:50,980
 If unsure, please ask others.

907
00:45:50,980 --> 00:45:52,980
 There's a Telegram group where a lot of people

908
00:45:52,980 --> 00:45:55,340
 did already a lot of experiments of that

909
00:45:55,340 --> 00:45:57,080
 and did it on their own.

910
00:45:57,080 --> 00:45:59,300
 So they know how to do that.

911
00:45:59,300 --> 00:46:01,660
 For the other RoboWork models, a little more complicated.

912
00:46:01,660 --> 00:46:05,060
 So sadly for most robots, the process model is the same,

913
00:46:05,060 --> 00:46:07,980
 but we cannot access the flash or the back pins

914
00:46:07,980 --> 00:46:10,340
 from outside, so you need to disassemble them.

915
00:46:10,340 --> 00:46:14,820
 Here the alternative way to get into FAL mode

916
00:46:14,820 --> 00:46:16,300
 is to basically connect to a UART

917
00:46:16,300 --> 00:46:21,300
 and press the keyboard to while basically accessing it.

918
00:46:21,300 --> 00:46:24,420
 You can check out also my website,

919
00:46:24,420 --> 00:46:27,940
 robotinfo.dev for the pinouts,

920
00:46:27,940 --> 00:46:30,100
 or again ask in the community.

921
00:46:30,100 --> 00:46:31,900
 So for the last few slides,

922
00:46:31,900 --> 00:46:33,640
 what can we do with root access?

923
00:46:33,640 --> 00:46:34,880
 So what do we have now?

924
00:46:34,880 --> 00:46:36,580
 So we have secure boot defeated.

925
00:46:36,580 --> 00:46:38,460
 We can run custom software,

926
00:46:38,460 --> 00:46:40,340
 but what kind of software can we run?

927
00:46:40,340 --> 00:46:44,700
 And the question is can we build something of our own

928
00:46:44,700 --> 00:46:46,900
 with like as an operation system of SLAM,

929
00:46:46,900 --> 00:46:48,600
 navigation and IEI models.

930
00:46:48,600 --> 00:46:51,400
 Well, to do our own software is a little bit complicated.

931
00:46:51,400 --> 00:46:52,620
 So our main idea is like,

932
00:46:52,620 --> 00:46:54,420
 can we just disconnect the device from the cloud

933
00:46:54,420 --> 00:46:56,460
 and just keep all the vendor logic in place

934
00:46:56,460 --> 00:46:59,520
 and just run the original software?

935
00:46:59,520 --> 00:47:02,020
 So one of the questions is like,

936
00:47:02,020 --> 00:47:03,920
 what kind of different ways we can we do that?

937
00:47:03,920 --> 00:47:06,460
 Some people think we can just disconnect the cloud.

938
00:47:06,460 --> 00:47:09,540
 This will make the robot work in most cases,

939
00:47:09,540 --> 00:47:10,640
 like if you press the buttons,

940
00:47:10,640 --> 00:47:13,260
 but you will lose the features like live maps

941
00:47:13,260 --> 00:47:15,180
 or advanced features and map editing.

942
00:47:15,180 --> 00:47:17,020
 And why root the device if you just basically

943
00:47:17,020 --> 00:47:18,540
 lose all this functionality?

944
00:47:18,540 --> 00:47:20,940
 So instead what we try to do is like we try to redirect

945
00:47:20,940 --> 00:47:22,880
 the cloud traffic to our own software.

946
00:47:22,880 --> 00:47:24,980
 And for that we need to extract some firmware secrets

947
00:47:24,980 --> 00:47:29,620
 and basically point it to like a fake cloud emulation.

948
00:47:29,620 --> 00:47:32,820
 So let's talk quickly about replacing the cloud.

949
00:47:32,820 --> 00:47:34,940
 The initial approach which we had was to redirect

950
00:47:34,940 --> 00:47:38,020
 DNS traffic and this was kind of easy.

951
00:47:38,020 --> 00:47:39,500
 We were just changing the host files

952
00:47:39,500 --> 00:47:41,740
 and we used IP tables to reroute that.

953
00:47:41,740 --> 00:47:45,500
 Sadly, Xiaomi who runs the ecosystem, the backend,

954
00:47:45,500 --> 00:47:46,380
 kind of figured it out.

