README.md

H-01 Wrong update of yieldFeeBalance on PrizeVault::claimYieldFeeShares

On the PrizeVault contract, the yield fee recipient calls the claimYieldFeeShares function to receive yield fee shares

function claimYieldFeeShares(uint256 _shares) external onlyYieldFeeRecipient {
    if (_shares == 0) revert MintZeroShares();

    uint256 _yieldFeeBalance = yieldFeeBalance;
    if (_shares > _yieldFeeBalance) revert SharesExceedsYieldFeeBalance(_shares, _yieldFeeBalance);

    yieldFeeBalance -= _yieldFeeBalance; // @audit wrong update, 'yieldFeeBalance` = 0 now

    _mint(msg.sender, _shares);

    emit ClaimYieldFeeShares(msg.sender, _shares);
}

You can see that the update of yieldFeeBalance is updated wrongly in which it is set to zero while it should be subtracted from _shares

Impact

If the fee recipient wants to receive a portion of the fee shares, the left shares will not be redeemable because the state is set to zero.

Proof of Concept

Consider the following example:

• Available yield fee balance is 30
• Fee recipient wants to receive 20 shares, he calls claimYieldFeeShares(20)
• yieldFeeBalance is updated as follows: yieldFeeBalance -= _yieldFeeBalance = 0
• The fee recipient can not claim the 10 shares left.

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Two possible approaches to solve the issue:

1. Change the yieldFeeBalance update to be subtracted from _shares

function claimYieldFeeShares(uint256 _shares) external onlyYieldFeeRecipient {
    if (_shares == 0) revert MintZeroShares();

    uint256 _yieldFeeBalance = yieldFeeBalance;
    if (_shares > _yieldFeeBalance) revert SharesExceedsYieldFeeBalance(_shares, _yieldFeeBalance);

-    yieldFeeBalance -= _yieldFeeBalance; 
+    yieldFeeBalance -= _shares; 
    _mint(msg.sender, _shares);

    emit ClaimYieldFeeShares(msg.sender, _shares);
}

2. Update the logic so that the fee recipient redeems the whole yield fee balance (remove the _shares from function's params)

function claimYieldFeeShares(uint256 _shares) external onlyYieldFeeRecipient {
    if (_shares == 0) revert MintZeroShares();

    uint256 _yieldFeeBalance = yieldFeeBalance;
    if (_shares > _yieldFeeBalance) revert SharesExceedsYieldFeeBalance(_shares, _yieldFeeBalance);

    yieldFeeBalance -= _yieldFeeBalance

-    _mint(msg.sender, _shares);
+    _mint(msg.sender, _yieldFeeBalance);
    emit ClaimYieldFeeShares(msg.sender, _shares);
}

M-01 PrizeVault::withdraw does not protect users from burning too many shares in case of lossy situation

The function PrizeVault::withdraw withdraws assets by burning shares

function withdraw(
        uint256 _assets,
        address _receiver,
        address _owner
    ) external returns (uint256) {
    uint256 _shares = previewWithdraw(_assets);
    _burnAndWithdraw(msg.sender, _receiver, _owner, _shares, _assets);
    return _shares;
}

Assets and shares are meant to be 1:1, but if the vault controls less assets than what has been deposited, a share will be worth aproportional amount of the total assets:

if (_totalAssets >= totalDebt_) {
    return _assets;
} else {
    // Follows the inverse conversion of `convertToAssets`
    return _assets.mulDiv(totalDebt_, _totalAssets, Math.Rounding.Up);
}

The issue is that the withdraw function does not protect users from burning too many shares when the contract controls less assets than the debts.

Impact

Too many shares can be burned that are not expected by users.

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Consider checking for max shares to be burned when calling withdraw. Below is the updated code:

function withdraw(
    uint256 _assets,
    address _receiver,
    address _owner,
+   uint256 _maxSharesOut
) external returns (uint256) {
    uint256 _shares = previewWithdraw(_assets);
+    if (_shares > _maxSharesOut) revert burningSharesExceedsMax();
    _burnAndWithdraw(msg.sender, _receiver, _owner, _shares, _assets);
    return _shares;
}