955
00:47:46,380 --> 00:47:48,820
 And so what we did is like they started to introduce

956
00:47:48,820 --> 00:47:50,980
 some content measurements and they basically hard coded

957
00:47:50,980 --> 00:47:53,460
 IP addresses in the cloud binary,

958
00:47:53,460 --> 00:47:55,140
 which was a little bit mean because that means

959
00:47:55,140 --> 00:47:57,300
 that DNS redirection doesn't work anymore.

960
00:47:57,300 --> 00:48:01,980
 Our content measurement was basically we counter measured

961
00:48:01,980 --> 00:48:04,340
 their stuff, we just replaced their hard coded IP addresses

962
00:48:04,340 --> 00:48:05,860
 with our hard coded IP addresses

963
00:48:05,860 --> 00:48:08,300
 and it was just working fine.

964
00:48:08,300 --> 00:48:10,220
 So this allowed us to run Balotudu,

965
00:48:10,220 --> 00:48:13,020
 which is like the custom software which is developed by Zoom

966
00:48:13,020 --> 00:48:15,700
 and it completely replaces the cloud and the vendor apps.

967
00:48:15,700 --> 00:48:17,980
 It runs locally in a robot, so you have like one package

968
00:48:17,980 --> 00:48:21,020
 which has everything in it, like on the robot itself.

969
00:48:21,020 --> 00:48:22,800
 It features everything which the cloud offers you,

970
00:48:22,800 --> 00:48:24,860
 like full the robot control, live maps,

971
00:48:24,860 --> 00:48:27,340
 map editing, the robot configuration.

972
00:48:27,340 --> 00:48:30,400
 It has a responsive web interface

973
00:48:30,400 --> 00:48:33,220
 and it works both in mobile and desktop.

974
00:48:33,220 --> 00:48:35,580
 It gives you also REST RP and the MQTT functionality,

975
00:48:35,580 --> 00:48:38,780
 which is important for people who run home automation software.

976
00:48:38,780 --> 00:48:41,740
 The weird thing choice from Zoom was basically

977
00:48:41,740 --> 00:48:43,100
 to use embedded JavaScript.

978
00:48:43,100 --> 00:48:44,260
 There might be something more performant,

979
00:48:44,260 --> 00:48:45,420
 but I mean, it works.

980
00:48:45,420 --> 00:48:47,260
 These devices are powerful enough.

981
00:48:47,260 --> 00:48:49,460
 Anyway, to give you some ideas how this looks like,

982
00:48:49,460 --> 00:48:51,420
 I mean, it's a very nice interface

983
00:48:51,420 --> 00:48:54,340
 and it gives you all the functionality which you need.

984
00:48:54,340 --> 00:49:00,460
 One thing, how do you get the custom software generated?

985
00:49:00,460 --> 00:49:02,020
 There's a website called DustBlooder

986
00:49:02,020 --> 00:49:03,820
 and one of the reasons why I created this website

987
00:49:03,820 --> 00:49:06,060
 was basically that Mac users started to break their devices

988
00:49:06,060 --> 00:49:08,020
 because Macs are kind of behaving a little bit weird

989
00:49:08,020 --> 00:49:11,100
 how they unpack file systems and repack them again.

990
00:49:11,100 --> 00:49:12,740
 So I just want to avoid the support cases

991
00:49:12,740 --> 00:49:17,300
 and just have a website which takes care of that.

992
00:49:17,300 --> 00:49:19,540
 So basically with this website,

993
00:49:19,540 --> 00:49:22,860
 you can build your own robot firmwares

994
00:49:22,860 --> 00:49:26,060
 and they're most of the time reproducible builds.

995
00:49:26,060 --> 00:49:26,900
 It's easy to use.

996
00:49:26,900 --> 00:49:30,240
 It works for Dreamy, Roborock, and VioMe, and some others.

997
00:49:30,240 --> 00:49:34,180
 If you don't trust it, the scripts are online on GitHub.

998
00:49:34,180 --> 00:49:35,320
 You can just do it themselves.

999
00:49:35,320 --> 00:49:36,220
 You just need the firmware file,

1000
00:49:36,220 --> 00:49:38,780
 which we can provide you out of legal reasons.

1001
00:49:38,780 --> 00:49:40,740
 But if you're interested in that,

1002
00:49:40,740 --> 00:49:42,620
 you can go to this website.

1003
00:49:42,620 --> 00:49:44,880
 All right, there's a couple more interesting things,

1004
00:49:44,880 --> 00:49:47,980
 but I think I will get torn down by from the,

1005
00:49:47,980 --> 00:49:50,700
 let me maybe quickly go through that.

1006
00:49:50,700 --> 00:49:53,820
 - Exactly, we have a proposal for you guys.

1007
00:49:53,820 --> 00:49:56,940
 As the time has elapsed already and due to technical issues,

1008
00:49:56,940 --> 00:49:59,180
 we already are five minutes over.

1009
00:49:59,180 --> 00:50:01,860
 We just want to give everybody the opportunity

1010
00:50:01,860 --> 00:50:04,220
 to go to the next talk perhaps.

1011
00:50:04,220 --> 00:50:08,860
 However, as this stage will only continue at 12.30

1012
00:50:08,860 --> 00:50:11,700
 with a movie night with War Games,

1013
00:50:11,700 --> 00:50:14,200
 which you could definitely have a watch,

1014
00:50:14,200 --> 00:50:16,420
 we want to also give you the opportunity

1015
00:50:16,420 --> 00:50:19,100
 to share and demonstrate especially the robots

1016
00:50:19,100 --> 00:50:22,420
 you brought here until 12 o'clock.

1017
00:50:22,420 --> 00:50:23,260
 - Yeah, I think--

1018
00:50:23,260 --> 00:50:24,300
 - If that's fine for the crowd.

1019
00:50:24,300 --> 00:50:27,060
 (audience cheering)

1020
00:50:27,060 --> 00:50:30,260
 Looks like it, so please continue.

1021
00:50:30,260 --> 00:50:32,740
 - All right, yeah, sorry for the technical issues.

1022
00:50:32,740 --> 00:50:35,600
 I tested everything before, but you never know.

1023
00:50:35,600 --> 00:50:37,660
 Anyway, what kind of interesting things did you find?

1024
00:50:37,660 --> 00:50:40,820
 Well, we have some camera access.

1025
00:50:40,820 --> 00:50:44,380
 All the devices use the video for Linux subsystem

1026
00:50:44,380 --> 00:50:45,840
 for their cameras.

1027
00:50:45,840 --> 00:50:47,560
 So if you have root access on the device,

1028
00:50:47,560 --> 00:50:50,500
 you can just talk to the cameras via the device notes

1029
00:50:50,500 --> 00:50:52,440
 like video zero, video one.

1030
00:50:52,440 --> 00:50:54,820
 And some of the vendors were even so nice

1031
00:50:54,820 --> 00:50:57,660
 and left us debugging tools for the cameras,

1032
00:50:57,660 --> 00:50:59,660
 like camera demo, which is an all-in-one tool

1033
00:50:59,660 --> 00:51:01,700
 where you can just pull pictures

1034
00:51:01,700 --> 00:51:03,860
 and configurations from the camera.

1035
00:51:03,860 --> 00:51:07,940
 So let me show you some examples from the optical sensors.

1036
00:51:07,940 --> 00:51:11,620
 This is like the Roborock G10S,

1037
00:51:11,620 --> 00:51:14,380
 which is mostly used in China and I think in Russia

1038
00:51:14,380 --> 00:51:15,700
 and some other Eastern European states

1039
00:51:15,700 --> 00:51:17,620
 because we can get it cheaper.

1040
00:51:17,620 --> 00:51:20,700
 On the left, you see the robot seeing itself in the mirror.

1041
00:51:20,700 --> 00:51:23,140
 So some philosophical picture, basically.

1042
00:51:23,140 --> 00:51:25,780
 And on the right is some example of the output.

1043
00:51:25,780 --> 00:51:27,860
 Dreamy is a little bit better,

1044
00:51:27,860 --> 00:51:29,300
 has better, nicer cameras.

1045
00:51:29,300 --> 00:51:31,580
 So on the left, you see the Dreamy L10S Ultra,

1046
00:51:31,580 --> 00:51:32,980
 again, in the mirror.

1047
00:51:32,980 --> 00:51:34,980
 Under the right, you see one of the pictures

1048
00:51:34,980 --> 00:51:36,740
 which it does use for object detection.

1049
00:51:36,740 --> 00:51:38,860
 This is in our lab in Boston.

1050
00:51:38,860 --> 00:51:42,480
 So this is the kind of quality of pictures you get nowadays.

1051
00:51:43,580 --> 00:51:48,580
 This is one where I, this is from the S8.

1052
00:51:48,580 --> 00:51:50,780
 Basically, on the left, it's a little bit weird

1053
00:51:50,780 --> 00:51:54,460
 because I think I didn't have the exposure correctly.

1054
00:51:54,460 --> 00:51:56,420
 On the right, you see my blue elephant,

1055
00:51:56,420 --> 00:51:59,220
 which I left in the tent, I think.

1056
00:51:59,220 --> 00:52:00,060
 So it's not blue here

1057
00:52:00,060 --> 00:52:01,500
 because it has like an infrared camera.

1058
00:52:01,500 --> 00:52:05,000
 So it sees basically just in black and white.

1059
00:52:05,000 --> 00:52:07,860
 Right, let's talk about quick findings

1060
00:52:07,860 --> 00:52:09,420
 which we found at Dreamy.

1061
00:52:09,420 --> 00:52:12,040
 So last time, if people saw the last time presentation,

1062
00:52:12,040 --> 00:52:14,900
 you might have seen some very sketchy things

1063
00:52:14,900 --> 00:52:16,840
 which were left in the firmware.

1064
00:52:16,840 --> 00:52:19,820
 Good news this time, they didn't leave SSH credentials

1065
00:52:19,820 --> 00:52:21,680
 to the backend service in the firmware this time.

1066
00:52:21,680 --> 00:52:24,840
 So that was good for them, I assume.

1067
00:52:24,840 --> 00:52:26,820
 They made a lot of improvements in the software.

1068
00:52:26,820 --> 00:52:29,340
 So the software is more stable, it's more clean,

1069
00:52:29,340 --> 00:52:31,380
 which is also very good for us.

1070
00:52:31,380 --> 00:52:33,800
 One of the bad news is that they introduced a lot of

1071
00:52:33,800 --> 00:52:35,700
 calling home functions

1072
00:52:35,700 --> 00:52:37,780
 and started to enforce geo-blocking by IP addresses.

1073
00:52:37,780 --> 00:52:39,460
 So they introduced a lot of functions

1074
00:52:39,460 --> 00:52:44,460
 where they will detect if you buy a cheap device in China

1075
00:52:44,460 --> 00:52:47,740
 and use it anywhere else, and I think vice versa.

1076
00:52:47,740 --> 00:52:50,340
 So there's kind of some weird stuff going on.

1077
00:52:50,340 --> 00:52:51,640
 Also, one quick thing is,

1078
00:52:51,640 --> 00:52:54,900
 many robots will detect where we are.

1079
00:52:54,900 --> 00:52:56,220
 Roborock does it, Dreamy does it,

1080
00:52:56,220 --> 00:52:58,380
 and a couple other companies do that too.

1081
00:52:58,380 --> 00:53:00,220
 If you're, for example, in America,

1082
00:53:00,220 --> 00:53:02,620
 they will disable some functions in the software basically.

1083
00:53:02,620 --> 00:53:04,320
 So you don't have edge cleaning anymore

1084
00:53:04,320 --> 00:53:08,620
 if you are in the US, if it detects that it's in the US.

1085
00:53:08,620 --> 00:53:10,660
 And part of the reason is apparently that iRobot

1086
00:53:10,660 --> 00:53:12,700
 has patents on that which expire I think next year.

1087
00:53:12,700 --> 00:53:14,620
 So I would expect that this function

1088
00:53:14,620 --> 00:53:16,740
 gets enabled magically next year.

1089
00:53:16,740 --> 00:53:19,020
 Also, some devices have a dust sensor

1090
00:53:19,020 --> 00:53:22,180
 to test how dusty the air is,

1091
00:53:22,180 --> 00:53:23,220
 but it's not enabled in software

1092
00:53:23,220 --> 00:53:25,060
 because iRobot has again a patent on that

1093
00:53:25,060 --> 00:53:26,020
 which expires next year.

1094
00:53:26,020 --> 00:53:28,460
 So I think it's kind of weird patent stuff.

1095
00:53:28,460 --> 00:53:31,860
 So in case of you wondering why they so livid

1096
00:53:31,860 --> 00:53:35,980
 about geo-blocking, it's one of the legal reasons also.

1097
00:53:35,980 --> 00:53:39,380
 So the other thing is Dreamy robots and also other robots

1098
00:53:39,380 --> 00:53:42,860
 support camera monitoring so you can watch your pets remotely.

1099
00:53:42,860 --> 00:53:45,260
 And for legal reasons, most of the time,

1100
00:53:45,260 --> 00:53:47,340
 if you're for actually all the devices,

1101
00:53:47,340 --> 00:53:49,260
 if you enable the remote camera feature,

1102
00:53:49,260 --> 00:53:51,740
 it will warn you via voice prompt and say like,

1103
00:53:51,740 --> 00:53:53,420
 oh, camera monitoring is enabled

1104
00:53:53,420 --> 00:53:56,700
 and it will repeat that every three minutes or so.

1105
00:53:56,700 --> 00:54:00,500
 The, this is I think a legal requirement

1106
00:54:00,500 --> 00:54:01,820
 in many, many countries.

1107
00:54:01,820 --> 00:54:03,900
 And so, yeah.

1108
00:54:05,360 --> 00:54:08,140
 One of the things is that these voice prompts

1109
00:54:08,140 --> 00:54:09,600
 they need obviously to be localized.

1110
00:54:09,600 --> 00:54:12,180
 So for example, you don't wanna hear like a,

1111
00:54:12,180 --> 00:54:13,820
 you know, English voice prompt if you're in Germany

1112
00:54:13,820 --> 00:54:14,860
 and some other things.

1113
00:54:14,860 --> 00:54:17,940
 So the, these audio files are part of an externally

1114
00:54:17,940 --> 00:54:20,300
 downloaded audio pack.

1115
00:54:20,300 --> 00:54:21,620
 The problem with this audio pack is

1116
00:54:21,620 --> 00:54:22,780
 they are not signed or encrypted.

1117
00:54:22,780 --> 00:54:25,060
 So basically you can just override the audio prompt,

1118
00:54:25,060 --> 00:54:26,940
 like this warning audio prompt with an empty file

1119
00:54:26,940 --> 00:54:29,460
 and basically push it onto the device

1120
00:54:29,460 --> 00:54:32,340
 and just disable this prompt and it can spy on people

1121
00:54:32,340 --> 00:54:34,040
 which is probably I think a little bit illegal.

1122
00:54:34,040 --> 00:54:36,020
 So don't do that again.

1123
00:54:36,020 --> 00:54:38,820
 That's probably very illegal in Germany, I think.

1124
00:54:38,820 --> 00:54:42,180
 And the important aspect here is it works on all devices,

1125
00:54:42,180 --> 00:54:43,220
 not only rooted devices.

1126
00:54:43,220 --> 00:54:44,740
 So be a little bit careful

1127
00:54:44,740 --> 00:54:47,380
 if you get device from somewhere else.

1128
00:54:47,380 --> 00:54:50,500
 One of the biggest fails I saw so far for a very long time

1129
00:54:50,500 --> 00:54:52,220
 was how they signed the signatures.

1130
00:54:52,220 --> 00:54:55,240
 So I think this is part of a panic process

1131
00:54:55,240 --> 00:54:58,340
 which we had last year or two years ago.

1132
00:54:58,340 --> 00:55:03,000
 So new robots of Dreamy encrypt and sign the firmware,

1133
00:55:03,000 --> 00:55:05,140
 but in a very weird way.

1134
00:55:05,140 --> 00:55:06,780
 So the firmware payload looks like this.

1135
00:55:06,780 --> 00:55:08,940
 So you have an outside zip archive

1136
00:55:08,940 --> 00:55:10,380
 which is encrypted with static passwords

1137
00:55:10,380 --> 00:55:12,400
 which is different for each of the models.

1138
00:55:12,400 --> 00:55:15,540
 Then they have a random file

1139
00:55:15,540 --> 00:55:18,040
 which is signed with a private key by Dreamy

1140
00:55:18,040 --> 00:55:19,880
 which you don't have.

1141
00:55:19,880 --> 00:55:22,660
 And then you have a zip archive inside

1142
00:55:22,660 --> 00:55:25,520
 which is encrypted with the random files, the password.

1143
00:55:25,520 --> 00:55:29,100
 Well, what's the problem here?

1144
00:55:29,100 --> 00:55:30,660
 Well, the actual firmware is not signed,

1145
00:55:30,660 --> 00:55:31,860
 only the password is.

1146
00:55:31,860 --> 00:55:34,060
 So basically they signed the password,

1147
00:55:34,060 --> 00:55:37,700
 but they didn't sign the actual firmware.

1148
00:55:37,700 --> 00:55:40,280
 So you can basically create your fake firmware update

1149
00:55:40,280 --> 00:55:43,240
 by just reusing the password which we used before.

1150
00:55:43,240 --> 00:55:44,980
 As an analogy, what I would say is,

1151
00:55:44,980 --> 00:55:48,220
 imagine you could prove that the phone is yours

1152
00:55:48,220 --> 00:55:50,140
 if the pin on the phone is the same as yours.

1153
00:55:50,140 --> 00:55:51,780
 So it's kind of like if I have a phone

1154
00:55:51,780 --> 00:55:53,780
 which has the password 1234,

1155
00:55:53,780 --> 00:55:55,220
 well, actually, now that I think about it,

1156
00:55:55,220 --> 00:55:56,060
 the analogy is kind of weird.

1157
00:55:56,060 --> 00:55:57,180
 But okay, it's a huge problem.

1158
00:55:57,180 --> 00:56:00,240
 So that's a very, very huge fail.

1159
00:56:00,240 --> 00:56:03,340
 So basically you can create your own firmware updates

1160
00:56:03,340 --> 00:56:05,500
 which are correctly signed in a way

1161
00:56:05,500 --> 00:56:07,940
 without the private key of Dreamy

1162
00:56:07,940 --> 00:56:09,340
 because we just signed the password

1163
00:56:09,340 --> 00:56:11,340
 and not the actual firmware.

1164
00:56:11,340 --> 00:56:13,100
 All right, as a summary, finally.

1165
00:56:13,100 --> 00:56:16,320
 So we have routing methods for most of the current release,

1166
00:56:16,320 --> 00:56:18,220
 Dreamy and Roborock models.

1167
00:56:18,220 --> 00:56:19,700
 So we can bypass secure boot,

1168
00:56:19,700 --> 00:56:22,240
 we can bypass any other security mechanism.

1169
00:56:22,240 --> 00:56:26,060
 We have persistence, we can run our own custom software.

1170
00:56:26,060 --> 00:56:28,420
 Now we can validate and verify vendor claims

1171
00:56:28,420 --> 00:56:29,860
 which is a very good thing.

1172
00:56:29,860 --> 00:56:32,760
 It's probably what the TÜV should have done some time ago.

1173
00:56:32,760 --> 00:56:36,380
 And the bootloader attack is also pliable

1174
00:56:36,380 --> 00:56:37,540
 to many, many other devices.

1175
00:56:37,540 --> 00:56:39,500
 So if you have smart speakers and they run your boot,

1176
00:56:39,500 --> 00:56:41,460
 then just take a quick look into that

1177
00:56:41,460 --> 00:56:43,180
 if you can manipulate that.

1178
00:56:43,180 --> 00:56:47,100
 And this whole routing method basically allows us also

1179
00:56:47,100 --> 00:56:50,060
 to do further research into IoT and AI.

1180
00:56:50,060 --> 00:56:52,860
 As some final notes,

1181
00:56:52,860 --> 00:56:55,380
 please don't use the knowledge for bad things.

1182
00:56:55,380 --> 00:56:59,100
 If you do routing, please help others

1183
00:56:59,100 --> 00:57:00,460
 if they need help with routing.

1184
00:57:00,460 --> 00:57:04,500
 Not many people are feeling comfortable with doing that.

1185
00:57:04,500 --> 00:57:06,220
 Especially if you have routing PCBs,

1186
00:57:06,220 --> 00:57:08,820
 feel free to share them in your hacker space.

1187
00:57:08,820 --> 00:57:11,400
 The tools are mostly published already,

1188
00:57:11,400 --> 00:57:13,100
 but there's still some work to do

1189
00:57:13,100 --> 00:57:16,860
 because I was a little bit busy over the last couple days.

1190
00:57:16,860 --> 00:57:18,780
 So if there's something not published yet,

1191
00:57:18,780 --> 00:57:21,260
 please be patient, this will be published very soon.

1192
00:57:21,260 --> 00:57:23,540
 If you're interested in more vacuum robot hacking

1193
00:57:23,540 --> 00:57:25,940
 or flash forensics, you can join me

1194
00:57:25,940 --> 00:57:27,380
 at the hardware I own in the Netherlands,

1195
00:57:27,380 --> 00:57:30,020
 which is in the beginning of November.

1196
00:57:30,020 --> 00:57:31,900
 There might or might not be a talk

1197
00:57:31,900 --> 00:57:33,940
 maybe about vacuum robots again.

1198
00:57:33,940 --> 00:57:38,080
 This time not about Robrock or Dreamy, so we will see.

1199
00:57:38,080 --> 00:57:39,820
 So some announcements.

1200
00:57:39,820 --> 00:57:41,380
 I want to thank Dani Wiggema,

1201
00:57:41,380 --> 00:57:44,520
 Giban Obeer, Zirn Baier and Mikael Kolkin,

1202
00:57:44,520 --> 00:57:47,720
 and obviously also all the testers in the community.

1203
00:57:47,720 --> 00:57:50,780
 And yeah, that's my presentation.

1204
00:57:50,780 --> 00:57:53,140
 If you have any questions, feel free to contact me

1205
00:57:53,140 --> 00:57:56,920
 on via Telegram, Twitter or email.

1206
00:57:56,920 --> 00:57:58,820
 And thank you very much.

1207
00:57:58,820 --> 00:58:01,260
 I can also do a quick demonstration of the microscope

1208
00:58:01,260 --> 00:58:04,020
 if you're interested, are you interested?

1209
00:58:04,020 --> 00:58:04,860
 All right, okay.

1210
00:58:04,860 --> 00:58:08,020
 (audience applauding)

1211
00:58:08,020 --> 00:58:11,980
 Let me just change to the camera.

1212
00:58:11,980 --> 00:58:13,900
 By the way, the camp is very dusty as you can see.

1213
00:58:13,900 --> 00:58:17,700
 These robots are not meant for being on a camp.

1214
00:58:17,700 --> 00:58:20,060
 So as mentioned before, for the Robrock,

1215
00:58:20,060 --> 00:58:21,660
 it's a little bit sketchy or a little bit scary

1216
00:58:21,660 --> 00:58:24,740
 because you have to basically remove the cover,

1217
00:58:24,740 --> 00:58:26,060
 which is very easy, you can just remove it

1218
00:58:26,060 --> 00:58:29,700
 and you have here the plastic part, the rubber part.

1219
00:58:29,700 --> 00:58:35,620
 And then you need to find the trace.

1220
00:58:35,620 --> 00:58:39,500
 Oh, oops.

1221
00:58:39,500 --> 00:58:46,460
 As you see, CS people are always tricky.

1222
00:58:46,460 --> 00:58:47,300
 All right.

1223
00:58:47,300 --> 00:58:55,660
 Now let me just change it real quick.

1224
00:58:55,660 --> 00:58:58,820
 (audience chattering)

1225
00:58:58,820 --> 00:59:03,340
 So this is the left button basically.

1226
00:59:03,340 --> 00:59:07,280
 And as you can see in a second, we have there a trace.

1227
00:59:07,280 --> 00:59:15,620
 Which is basically here comes the via out

1228
00:59:15,620 --> 00:59:19,380
 and then goes through here and goes there.

1229
00:59:19,380 --> 00:59:21,100
 So one thing which you can do to basically route it,

1230
00:59:21,100 --> 00:59:23,380
 you take like something pointy, you don't wanna cut it,

1231
00:59:23,380 --> 00:59:26,260
 you just wanna scrape off the trace a little bit.

1232
00:59:26,260 --> 00:59:28,740
 So you take it and you find it anyway here

1233
00:59:28,740 --> 00:59:32,740
 and you just start to scratch.

1234
00:59:32,740 --> 00:59:42,340
 And at some point, so if you use a knife,

1235
00:59:42,340 --> 00:59:45,100
 just scratch it, don't cut it please.

1236
00:59:45,100 --> 00:59:46,540
 And at some point you will see the copper

1237
00:59:46,540 --> 00:59:47,660
 and that should be more or less enough

1238
00:59:47,660 --> 00:59:50,740
 to kind of hold it down for like in a moment

1239
00:59:50,740 --> 00:59:52,420
 when you power the device on

1240
00:59:52,420 --> 00:59:54,220
 and it will go into bootloader mode.

1241
00:59:54,220 --> 00:59:55,860
 So just scratch a little bit.

1242
00:59:55,860 --> 00:59:57,780
 I know it looks scary and you need to have

1243
00:59:57,780 --> 00:59:59,260
 some very good eyes if you have a microscope,

1244
00:59:59,260 --> 01:00:01,860
 it's bonus points but you might use also phone.

1245
01:00:01,860 --> 01:00:02,900
 And as you can see a little bit,

1246
01:00:02,900 --> 01:00:05,780
 you see like already now the copper and that's enough.

1247
01:00:05,780 --> 01:00:07,700
 You just need to have like a very short contact.

1248
01:00:07,700 --> 01:00:12,700
 It's not mission critical basically to keep it in place.

1249
01:00:12,700 --> 01:00:14,860
 Actually, do I see the copper?

1250
01:00:14,860 --> 01:00:17,420
 Yeah, I can scratch even a little bit more.

1251
01:00:17,420 --> 01:00:21,900
 It's a little bit tricky to do it on camera.

1252
01:00:21,900 --> 01:00:25,060
 (audience chattering)

1253
01:00:25,060 --> 01:00:28,740
 The more effort you put into that, the less it's visible.

1254
01:00:28,740 --> 01:00:33,700
 All right, I think it should be.

1255
01:00:33,700 --> 01:00:38,140
 Okay, just imagine but do you see the copper there?

1256
01:00:38,140 --> 01:00:39,740
 You should see at some point a copper.

1257
01:00:39,740 --> 01:00:41,140
 Again, don't cut the trace

1258
01:00:41,140 --> 01:00:44,500
 but you can scratch it off anywhere you want.

1259
01:00:44,500 --> 01:00:47,060
 For the other devices, it's a little bit easier.

1260
01:00:48,340 --> 01:00:52,060
 The scary aspect of rooting the Dreamy devices

1261
01:00:52,060 --> 01:00:54,940
 is to remove the cover and it will feel wrong

1262
01:00:54,940 --> 01:00:57,100
 because you need to use a lot of force.

1263
01:00:57,100 --> 01:00:59,100
 And because I did that already probably 50 times

1264
01:00:59,100 --> 01:01:01,940
 for these ones, this is easier but at some point

1265
01:01:01,940 --> 01:01:04,660
 it just comes off and you have the back pins

1266
01:01:04,660 --> 01:01:06,340
 very nicely here.

1267
01:01:06,340 --> 01:01:09,700
 So from a rooting perspective, Dreamy is great

1268
01:01:09,700 --> 01:01:11,380
 but nowadays we can also root Roborock.

1269
01:01:11,380 --> 01:01:12,780
 So it's kinda like, I mean, you're not limited

1270
01:01:12,780 --> 01:01:14,260
 to one company or the other.

1271
01:01:14,260 --> 01:01:16,340
 You can just decide freely.

1272
01:01:17,140 --> 01:01:18,860
 All right, if you have any questions,

1273
01:01:18,860 --> 01:01:22,660
 feel free to ask them probably after this thing outside.

1274
01:01:22,660 --> 01:01:25,740
 Have a bag of couple rooting adapters left.

1275
01:01:25,740 --> 01:01:27,740
 Sorry for the technical issues.

1276
01:01:27,740 --> 01:01:30,020
 It worked for me before but I mean, you never know.

1277
01:01:30,020 --> 01:01:31,100
 It's computer stuff.

1278
01:01:31,100 --> 01:01:33,420
 All right, thank you very much for being here

1279
01:01:33,420 --> 01:01:35,580
 and thank you very much for your patience.

1280
01:01:35,580 --> 01:01:38,740
 (audience applauding)

1281
01:01:39,020 --> 01:01:41,600
 (gentle music)

1282
01:01:41,600 --> 01:01:44,180
 (upbeat music)